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INDIAN MUTINY

OF

1857-8.

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KAYE'S AND MALLESON'S HISTORY
OF THE
INDIAN MUTINY
OF
1857-8

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EDITED BY COLONEL MALLESON, C.S.I.

IN SIX VOLUMES

VOL. V.

BY COLONEL MALLESON, C.S.I.

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I INSCRIBE THIS VOLUME TO THE MEMORY OF

THE LATE

SIR HENRY MARION DURAND,
KCSI

A MAN WHO COMBINED A RARE GREATNESS OF SOUL
AND A PERFECT GENIUS FOR AFFAIRS
WITH SIMPLICITY OF MANNERS DIRECTNESS OF PURPOSE
AND A DETESTATION OF ALL THAT IS MEAN AND FALSE.
AS WISE IN COUNSEL

AS HE WAS PROMPT AND DECIDED IN ACTION
HE MET ALL THE STORMS OF LIFE WITH FORTITUDE
RENDERING EVER ALIVE BY HIS ACTION AND HIS EXAMPLE
UNSUPPASSED SERVICES TO HIS COUNTRY

AFTER A SERVICE FULL OF HONOUR, EXTENDING OVER
• FORTY TWO YEARS

HE DIED IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTY
' HE LEFT A REPUTATION WITHOUT SPOT—THE BEST
INHERITANCE HE COULD BEQUEATH TO HIS CHILDREN

PREFACE TO THE FIFTH VOLUME

THE present volume concludes the history of the purely military events of the great Indian uprising of 1857

The question whether that uprising was simply a military mutiny, or a revolt of which that military mutiny constituted the prominent feature, was debated keenly at the time and is to this day as warmly contested. In the concluding chapter of this volume I have endeavoured to throw some light on the dispute, by the simple process of tracing effect to its cause. There is not a line in that chapter which will not bear the most searching analysis. The conclusion I have arrived at is that the uprising of 1857 was not primarily caused by the greased cartridges—that it was neither conceived nor designed by the Sipahis. The mutiny was in reality the offspring of the discontent roused by the high handed measures inaugurated, or at least largely developed, by Lord Dalhousie, and brought to a climax by the annexation of Oudh. The greased cartridge was the opportune instrument skilfully used by a band of conspirators, for the most part men of Oudh, for the purpose of rousing to action the Sipahis, already made disaffected by consecutive breaches of contract and of faith.

Of these acts—of the attempt as I have termed it to disregard the silent growth of ages and to force Western ideas upon an Eastern people, and in the course of that attempt to trample upon prejudices and to disregard obligations—the mutiny was the too certain consequence. It is remarkable that the decisive points of this great uprising were at two places, famous in Indian history, in both of which we had, by force or by the moral power engendered by the possession of force displaced the former rulers. These places were Delhi and Lucknow. At the one we were the besiegers in the other we were besieged.

Dehli and Lakhnao constituted, so to speak the wings of the rebel army. Had the centre, represented by Gwalior, gone with the wings, it had fared badly with us. But, for the reasons I have specially referred to in the concluding chapter, the centre remained sound long enough to enable us to concentrate the bulk of our forces on the two decisive points of the rebel line.

It was after Dehli had fallen and a severe blow had been dealt at Lakhnao that we had to deal with the centre—a centre formidable indeed, but which the loyalty of Sindhiá had deprived of much of its power and prestige. It is with the contest with that centre, carried on by Colonel Durand, Sir Hugh Rose, Sir Robert Napier, Generals Stuart, Roberts, Michel, and Whitlock, Brigadiers Smith, Honner, Parks, Somerset, Colonel Holmes Becher, and many others that the military portion of this volume mainly deals, and I venture to affirm that no part of this history is more remarkable for the display of capacity and daring by the generals, of courage and endurance by the men. It is a page of history which every Englishman will read with pride and satisfaction—with pride because the deeds it records were heroic, with satisfaction because many of the actors survive, ready, when they are called upon to repeat their triumphs in other fields.

But, important and full of interest as are the military records of this volume the political action it relates is certainly not less so. There was not a moment of more consequence to India than that in which Lord Elphinstone had to decide whether he would content himself with saving his own Presidency, or, risking everything, would send every available man to the decisive points in the endeavour to save India. Not for a second did that illustrious man hesitate. It has been to me a task of no ordinary pleasure to demonstrate how the daring and generous conduct of the Governor of Bombay vitally affected the interests of England at the most critical period of the struggle.

Nor have I experienced less gratification in repudiating justice to the character of Lord Canning as that character developed itself when, in the early part of 1858, he stood unshackled at Allahabad. I have entered in the concluding chapter so fully into this point and into others affecting the judgment passed upon his action in the earlier part of his Indian career, that it is unnecessary to allude to the matter further here.

Since the first edition of this volume was published I have received numerous letters from gentlemen who were actors in the several campaigns, and have conversed with many of them. I have enjoyed the opportunity likewise of revisiting India. The result has been that I have been able to render some share of justice to distinguished officers whose deeds were not so fully described as they deserved to be. I may add that I have likewise obtained the fullest information regarding the transactions between the Government of India and the State of Kirwá prior to 1857, and have rewritten that portion of the narrative.

Although I have exerted myself to the utmost to ensure accuracy of detail in all the military operations I am conscious that there are many other gallant deeds the details of which have not reached me, and which are therefore unnoticed. I have found it impossible even in a work so bulky as this to mention every individual who deserved well of his country. When a small body of men attack and defeat a large number of enemies, every man of the attacking party is necessarily a hero. There may be degrees of heroism but it is difficult to distinguish them. "Napoleon feeling this difficulty, announced to his army after one of his great campaigns that it would be sufficient for a soldier to declare that he had belonged to the army which had fought in that campaign, for the world to recognise him as a brave man. That assurance is certainly not less applicable to the soldiers whose gallant deeds are recorded in this volume and on whom the campaigns of Málwa of Central India, of the southern Maratha country, and again of Málwá and Rajputana have fixed the stamp of heroes.

The appendix gives the story of Tántia Topi's career as related by Tántia Topi himself.

I cannot conclude without expressing the deep obligations under which I lie to the many gentlemen who have placed their journals and letters all written at the time, at my disposal. The value of the information I have thus been able to obtain is not to be expressed in words. But especially do I desire to acknowledge the benefit I have received from the services of the gifted friend who read the first edition of this volume in proof sheets and whose frank and judicious criticisms greatly contributed to the clearness and accuracy of the military narrative.

I may add that there is in the press a sixth volume, which, in addition to an analytical index prepared by my friend,

Mr Pincott, will contain a reference, taken in the order of the Governorships, Lieutenant Governorships, and Chief Commissionerships to which they severally belonged, to many of the civil districts throughout India. To this volume has been transferred the narrative of the five civil districts, and the chapter regarding the Indian Navy, which originally appeared in this volume. Although I have taken the greatest pains to ascertain the truth regarding the events in several of these stations, I am conscious that much has been left still to be recorded. In but few cases were journals kept, many of the actors are dead, many are old and indifferent. I trust, however, that it will be found that I have succeeded in unearthing many deeds of daring in rescuing from oblivion more than one reputation, and generally in adding to the interest of the story of the most stupendous event that has occurred in the reign of Queen Victoria.

G. B. MALLESON,

27, West Cromwell Road,
1st July, 1889

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LIST AND SHORT DESCRIPTION OF IMPORTANT
PLACES MENTIONED IN THIS VOLUME, AND NOT
DESCRIBED IN PREVIOUS VOLUMES.

AMJHERA, a Native State in Málwá, within an area of 531 square miles.

ASINDHAN is a fortress in the Nimár district of the Central Provinces, situated on a spur of the Sâtpúra range. It stands at an elevation of 850 feet, and is a place of great strength. It was once taken by Akbar, and twice by the English, to whom it now belongs. It lies 313 miles from Bombay.

AURANGABAD, a city in the Haidarâbâd State, which derives its name from the Emperor Aurangzib, who built here a beautiful mausoleum over the remains of his favourite daughter. It lies 215 miles from Bombay, and 690 from Madras.

BÂLBET, a town in the Gwâlâr State, 40 miles to the north-west of Sîgar.

BANPUR, chief town of district of same name, now in the Allahâbâd division, 95 miles south-west of Allahâbâd, and 190 south-east from Agra.

BÂNGUR, a parganah in the Lâl tîjûr district, Central Provinces, forming the seat of a chief who rebelled in 1857.

BEJALON, the chief town of the district of the same name in the Southern Marathâ country, situated on the northern slopes of the Bellâri watershed, 2500 feet above the sea. It is 318 miles from Bombay.

BURHÂN, a ruinous town in the Gwâlâr State, 64 miles south-west of Ljén, and 330 south-west of Gwâlâr.

BURHÂNPUR, an ancient and famous city in the Nimár district of the Central Provinces, was for a long period the capital of Khândesh, and the chief city of the Dakhni under the Mughal emperors. It lies on the north bank of the Tapi. It was founded by Nasir Khân, of Khândesh, and was called after the renowned Sheikh Burhân'dîn, of Daulatâbâd. It is famous for its quaint porcelain. It is two miles from the Lâlâgh station of the Great India Peninsula Railway.

CHÂNDÉRI, a town and fortress in the Gwâlâr State, described at page 101.

CHARKHÂRI, capital of State of same name in Central India, on the route from Gwâlâr to Pândah, 41 miles south-west of the latter.

DZWÁS a State in the Central Indian Agency, with two chiefs, one called Bárá Sahib, the other Dúrá Sahib. The territories of the former have an area of 1378 square miles, those of the latter, 6197 square miles, yet the Bárá Sahib is the senior of the two.

DHÁS, a State in the Central Indian Agency, with an area of 2500 square miles. Its capital is also called Dhár.

DHARWÁR, capital of district of the same name in the Southern Maráthá country, lies 351 miles from Bombay. Is a great cotton centre.

GORAHÍ, a village in the Gwárár State between Nimrah and Manlesar.

HAIDARÁBAD, described in the text, page 80.

JABALPÚR, capital of district and division of the same name in the North West Provinces. The town is an important centre of trade. It lies 700 miles from Calcutta, 202 from Allahábad, 879 from Madras, and 674 from Bombay.

JALÁUN, a town in the district of the same name in Jhánál territory. The district has an area of 1469 square miles, and comprises the towns, Kalpi, Kunah, Jaláun and Uráí (the capital). The chief rivers in the district are the Jannah, the Betwá, and the Páhúj.

LAUKHÁNDÍ, capital of State of same name in Southern Maráthá country 70 miles north-east of Belgón, 63 east of Kolhapúr, and 162 south east of Puná. The chief maintains a force of 57 horse and 852 foot.

KIRWÍ, a town, formerly capital of a principality in Bundelkhand, 45 miles from Bandah.

KOLÁRÚR, capital of a native State of the same name between the Retnágiri and Belgón districts, distant 128 miles south east from Puná, 64 from Satarah, and 220 from Bombay.

KULÁND, capital of the district of the same name in the Southern Maráthá country, to the north east of Belgón. It lies 314 miles from Bombay,

KRYCH, a town in the Jaláun district, 19 miles west of Uráí, and 42 miles south west of Kalpi.

KURUNDWÁU is the capital of two States of the same name in the Southern Maráthá country, ruled by two branches of the Patwardhan family.

LÁLITPÚR, capital of a district in the Jhánál division, as it now is, of the North West Provinces. The district borders on that of Sagar.

MALTHON, a town in the Sagar district, 40 miles north of Sagar.

MÁLWÁ, the name applied to the western portion of the Central Indian Agency. It is a tableland of uneven surface, rising from 1500 to 2000 feet above the level of the sea, bounded on the west by the Araváti range, on the south by the Vindhjá chain, on the east by Bundelkhand and on the north east by the valley of the Ganges. It comprises the States of Gwárár, Indúr, and Dhár.

MÁLWÁ (WESTERN) is the westernmost tract of Málwá and constitutes a subordinate agency of the Central Indian Agency. It comprises the States Jaurá, Ratlam, Sóláná, and Sitámáú.

MANERAR, a town in Sindh's dominions, on a tributary of the Chinnói, 80 miles from Ujjen, 120 from Indar, and 328 from Bombay.

MEHIDPUR, a town in the Indur State, on the right bank of the Siprá north of Ujén, 432 miles from Bombay. Since 1817, when Sir J. Havelock defeated Mulhar Rao Holkar on the banks of the Siprá, it has been a cantonment for British troops.

MIRÁJ, capital of State of same name in Southern Maráthá country. The chief is a first class Sirdár, with a military force of 597 men.

MUDHÁL, capital of State of same name in Southern Maráthá country, south of the Jámkháol State. The chief maintains a military force of 700 men.

NÁGOL, town in the Uchahárá district, Central Indian Agency, on the direct route by Rewah from Fígar to Allahábád, is 48 miles from the first, 43 from the second, 180 from the third and 110 from Jabalpur.

NARGUND, town in the Dhárárá district, 22 miles north-east of Dhárárá. The chief lost his possessions in consequence of his conduct in 1857, related in this volume.

NARSINHPUK, a district in the Narbada division of the Central Provinces, with an area of 1916 square miles. Its capital, also called Narsinhpur is on the River Singrí, a tributary of the Narbada. It lies 60 miles to the west of Fígar.

PÉCH, a village in the Jhánú district, on the road from Kápi to Gárah, 55 miles south west of the former, and 150 north-east of the latter.

PÉCH, the ancient Maráthá capital, is situated near the confluence of the Mutá and Mulá, in a plain 2000 feet above the sea. It is 90 miles from Bombay. Adjoining it is the artillery cantonment, Karkí, where Colonel Burr, in 1817, defeated the Peshwa's army.

RÁHARGARH, a fortified town is a tract of the same name in the Sagar district 25 miles to the west of the town of Sagar.

RAIRÁR, capital of the district of the same name in the Central Provinces, 177 miles to the east of Nagpur, by the road from that place to Calcutta.

REWAH, native State in Bundelkhand, having a capital of the same name. It is bounded to the north by the Bhojpur, Allahábád, and Mirzápur districts, to the east by part of the Mirzápur district and the territories of Chutá Nagpur, on the south by the Chhátgarh, Jabalpur, and Mandlá districts, on the west by Maikur, Nágol, and the Kothí States. It has an area of 13000 square miles. The position of the town is described in the text.

SÁGAR, capital of the district of the same name, situated on an elevated position 1910 feet above the sea, on the north west borders of a fine lake nearly a mile broad, whence it derives its name (*Ságar*, *Aglicé* the Sea). It lies 90 miles north west of Jabalpur, 18 miles north of Nagpur, 913 miles south west of Allahábád, 221 miles north-east of Indur, and 602 from Bombay.

SANGLI, capital of the State of the same name in Southern Maráthá country, the chief of which is a Sirdár of the first class, with a military force of 822 men. It is situated on the River Káshiká, to the north-east of Kholápur.

SATÁRAH, capital of the district of the same name, lies 56 miles south of Pune, at the junction of the Krishna and the Yena. It is 163 miles from Bombay.

SAYÁNUR, capital of State of same name in the Dbarwar district, lies 39 miles south by east of Dhárwár. The Nawáb is of Afghan descent.

SHÁNGARH, town in Sagar district, Central Provinces, 40 miles north east of the town of Sagar.

SHIOR, a town in the Bhopál State, Central India, situate on the right bank of the Saven on the road from Sagar to Ásirgarh, 132 miles south west from the former, and 152 north east from the latter, 22 miles from Bhopál, and 470 from Bombay.

TAL-BAHAT, chief town of parganah of same name in Lálitpúr district, Central Provinces, stands on a hill, 26 miles north of the town of Lálitpur.

TEHRU, capital of the Tehri or Uchhal estate, to the east of Lálitpúr. It is 72 miles north west of Sagar. The Rájah is looked upon as the head of the Bundélas.

UJJÉV, a very important town—more so formerly than now—on the Sipsá, in the Gwáliar State. The modern town is six miles in circumference and surrounded by groves and gardens. The old town lies about a mile to the north of the new town. It is 1693 feet above the sea. It is 40 miles from Indur.

ÚCHUAN, ancient capital of State of the same name, also called Tehri, in Bundelkhand. The State is bounded on the west by the Jhansi and Lálitpúr districts, on the south by the Lálitpúr district and Bujáwar, on the east by Bujáwar, Charkhári, and Garáuli. The town is on the Betwa.

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HISTORY OF THE INDIAN MUTINY.

BOOK XIII.—BOMBAY, CENTRAL INDIA, AND THE DAKHAN.

[1857]

CHAPTER I.

LORD ELPHINSTONE, MR. SUTTON WARR, AND MR. FORBETT

THE western, or Bombay, Presidency of India comprises a long, narrow strip of country of varying breadth and irregular outline. Including the province of Sindh, the administration of which is subordinate to it it occupies the western coast of the peninsula from the mouth of the Indus to the northernmost point of Goa and from the south of that territory to the borders of Mysur. It is thus bounded on the west by Baluchistan and the Arabian Sea, on the south by Mysur, on the east by the Madras Presidency, Malharabad, Barar, the central provinces, the states forming the Central Indian agency, and Rajpootana, on the north by Bhawalpur, the Panjab, and Baluchistan. The area of the British portions of the Presidency is one hundred and thirty-four thousand one hundred and thirty-five square miles, supporting fourteen millions of inhabitants, but, in subordinate political relations to it there are, or rather there were in 1857, native states comprising seventy-one thousand three hundred and twenty square miles with six millions of inhabitants. The principal of these were Berar, Kathiawar, Kachin, Kambhat, Mahikanta, Rewakant, Kohlapur, Sawantwar, and Khairpur.

1857
May
The Bombay
Presidency

Its area and
population

The native
states con-
tained in it.

In 1837 Lord Elphinstone was Governor of Bombay. A man of culture and ability Lord Elphinstone had enjoyed more experience of India than generally falls to the lot of governors unconnected with the civil or military services. He had been Governor of Madras from 1837 to 1842, and, although the records of the Madras Presidency throughout his incumbency had marked no stirring events within its borders yet the first Afghan war, with its early success and its later collapse, had excited the minds of the natives throughout the country, and had called for the exercise of tact and judgment on the part of the rulers. These qualities Lord Elphinstone was eminently qualified to display, and he had displayed them. He was called, however to deal principally with administrative details. The manner in which he performed these duties gained for him the confidence of the natives. His measures for improving the resources of the country, and for establishing means of communication in all directions, are spoken of to this day.

Lord Elphinstone revisited India at the time of the first Sikh war, 1845-6, and marched in company with the 14th Light Dragoons then commanded by the late Colonel William Havelock, who had been his military secretary, from Bombay, through central India, to the head-quarters of the British army before Lahore. On the transfer of Kashmir to Gulab Singh, a proceeding following the treaty of 1846 with the Sikhs, Lord Elphinstone formed one of the party which first visited that famous valley. After a residence in it of nearly three months he set out for Ladakh by the Hunza valley, and endeavoured to proceed thence up the Gilgit valley—in those days an utterly unknown country. Forced, perhaps fortunately, by the objections of the authorities, to renounce this expedition, Lord Elphinstone crossed the Harpo pass to Rundu on the Indus, being the first Englishman by whom that journey had been attempted.

It will be seen, then, that when in 1853 Lord Elphinstone was called to the post of Governor of Bombay, he brought to that office experience such as few men, not trained in the Indian services could command. His knowledge of men his courtesy, his genial bearing gave effect to that experience. Up to the outbreak of the mutiny in 1857 his conduct as Governor of Bombay was

Lord Elphinstone.

His previous career.

His travels in India.

His equal fitness for his post.

invariably marked by temper, judgment, and discretion. Calm and dignified in manner, courteous to his colleagues and to all with whom he was brought in contact he evinced, on every occasion likely to test his action, the possession of a guiding mind, of a will not to be shaken, a resolution that went direct to its aim. The crisis of 1857 was just one of those occurrences which Lord Elphinstone was constitutionally fitted to cope with. He at once realised its difficulty and its danger, and rose equal to encounter the one and to neutralise the other. In the words of a contemporary writer generally unfavourable to him, he displayed "the courage of the soldier who knows his enemy" *.

Well fitted to encounter the crisis of the mutiny

The truth of this judgment was proved by the action taken by Lord Elphinstone when the news reached him of the outbreak of the 10th of May at Mirath. Lord Elphinstone was at Bombay when he heard of that event. It happened that General Ashburnham, commanding the expeditionary corps on its way to China, was staying with him. So greatly did the importance of the intelligence impress the Governor, so certain did he feel that the Mirath revolt would spread, and that it should be met at once by bringing large reinforcements of European troops without delay into the country, that he urged General Ashburnham to proceed immediately to Calcutta, and to offer his services, and the services of the China expeditionary force, to the Governor General.

Lord Elphinstone's action on hearing of the mutiny at Mirath.

with reference to General Ashburnham

It was a fortunate circumstance that the war with Persia had just been brought to a successful conclusion. Fortunate, likewise, that the disaffection had not spread to the native army of Bombay. Lord Elphinstone thus felt himself equal to the most decisive measures. He at once authorised the Commissioner of Sindh, Mr Frere, to transfer the 1st Bombay Fusiliers from Karachi to the Panjab. He arranged that the 64th and 78th regiments, then on their way from Persia, should proceed forthwith, without landing at Bombay, to Calcutta. The more speedily to carry out this object, he caused vessels to be equipped and prepared for the reception of these regiments, so that on the arrival in the Bombay harbour of the transports

to Mr Frere

regarding the regiments on their way from Persia

* The Incident of 1857.

which were conveying them from Bushir they might be transhipped without loss of time. This measure was duly and effectively carried out. The men moved from the one transport into the other, and reached Calcutta in time materially to influence the campaign. But Lord Elphinstone did more.

regarding the
Mauritius
Artil-
lery to Bom-
bay

He despatched on the instant to Calcutta a company of Madras artillery which happened to be on the spot taking the duty of the Bombay

artillery, then absent in Persia. He at the same time sent instructions to the officer commanding at Disa to hold the 83rd regiment and a troop of horse artillery at that station in readiness to march on Ajmir, on the sole condition that,

He pre-
serves
as let Raj
island

in the opinion of the local authorities, the departure of the only European troops in the vicinity of Ahmadabad and Gujrat might be hazarded without the absolute certainty of an outbreak. And, still penetrated by the necessity to concentrate on the scene of the mutiny as many European troops as could be collected, Lord Elphinstone chartered, on his own responsibility two steamers belonging to the

Penninsular and Oriental Company, the *Pottinger* and the *Madras*, provided them with all necessary stores, and despatched them, under the command of Captain Griffith Jenkins of the Indian navy, to the

and sent to
the Mauritius
and the Cape
for reinfor-
ment

Mauritius and the Cape, with letters to the Governors of those settlements, dwelling upon the importance of the crisis, and begging them to despatch to India any troops they could spare.

I may here state that the result of these applications was such as might have been anticipated from the characters of the men to whom they were addressed.

Result of his
applications
to the Mauritius
thus

The Governor of the Mauritius Sir James Higginson, embarked on board the *Pottinger* the head quarters

and as many men of the 83rd as that steamer could carry. Not content with that, he took an early opportunity to charter and despatch another transport to convey the remainder of that regiment, a battery of artillery, and as much money as could be spared from the treasury of the island.

and to the
Cape

Nor was the Governor of the Cape, Sir George Grey, animated by sentiments less patriotic. It fortunately happened that an unusually large force of British regiments was at the moment, concentrated at Capo

town. Sir George despatched, without delay, as many of them

cult to over estimate the importance thus gained, solely by the exercise of timely foresight

A rather serious breach of the law at Bhatoch in the month of May originating in a dispute between the Parsis and the Muhammadans, might have led to important consequences but for the firmness with which it was met in the first instance, by the officer commanding on the spot, and in the next by the Governor. The spirit of Lord Elphinstone's action may be judged from the fact that, to prevent the spread of the riot, he despatched a hundred and fifty men of the 86th to Surat—a movement of troops which left only three hundred and fifty European troops of all arms in Bombay itself.

The riot at Bhatoch was for a time, the only indication of ill feeling manifested in the western Presidency, and it was entirely unconnected with the great revolt then raging in the north west. Lord Elphinstone, whilst carefully repressing it, did not abate a single effort to carry out the policy which he was convinced was the only sound policy—the policy of offensive defence. Almost from the very first he had designed to form, at a convenient point within the Presidency, a column to secure and hold the great line of road between Bombay and Agra. Not only would the line thus secured form a base for ulterior operations, but a great moral advantage would be gained by its tenure. In the crisis which then afflicted India, it was not to be thought that any portion of the empire would stand still. The attitude of folded arms was an attitude to invite danger. To check the approach of evil, the surest mode was to go forth and meet it. A column marching towards the north west would encounter the elements which, having brewed there disturbance, were eager to spread it, and, encountering, would annihilate them. The presence of such a column, marching confidently to the front, would, moreover, go far to check, perhaps even to suppress, any disloyal feelings which might have been engendered in the minds of the native princes who state bordered on this line of communication. For these reasons then, at a very early period of the crisis Lord Elphinstone proposed in council, and ordered, the formation of a column, under the

Lord Elphinstone notes a breach of law in Bhatoch

He designs a policy of offensive defence

to hold the line between Bombay and Agra

and by advancing to meet the evil coming from outside to prevent it entering within

perhaps even to

With this view forms a column under General Woodburn

command of Major General Woodburn, to open out communications with central India and the North West Provinces.

The column formed in consequence, under the command of Major General Woodburn, was but small in numbers. It consisted only of five troops of the 14th Light Dragoons, the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, Captain Woolcombe's horse battery of artillery, and a pontoon train. It set out from Puna on the 8th of June, under orders to march with all speed to Máu, with the view to save that place while there was yet time, and to prevent the spread of the insurrection in Malwá, and along the northern frontier of the Bombay Presidency.*

Composition
of the
column.

June
It is ordered
to march to
Máu.

The state of affairs at Máu and at Indur was such as to demand the most prompt action on the part of General Woodburn. It was just possible that, making forced marches, he might approach so near to Indur as to baffle the plans of the discontented. The dread that he might do so for a long time paralysed their action†. Circumstances, however, occurred which baffled the hopes expressed by Lord Elinstone, when, acting on his own sound judgment, he pressed upon the military authorities the necessity for General Woodburn to advance.

Possibilities
before
General
Woodburn.

The city of Aurangábád—once the capital of the kingdom of Ahmadnagar, and, at a later period, the favourite residence of the Emperor Aurangzib—occupies a prominent and important position in the north-western corner of the dominions of the Nizám. The corner of which it was the capital juts like a promontory into British territory. To the east and north-east it touches western Barar and the central provinces, to the south, the west, and the north-west, the northern portions of the Bombay Presidency. Beyond the northernmost part of that Presidency, and within easy distance of Aurangábád lies Malwá.

Aurangábád.

Disaffection was known to reign in Malwá and it was of the highest consequence that that disaffection should not spread southward to Bombay. But at Aurangábád the capital of the small promontory I have described, almost touching Malwá on one side and running into Bombay on the other three sides,

* Lord Elinstone's letter to General Woodburn

† *Ibid.* Vol. III. page 137

were quartered the 1st and 3d Cavalry, the 2nd Infantry, and a battery of artillery, of the Haidarabad Contingent. These regiments commanded by British officers were composed chiefly of Muhammadans, and one of them—the 1st Cavalry—had, in the early part of June, displayed symptoms of disaffection.

Garison of
Aurangabad

Aurangabad is distant from Puna a hundred and thirty eight miles, from Ahmadnagar, about midway between the two, sixty eight miles. In the ordinary course of events, General Woodburn, armed with positive instructions to push on with all speed to Mau, would not have entered the dominions of the

Disaffection
of the
garrison.

Nizam. It happened, however, that the authors of the disaffection I have spoken of as prevailing at Aurangabad proceeded on the 13th of June to more open demonstrations, and in consequence General Woodburn received not from Lord Elphinstone instructions to deviate from the line urged upon him by that nobleman, and to march upon Aurangabad.

In explanation of the open demonstrations at Aurangabad, I

Reasons of
the disaffec-
tion

may state that a rumour had reached that place that the cavalry regiment stationed there would be required to join General Woodburn's column and march with him on Dehli. The rumour was founded upon truth for it had been intended that the regiment in question should join General Woodburn's force. But to the minds of soldiers who were not British subjects, who lived under the rule of the descendant of a viceroy appointed by the Mughul the idea of fighting against the king of Dehli was peculiarly distasteful*. They showed their dislike on the moment. On the 13th of June the men of the 1st Cavalry openly expressed their dissatisfaction, and—it was stated at the time—swore to murder their officers if pressure to march against Dehli were put upon them. Fortunately the commanding

Judicious
conduct of
Captain
Abbott

officer, Captain Abbott, was a sensible man. He summoned the native officers to his quarters, and discussed the question with them. The native officers declared that, for their own part they were ready to obey any lawful order, but they admitted that their men would not fight against the mutineers. Captain Abbott

* The splendid manner in which the Haidarabad cavalry atoned for this momentary disaffection is likewise recorded in subsequent pages.

then, after communicating with the Resident, resolved to adopt a conciliatory course. He gave the men assurances that they would not be required to march on Dehli. In this way order was restored. So little confidence, however, in the stability of the compromise was felt on both sides that the officers proceeded to barricade themselves in their mess house whilst the mutinous cavalry hoisted over their mural victory in every quarter of the city.

Order is restored but not confidence

Matters were in this state when, on the morning of the 23rd of June, General Woodburn's column entered Aurangabád, marched at once to the ground occupied by the mutineers, and ordered the men to give up their arms. With the exception of one troop of the 1st Cavalry, all obeyed. The general gave the men of that troop six minutes to consider the course they would pursue. When the time elapsed, the men, instead of submitting, put on a bold front and attempted to ride away. In this attempt most of them succeeded. The next morning some three or four, convicted of attempts at assassination, were hanged, and order was restored.

Woodburn enters Aurangabád and disperses the mutineers.

General Woodburn was under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Henry Somerset. In the opinion of Lord Elphinstone, the danger at Aurangabád had not been so pressing as to necessitate the deviation of the field force from the direct road to Mau. He thought that, in the presence of two dangers that which would result from the mutiny coming down to Bombay from central India and Malwá was greater even than the disaffection of a portion of the troops of the Nizam. Forced, however, to accept General Woodburn's action at Aurangabád, he lost not a moment in urging him to press on towards Mau. "I am persuaded," he wrote to that officer on the 22nd of June, "that the local officers greatly exaggerate the danger of a rising in our own provinces. I have no fear of anything of the sort, and, if it should happen I trust that we should be able to put it down speedily. But I feel confident that it will not happen—at all events for the present. If you allow the insurrection to come down to our borders without attempting to check it, we shall almost deserve our fate, but if by a rapid advance you are able to secure Mau you will also, in all probability, save Mehlipur, Sagar, Hoshangabád," &c. Lord Elphinstone

Lord Elphinstone urges Woodburn to press on to Mau

followed up these noble words, displaying the true conception he had formed of the situation, by a letter addressed, the same day, to Sir Henry Somerset "I am very much obliged to you," he wrote, "for the perusal of General Woodburn's letter. I conclude that since it was written he has received his orders to continue his march to Mau with all possible expedition."

But General Woodburn did not move forward. In reply to the letter I have just quoted, he wrote on the 25th, to Lord Elphinstone, urging the various reasons which, he thought, would necessitate a long stay at Aurangabad. These reasons might, in the presence of the greater danger at Mau, be justly termed trivial. They consisted in the possibility of a fresh outbreak after his departure, and in the necessity of trying some sixty-four prisoners by court-martial.

Lord Elphinstone answered the objections to advance urged by the general in a very decided manner. "I wish you to remember," he wrote to him on the 27th of June, "that it was for the object of relieving Mau, and not for the purpose of chastising a mutinous regiment at Aurangabad, that the field force was formed. The latter is an incidental duty, which it was hoped would not interfere with the main object. I am perfectly aware that in these times, circumstances may occur to divert your force from its original destination, but I do not think they have yet occurred." He then proceeded in a few forcible words to urge the folly of wasting unnecessary time upon trials,* and the necessity of disarming regiments which might show disaffection, instead of delaying a movement of the first importance from a fear that a revolt might take place after the departure of the British troops.

This letter, I have said, was despatched to General Woodburn on the 27th of June. On the morning of the 28th Lord Elphinstone received a despatch from Calcutta, instructing him to send to Calcutta by sea the wing of the 12th Lancers then stationed at Puná. This diminution of his available European strength, already extremely small, following immediately upon the departure

* "To allow twenty days for the trial of sixty-four prisoners is out of the question in these times."

from the Presidency of General Woodburn's force, and accompanied by reports received from many district officers to the effect that rebellion was only watching its opportunity, so affected Lord Elphinstone, that for a moment he felt inclined to authorise General Woodburn to halt at Aurangabad. Indeed, on the spur of the moment he wrote that officer a letter, expressive of his deep regret and disappointment at having to request him to give up a measure which he believed to be of great importance. But the night dissipated his anxiety. In the morning he had resolved to dare all, to risk all, for the supreme advantage of saving central India. On the 29th, then, he wrote again to General Woodburn, cancelling that portion of his previous letter which had given him authority to defer the projected movement.

It is order
for a moment
causes Lord
Elphinstone
to waver

But only for
a moment

But before this letter could reach General Woodburn that officer had become incapacitated for command by ill health. The Government promptly replaced him by Colonel C. S. Stuart, of the Bombay Army, then commanding the 3rd Regiment Native Infantry. Pending the arrival of that officer, the command of the field force devolved upon Major Follett, 25th Regiment Native Infantry.

Woodburn
is ill and
is replaced
by Major
Follett.

Major Follett had a grand opportunity before him only to move forward. Unfortunately, he wrote to the Commander in Chief a letter in which he dwelt upon the impossibility of leaving Aurangabad in the then condition of the Nizam's regiments. More unfortunately still, Major Follett's representations were strongly supported by the head of the army.

He had

Follett labors
Woodburn's
views

Lord Elphinstone's reason and instincts still told him that the further delay thus proposed was the delay of red tape—the natural consequence of the absence of a clear mind and a firm will. But he was in a very difficult position. He was not a soldier.

Difficulty of
Lord Elphinstone's
position

And although he would unhesitatingly have regarded the scruples of Major Follett, unsupported by higher authority, he could not treat with contempt the weighty support given to those scruples by the officer who was Commander in Chief of the armies serving in India. Unwillingly, then, and solely in deference to the strong opinion expressed by Sir Henry Somerset, Lord Elphinstone consented to the delay.

A few days proved how true had been his judgment. On the 7th of July, Major Follett convinced himself and the chief who supported him of a hasty and premature decision. On the 7th of July that officer wrote to Lord Elphinstone * declared that it was perfectly feasible to leave Aurangabad, and announced his intention to march for Man on the 10th, leaving a troop of cavalry and two guns for the protection of the Aurangabad cantonment.

Lord Elphinstone promptly requested Sir Henry Somerset to confirm this change of feeling by cancelling his previous orders. This was, in effect, carried out.

The force led by Colonel C S Stuart of the Bombay army, who joined it on the 8th, quitted Aurangabad on the 12th too late to prevent the mutinies at Mau and Indur, but not too late, under the guidance of Colonel Durand, who joined it at Asurgarh, to restore British authority in central India. To the further movements of this column I shall return in a subsequent chapter. Its march beyond the Bombay frontier was due solely to Lord Elphinstone †. Had he been unfettered, and had its first commander been a man after his own heart, it

* It is probable that Major Follett's change of opinion was due to the receipt of a despatch from Colonel Durand addressed to Mr Plowden, and sent through the officer commanding at Aurangabad. This letter contained convincing proofs of the necessity of promptly advancing.

† "I quite agree with you" wrote Lord Elphinstone to Colonel Durand the 27th of July, "in regretting the delay which took place in the advance of the force. You cannot have written more strongly than I have upon the subject, but there was a strong counter prejudice on the part of the officers on the spot, every one of whom declared that the departure of the column from Aurangabad would be the signal of a general rising. I from the first recommended that the mutinous troops should be disarmed and dismounted. But this was considered inexpedient. It was represented that it was not so much the troops but the whole population was against us. Mr —, the Deputy Commissioner in North Barar, who is reckoned a very good officer, said that there were, I am afraid, to say how many, armed Musalmans in his district, who would rise the moment the column was ordered to move. Colonel —, who commands the Madras cavalry regiment at —, said it was utterly impossible to send half his regiment over to Aurangabad, as the people in that neighbourhood would attack the station." It is immensely to the credit of Lord Elphinstone that, in spite of these and many similar reports from district officers and of the opposition referred to in the text he should have persevered in urging the forward movement. He was in fact, one of the few men in high position in India who realised how the mutiny should be met.

would have taken place in time to prevent much evil in central India.

But the despatch of Colonel Stuart's column to central India was not the only aid proffered by the Bombay Presidency for the suppression of the mutiny. I have already alluded to the splendid self-abnegation by which the province of Sindh was denuded for the benefit of the Panjáb. Again, the western Presidency was prompt to comply with the indent made upon it by Colonel G. St. P. Lawrence, the Governor-General's agent in Rajputána*. The greater part of the garrison of Dacca consisting of a troop of horse artillery, one regiment and one squadron of native light cavalry, a detachment (four hundred men) of the 83rd, and a detachment of the 12th Native Infantry, was formed into a movable column and placed at the disposal of George Lawrence, just then nominated Brigadier-General in Rajputána. Lord Elphinstone was prompt to confirm this arrangement—an arrangement which gave General Lawrence a power, exercised with remarkable ability and judgment, to maintain order in a country ruled over by the great Rajput chiefs†. Further, on the 23rd of July four companies of the 86th Regiment were sent from Malgaon to join Colonel Stuart's column on its way to Mau. Marching direct by the Bombay road, they did not join till after that column had arrived at Min.

Lord Elphinstone places a column at the disposal of Colo. Lawrence.

Whilst Lord Elphinstone was thus actively employing a policy of aggressive defence alike to keep the evil from his own borders and to crush it in the provinces beyond them, the spirit which had worked so much mischief in the north-west suddenly raised its head on his very hearth. The first symptoms of mutiny in the Bombay Presidency broke out shortly after the march of the columns whose movements I have just recorded.

First symptoms of mutiny in the Bombay Presidency.

The southern Maratha country, comprises the territory between Satarah and the Madras Presidency to the north and south and between the Nizam's dominions and the western ghats to the east and west. It has an area of fourteen thousand square miles and a population of about three millions for the most part of pure Maratha blood. Within this country are the two


The southern Maratha country.

its area

collectorates Belgaon and Dharwar, the native state Kolhapur and numerous small semi independent states each with an annual revenue rising up to but in no case exceeding, fifty thousand pounds. In 1857 the principal of these were Singh, Miraj, Savanúr, Kurandwar, Jamkhandi, Nargund, and Mudhol.

Of this important country the Collector and Magistrate of Belgaon, Mr George Berkeley Seton Kair, had political charge. Mr Seton Kair possessed remarkable natural abilities and these had been developed by an education which had continued up to the date of which I am writing. He was a firm advocate for the rights of native princes for continuing to them the power to adopt, for interfering as little as possible with their customs which however little understood by Europeans were harmless in themselves and which were hallowed by the practice of ages. He was one of those men who whilst possessed of a firm and decided character, yet preferred to try to their fullest extent the arts of persuasion before having recourse to intimidation or violence.

The internal condition of the southern Marátha country when Mr Seton Kair assumed charge of it in May 1856 just twelve months prior to the revolt, was one of brooding discontent. The annexation by the Government of India of Barár and of Oudh had been in the one case followed in the other preceded, by an Act known as Act XI of 1852 under the operation of which an Inam Commission was empowered to call up on all landed proprietors to produce the title-deeds of their estates. A new tribunal had, under this Act, been invested with arbitrary jurisdiction over this vast mass of property. The holders of estates careless and improvident, unacquainted with law, and accustomed to consider that thirty years' possession conferred an irrefragable title, had failed in many instances to preserve the most valuable muniments of their estates. In some cases indeed no muniments had ever existed. Chiefs who, in the anarchy which prevailed in India subsequent to the death of Aurangzib had won their estates by the sword, had not been careful to fence them in with a paper barrier—in that age utterly valueless—but they had transmitted to their descendants the arms and the retainers who had constituted their right to possession, and with whose



aid they had learned to consider mere titles superfluous, as without it they were contemptible. In other cases, men who had acquired land in the general scramble which preceded the downfall of the Peshwá's Government, had transmitted their acquisitions to their children, fortified by no better titles than entries in the village account-books. To both these classes the Inám Commission had been a commission simply of confiscation. In the southern Maráthi country the titles of thirty-five thousand estates, large and small, had been called for by the new tribunal. In twenty-one thousand cases that tribunal had pronounced sentences of confiscation. Thousands of other landowners, still unevicted, looked on in dismay, tremblingly awaiting the sentence which was to add their wail of distress and resentment to that of their impoverished neighbours.* Can it be wondered at, then, that Mr Seton-Karr, when he assumed charge under these circumstances in May 1856, found the native landowners of the Southern Maráthi country in a state of moody discontent, which was prevented from bursting into open disaffection only by a sense of the utter hopelessness of success?

The manner in which that commission affected many of the chiefs and land-owners.

The result.

But another cause increased, even intensified, the discontent, and, by its connection with the religious feelings of all classes, added greatly to the danger of the situation. Of all the rights devolving upon a Hindu landowner, the right to adopt is at once the most cherished and

The right of adoption.

* In writing thus of the feelings of the actual landowners, I am far from desiring to say a single word against the inquiries instituted by the Inám Commission. I wish to record only the discontent of the men who actually possessed the land when the inquiry was ordered. I admit not only that the Government was perfectly justified in ordering that inquiry, but that it was demanded by thousands who had been violently and, in some cases, fraudulently dispossessed of their hereditary acres during the period antecedent to the fall of the Peshwá. The Inám Commission rendered substantial justice to these men. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that forty years had elapsed since the dominions of the Peshwá had been brought under British sway, and that during those years, and, in many cases, during many antecedent years, the landowners who felt aggrieved by the action of the Inám Commission had enjoyed and transmitted to their children the estates which their fathers had gained. The long possession gave them in their eyes a better right than any which could be urged by the descendants of the men who had been dispossessed. No wonder, then, from their point of view, the Inám Commission was an instrument of tyranny.

the most sacred. It is an observance enjoined upon him by his religion. Should he fail to beget a child, he is bound to provide for himself an heir by adoption. On the child so adopted he bestows all the care and the affection ordinarily lavished on the offspring of love. Taught by his religion to believe that his own happiness in the other world depends upon the transmission to the adopted son of the inheritance of his fathers, he is ever careful to instil into his mind that he actually is of the family, and will be, after his death, the representative of its traditions and its honours. The idea that he might die heirless is to the Hindu landowner not blessed with offspring an over-present canker worm. It is sufficient to make him moody, desponding, miserable. The prohibition to find for himself such an heir might even make him reckless.

a religious
rite necessary
for the
Hindu

The policy
of Lord Dal
housie

its action

denies the
exercise of
this rite to
many Indian
land chiefs

But the Anglo Indian Government had, in many instances, pronounced such a prohibition. The policy of absorption adopted by Lord Dalhousie had shown no respect for the principle of adoption. Under its action large states had been absorbed, and the power to adopt had been denied to lesser landowners. This refusal had been extended to the landowners of the southern Maratha country—amongst others, to the important chief of Nargund. The prohibition produced consternation. The effeminate early training of the Hindu upper classes often rendered it absolutely necessary to employ the rite of adoption to prevent the extinction of a family. The custom had been hallowed by time. The prohibition of it by a paramount power, alien in race and faith, could be attributed only to greed for the land. When, then, the prohibition was extended, and the landowners saw family after family disappear, a great fear fell upon them. They felt, one and all, that their turn would come, that their names, too, would perish, that none would succeed to commemorate their deeds and the deeds of their ancestors, and to appease their *manes* by yearly celebrations. In the common despair old feuds were laid aside, hereditary enmity was forgotten. A common dread produced a common sympathy, and the indignation or alarm of each was supported and increased by the sense that it was shared by all. For the moment, indeed, the aggrieved landowners had no thought to combine against the British Government. But

Effect pro-
duced by this
refusal

though tranquillity prevailed, it was not the tranquillity which is based upon contentment. The landowners were tranquil simply because successful revolt seemed impossible. The British authority seemed too firmly fixed to be easily shaken. But, were it to be shaken, it was always possible, considering the intense and widespread discontent of the landowners that their helplessness might become the anarchy of despair.

Such was the state of the southern Maratha country when, in May, 1856, Mr Seton Karr assumed charge of it. But a few weeks elapsed before his experienced mind had mastered the causes of the discontent which he found everywhere prevailing. It was difficult, even for a man who condemned the policy of the Government and who sympathised with the native landowners, to allay it. He found, in fact, that in almost every instance the landowners had been grievously wronged. The influential chief of Nargund had been denied the rights of adoption in terms which—owing to the faultiness of the translation of the original English—added insult to injury. Other landowners of ancient lineage, and possessing weight in the country, were found by Mr Seton Karr estranged from their loyalty by the causes to which I have adverted—the Inam Commission and the withholding of the right of adoption—and plunged in moody mistrust of the Government. It was not in the power of Mr Seton Karr to carry out the only act which would have restored confidence—to moderate the action of the Inam Commission and to restore the right of adoption. Nor, conciliatory and sympathising as he was, was he more able to reconcile the native chiefs and landowners to the new order which had to them all the effects of a revolution. But all that an earnest and high minded man could do he did. He visited every landowner. Their individual characters he carefully studied. To their complaints he listened with patience. He met them generally with such explanations of the policy of the Government as might remove misapprehension as to its general intention whilst in cases of individual hardship—which he was powerless to remedy—he endeavoured to soothe the sense of hardness and injustice by kindly expressions of sympathy. In this way he won their confidence. He made the landowners

State of the
most
Marathas
country in
May, 1856

Mr Seton-
Karr's
powers in re-
spect of the
grantees
restricted,

revolution

but he uses
all his in-
fluence to
soothe the
discontented.

He wins the
confidence of
the land
owners

feel that in the highest official in the province they had a real friend. More it was impossible for him to effect. Regard for the individual in no way obliterated resentment at the action of the Government. A sense of deep injury still continued to rankle in each breast.

Such was the state of affairs when, on the 21st of May, 1857, the news of the mutiny at Mirath and Dohli reached Belgáon. The effect of this news, and of the worse tidings which continued to follow, upon the peoples of the southern Marathá country, was electric. The Muhammadans were at once aroused to an intense pitch of excitement. The Hindus, on the other

hand were far more reticent, and for some time concealed their inner feelings by an impassive exterior. British authority seemed so firmly rooted in the country that they hesitated to believe that it could be suddenly destroyed.

Mr Seton Karr was fully alive to the dangers of the crisis.

The means at Mr Seton Karr's disposal were inadequate. The force at Belgáon consisted of one regiment of native infantry, the 29th, a weak battery of European artillery, and the depot of the 64th Foot composed of about thirty men fit for duty, guarding upwards of four hundred women and children be-

longing to that regiment. Exclusive of the artillery, not more than a hundred Europeans fit to carry arms could be mustered in the place, whilst between Belgáon and Pána and Sholapur there were more than two thousand native, and only a hundred and twenty European, soldiers. The defences of Belgáon consisted of a fort nearly a mile in circumference, the ramparts of which, unrepaired for years, presented breaches in several places. In a military point of view the place was, in fact, untenable, but it had, nevertheless, to be regarded as the sole refuge for the European non-combatants, consisting of some five hundred including children. Belgáon was the

General
Lester

head quarters of the southern division of the army, and Major General Lester had arrived there on the

11th of May to assume that command. Mr Seton Karr at once placed himself in communication with that officer, and, under his direction, such improvements as in so brief a time were practicable were made to the defences.

An embassy
arrives from
the north
west.

During the week or two following, the unusual exaltation of the Muhammadans alone gave evidence of the effect produced by the bad news from

the north west. But in the early part of June Mr Seton Karr discovered that an emissary from that part of India had arrived some days before, and that he had been in daily communication with the Muhammadan leaders. Prompt to act in the presence of real danger, as he was slow to use violence when the end could be accomplished by peaceable means, Mr Seton Karr caused this intruder to be arrested and confined. He did not act one minute too soon. The Sipáhis, many of them natives of Oudh, had for some days previous displayed an unaccustomed insolence. It had become hourly more and more evident that they sympathised with the action of their brethren in the north, and that they would grasp at an opportunity to follow their example. In the proportion in which their insolence displayed itself did the peril of Mr Seton Karr's position increase. It was still further augmented by the action of Nana Sâhib at Kanhpur towards the end of June. To understand this it is requisite only to remember that Nana Sâhib claimed to be, and in the eyes of his countrymen actually was, the adopted heir of the last of the Peshwâs, and that some of the most important estates in the southern Marâtha country—the estates of Sangli, of Jamkhândi, of Miraj, and of Kurandwar—were held by branches of the great Patwardhan family, the most illustrious of the dependants of the Peshwa. The fact that Nana Sâhib was married to the first cousin of the chief of Sangli, that his most active lieutenant was that chief's uncle, and that the chief himself on the verge of his majority, had evinced a taste for low and intriguing associates, did not certainly lessen the danger of the position.

He is
arrested.

Relationship
of many of
the southern
Marâthi
chiefs to
Nana Sâhib.

There were other chiefs whose discontent was hardly less formidable. Prominent amongst these were the Desai of Nipani, a small fortress built on the model of Bharatpur, forty five miles from Belgaon—a chieftain who had lost a large portion of his estates under the operation of the Inâm Commission, who was known to be disaffected, and whose disaffection would cut off communications with Bombay, the Desai of Jamboti—a chieftain whose family, settled for many generations amongst the forests which stretch onwards from the Ghats, had come to be regarded as the natural lords of the wild population of the jungles, and who, in his own person,

The discon-
tent of the
chiefs of
Nipani

of Jamboti

had been reduced to penury by the action of the same arbitrary tribunal. The temper of this chieftain had been soured by his misfortunes. He had little to lose everything to gain, by rebellion. It was in his power to draw after him a large portion of the jungle population and by their means to sever the communications of the British with the sea. Not less dangerous was the adopted son of the late Desai of Kittur

^{of Kittur} The retainers of this family, twenty four years previously had crowned a rash insurrection by a gallant defence of their fort only twenty six miles from Belgaon, in the siege of which a political agent of that day had fallen. The last representative of the race was then living as a pensioner upon the bounty of his father in law, commanding in his fallen state the sympathies of the whole Langayat population. He too, had nothing to lose, everything to hope from rebellion. His father in law the Desai of

^{and of} ^{Waimur} Waimur though a cautious and prudent man, did not possess the strength of character to resist extraordinary pressure placed upon him by his co-religionists. Add to these the chief of Nargund, connected

^{also of the} ^{chief of} ^{Nargund} with some of the most powerful families in the southern Maratha country, and known to be thoroughly disaffected, add, moreover, that the population, naturally turbulent and warlike, had retained the arms which had all but gained empire for the Marathas, and the reader may gather some idea of the position which, difficult in May, became dangerous in the early part of June, and threatening

as every day witnessed a closer approach to the advent of July.

For long Mr Seton Karr met the increasing danger from the resources suggested to him by his long experience, and by his thorough acquaintance with native character. But as time went on, each post bringing with it intelligence of further outbreaks in the provinces of the north west, that gentleman deemed it at last his duty to bring the situation of the provinces under the eyes of the Government of Bombay. He did this on the 20th of June. Cognisant, however, of the great difficulties which Lord Elphinstone had to encounter, of the unselfish foresight which had induced that heroic man to denude his own Presidency that he might crush rebellion upon

Mr Seton
Karr applies
for extended
powers and
responsibility

its borders, Mr Seton Karr did not ask for aid, material or other. He merely asked that his own powers might be extended. He asked, in fact, that the entire responsibility of meeting and encountering the crisis might be cast on him alone. It was a noble request, especially noble at that crisis—especially noble considering the resources at his disposal—a native regiment in a state of veiled rebellion, a weak battery of artillery, about a hundred Europeans—to meet the rebellion which might occur at any moment. The request was complied with.

His request
is complied
with

Free now to act Mr Seton Karr developed his plan. The use of force was out of the question. The only possible policy was conciliation. In carrying this out Mr Seton Karr enjoyed advantages which would have been denied to many men. During the year immediately preceding the mutiny he had carefully cultivated friendly relations with the chiefs. Over the minds of many he had acquired an extraordinary ascendancy. This ascendancy he now tested—and in the most cases with the happiest results. Valuable information was placed at his disposal, the intercommunication of the disaffected was prevented, a vigilant watch upon their movements was secured. In this way, and by a show of confidence towards all, by impressing upon each chief the idea that his neighbour was loyal, and by the expression of a confidence really felt, that the scare would soon pass away, leaving the British complete master of the situation, Mr Seton Karr succeeded in staying off the fatal day and in averting the dreaded explosion.

His gradual
unfolding
plans

and retains
the
idea of the
chance

Difficulties however, continued to increase. On the 31st of July the 27th Native Infantry mutinied at Kolhapur, plundered the treasury and, after murdering such officers as fell in their way, set off for the Ghats. Kolhapur is sixty five miles from Belgaon. Communications between the 27th Regiment and the 29th at the latter place had been frequent. At Dharwar, forty two miles from Belgaon in a direction opposite to that of Kolhapur, the 28th Regiment had been for some time on the very verge of revolt. Mr Seton Karr was thus occupying a position between one station where the garrison had just mutinied, and another the garrison of which was on the verge of mutiny—the troops at the central point

Mutiny at
Kolhapur

Its position
with respect
to Belgaon
and Dharwar

being also infected. It happened, however, that the native officer of the 29th—the regiment stationed at Belgaon—who was the secret leader of the disaffected one Thákur Singh, was known to Mr Seton Karr. That gentleman at once, and before the news of the mutiny at Kolhapur was generally known at Belgaon, entered into communication regarding this native officer with General Lester. To arrest him might have precipitated a calamity. It was more easy to devise a pretext to remove him honorably from the station. Such a pretext was soon found. Two companies of the 29th that of Thákur Singh being one of them were

ordered on command to Badamí, a small town some ninety miles distant near the south western frontier of the Nizám's dominions. The two companies set out on the morning of the 2nd August, still ignorant of the mutiny at Kolhapur. When the tidings of that mutiny reached the sipahis left behind at Belgaon they were too disconcerted by the absence of their leader to act on the moment. The opportune seizure and the condign punishment of an emissary from Jamkhandi who had come to incite them to an immediate outbreak, awed them into still longer inaction.

The danger however, was by no means removed. Concurrently with the events I have just related, Mr Seton Karr discovered a plot of the Muhammadan population of Belgaon. He soon found that this conspiracy had its ramifications at Kolhapur, at Haiderabad, and at Poona, and that its outbreak was to be signalled by the seizure of Belgaon itself. The arrest of one of the chief conspirators at Poona seemed likely to precipitate the outbreak. Mr Seton Karr, therefore, no sooner received information of this event, than he secured the local leaders at Belgaon, all of whom he had carefully watched. The evidence regarding some of these proved defective, and they were discharged.

But the principal conspirator was convicted on the clearest evidence, and he was blown from a gun in company with the emissary from Jamkhandi just spoken of.

Three days before this execution—the 10th of August—a small detachment of European troops arrived to reassure the authorities at Belgaon. Another detachment went on to produce a similar good effect in Dharwár. General Lester at

once proceeded to repress the rising mutinous spirit of the 29th Native Infantry. Five men of that regiment were tried, one of them was condemned to death, the remainder were transported for life. Taking advantage of the good effect produced by these proceedings, Mr Seton Karr began the work of disarming the district, including the towns of Belgaon and Shahpur. On the 24th of August a further reinforcement arrived in the shape of a detachment of the 86th Foot. Its presence, combined with other precautionary measures he had taken, enabled Mr Seton-Karr to steer his state bark through the great Muhammadan festival of the Muharram* without disturbance—and, for a time, the Europeans in the southern Maratha country felt that they could breathe freely.

The arrival of reinforcement in his enables General Leser to suppress the ill feeling in Belgaon and Durgad.

Mr Seton Karr had thus succeeded, by a combination of firmness and tact, the result of good judgment directing intimate acquaintance with the native character, in guiding the territories committed to his charge through the most dangerous crisis of the mutiny. Considering the previous discontent of the chiefs and landowners, the fact that he was supported by no force that he had only his own energies upon which to rely, this result will ever be quoted as a marvellous instance of skilful management of men. It is not too much to say that a single false step would have produced the most fatal consequences. Not only would it have involved the southern Mirathá country in revolt, but it would have kindled a flame which would have spread throughout the dominions of the Nizam. Had Mr Seton Karr diverged but for one day, from the line of vigilant forbearance which he had laid down as his policy, had he hurried the ill-disposed into open insurrection by any unguarded word of suspicion or slight, or had he encouraged their designs by supineness, a great calamity would have been inevitable. Unhappily, subsequent events proved only too truly the truth of this assertion. When in an evil moment to be related hereafter, the charge of political affairs was removed from the hands of Mr Seton Karr to those

Partow of the success of Mr Seton Karr was the cause and the reason of that success.

The truth of the argument proved by subsequent events.

* The "Muharram" is the name of the first Muhammadan month held sacred on account of the death of Hussein son of Ali, who was killed by Yazid near Kufa, in the pashalic of Bagdad.

of an officer distasteful, from his previous connection with the Indian Commission, to the chiefs and landowners, one month did not elapse before the rebellion, no longer controlled by good management, began its course with murder. All honour, then, to the wise and far seeing officer who kept it within bounds when its outburst would have been far more dangerous *.

Before returning to Bombay, I must ask the reader to accompany me for a brief period to Kolhápúr. The state of this name, ruled over by the descendants of Shivaji, had up to the year 1842 suffered from continuous disorder and misrule. To such an extent had the evil proceeded, that in the year I have mentioned the British Government was forced to interfere and to nominate a minister to introduce order and good government. The efforts made in that direction by this enlightened man, a Brahmin named Daji Krishna Pandit, to deprive the corrupt party in the state of their illicit gains, provoked a rebellion. This rebellion having been suppressed, the British Government assumed the direct administration of the state during the minority of the Rájah. Within this period, which did not expire till 1862, the forts of every description were dismantled, and the system of hereditary garrison was abolished, the native

* The Government of Bombay was not insensible to Mr Seton Karr's great merits. On the 14th of September 1857, he was informed that "the Right Honourable the Governor in Council considers that in a conjuncture of great anxiety and danger you have displayed a calmness, an energy and a foresight which entitle you to the thanks and commendations of Government." Again "the judicious arrangements made by you have amply secured the future tranquillity of the southern Maráthá country." These and other commendations were repeated and confirmed by Lord Elphinstone in letters under his own hand in which he alludes to "the marked ability and success" with which Mr Seton Karr had performed his duties. In his published minute on distinguished services rendered during the mutiny, Lord Elphinstone placed Mr Seton Karr's name third on the list of those who had deserved well of their country. The honour was the more marked because as Lord Canning observed, every recommendation from Lord Elphinstone carried double weight from the fact that out of the many who had rendered important services in western India he selected only a few names for mention. Yet, strange as it may appear, when so many were decorated Mr Seton Karr received neither honours nor reward. He returned to England towards the end of 1860, his proud nature suffering from the unmerited slight which had been cast upon him. In less than two years he died, conscious that he had performed a great service which his country had failed to recognise.

military force was disbanded, and a local corps officered by three English officers, was substituted for it. These measures, especially those for the disarmament of their forts and the disbandment of their native force, though in view of the many previous rebellions absolutely necessary, had been regarded with great disfavour by the higher orders in Kolhápúr, and had tended not a little to the unpopularity of the paramount power.

Reasons for the discontent of the people

Such was the state of affairs in the province when the mutiny broke out at Mirath. Hopes and wishes similar to those which I have described as actuating the Muhammadan population of the Belgáon district, at once took possession of the minds of their neighbours in Kolhápúr. To a people accustomed to revolt, living on the memories of plunder and corruption, and hating orderly government, the occasion seemed singularly favourable. The town of Kolhápúr is distant only sixty-five miles from Belgáon. It was garrisoned by one native regiment, the 27th, and by the local corps raised on the disbandment of the native force. There were no European troops nearer than Belgáon, and it was impossible to spare any from that place. Sátaráh was eighty-one miles to the north, and Púnd, whence European aid was alone possible, seventy-one miles further. The political superintendent of Kolhápúr was Colonel Maughan. Major Holland commanded the 27th Native Infantry, Captain Schneider the local corps.

Effect of the Mirath mutiny at Kolhápúr

Garrison of Kolhápúr

I have already stated* that communications between the 27th Native Infantry at Kolhápúr, the 29th at Belgáon, and the 28th at Dhárwar, had been frequent during the months of June and July. Supported, as they were, secretly, by disaffected chiefs, almost openly by the disaffected Muhammadan populations, these three regiments had the game in their own hands. Coordinated and simultaneous action was only necessary to their success. Happily on this, as on so many occasions at this eventful period, the conspirators failed in this essential particular. It would seem that they reckoned without the telegraph. Instead of deciding to rise on a settled date they arranged that the example should be set by Kolhápúr, and followed at once by Belgáon and

The most frequent communications at the various stations intercommunicate

The one blot in their plan

Dhaiwar The 27th Native Infantry accordingly rose on the 31st of July at Kolhapur. But for the telegraph the regiment at Belgaon would have received by express intelligence of the movement, and have followed the example. But the telegraph forestalled their express. And Mr Seton Karr, using his priority of news with judgment, averted as we have seen, the calamity from that place.

But the mutiny at Kolhapur was a reality. During the night of the 31st of July the 27th rose in arms and detailed parties to attack their officers' bungalows.

The native adjutant, a Jew, and a Hindu hawaldar ran to give warning only just in time to permit the ladies to escape from their houses before the Sepahis came up and poured volleys into them. Some of the officers nobly endeavoured to bring back the rebels to their duty, but their efforts were vain. The treasury and the bazaar were plundered, and riot reigned supreme. Three officers who had escaped into the country were shot and thrown into the river. The remainder took refuge in the Residency, about a mile from the cantonment, but near the lines of the Kolhapur local regiment, which happily remained loyal.*

The news of this disaster reached Bombay by telegraph. Lord Elphinstone acted with promptitude and decision. It happened that Colonel G Le Grand Jacob, a man of the old heroic type, really in council, prompt and decisive in action, had but just returned to Bombay from a command in the Persian campaign. He was about to start for Punjab for the orders of the Commander in Chief, when the telegram from Kolhapur was placed in the hands of the Governor.

Lord Elphinstone at once sent for Jacob, told him all that had occurred at Kolhapur, that he would receive orders from the Commander in Chief to take command of the troops in that quarter. He added that he was well aware that there were no troops to be depended upon, except perhaps the local regiments, but that he would receive special powers, and was to do the best he could.*

* *Western India before and during the Mutinies* by Major General Sir George Le Grand Jacob KCSI, CB.

† The final orders to Colonel Jacob were not issued till the following day, as Lord Elphinstone wished before the issue, to receive a reply to a telegram he had sent to Kolhapur. As no reply came, the orders were at once issued.

Colonel Jacob set out at once, saw the Commander in Chief at Puna, pushed on then to Satarah, and found there a troop of horse artillery and dragoons. The rainy season was at its height, the track between Satarah and Kolhapur was composed of the black soil in which, during the monsoon, horses not unfrequently sank up to their girths, and wheels to their axles, there were several rivers and streams unbridged and unfordable. Still, time was every thing. Colonel Jacob then pushed on two guns with double allowance of men and horses, and riding forward himself with a few men of the Southern Marátha Horse a loyal and capable regiment, reached Kolhápur on the 14th of August, just before midnight.

Jacob sets out,

and, despite a of difficult e.

Now, meanwhile, bad matters been progressing in Kolhapur? There according to all probabilities, there would have been little to check the victorious progress of the rebels! Thanks to their delays and to the prompt action of Colonel Maughan, it had happened otherwise. The Sipáhus, greedy of plunder, went first to pillage the treasury and sack the station. Then and then only, did they make their way to the town, fully expecting to find its gates open. But Colonel Maughan had closed those gates. The Sipáhus, not caring to attempt to force them, took up a rather formidable position outside, close to the gates, in a small outwork where the rajah's horses and menagerie were kept. Here they maintained their position all night, repulsing Colonel Manghan in an attempt made by him to dislodge them.

reaches Kolhápur. The mutineers have meanwhile been checked by Colonel Maughan.

It would seem that from this time the greater part of the regiment returned to its allegiance. This movement was probably hastened by the knowledge, brought to the Sipáhus by some of their still recalcitrant comrades, that the passes to the coast had been occupied by Europeans landed on the coast by the splendid exertions of the Indian Navy. This is certain, that the recalcitrant Sipáhus were checked in this way, that the greater number betook

Many returned to the duty.

'They were writes Sir G. Le G. Jacob brief and satisfactory. 'I am aware,' said Lord Elphinstone 'that in a crisis like this, a person on the spot ought to be the best judge of any action that might be at once necessary, to wait for orders may allow events to become too strong to master. I have confidence in your judgment, do your best to meet the present emergency, and rely on my full support.'—H. M. I. L. by Sir G. Le G. Jacob

themselves to the jungles, whilst the minority, about forty in number, returning to Kolhapur, reoccupied the outwork close to the town. But the garrison of the town had in the meantime been reinforced. Lieutenant Kerr of the Southern Maratha Horse, had marched a detachment of that regiment from Satarah—a distance of eighty-one miles—without a halt. The rebels were at once attacked, on the 10th of August, in their outwork, some of their own comrades joining in the attack. They made a desperate defence—but, a secret entrance to the outwork having been pointed out to Lieutenant Kerr, that gallant officer dashed in, followed by horsemen whom he had caused to dismount, and fought his way to the interior of the building. At the same time, Lieutenant Innes, with a party of the 27th, took the rebels in the rear. These two attacks decided the affair, but so desperate had been the defence, that of the forty rebels three only escaped wounds or death.*

When, then, Colonel Le G Jacob reached Kolhapur, he found that the mutiny had been quelled. Some forty of the most rebellious men of the 27th Native Infantry had been killed in fair fight, a larger number was in the jungles, but still the great bulk of the regiment was doing its duty, and there was no evidence against any man of it.

Three days after his arrival, Colonel Jacob was reinforced by the two horse artillery guns he had sent on from Satarah, and about a hundred men of the 2nd Europeans from the coast—the same who had so opportunely occupied the passes. With so small a force at his disposal he felt it would be impossible to act against the insurgents unless he should decide, before acting, to disarm the regiment whose conduct had been so suspicious. On the one hand was the danger of his being attacked before his force should gather further strength, or of the mutineers marching away with their arms, on the other, the chance of the men who were still loyal, those of the local corps especially, yielding to the temptation to join their countrymen. It was a balance of risks and probabilities. Many men would have preferred to wait. But Jacob was, as I have said, a man of the old heroic type, and, feeling the

* Jacob's *Western India* Lieutenant Kerr received the Victoria Cross for his conduct on this occasion.

importance of striking the first blow, he determined to disarm the men of the 27th Native Infantry

He disarmed them on the morning of the 18th of August Under his orders were twenty five European gunners, with two guns and two howitzers, ninety men of the 2nd Europeans, one hundred and eighty men of the Southern Marátha Horse, and three hundred and fifty men of the local corps These were drawn up in a manner to command any movement tending to resistance on the part of the rebels

He disarms them.

But they made no resistance They piled their arms in silence The investigation which followed brought to light many hidden springs of the movement It had been intended, it was discovered, to delay the mutiny till the 10th of August, but the action of the Jew native adjutant on the 31st of July, in sending away his family, aroused suspicion, and prompted a sudden and ill matured rising This premature movement ruined the plot Acting hurriedly and without concert with their brethren at Belgáon and Dharwár, the mutineers acted without plan or settled purpose It required then only energy to baffle them and that energy was conspicuous in the conduct of all the European officers concerned, in the conduct also of Lord Elphinstone at Bombay, of Maughan of Kerr, of Innes in defence and attack, and of Colonel Jacob in striking the decisive blow

Remarks on the success of the present action of the Bombay and military officers.

I ask the reader to return with me now to Bombay Until the approach of the great Muhammadan festival of the Muharram there had been no apprehensions of an outbreak in that city The Superintendent of Police, Mr Forjett, a gentleman who born and bred in India, knew the natives thoroughly, had deemed it sufficient, when the news of the massacre of Kanhpur reached Bombay, to obtain permission to incorporate into the police a body of fifty mounted Europeans He reasoned justly that as the Muhammadan population of the city exceeded a hundred and fifty thousand it would be folly to trust implicitly to the fidelity of the native police

Bombay

The police force there

It may be fitting to describe here the officers to whom was intrusted the direction of the civil and military forces upon whose conduct depended the safety of the important town of Bombay at this critical juncture

The commander of the military forces was Brigadier General Shortt of the Bombay army. General Shortt was an officer of capacity and intelligence. He thoroughly understood the native soldier. He was quick to decide on an emergency and prompt to carry his decision into execution. In a word, he was an officer thoroughly to be depended upon in danger, a tower of strength to the Government in the crisis which was then impending.

The Superintendent of Police, Mr C Forjett, was * one of the most remarkable men brought to the front by the events of 1857. I have already stated that he was born and bred in India. When the mutiny broke out he was in the very prime of manhood. He was so thoroughly acquainted with all the dialects of all the languages of western and southern India, that it was easy for him to pass himself off as a native upon the most astute of natives. Mr Forjett gave an extraordinary proof of this talent immediately prior to his nomination to the office of Superintendent of Police. He had gained so great a reputation for ability, tact and judgment in the performance of his duties in the southern Maráthá country, that in 1855 Lord Elphinstone sent for him to offer him the chief superintendence of the police in Bombay. Mr Forjett came to the Presidency, saw Lord Elphinstone, and received the offer. He at once expressed his willingness to accept it, but requested that Lord Elphinstone would defer the nomination for a fortnight, so as to give him time to find out for himself the true character of the men he had been summoned to command. The request was at once granted. Mr Forjett then disguised himself as a native and went to places haunted by the police, passing himself off as the son of a subahdar in search of a girl whom he loved. He so completely deceived the natives that men of the highest caste invited him to eat with them. He found out the character, the secret longings, of the natives, who, in a few days would be his instruments. Nor did he neglect the European police. His experience with some of them was remarkable. Of those whom he tested

General
Shortt

Mr Forjett

His large ac-
quirements,

his tact, and
judgment

His answer to
Lord Elphinstone when
offered the
office of Su-
perintendent
of Police.

Mr Forjett's
experience
on the police

* I am happy to add that the imperfect tense is used only historically. Mr Forjett still lives in the vigour of health &c.

not one refused the bribe he offered. At the end of the fortnight he presented himself to Lord Elphinstone, and took up the office. I leave the reader to imagine the consternation of his native subordinates when they learned who it was whom they had now to serve.

He assumes the office.

But quickness, cleverness at disguise, readiness of resource, represented but a small part of Mr Forjett's qualities. Small in person, endowed, according to all appearance, with no great strength, he united the cool courage of a practised warrior to remarkable powers of endurance. The courage was not merely the physical courage which despises danger, it was that, and much more. It was a courage set into action by a brain cool and clear—so cool and so clear that there never was a crisis which could blind it, never a danger which it was unable to parry. I venture to describe it as the highest form of intellectual courage.

His other remarkable qualities;

his intellectual courage.

I have spoken of his powers of endurance. These were often tested in the southern Maráthá country prior to 1855. If to ride a hundred miles a day, on dismounting to partake of a simple meal of the natural products of the country, and then to lie on the ground, with a bundle of grass for a pillow, in the morning to wash in the stream or in the water drawn from the well, and pursue a similar journey in a similar manner, if to do this day after day be a test of endurance, then Mr Forjett may claim to be a passed master in the art. If, to the qualities I have recorded, I add an upright mind, a lofty sense of honour, a devotion to duty, I present to the reader an accurate portrait of the Superintendent of Police of Bombay.

his power of endurance

his lofty character

During the two years which had elapsed between his assumption of that office and the outbreak of the mutiny, Mr Forjett had gained the complete confidence and esteem of Lord Elphinstone. Those who knew that high-minded nobleman are aware that he never bestowed his trust until he had assured himself by experience that the recipient was fully worthy of it.

He gains Lord Elphinstone's confidence

There being thus two men so capable and in all respects so well qualified at the head of the departments regulating order, it would seem that the repression of disturbance in Bombay would be easy. But there were two causes which

militated against such a conclusion. The first was the great disparity between the numbers of European and native troops. Whilst there were three native regiments, the 10th and 11th Native Infantry and the Marine Battalion, of the former there were but four hundred men. The other cause affected the concert between the heads of the two departments. General Shortt believed in the loyalty of his Sipahis but mistrusted the native police. Mr Forjett was confident that he could do what he would with the police but mistrusted the Sipahis. To use his own words, Mr Forjett regarded the Sipahis as "the only source of danger."

The festival of the Muharram was a festival of a character the most dangerous of all. It was a religious festival, lasting many days, the excitement of which increased with each day. Lord Elphinstone had confided to General Shortt the arrangements for preventing disturbance during the whole of the time at last. Granted one premiss—that the Sipahis were absolutely loyal—these arrangements were perfect. Mr Forjett, when informed of them, declined, without pledging himself to the contrary, to admit this premiss, and he informed Lord Elphinstone of his doubts. Lord Elphinstone replied that he was sorry he had not known of his objections before, but that it was now too late to alter them. I may here state that the arrangements made by General Shortt involved the division into very small bodies of the European force under the orders of Mr Forjett. The reply made by that gentleman to Lord Elphinstone's remark just referred to is eminently characteristic. He intimated that he should, at all events, be obliged to disobey the orders of Government with respect to the police arrangements, because it was necessary for him to have them in hand in the event of a Sipahi outbreak. "It is a very risky thing," replied Lord Elphinstone, "to disobey orders, but I am sure you will do nothing rash." Mr Forjett construed this tacit permission in the sense in which it was doubtless intended.

Difference of
opinion be-
tween Ge-
neral Shortt
and Mr
Forjett.

September
The Muhar-
ram festival
at Bombay

General
Shortt's ar-
rangements.

Forjett's in-
terview with
Lord Elphinstone

* "Happy was it for Bombay, happy for western India, and happy probably for India itself," wrote Mr Forjett, reviewing at a later period these events, "that one so noble and clear-headed as Lord Elphinstone was Governor of Bombay during the period of the mutiny."

I've days of the festival passed without disorder night would see its conclusion. On the eve of that night an incident, accidental in its cause, almost produced an outbreak. A Christian drummer belonging to the 10th Regiment Native Infantry, whilst in a state of intoxication, insulted the carriers of a Hindu divinity which was being carried in procession by some townspeople, and knocked over the divinity. Two policemen, who witnessed the outrage, took the drummer into custody. It happened that the Sipáhis of the native regiments were possessed by an inner conviction that their loyalty was doubted by Forjett, and they replied to the feeling they thus imputed to him with one of hatred to himself and his subordinates. When, then, the men of the 10th heard that one of their comrades, albeit a Christian, caught in the act of offering an insult to a Hindu divinity, had been taken into custody by the police, some twenty of them turned out, broke into the lock up, rescued the drummer, assaulted the policemen, and marched them off as prisoners to their lines. The European constable of the section at once proceeded with four native policemen to the lines and demanded the liberation of their comrades. The demand was not only refused, but the newcomers were assaulted by the Sipáhis, and, after a conflict in which two of the assailants were left for dead, and others were wounded, they were forced to retire. The excitement in the Sipáhi lines increasing every moment, received a further impetus from this retirement, and the Sipáhis began to turn out in such numbers that a messenger was sent at full speed to Mr Forjett, with the information that the native regiments had broken out.

The next

The last night but one of the Muharram

A Christian drummer is seized by the Sipáhis. The police take him into custody

The Sipáhis take the part of the drummer

The police try to rescue their comrades but fail.

Forjett is sent for

Forjett arrives alone.

This was the one danger which Mr Forjett had all along dreaded, and against which he had taken every precaution possible under the circumstances, already noted, of his limited sphere of action. He had, that is to say, disobeyed orders, and massed his European policemen. On receiving the news that the Sipáhis had broken out, Mr Forjett ordered the European police to follow him as soon as possible, and galloped down to their lines at so great a speed as to outstrip all his attendants. He found the

Sipáhis in a state of tumult, endeavouring to free their way out of the line, their European officers, with drawn swords, keeping them back. The sight of Mr. Forjett inflamed the Sipáhis still more. They called out loudly that this was the man who had wished them all to be killed while the European officers seeing how the presence of Mr. Forjett excited their men, begged him in earnest language to go away. The fate of

Many of the
Sipáhis at
see ing L. M.

The European
officers beg
L. M. to retire

Pomboy at that moment hung upon the conduct, at this critical conjuncture of Mr. Forjett. Such an Asiatic that had that gentleman obeyed the calls

of the officers the Sipáhis would have burst the bonds of discipline and dashed forward to pursue him. He was there, alone, seated on his horse calmly daring them. His knowledge of natives made him feel that so long as he should remain there, facing and defying them, they would not move, but that a retrograde movement on his part would be the signal for a real outbreak. In reply, then, to the shouts of the officers and men

He refuses

of the native regiments Mr. Forjett called out to the former, "If your men are bent on mischief the sooner it is over the better, and remained facing them. Two minutes later his assistant Mr. Edington, galloped up, followed very shortly by fifty five European policemen—the men he had kept massed in case of a disturbance. Then Mr. Forjett acted.

and crushes
the incipient
mutiny

Forming up and halting his men he called out, "Throw open the gates, I am ready for the Sipáhis." Again was displayed that complete acquaintance with the Asiatic character which was one of the

secrets of Mr. Forjett's power. The excitement of the Sipáhis subsided as if by magic and they fell back within their lines. Never had a nobler deed been more nobly done!

The tide now turned. The evil disposed amongst the Sipáhis—and that many were evil-disposed subsequent revelations fully proved—were completely cowed. Nevertheless Mr. Forjett relaxed not one of his exertions. The Muharram was not yet a thing of the past and it was clear that an accident might

yet kindle the mine. One might still remained and Mr. Forjett, far from relaxing his precautions, bent himself to increase them. He so posted his police that the smallest movement upon the part of the Sipáhis would at once become known to the main body of his Europeans forty eight in number, located at

The Muharram
thanks
to Mr. Forjett, is tided
over

a decisive point. His precautions were not only successful, they were the cause of success. To borrow the language, subsequently revealed, of the baffled conspirators, "it was the vigilance maintained that prevented the outbreak." The vigilance was the vigilance of the police personally directed by Mr. Forjett.*

I have already stated that, thanks to the precautions taken and to Mr. Forjett's energetic action, the festival of the Muharram had passed off quietly. The discontented men amongst the Sipsáhs still, however, cherished the hope that another opportunity more favourable to the execution of their projects would soon arise. The Hindu festival of the Duáli, occurring towards the end of October, seemed to them to offer such an opportunity. During this festival the Hindus of the upper and wealthier classes are accustomed to collect all their wealth in one room of their dwelling, and, assembling, to worship it. The discontented Sipsáhs resolved, in many a secret council, to break out during the Duáli, to pillage Bombay, killing all who should oppose them, and then to march out of the island. Had this

The Sipsáhs
hatch a new
conspiracy.

* Mr Forjett's great services were not left unacknowledged. On the 19th of June, 1858, Lord Elphinstone thus recorded his sense of their value—"The Right Honourable the Governor in Council cannot too highly praise the devoted zeal of this excellent public servant, upon whom such grave responsibilities were imposed during last year." Referring to Mr Forjett's "very valuable services" in the detection of the plot in Bombay in 1857, the same high authority thus wrote—"His duties demanded great courage, great acuteness, and great judgment, all of which qualities were conspicuously displayed by Mr. Forjett at that trying period."

All classes combined to testify to the great services rendered on this occasion by Mr. Forjett. Couched in varying phraseology, every letter received from the members of the European community indicates that, in the opinion of the several writers, it was the vigilance of Mr Forjett which saved Bombay.

I may add here that, for his services in the mutiny, the European and native communities in Bombay presented Mr Forjett with addresses, and, with the sanction of the Government, with testimonials and purses to the value of three thousand eight hundred and fifty pounds. It was still more gratifying to him that, after he had left the service and quitted India, the native cotton merchants sent him a handsome address and a purse of fifteen hundred pounds, "in token of strong gratitude for one whose almost despotic powers and zealous energy had so quelled the explosive forces of native society, that they seem to have become permanently subdued." In addition, and likewise after he left India, the shareholders of a company, mainly composed of natives, presented Mr. Forjett with shares, which they subsequently sold on his account, for thirteen thousand five hundred and eighty pounds.

plan been carried out, it is nearly certain that the contagion would have spread all over the Presidency, and have even reached Madras.

But again had the mutineers to reckon with Mr Forjett. That gentleman was informed by a detective that suspicious meetings were being held by disaffected Sipahis at the house of

one Gangá Parhad. Attempts to introduce a confidential agent of the police into those meetings, having been baffled by the precautions of the Sipahis Mr Forjett had Gangá Parshad conveyed to

the police office during the night and obtained from him a complete revelation. Fertile in disguises Mr Forjett subsequently became an eye witness—by means of holes made in the wall which separated the chamber where the conspirators assembled from the ante room—of the proceedings of the Sipahis, a listener to their conversation. More than that aware

of the feeling prevailing amongst the officers regarding himself, he induced Major Barrow, the officer commanding the Marine battalion, to accompany him on four different occasions, to the meetings.

The information thus obtained was duly reported to General Shortt by Major Barrow, and to Lord Elphinstone, through his private secretary, by Mr Forjett. Courts martial

were in due course convened. The proceedings resulted in sentences of death being passed and executed on two, of transportation for life on six, native soldiers of various ranks. But the projected

mutiny was nipped in the bud.

With the story of the measures taken for the safety of Bombay closes the general sketch of events in the

western Presidency up to the close of 1857. We have seen how, displaying at once a rare foresight and a remarkable self reliance, Lord Elphinstone

had denuded his own Presidency of European troops in order to crush the mutiny beyond its borders. No man in high position recognised more truly, and applied more conscientiously,

* Major Barrow's astonishment when he saw some of his own men in Gangá Parshad's house was remarkable. He exclaimed, "My God my own men! Is it possible?" And his memorable words to me at the court martial were "It is well I was present and saw and heard them myself but for which I should have been here not as a witness for the prosecution but as one for the defence, such was my confidence in these men."—Forjett's *Our Internal Danger in India*.

the maxim that the art of war consists in concentrating the greatest number of troops on the decisive point of the action. Now, the decisive point of the action in the early days of the revolt of 1857, was not in Bombay. To Lord Elphinstone it was clear that Delhi could only be reached from Bengal, and that it was just possible he might save central India and Rajputana. Whilst, then, he sent every available European soldier to Calcutta, he formed, from the small remnant which was left, a number in reality not sufficient for his own needs—one column which should march on Meerut, another which should restore order in Rajputana. Feeling that amidst the many dangers which threatened him the most fatal was that which would come from without he sent to meet and to crush it before it should penetrate within. His defence of Bombay was an aggressive defence. It was a policy requiring rare courage, immense confidence in his own judgment, and great resolution. In carrying it out he exposed himself to the danger only one degree less, of a rising within the Presidency. How nearly that was occurring I have shown in these pages. The southern Maratha country was saved, in 1857, partly by the prudence and the judgment displayed by Mr G. B. Seton Karr, aided by the energy of General Lester partly by the bungling and want of concert of the conspirators. How Bombay was saved I have just told. The reader will have seen that the danger was real, the peril imminent, that but for the unlimited confidence placed by Lord Elphinstone in Mr Forsett—a man of his own selection—it might have culminated in disaster. That he dared that risk to avert a greater danger is one of the many proofs of Lord Elphinstone's capacity. Sufficient credit has never been given to him for his noble his far seeing, his self denying policy. In the presence of the massacres of Kanhpur and of Jhānsi of the defence of Lucknow and of the siege of Delhi the attitude of Lord Elphinstone, less sensational though not less heroic, has been overlooked. Had there been an uprising attended with slaughter in Bombay, the story of its repression and the deeds of valour attending that repression would have circulated throughout the world. Instead of that, we saw only calm judgment and self reliance meeting one danger and defying

Lord Elphinstone's one & forethought, unselfishness & and decision

It is a plan of aggressive defence

Mr Seton Karr
General Lester

Mr Forsett

The attitude of Lord Elphinstone has never yet received its due meed of praise

another, carefully selecting the most experienced instruments, and by their aid preventing a calamity so threatening that, if it had been met by men less tried and less worthy of confidence, it must have culminated in disaster. It is an attitude which gains from being contemplated, which impresses the student of history, in an ever increasing degree, with admiration of the noble character of the man whose calm trust in himself made possible the success of the policy he alone inaugurated.

CHAPTER II

CENTRAL INDIA AND DURAND

ĀSIRGARH is a very famous fortress in the Nimār district of the Central Provinces, lying two hundred and ninety miles to the north east of Bombay, one hundred and fifty miles from Māhgaon, and ninety nine miles to the south east of Mau. It is built on an isolated hill, detached from the Satpura range, dividing the valley of the Tapti from that of the Nerbada. It has a history which has sent its name through the length and breadth of India. Alike in the times of the Hindu, of the Muhammadan, and of the British overlordship, it has been considered a place worth fighting for. After many changes of masters, it surrendered, on the 9th of April, 1819, after a vigorous resistance to a British force commanded by Brigadier General Doveton, and it has, ever since, remained in the occupation of a British garrison.

In 1857 that garrison consisted of a wing of the 6th Regiment Gwalior Contingent lent by the Bengal Presidency to replace the 19th Bombay Native Infantry, ordered on service to Persia, but which never embarked for that country. The commanding officer of the garrison was Colonel Le Mesurier, and the Post Adjutant was Lieutenant John Gordon of the 19th Bombay Native Infantry.

The hill on the summit of which Āsīrgarh is perched rises abruptly to about five hundred feet above the jungle. Below it is a town of no real importance, inhabited by villagers mainly engaged in tending their flocks.

The men who formed the garrison of Āsīrgarh belonged to a contingent which speedily asserted its right to a prominent place amongst the mutineers. The events at Nīmach and at Gwāliar speedily convinced the European residents at Āsīrgarh that their guardians were not to be trusted. Even before this discovery

Āsīrgarh

Garrison of
ĀsīrgarhSituation of
the fort.The men of
the con-
tingent
evidence
symptoms
of mutiny

had been made, the fort adjutant, distrusting their demeanour, had enlisted some ninety men from the villagers of the town, and had charged them with the task of watching the behaviour of the Sipahs. These men are known as Gordon's Volunteers.

On the 19th of June the Europeans of the garrison heard of the mutinies at Nimrah and Nasiribil. From that day almost every post brought them distressful tidings. Every precaution was taken by Lieutenant Gordon. To relieve the fort, by fair means, of a portion of its real enemies one company of the regiment was detached to Burhānpur, twelve miles distant. The anxieties of the ladies of the garrison were lessened about the same time by the intelligence verified by a personal visit made by Lieutenant Gordon, that Captain Keatinge,* the political agent for that part of the country, had fortified a position fourteen miles distant from Asirgarh.

From this time till the end of July good and bad news succeeded each other with great rapidity. At times the Europeans were in great danger. The company sent to Burhānpur mutinied, marched on Asirgarh, and was only prevented from entering it by the hawāldar major of the regiment, whose loyalty had been appealed to, not in vain, by Lieutenant Gordon.

The following morning the four remaining companies obeyed, not without murmuring, the order given to them to march out and encamp below the fort, their places within being taken by Gordon's Volunteers. The next day a party of Bhil infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Birch, surprised and disarmed the Burhānpur mutineers, and carried their arms into Asirgarh. A few hours later that place was reinforced by two companies of the 19th Native Infantry, under Captain Blair. The disarming of the Gwihār men outside the fort—a work performed admirably and without bloodshed by Captain Blair and Lieutenant Gordon—completed the necessary measures to ensure the safety of the fortress pending the arrival of Colonel Stuart's column.

That column, the earlier movements of which I have recorded in the preceding chapter, quitted Aurangābād for Asirgarh on the 12th of July.

* Now Major General Keatinge, V.C.

Marching rapidly, it reached Burhanpur on the 21st and Asirgarh on the 22nd idem Here it was joined by Colonel Durand, who had reached Asirgarh some days previously

In another part of this history * I have shown how Durand, after the catastrophe of Mau, had fallen back on Sihor, how, staying there only one day, he had set out for Hoshangabad on the southern bank of the Narbadá in the hope of being able to communicate there with General Woodburn, how, learning at Hoshangabad of the safety of Mau he heard also of the attempts made to change the direction of Woodburn's force from the line of the Narbada to Nagpur, how, not content with simply protesting against such a line of conduct, he had set off for Anangabad with the intention of enforcing his arguments there and if necessary, of pressing on to Bombay how, on his road, he received the gratifying intelligence that Woodburn's column, now commanded by Stuart, was advancing towards Asirgarh, how he had at once hurried to that place He had the gratification of meeting that force on the 22nd of July From the moment of his joining it he assumed his position as the Governor General's representative and became likewise, in every thing but in name, the real leader of the column

Summary of
Durand's
proceedings
after leaving
1 dur

He assumes
the real direction
of the
column.

The column pushed on for Mau on the 24th with all practicable expedition On the 28th it was joined by the 3rd Regiment Cavalry, Haidarabad Contingent, under the command of Captain S O' On the 31st it ascended the Simrol pass, halted on its summit to allow the artillery to close up, and the following morning marched into Mau The weather for the time of the year, the height of the monsoon had been exceptionally fine no rain had fallen to hinder the march of the guns over the sticky black soil On the night of the 1st of August, however the weather changed Heavy rains set in and continued throughout August and September But Durand was now at Mau, within thirteen and a half miles of the capital whence the mutinous conduct of Holkar's troops had forced him to retire just a month before He had returned to vindicate British authority, to punish the guilty, to give an example which should not be forgotten

Is joined by
the 3rd
Regiment
Cavalry
Haidarabad
Contingent.

Durand arrives
at Mau

Even before he had marched into Mau, whilst he was yet halted on the top of the Simrol pass, Durand had received a message from the Indur Durbar. Maharajah Holkar and his minister sent to inform him that they were still in a state of alarm as to the conduct of their own troops and to inquire whether aid could not be afforded to them. Durand replied that he was ready, if the Maharajah wished it to march with the entire force into Indur instead of into Mau. Apparently, this was not the end desired by the Durbar, for the messengers at once withdrew their requisition.

In deciding to march on Mau instead of Indur, Durand was mainly influenced by considerations regarding the state of the surrounding districts which will be presently adverted to. At the moment, indeed, there was another consideration which he had to take into account. He had with him no European infantry. Our companies of the 86th were indeed marching up by the Bombay road, and would join in a few days. But it was desirable, after the events which had occurred, that the Indur rabble should see in the British force the white faces of the unvanquished foot soldiers of England. Durand marched then on Mau.

The four companies of the 86th having joined a few days later, the propriety of marching on Indur to punish Holkar's guilty troops and the townspeople who had abetted the revolt again became a question for Durand's consideration. It was a very difficult question. That Holkar's troops had attacked the Residency on the first of July was a fact admitted by every one. But Holkar had asserted that this act had been committed without his sanction or authority. Durand himself was never satisfied of this. To the last he regarded Holkar as a trimmer, a watcher of the atmosphere, but officers who had occupied the Mau fort in July, notably Captain Hungerford, had been penetrated with the conviction that Holkar was innocent, and, in his letters to Durand, Lord Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay, had insisted on the same view. Under

* The force consisted of five troops 14th Light Dragoons 3rd Cavalry Ha darabád Contingent one horse battery of European artillery the 20th Bombay Native Infantry, and a pontoon train.

these circumstances Durand, duly weighing the difficulties presented by the case deemed it advisable to defer all action, so far as Holkar was personally concerned, until he should become acquainted with the views of the Governor General regarding him. He accordingly made a complete reference on the subject to Lord Canning.

Holkar, on his part, was naturally anxious to delay Durand's action as long as he could. He knew that, in his heart, Durand had thoroughly mistrusted him. And, although it was well known that, in the excited state of native feeling throughout the country, he could not depend on the conduct of his own troops, and would have been glad to see them coerced by the British, yet, when he thought of the possible results of such action, he inclined to prefer the uncertainty of his actual condition. Could he, he felt, but stave off the critical moment for a few months, Durand would be relieved by Sir Robert Hamilton, and Sir Robert Hamilton, an old and much regarded friend, would, he felt confident, accept explanations regarding the events of the 1st of July which Durand would utterly condemn.

Probable reason is for Holkar's conduct

The question of disarming Holkar's revolted troops whilst the personal case regarding Holkar was still pending, opened out difficulties of another description. The force at the disposal of Durand was small, and, though sufficient to dispose of the revolted troops of Indur, could these be encountered *en masse*, it was scarcely large enough to attack its several component parts in detail, holding the bulk in check whilst portion after portion should be destroyed. It must always be remembered, writing of this period that the revolt had at that time nowhere received a serious check. The force before Delhi was almost as much besieged as besieging. The English garrison of the Lucknow Residency was supposed to be at its last gasp, Havelock had made no impression upon Oudh, Bihar was surging with mutineers. The disaffected in central India might, then, well be excused if, regarding all these points they were not only hopeful, but confident, that resolute resistance on their part would serve the cause which they now regarded as the common cause of their co-religionists throughout India. Under these circumstances, it was to be apprehended that Holkar's troops, the three arms of which,

Reasons why Durand deter-
mines to de-
fer to a later
period any
movement
against Hol-
kar's troops.

each superior in numbers to the entire British force, were located in separate cantonments, might evince a strong disinclination to be disarmed, and that, morally supported as they were by a large party in the city of Indur, and, as I shall presently show, by a strongly aggressive party in the districts lying between Indur and Nimach, they might offer a resistance certain to entail great loss on the attacking party, and to cripple its future movements. This will be clear to the reader when, recalling the composition of the force at the disposal of Durand,* extremely weak in infantry, he reflects that a rainy season of unusual force was at its height, that the roads could be traversed by guns only with the greatest difficulty, that the bridges in many places had been carried away, and that any military operation against the several cantonments occupied by Holkar's troops would have to be carried out on a swampy plain on which at that season of the year, it would be impossible for the three arms to work together.

But there were other reasons which impressed Durand with the necessity of dealing in the first instance with those rebels in the districts, of whose aggressive tendencies I have just spoken.

Mandesar is a large and important town on a tributary of the river Chambal about a hundred and twenty miles from Indur. In the month of July this place had been occupied by some of Sindhiá's revolted troops, and these had been joined, and were being constantly further strengthened, by Afghan, Mehrání, and Mewáti levies. In August the insurrection at Mandesar threatened not only to embrace all western Málwa, but Nimach as well. Impressed with a confidence in themselves, justified only by the prolonged immunity which had been allowed them, the rebels at this place began, in the month of August, to display an aggressive temper far more dangerous than the sullen disaffection of the compromised troops of Holkar. The more active and daring of the mutineers of Holkar's army had proceeded to Gwalior after the insurrection of the 1st of July, the less energetic mass remained, sullen, dangerous, watching events, but to a certain extent paralysed, though not controlled, by the English party in power at Holkar's court. The progress of the Mandesar

Mandesar

becomes a
centre of in-
surrection

aggressive in
its nature

insurrection was, however, so rapid, that to uphold British supremacy in Rajpūtānā and Mālwa, and to maintain the line of the Narbadā, it became absolutely necessary to check its growth with the utmost promptitude. In the presence of this new danger, the disarming of Holkar's troops became, in every sense, a matter of secondary importance. An attempt to subdue the less or evil might have augmented the greater, whilst a decisive blow struck at the greater could not fail to affect fatally the lesser.

and requiring
the most
prompt at-
tention

Action in any shape was impossible so long as the heavy rains continued. But when, in the beginning of October, the monsoon passed away, and the country began to dry up, the Mandesar rebels began to give proof of the possession of the aggressive nature with which I have credited them.

The rains an
impediment
to prompt
action

The leader of the Mandesar insurgents was Tīrūzshāh, a Shāhzāda or prince connected with the imperial family of Dehli. It was estimated in September that some fifteen thousand men, with sixteen or eighteen guns, had rallied round his standard, and this estimate was subsequently found to have been below the actual number. To meet these, Durand, after deducting the sick and wounded, and a sufficient number of men to guard Māu, could not bring into the field more than fifteen hundred men* and nine guns.

Composition
of the Mande-
sar insur-
gents

Number of ef-
fective force

Under these circumstances it was perhaps fortunate that the aggressive movement was made by the rebels. Durand expected it. Towards the very end of September he had intercepted letters from Haidarābād from Nāgūr, from Sūrat, from Ujén, from Gwālār, and from Mandesar, all telling the same tale. The tale was to the effect that, after the conclusion of the Dasabā festival,† a general rising would take place in Mālwa, and that influential personages were coming

Durand
learns that
central India
is about to
rise in re-
volt

* Thus composed. Artillery, one hundred and seventy, Dragoons, two hundred, 86th, two hundred and thirty, 25th Bombay Native Infantry, three hundred and fifty, 3rd Nizām's Cavalry, three hundred and fifty.

† A festival of ten days' duration, nine of which are spent in worship and religious ceremonies. The tenth day is the birthday of Gangā (the Ganges). Whoever bathes in the Ganges on that day is purified from ten sorts of sins. The festival occurs in September or October, the date varying with each year.

from Nagpúr and Haidarábád for the purpose of giving life and strength to the insurrection. The close of the Dasahra corresponded with the setting in of the dry season. The

The rebels attempt to cut off Durand from Bombay

result corresponded with the information Durand had thus obtained. Early in October the Sháh-záda's troops, who had previously occupied Dhár and Amjhera, advanced to the Bombay road and threatened to interrupt Durand's communications with Bombay, to command the line of the Narbada along the Bombay frontier, and to attack Nimach. They sent also a pressing invitation to Holkar's troops to join them.

The vital importance of rapid action

Everything depended upon the rapidity with which Durand would be able to strike a blow at this enemy. Failing it, it was quite possible that Náná Sahib, who at that time was hovering in the vicinity of Kálpi, might transfer the whole of his troops to central India, and that the Marátha war cry might raise the entire country formerly acknowledging the supremacy of the Peshwa. Seeing the necessity, Durand struck.

Durand's force at Dhár

On the 12th of October he detached one body of Haidarabad cavalry to defend Mandlesar on the Narbadá, threatened by the rebels, and another to the village of Gujri to intercept them on their way. On the 14th he sent three companies of the 25th Native Infantry and some dragoons to support this last named party, and on the 19th, with all the men who could be spared from the garrison of Máu, he marched for Dhár.

If story of Dhár in me lately previous to the events of 1857

Anand Rao Puár, a lad of thirteen years, had succeeded to the chiefship of Dhár on the death of his brother, cut off by cholera on the 2nd of May 1857*. His minister, Rámchandar Bapuji, a shrewd and intelligent man, who, from his thorough knowledge of the English and from his large acquaintance with British officers, was supposed to be devoted to British interests, began, almost immediately after his assumption of office, to pursue a line of policy the very reverse of that which had been hoped from him. In direct opposition to the policy pursued by the Government of India ever since the settlement of Málwa, to prevent the

The loyalty of Rámchandar Bapuji.

* The formal recognition by the British Government only reached the young chief on the 23th of September, but he was acknowledged and treated as Rájah from the date stated.

employment of mercenary troops in native states, this man began to enlist large numbers of Arabs, Afghans, and Mekranis. As soon as the news of the Indur rising of the 1st of July reached Dhar, a party of these mercenaries, four hundred in number, joined with the mercenaries of the Rájah of Amphéra and plundered the stations of Bhopaur and Sirdarpur burning the hospitals over the heads of the sick and wounded. Returning to Dhár with their plunder, they were met and honourably received by Bhím Ráo Bhonsla, the young Rájah's uncle, and three of the guns which they had captured were placed in the Rájah's palace. On the 31st of August they were in possession of the fort of Dhar, with or without the consent of the Durbar was not certainly known. But on the 15th of October Captain Hutchinson, the political agent, reported that there was strong reason to believe that the Rájah's mother and uncle and the members of the Durbar were the instigators of the rebellion of the Dhár troops; that the conduct of the Durbar was suspicious; that its agent had purposely deceived him regarding the negotiations entered into by its members with the mutinous mercenaries and the number of men they had enlisted, and that it had received with attention and civility emissaries from Mandesar, the centre of the Muhammadan rising. It was this intelligence which decided Durand to dismiss the Dhár agent in attendance on him with a message to the Durbar that its members would be held strictly responsible for all that had happened or that might happen,* and to despatch all his available troops to attack Dhar.

On the 22nd of October the British force arrived before Dhar. The Arab and Mekraní levies who garrisoned that fort gave a signal instance of the confidence engendered by the long compulsory inaction of the British in quitting the protection of their lines of defence and coming to attack them in the open. Planting three brass guns on a hill south of the fort, they extended from that point along its eastern face in skirmishing order, and advanced boldly against the British.

* Durand repeated this warning to the Rájah in person during the siege of the fort.

He enlists
mercenaries,

whom a't r
the r plunder
of British
stations he
receives with
his own

Captain Hut-
chinson re-
ports the
complicity of
the Rájah's
family and
of the Durbar

Durand dis-
misses the
Durbar agent
with a
warning

The British
troops arrive
before Dhar

But their confidence soon vanished. The 25th Bombay Native Infantry, a splendid regiment, often to be mentioned, and always with honour, in these pages, led by their most capable commandant, Major Robertson, charged the three guns, captured them, and turned the guns on the rebels. Almost simultaneously, the four companies of the 86th and the sappers, flanked by Woolcombe's (Bombay) and Hungerford's (Bengal) batteries, advanced against the centre, whilst the cavalry threatened both flanks, the dragoons, under Captain Gill, the left, the Nizam's cavalry, under Major Orr, the right. Baffled in their advance by the action of the 25th, and the play of the British guns on their centre the enemy made a rapid movement to their left and attempted to turn the British right. But the dragoons, led by Gill, and the Nizam's cavalry, led by Orr and Macdonald, Deputy Quarter-master General of the force, charged them so vigorously that they retired into the fort, leaving forty bodies of their companions on the field. On the British side three dragoons and one native trooper were wounded, a *jāmīdār* and a native trooper were killed.

The fort was now invested, but the British force had to wait for the siege guns expected on the 24th. They arrived on the evening of that day, the next morning they were placed in position.

The fort of Dhar is entirely detached from the town of the same name. Its southern angle rests on the suburbs, the road running between. It is situated on an eminence of thirty feet above the surrounding plain, and is built of red granite, in an oblong shape conforming itself to the hill on which it stands. The walls are about thirty feet in height, and have at intervals fourteen circular and two square towers.

On the 25th a sandbag battery, two thousand yards south of the fort, armed with one 8 inch howitzer and one 8 inch mortar, began to shell the fort. Under cover of this fire the infantry pushed on to a low ridge, about two hundred and fifty yards from the southern angle of the fort, forming a natural parallel, and took possession of it. On this the breaching battery was at once constructed. Simultaneously, strong cavalry and infantry pickets were thrown out

on the north and east faces of the fort, security on the west face being assured by an extensive tank or lake which could not be forded. Durand was in hopes that the rebels seeing themselves thus surrounded, would spontaneously surrender. But although during the six days the siege lasted, they made many efforts to obtain aid from outside, acting and writing in the name of the Durbai under whose orders they professed to be defending the fort, they waited until, on the night of the 29th the breach had been made so large that its practicability was only a question of a day or two, ere they sent a white flag to inquire the terms which would be granted. "An unconditional surrender," was the reply, upon which the firing continued.

The rebels
ask for
terms

The reply

At sunset on the 31st the breach was reported practicable, and that night a storming party was detailed to assault the place. Never was a task easier. The breach was easily ascended. Almost immediately afterwards firing was heard on the plain. Whilst dragoons and irregulars were despatched in that direction, the storming party entered the fort. It was empty.*

The breach
practicable
and

the fort
evacuated.

In fact the rebels, foreseeing the assault, had quitted the fort by the main gate between 9 and 11 o'clock, and escaped in the direction of the north west. The firing heard on the plain at the moment the breach was entered was only a skirmish with the rear guard of the retreating enemy and an outlying picket of the 3rd Nizam's cavalry. The main body had passed by them and the dragoons† wholly unobserved and were well away before the alarm could be of any avail. Pursuit, though it could scarcely accomplish much, was attempted. It resulted, however, only in the capture of a few wretched stragglers.

Escape of the
rebels.

Pursuit
unsuccessful

Durand ordered the fort of Dhar to be demolished, the State to be attached, pending the final orders of Government, and charges to be prepared against the leaders and instigators of

* Sindhu and Dhar. Calcutta Press. Lowe's Central India. Private papers.

† It had unfortunately happened that the European pickets which had been there for some days, and which knew the ground well had to change it at very day. The trooper sent by the pindar of the native picket to give the alarm fell with his horse on the way, and was disabled.—Lowe

the rebellion * The force then continued its march through western Malwa towards Mandesar, in pursuit of the rebels. These latter, however, had by no means renounced their aggressive tendencies. On the 8th of November, they attacked the cantonment of Mehidpur garrisoned by a native contingent of the three arms, officered by English officers. Major Tinnimus, who commanded the contingent, imprudently permitted the rebels, without offering opposition to take up a strong position close round his guns and infantry. The men of the contingent, on their side, displayed mingled cowardice and treachery, the majority eventually going over to the rebels. Half a troop of the cavalry behaved, however, extremely well, and after making a gallant but ineffective charge, in which their leader, Captain Mills, was shot dead, and their native officer severely wounded, escorted the remainder of the European officers to Durand's camp, where they arrived on the 9th.

Two other affairs, which occurred during the pursuit of the rebels to Mandesar, deserve here to be recorded. The first was the capture and destruction of the fort of Amjhera by a small party of Haidarabad cavalry and infantry under Lieutenant Hutchinson. There was, indeed, no opposition, but the fact of the occupation was satisfactory, as it proved that Durand's rapid action had saved the line of the Narbadá and had maintained that barrier between the blazing north and the smouldering south.

The other action was one in which Major Orr and the Haidarabad Contingent was prominently engaged.

I have already stated* how one regiment of the Haidarabad Contingent had joined Brigadier Stuart's force on its march from Aurangabad. The remaining cavalry of the contingent and a large force of its infantry and artillery had, about the same time been formed at Fildabad, one of the chief outlets of the Dikhan, on the high road to central India. Here they remained until the monsoon had ceased and the roads had

* Ultimately, owing to circumstances upon which it is unnecessary for me to enter here they all escaped punishment. To the young Rájah himself merciful consideration was shown, and he was restored to his title and position.

† Vide p. 41

begun to dry up. They then marched with all speed into Málwa, and coercing on their way the refractory zamindárs of Piplia* and Raghugarh, reached Durand's force before Dhar.

Upon the news reaching camp of the successful action of the rebels at Mehidpur, Major Orr, with a small force, consisting of three hundred and thirty-seven sabres drawn from the 1st, 3rd, and 4th regiments Nizam's cavalry, was sent to follow on their track. The

Major Orr
surrounds the
Mehidpur
plunderers

second morning after he had left camp, Orr, having marched some sixty miles, arrived before Mehidpur. There he learned that the rebels had left the place the same morning, carrying with them all the guns, stores, and ammunition upon which they could lay hand. Orr stopped to water and feed his horses and whilst thus halting had the gratification to receive Mrs Timmins the wife of the commandant already mentioned, who had been unable to effect her escape with her husband. Having despatched that lady under a sufficient escort to rejoin her husband, Orr followed the rebels, and, after a pursuit of twelve miles, came up with their rear guard, about four hundred and fifty men with two guns, about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, at the village of Rawal. They were prepared to receive him. They had taken up a very

He catches
them up

formidable position, especially calculated to resist cavalry, their right resting on the village and their front covered by a muddy nullah or rivulet. Occupying this

Their strong
position

position, they hoped effectually to cover the retreat of their main body, conveying their stores, their ammunition, and the spoils of Mehidpur. But they had not counted on the gallant spirit of their enemy. Orr, and his officers Abbott, Johnstone, Clark, Murray, and Samwell, led their men forward, crossed the nullah, charged the guns, and then fought hand to hand with the enemy. The contest was desperate and continued till the

Orr gallantly
and success-
fully assails
1

sun went down. Then the rebels gave way and all their guns eight in number, and stores fell into the hands of the victors. The nature of the engagement may be gathered from the fact that the British lost

and carries it
though with
loss

* Called also and more correctly "Hath Ka Pipla" a town in the Dindia State, twenty eight miles east from Indur. Raghugarh lies two short marches distant from it.

† This lady had been concealed by a faithful tailor, who frustrated all the efforts of the rebels to discover her hiding place.

nearly a hundred men killed and wounded. Amongst the latter was Lieutenant Samwell, shot through the abdomen. The rebels lost a hundred and seventy five killed, and some seventy taken prisoners.

When the despatch containing the account of this affair reached Durand, he handed it over to Major Gall to read to the 14th Dragoons and 86th Foot. By these men it was heard with more than satisfaction, for it dissipated any doubt which might have been caused by the escape of the garrison of Dhar.

Durand now pushed on as fast as the baggage carts and the roads would permit him, and on the 19th of November reached Hernia on the banks of the river Chambal. The crossing of this river, unopposed as it was presented no inconsiderable difficulties. Its banks are rugged and almost perpendicular, its stream is deep and rapid, and its bed is broken by enormous boulders of basalt. The baggage of the force was carried almost entirely on carts drawn by bullocks, a few camels

only having been obtainable, and to convey these carts and the artillery guns across a river presenting the difficulties I have described would, under no circumstances, have been an easy task. That the rebels, hitherto so aggressive, should have

neglected the opportunity thus offered to them adds another to the many proofs in which this history abounds, that, brave as they were in fight, they understood little of the art of war. As it was,

nearly two days were spent in effecting the passage, nor was this possible until the sappers had cut a road down the bank for the artillery and carts, and another up the opposite bank.*

* "I never saw a more animated and beautiful picture in my life than when our brigade crossed this river. The steep, verdant, shrubby banks, covered with our varied forces, elephants, camels, horses, and bullocks, the deep flowing clear river, reaching on and on to the far east, to the soft deep blue tufted horizon, the babble and yelling of men, the lowing of the cattle, the grunting screams of the camels, and the trumpeting of the wary, heavily laden elephant, the rattle of our artillery down the bank, through the river and up the opposite side, the splashing and plunging of our cavalry through the stream—neighing and eager for the green encamping ground before them, and everybody so busy and jovial, streaming up from the deep water to their respective grounds, and all this in the face, almost, of an enemy formed a *tableau vivant* never to be forgotten"—*Lowes Campaign in Central India.*

The column halted the afternoon of the 20th on the east bank of the Chambal, and, marching early the following morning, encamped four miles south of Mandesar, in a position covered to the front by some rising ground, flanked on the left by a little village and gardens, beyond which again were several large topes some cultivated ground, and another village surrounded by gardens and trees. On the right of the British position were hills and villages, and between these and the rising ground in front already referred to was an extensive plateau, covered here and there with acres of uncut corn. Beyond it, again, the city of Mandesar.* A reconnaissance having indicated that all was quiet in front, the camp was pitched and the men went to their breakfasts.

Durand
approach s
Mandesar

Aggressive
h near of
the rebels.

But the rebels were again in an aggressive humour. Rumours had been industriously spread in their ranks that the British force had been repulsed from Dhár, and, in sheer desperation, was now meditating an attack on Mandesar. The leaders knew better, but they used all their efforts to give currency to the story. Consequently, about mid-day on the 22nd, the rebels, confident that they had before them only a dispirited and beaten column, sallied forth from Mandesar, and, marching gaily, took possession of a village surrounded by trees and gardens beyond the extreme left of the British line, and, making that village their extreme right, occupied, with two considerable masses, the plateau connecting it with Mandesar.

They
threaten the
British force,

The men in the British camp were at their breakfasts when the news of the rebel movement reached them. Instantly they fell in and the line formed, the dragoons on the extreme right, the Nizam's horse on the extreme left, Hungerfords and Woolcombe's batteries forming the right-centre, the bullock battery of the Hyderabad the left centre, the 86th and 25th Bombay Native Infantry the centre, and the Hyderabad infantry with the Madras Sappers on the left of the Hyderabad guns, opposite the village occupied by the rebels. The British guns at once opened fire, and Woolcombe's guns, pointed by Lieutenant Strutt, to be again mentioned in these pages, firing very

which turns
out to re-
ceive them

true,* the rebels wavered. An advance of the Haidarabáí troops converted their wavering into flight. The cavalry then pursued and cut up a number of them. The remainder escaped into the city.

and beats
them

Durand inter-
poses be-
tween the
Mandesar
and Nimach
rebels

The next day, the 22nd, Durand crossed to the right bank of the Mandesar river, and encamped to the west of the town within two thousand yards of the suburbs. His object was to gain a position whence he could threaten Mandesar with one hand, and the rebel force which had occupied Nimach,† and which, he had learned from spies, was now listening to the aid of their comrades, on the other. A cavalry reconnaissance showed the Nimach rebels to be in considerable force in the village of Gorariá on the high road to that place.

In that direction, then, Durand moved on the 24th. After a march of three miles, he espied the rebels about a mile distant, their right resting on the village, their centre on a long hill, and their left well covered by fields of uncut grain, with broken ground and nullahs in their front, full of water and mud.

Attacks the
latter at
Gorariá.

The British guns, opening on the rebels, soon overcame the fire of their five field pieces, and forced their line to fall back. They clung, however, with great pertinacity to the village of Gorariá, and on this, retiring from the centre and left, they fell back very slowly. Whilst the British were endeavouring to drive them from this position, a strong party sallied from Mandesar and attacked their rear. The Nizám's horse and the dragoons met the assailants boldly, and, after a sharp contest, drove them back with loss. In front, however, the British could make no impression on the village. The brigadier detailed the 86th and 25th Bombay Native Infantry to carry it with the bayonet, but the fire from it was so fierce that he countermanded the order, preferring to reduce it with his guns. When night fell the rebels still-

Desperate
conflict

* "Lieutenant Strutt's shooting was very true. All the while this firing was going on at the village, a fine fellow, dressed in white, with a green flag, coolly walked out from the cover, and sauntered leisurely along the whole line of our guns, while round shot and shell were whizzing about him in awful proximity. He occasionally stooped down, but never attempted to run; he then quietly retraced his steps, when a shot from Lieutenant Strutt struck him just before he regained the village."—*Lowe's Central India*.

† Vol IV. page 403

occupied Goraria. The British loss had been considerable, amounting to upwards of sixty officers and men killed and wounded.

At 10 o'clock next morning the 18 pounders and the 24 pounder howitzer were brought to within two hundred and fifty yards of the village, and the firing commenced. The place was shelled till it became a mere wreck, everything that could be burned in it was consumed. Still the rebels held on. At last, about mid day, some two hundred and twenty came out and surrendered. Those that remained were Rohilahs, and they stuck to the last brick in the place. About 4 o'clock the Brigadier directed that the firing should cease: the 86th and 25th Bombay Native Infantry then stormed the battered ruins.

Goraria is finally carried

The stern defence of the Rohilahs did service to their cause. Whilst the British force was dealing with them the Shahzada and his two thousand Afghans and Mekranis evacuated Mandesar and retreated on Nangarh. The cavalry, worn out by four days of unremitting exertion, was unable to pursue them.

The gallantry of the Polis allows the Shahzade to escape

Pursuit, however, was scarcely necessary. The blow struck at Goraria was a blow from which there was no rallying. The Afghans and Mekranis, as panic-stricken as they had been bold, fled through the country, ravaging towns and villages, and endeavouring to seek refuge in the jungles. One party of them, more daring than their fellows, suddenly appeared at Partabgarh. The loyal chief of that state, summoning his Thakurs, attacked them, killed eighty of them and drove the rest into flight. The others seemed, above all, anxious to place the Chambal between themselves and their conqueror.

The blow struck at Goraria is decisive

The objects which Durand had in his mind when he set out from Máu on the 14th of October had now been accomplished. With a force extremely weak in infantry, he had crushed the rebellion on the plateau of Málwa, thus saving the line of the Narbadá, and cutting off the disaffected troops of Holkar from the supports on which they had rested. The campaign, brief as it was, had proved decisive, and had vindicated to the letter the presence of Durand when, resisting every temptation to act otherwise, he resolved to allow Holkar's troops to rest until he should

The objects of the campaign achieved

have disposed of the Dhat rebels and the mutineers of Mandesar and Nimach

He was now at liberty to turn his arms against Holkar's troops. This he did. Leaving the Haidarabad contingent under Major Orr at Mandesar, and constituting Major Keatinge political agent for Western Málwa, he returned by Mehidpur and Ujjen, and reached the vicinity of Indur on the 14th of December, fully prepared to encounter the troops of the Maharajah should they offer opposition to his entrance into the city. But the spirit which had prompted the treacherous attack on the 1st of July quailed before the sight of a British force returning from victory over traitors. The Indur troops, held in check during Durand's campaign by the Mau garrison, had been utterly disheartened by the defeat of their sympathisers at Mandesar, and were as humble as some few weeks previously they had been boastful and defiant.

Near the ground on which Durand encamped on the 14th of December he met and disarmed Holkar's regular cavalry, and placed the men under the care of the Sikh cavalry of the late Bhopal Contingent. He sent likewise to Holkar's chief minister a letter, in which he insisted that the remainder of the troops should be promptly disarmed. Should this demand not be complied with immediately, he expressed his firm resolution to disarm them himself.

The reply came that afternoon. The agent who brought it expressed the intention of the Durbar to disarm the infantry at once, and the request that whilst the operation was being carried into effect Durand would halt at a point one mile from the cavalry lines. Durand complied, and Holkar's infantry, sixteen hundred in number, were quietly disarmed that same evening.

After the disarming had been completed, Durand, accompanied by a large body of the officers of the Mufci column, called upon the Maharajah in his palace in the city of Indur. It was the first time since the month of June that Durand had seen Holkar. Regarding him in his own mind as an accessory to the attack made upon the Residency on the 1st of July, Durand had sent a report of all the circumstances of the case to Lord Canning, and, pending a reply, had declined to renew personal relations with a prince who might possibly be adjudged by the supreme British authority in India to be a rebel. But when, after the Málwa campaign,

Durand
marches
on Indur

disarms
Holkar's
regular
cavalry

and engages
Holkar to
disarm the
infantry

Durand visits
Holkar

Holkar had acquiesced in the disarming of his cavalry and infantry, and his minister had promised that a suitable punishment should be meted out to the guilty, Durand, on the eve of being relieved by Sir Robert Hamilton, felt that the circumstances were not such as to warrant the omission of the ordinary courtesy required to be displayed on such an occasion. Holkar himself was anxious for the visit, and that it should be conducted with a ceremony and an ostentatious display of friendly intercourse such as would produce an impression on his people. Durand acceded. The visit went off well. Holkar was in good spirits, expressed himself delighted at the disarming of his troops and a hope that the act would be regarded by the British Government as a proof of his loyalty. Durand quietly, but firmly, impressed upon him that something further was yet required—the punishment of the guilty, whether soldiers or citizens—and stated his confident belief that the British Government and the British people would expect that this remaining duty would be properly carried out. Holkar gave an assurance that a Commission, which he had previously appointed, would make full inquiries into the matter. The interview then terminated. The next day Durand was relieved by Sir Robert Hamilton.

prompted by reasons of courtesy

Interview between Durand and Holkar

He had completed a noble task. His personal character had been the mainstay of British authority in central India. Had Durand not been there, the result had not been accomplished. This little sentence conveys to the reader more clearly than a multitude of words the vast value of his services. He was the representative of political power, and, virtually, the general, the brain and the hand, in a most important part of India. He foresaw everything, and he provided for

Durand's character created his career

His great capacity

everything. He foresaw even—his own despatches and memoirs written at the time show it most clearly—all that was to happen in the few months that were to follow, how the pacification of the North West Provinces would increase the pressure west of the Jamnali, the action of Naná Sahib and his nephews, the incursion of Tantia Topi. He saw equally clearly the line that should be, and that was followed. 'If his foresight affairs at Indur are successfully arranged,' he wrote on the 12th of December, 'I shall lose no time in marching the bulk of the Main column to Sihar with the view of concentrating Sir H

Rose's command, and enabling him to relieve Sagar, clear Bundelkhand and advance on Jhansi and Gwalior. In these lines Durand foreshadowed the course which he would himself have pursued and which Sir Hugh Rose did pursue. But it is his actual achievements which call for special commendation.

The value of his great achievement is In spite of his earnest entreaties in spite of the pressure exercised by Lord Elphinstone Woodburn had in June chosen to waste most precious moments at Aurangabad. Had that general not delayed at that Capua it is more than probable that the insurrection of the 1st of July would never have been attempted at Indur. But mark the conduct of Durand after that misfortune had happened. He hastens to meet Woodburn's column, now commanded by another officer, he meets it quickens its movements and brings it to Mau. He finds western

In spite of the incapacity and wrong-headedness of others Malwa in a state of aggressive insurrection and the only line which had remained a barrier between the Central Provinces and Bombay—the line of the Nerbada—sorely threatened. Of all the political officers in central India he alone understands the enormous importance of that line. He finds Mr Plowden from Nagpur Major Erskine from the Sagar and Nerbada territory, urging measures which would have lost it. Though pressed by many considerations to disarm Holkar's troops he receiving from no quarter a word of encouragement or support risks everything to save that important line. Then what do we see? With a weak column of five hundred Europeans of all arms and eight hundred natives* he sets out from Mau and in five weeks takes a strong fort fights several cavalry combats gains

he wins back for us more than he all that had been lost. three actions in the open field, takes more than forty guns crushes the Mandesar insurrection, saves the line of the Nerbada and marching back to Indur, causes the disarming of the disaffected troops of Holkar. In four months he more than counteracts the evil effected by an army of conspirators.

It was, I repeat, a noble work, nobly performed and, like many noble works left unrewarded. No man has been more calumniated than its author. No one more bravely fought the battle of life in face of calumny. I may add that of no man that ever

* Reinforced at Dhár by the Haidarabad troops.

lived will the career bear more acute and critical examination. Should the life of Henry Marion Durand be written with the fearlessness the occasion demands, * his countrymen will realise alike the worth of the man who, at a most critical period, secured a line the loss of which would have produced incalculable evils. They will learn, too, something of the nature of the smaller beings who aided in the attempt to calumniate, to insult, and to depreciate him. They will learn that it is not always the truly great man who occupies the most conspicuous position in the eyes of his contemporaries!

who were
also rivals,
though far
below him

Many officers distinguished themselves in this campaign. One of these, who for his daring, his gallantry, and his brain power was especially noticed by Colonel Durand, requires mention here. "Much of the success in quelling this insurrection," wrote Durand to Lord Canning at the end of November 1857, 'is due to the judicious daring, the thorough gallantry with which, whenever opportunity offered, Major Gall, his officers and men, sought close conflict with the enemy—a bold one, who often fought most desperately. I feel it a duty to Major Gall and H M's 14th Light Dragoons, men and officers, thus especially to beg your Lordship's influence in favour of officers and men who have merited, by conspicuous valour, everything that Her Majesty's Government may be pleased to confer. They deserve most highly." Durand also noticed with marked commendation the splendid services of Major Orr, Captain Abbott, and the officers and men of the Hindarabad Contingent and of the 25th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry. This regiment boasted a commanding officer, Major, afterwards Lieutenant Colonel, Robertson than whom no one rendered better service to the State. Captain Woolcombe, Lieutenants Strutt and Christie, of the Bombay Artillery, the last named of whom was shot by a bullet in the region of the heart † also greatly distinguished themselves. But there were many others in the same category. The list is too long.

Some of the
men who
served after
him

* This was written in 1879. The life has subsequently been written by his son.

† Captain Christie recovered from the wound, took part in the subsequent campaign, and was killed by a tiger some years afterwards.

CHAPTER III

THE SÁGAR AND NARBADA TERRITORIES, AND NAGPUR.

THE territories known as the Sagar and Narbada territories formed an extensive tract, bounded on the north by the British districts of Bandah, Allahábád, and Mirzapur, on the south by Nagpur and the dominions of the Nizam on the west by Gwalíar and Bhopal. Within these boundaries is comprehended the state of Rewah whose Rajah recognised the overlordship of the British. The other native feudatories, the feudatories of Koti, Maibir, Uchahárá, and Sohawal held their lands under grants from the East India Company. Within the limits of those lands, however, they exercised a ruling authority, subject to the interference, when necessary, of the paramount power. The larger portion of the Sagar and Narbada territories were directly British. This portion comprised the districts of Sagar, Jabalpur, Hoshangabad, Sion, Damoh, Narsimhpur, Betul, Jhansi, Chanderi, Nagod and Mandla.

When, in 1843, the Gwalíar Durbar commenced those hostilities against the British which culminated in the battle of Maharajpur the chiefs and people of the Sagar and Narbada territories, then ruled by Mr Fraser, C.B., as Agent to the Governor-General, broke out into open rebellion. This rebellion was due partly to the great dislike felt by the people to the civil courts, and more particularly to the mode in which they were administered, and partly to the propaganda of the Gwalíar Durbar. When, however, the pride of that Durbar had been lowered by the battle of Maharajpur, peace was restored to the Sagar and Narbada territories. Lord Ellenborough, who, throughout his Indian career, always displayed a marked detestation of proved

Sketch of the
later history
of those
territories.

abuses inaugurated the newly gained peace by making a clean sweep of the British officials serving in the territories and by sending one of the ablest officers in the Indian services the late Colonel Sleeman, to administer them on a new basis. Colonel Sleeman succeeded in pacifying the chiefs and in contenting the people. When, after a rule of two or three years he was promoted to be Resident at Lucknow, he handed over the territories to his successor, Mr Bushby, in perfect order. Mr Bushby's administration for five or six years was characterised by ability and good judgment, but when at the close of that period, he was promoted to the Residency of Haidwarid, the Sagar and Narbada territories were joined to the North West Provinces, then ruled by Mr Colvin, Major Erskine* receiving the appointment of Commissioner of Jabalpur, and becoming Mr Colvin's representative in the territories. Subordinate to Major Erskine were amongst others Captain Skene, Commissioner of Jhansi, and Captain Ternan, Deputy Commissioner of Narsimhpur.

With their transfer to the North West Provinces, the Sagar and Narbada territories came under the Sadr Board of Revenue. In accordance with its traditions, that venerable Board at once proposed changes in the administration so startling that, if carried out they would inevitably have caused a violent rebellion. Before finally deciding in favour of the proposed changes, Mr Colvin had the good sense to ask the opinion of the officer who had served longest in the territories, a man of remarkable sense and strength of character, Captain A. H. Ternan. Captain Ternan replied by pointing out the inapplicability of the rules of the Sadr Board of Revenue to the needs of the province, and the certain consequence which would follow any attempt to enforce them. Mr Colvin, struck by Captain Ternan's representations, withdrew nearly the whole of the proposed changes. It is to be regretted that he did not withdraw the whole for the few that he allowed, relating chiefly to the subdivision of properties, roused a very bad feeling, and led to many agrarian outrages.

They fall under the rule of the Aggra Board of Revenue

which proposes revolutionary changes

On Captain Ternan's representations on many of these are modified

Such was the state of the territories in 1855. The temper of

* Afterwards Earl of Kellie

the people, kindled by the cause I have mentioned, had not wholly subsided into its normal conditions of contentment. The outbreak in the North-West Provinces came inopportunately to inflame it still more.

Full lent remains to
soothe the temper of the
people

The small station of Narsinbpur on the Singli, sixty miles to the west of Sagar, was garrisoned at the outbreak of the mutiny by four companies of the 28th Madras Native Infantry under the command of Captain Woolley, an excellent officer. The Deputy Commissioner of the district, Captain Ternan, to whose calm and cool judgment I have already referred, had his headquarters also at Narsinbpur. The district of which this town was the capital was largely inhabited by petty chiefs, who had gone into rebellion in 1813, and who had never submitted willingly to British jurisdiction. So early as December 1856 there were not wanting indications that some great event was looming before the eyes of these men, but no European could venture an opinion as to the form that event would take. It happened, however, that one evening, in January 1857, Captain Ternan was sitting outside his tent, smoking a cigar, when the Kotwal* of the village came running to him, bearing in his hand some small chapatis or cakes of unleavened bread. On reaching Ternan, the Kotwal, out of breath and panting, stated that the cakes were the remnant of a large quantity he had received that morning, with instructions to leave them with the watchmen of every village to be kept till called for, that he had so distributed them in the neighbouring villages and that those which he held in his hand constituted the surplus. "What," he asked Ternan, "was he to do with them?"

It is first ex-
perence of
the chapatis
in circulation

Ternan, naturally shrewd, and that natural shrewdness sharpened by the experience of the rebellion of 1842-43, at once divined the truth. In those small unleavened cakes he saw the fiery cross sent through the land to unsettle the minds of the great mass of the people, that, distributed broadcast as the Kotwal had distributed them in his district, they would indicate a sudden danger that might come at any moment upon the people, threatening their caste and

Ternan
divines the
mystery

and reports
his views to
Major
Erskine

* A Kotwal is generally a chief officer of police

undermining their religion. He at once embodied these ideas in a report, which he transmitted forthwith to his official superior, Major Erskine.

Major Erskine was an officer who had written a book entitled "Forms and Tables for the Use of the Bengal Native Infantry." That book was a reflex of his mind. His mind was a mind 'of forms and tables.' His mental vision commanded the line of strict and formal routine. Out of that line he saw nothing; he was incapable of seeing anything. When, therefore, he received Ternan's report and read the conclusions drawn by that officer regarding the unleavened cakes, he ridiculed them; he considered the idea far fetched, absurd, impossible. He wrote back to Ternan to that effect, adding that it was simply a case of "a dyer's vat having gone wrong," and that the owner of the vat was propitiating the gods by the distribution of cakes.

Major
Erskine

utterly
decided
Ternan's
view

Subsequent events made it abundantly evident that Erskine was wrong and Ternan was right. Distributed broadly over the North West Provinces and in Oudh, in the earlier months of 1857, these cakes were the harbingers of the coming storm. It is certain now that they originated in the brain of the Oudh conspirators; of the men made conspirators by the annexation of their country, and they were sent to every village for the very object divined by Ternan—the object of unsettling men's minds of preparing them for the unforeseen, of making them impressionable, easy to receive the ideas the conspirators wished to promulgate.

Ternan's
pres. view
is justified
by events

I may record here a decision of the Government promulgated in the same district a year or two prior to 1857, and of the remarkable consequence it produced after the mutiny had broken out as illustrative of the influence which an able and conscientious English officer can almost always bring to bear upon native chiefs. One of the most influential chieftains in the territories under Captain Ternan's supervision was the Rájah of Dilléri, the feudal lord of all the Gónd clans. This chief had ever been loyal. For his fidelity and good conduct in the trying times of 1842–43, the Government had presented him with a gold medal. Like many of the Gónd tribe, he had been somewhat too profuse in his expenditure and had incurred debts, but, by exercising a strict economy,

The Rájah
of Dilléri

he had paid off those debts. Such was his condition in 1855, shortly after the Sagar and Narbada territories had been brought under the government of the North West Provinces. It had been a principle of that government, since the time when it was administered by Mr. Thomas, to discourage large landowners.

One morning in that year Captain Ternan received instructions, emanating from Agra, desiring him to inform the Rájah of Dilberí that, inasmuch as he was unfit to hold the title of Rájah and had proved himself incapable of managing his estates, he was deprived of both, that his title was abolished and that his property would be distributed among his tenants, he receiving a percentage from the rents! When this decision was most unwillingly announced to the Rájah by Captain Ternan, the old man drew his medal from the belt in which it was habitually carried, and requested the English officer to return it to those who had bestowed it, as they were now about to disgrace him before his clan and before the whole district.

With great difficulty Ternan pacified him. It was generally expected that he would break out into rebellion. He might well have done so for every member of the clan felt insulted in his person. Ternan, fearing an outbreak, pressed on the Government the mistake they had committed and urged them to rectify it. But the Government would not listen. The order was carried out. Ternan did all in his power to save the family from ruin, but even he could do little.

Before the mutiny broke out in May 1857, the old man had died, his son, too, had died. The next heir took the title—for, however the Government might order, the representative of the family was always Rájah to the people. Then came the mutiny of May 1857. The Narsinhpur district felt its shock. Muhammadans from across the border invaded the district and pillaged the villages. The outlook became every day more gloomy. 'Save yourselves while there is yet time,' said the loyal officials to Ternan. But Ternan stayed. One morning, however, early in June, his house was surrounded by a considerable body of armed men, with lighted matchlocks. Ternan saw at a glance that they all belonged to the Dilberí

clan. He at once summoned the chief and asked him what had brought him and his clansmen in such numbers and in so warlike a garb. The chief replied that he would answer if he and the other chiefs were allowed a private audience with their interlocutor. Ternan admitted them into his drawing room. The chief replied, 'You behaved kindly to us and fought our battle when the title and estate were confiscated, and you were abused for so doing. Now we hear disturbances are afoot, and we come to offer you our services. We will stick by you as you stuck by us. What do you wish us to do?' Ternan thanked them, accepted their offer, assured them they should be no losers by their conduct and promised to do his utmost to see justice done them. The members of the clan remained loyal throughout the trying events of 1857-58, resisted the urgent solicitations made to them to join the rebels, and, what was of equal importance they induced other clans to join them in rendering most valuable service to the British cause.

For their services to Ternan, and continued loyal to him every day of fortune.

I turn now to the part of the territories the chief centres in which were more purely military stations.

There were three military stations in the Sagar and Narbadá territories—the stations of Sagar, Jabalpur, and Hoshangabad. Sagar was garrisoned by the 31st and 42nd Bengal Native Infantry, the 3rd Regiment Irregular Cavalry, and sixty-eight European gunners. Jabalpur by the 52nd Bengal Native Infantry, and Hoshangabad by the 28th Madras Native Infantry. The commandant of the Sagar district force was Brigadier Sage, who had his headquarters at Sagar.

Garrisons of the Sagar and Narbadá territories.

Neither the news of the mutiny at Mirath nor the tidings of the nearer and more horrible events of Jhánzi,* affected, according to all appearance, the demeanour of the native troops at Sagar. Indeed, so conspicuous was their good conduct that, early in June, Brigadier Sage, not trusting them yet unwilling to openly display an opposite feeling, did not hesitate to send a detachment consisting of five hundred infantry, a hundred and twenty-five cavalry, and two 9 pounders, against a Rájah who had rebelled, promising them a reward of six thousand rupees for the capture

Brigadier Sage at Sagar.

of the said Rajah, dead or alive. A few days later, however, the brigadier had reason to feel that the policy of concealing distrust was not likely to answer better in Sagar than in the places where it had been already tried and failed. The station of Sagar was laid out in a manner which rendered it difficult for a commander with only sixty eight European soldiers at his disposal, to exercise a general supervision over every part of

The position
at Sagar

it. At one end of it were the fort, the magazine, and the battering train. At the other end, distant from it three miles and a quarter, was a commanding position known as the artillery hill. Both these points could not be retained. The artillery hill, though in many respects important as a position, wanted water and storing room for provisions. There was no question then, in the brigadier's mind as to the position which should be abandoned. Yet he laboured under this great difficulty, that the Sipahis guarded the fort and the treasury, and they took care to let it be surmised that they would yield neither the one nor the other. In a word, the station seemed to be at their mercy.

Affairs were in this position when, on the 13th of June,

At Lalitpur

Brigadier Sage received an application for assistance in guns from Lalitpur, a station in the Jhansi territory, though bordering upon that of Sagar, garrisoned by three hundred men of the 6th Infantry of the Gwalior Contingent. The brigadier promptly despatched two 9 pound is, escorted by one company of the 31st Native Infantry, one of the 42nd and seventy five troopers of the 3rd Irregulars. The detachment never reached Lalitpur. The very evening before it left Sagar, the three companies of the Gwalior regiment at that station had broken out into mutiny, had plundered the treasury, and had driven the European officers* to flee for protection to the Rajah of Banpur, who, under the pretence of being a friend, had been for some days in the vicinity of Lalitpur, exciting the Sipahis to mutiny.

For a moment I follow the action of this Rajah. Finding

The Rajah
of Banpur
rebels

that the rebel Sipahis had taken possession of the Lalitpur treasury, and were marching off with its contents, he attacked them, and was repulsed.

* Captain Sale commanding Lieutenant Irwin, second in command his wife and two children, Dr O'Brien, and Lieutenant Gordon, Deputy Commissioner of Chandera. They were made over to the Rajah of Shahgarh, by whom they were kindly treated. Ultimately they were all released.

Thus baffled, he sent off his European guests to the fort of Tehri, there to be confined and then marched in haste to meet the detachment coming from Sagar, with the view of inducing the Sipahis composing it to join him.

Major Gaussen, commanding that detachment, had reached Malthon, forty miles from Sagar, when he heard of the mutiny at Lalitpur and of the movement of the Banpur Rajah. He at once halted and wrote for reinforcements. Sage replied promptly by sending four hundred infantry and one hundred cavalry. The night previous to the day on which those men were ordered to set out, great commotion reigned in Sagar, and it seemed as though mutiny might break out at any moment. The danger passed, however. Brigadier Sage, though urged by many of those about him to put an end to the terrible suspense by striking a blow with the few Europeans under his orders, remained impassive. He had resolved to act only when the Sipahis should commit themselves unmistakably to revolt.

Major Gaussen with a detachment from Sagar reaches Malthon

The detachment marched the following morning the 19th of June, and joined Major Gaussen on the 23rd. Gaussen then marched with his whole force against the fort of Balabat, held by the rebels, stormed it, and took sixteen of the garrison prisoners. The Sipahi stormers promised these men their lives, and two days later, on the return of the detachment to Malthon, they insisted on their release. Major Gaussen being powerless to refuse the demand, they released the prisoners, and made them over to the Banpur Rajah. No sooner had this act been accomplished than that Rajah entered the British camp, and openly offered the Sipahis a monthly pay of twelve rupees if they would leave their officers and go over to him with their arms and ammunition! The Sipahis agreed, dismissed their officers, and joined the Rajah.

His men revolt.

The information brought by the returning officers to Sagar decided Sage to act promptly. He saw that, if he were to wait till the rebel Rajah should march on Sagar, he and his sixty-eight men would be surrounded and lost. Accordingly he at once, and in the most judicious manner, began his operations. He first moved the contents of the treasury into the fort, to the same

Sage prepares for a decisive movement.

* In blowing open the gate Ensign Spens of the 31st was accidentally killed. Lieutenant Widdoughby of the artillery was wounded.

place he next conveyed the contents of the expense magazine and the artillery magazine, and, last of all, he removed thither the women, the children, and the baggage of the European artillery. As soon as this had been accomplished he took a guard of Europeans and relieved the Sipáhi guard at the fort gate. Thus, by a few decisive strokes, the one following the other with rapidity, Sago gained a place of refuge, secured the contents of the magazine, and saved the treasure.

The second day after, the morning of the 30th of June, whilst the ordinary grand guard mounting was progressing, Sago marched the Europeans and sixty cavalry, who remained loyal, into the fort. He then sent for all the native officers, and, frankly telling them the reason of his action, added that they had suffered

acts of mutiny to take place without opposing them and had forfeited their character, that there was yet one method open to them of regaining it, and that was to have the leading mutineers seized and delivered up to justice.

The native officers of the three regiments, apparently very much affected, promised everything. The next morning, however, the 3rd Irregulars and the 42nd Native Infantry broke into open mutiny and plundered the bazaars and the bungalows of the officers. The 31st held aloof, professing loyalty, and on the 7th of July, one of their men having killed a trooper who had fired at him a

desperate fight ensued between the two native infantry regiments. The 31st, being unable to make much impression on the 42nd, who had two guns, sent into the fort to implore assistance. Sago despatched to their aid the sixty loyal troopers. A good deal of fighting then ensued, but, in the midst of it,

forty of the 31st deserted to the 42nd. Still the bulk of the loyal regiment persevered, and, when evening fell, they sent again to the fort to implore assistance in guns. Sago replied that it was too late to send them that night, but in the morning he would bring them victory. The disclosure of this message to the two belligerent parties fixed the 31st in their loyal resolves, whilst it so dispirited their opponents that during the night they fled, pursued for some

miles by the loyal Sipáhis and troopers, who captured one of the guns. When the victors returned, it was ascertained that

whilst the entire 31st, the forty above alluded to excepted, had remained loyal, fifty of the 42nd had followed their example and the sixty loyal troopers had been joined by at least an equal number of the same temper from out stations.

The brigadier now devoted himself to strengthening the mud fort. He had supplies and medical stores for six months, and a sufficiency of guns and ammunition.

The in the
Sagar fort

The able bodied men of the Christian community were gradually drilled, and, as they numbered nearly sixty, Sage soon had at his disposal a force of a hundred and twenty three fighting men. The number was not at all too large, for the duties were heavy, there were a hundred and ninety women and children to be guarded and occasionally parties of Bundela rebels into whose hands the surrounding country had fallen, made known their presence by a sudden volley. They invariably however, disappeared in the jungles on the first appearance of pursuit.

The districts—in close vicinity to each other—of Jabalpur, of Sagar, of Chandéri, of Jhansi, and of Jalaun, continued, from this time until the arrival of the relieving force under Sir Hugh Rose to be over run by rebels, Sipahi and other. These harried the country, captured forts, plundered villages, for a long time with impunity. Before I narrate the manner in which they were ultimately dealt with, it will, I think be advisable to clear the ground by recording the events passing at the other stations in this part of India.

The districts
of the
native

Of Lalitpur I have spoken. Jabalpur, a hundred and eleven miles south-east from Sagar, has next to be noticed.

This station was, in 1857, garrisoned by the 52nd

Jabalpur

Native Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel

Jameson. It was the head quarters likewise of Major Erskine,

the chief political officer in the Sagar and Narbadá territories.

For a few weeks after the news of the mutiny at Mirath had

reached Jabalpur the men of the 52nd showed no sign of dis-

affection, but it soon became clear that they too were only

watching their opportunity. On the 16th of June

one of the men attempted to murder the adjutant,

and, though the man in question was subsequently

released on the ground of insanity, the conduct of his

comrades a little later proved that there had been method in his

murder. They assumed the usual airs of authority, treated

The conduct of the
52nd Native
Infantry

their officers with patronising familiarity, and declared that they would only mutiny if a European regiment were sent to disarm them. The folly of retaining the ladies and children at the station—a folly which had been pointed out to Major Erskine, but upon which he had insisted—became then apparent.

The news that a native brigade was advancing on Jabalpur from Kamthi would appear to have produced a good effect on the men of the 52nd, for in the interval between the period I have referred to and the arrival of the brigade, 2nd of August, they were usefully employed by Major Erskine in repressing disturbances in the district. The Kamthi movable column—for it was no

For a time
they do good
work in the
district.

The Kamthi
column
arrives

more—consisted of the 4th Madras Light Cavalry under Captain Tottenham, the 33rd Madras Native Infantry under Colonel Millar commanding the column, a battery of Field Artillery under Captain Jones, and one company Rifles of the Nagpur Irregular Force, under Lieutenant Pereira. This column marched into Jabalpur on the 2nd of August. After a halt there of a few days, the larger portion of it was sent into the neighbouring districts to restore order. During its absence an old Rajah of the Gond dynasty, Shankar Shah, his son, and some adherents of his house were convicted, on the clearest evidence, of plotting the destruction of the English at Jabalpur, and the plunder of the station. On the 18th of September the father and

Rajah Shankar Shah
and his
son mutiny
and are
punished

son were blown away from guns the adherents being reserved for the following day. But little doubt was entertained that the incriminated Rajah and the incriminated son had made many efforts to seduce the men of the 52nd from their allegiance.

To allay, then, the excitement which it was apprehended their execution might create in the minds of the rank and file, Colonel Jamieson and other officers of the regiment proceeded almost immediately to the lines, and explained to the men that the Rajah and his son had merely paid the penalty for proved misconduct. They judged, from the manner of the men, that they had removed all apprehensions from their minds. At 9 o'clock

The 52nd
Native
Infantry
marched

that night, however, the entire 52nd regiment marched quietly out of the station, without noise or alarm, and proceeded some twenty miles without a halt to the Tahsildari of Patan. At that place

was stationed a company of their own regiment commanded by Lieutenant MacGregor. MacGregor, who naturally had no intimation of the proceedings of the regiment, was surprised, and at once placed in confinement under sentries. The Sipahis then sent in to their colonel a letter, most respectfully worded, in which they announced their intention of marching to Dehli, and offered to release MacGregor in exchange for ten Sipahis left behind in Jabalpur. This offer not having been complied with, the rebels kept their prisoner till they were attacked, and then shot him.*

s. I kill one
of their
officers

But, long before the commission of this atrocity, information of the high handed action of the 52nd Native Infantry, and orders to return to Jabalpur, had been conveyed to the Madras column in the district. That column consisting of four hundred men of the 33rd Madras Native Infantry, the rifle company of the 1st Madras Native Infantry, one troop of the 4th Madras Light Cavalry, and four guns, manned by European gunners, happened to be at Dinich, sixty five miles to the north west of Jabalpur. It started at once, on the 21st of September. On the night of the 25th it encamped at Sangrampur, about twenty five miles from its destination. Between this place and Jabalpur, close to a village called Katangi flows a navigable river, the Hiran, the passage across which, it was thought possible, might be disputed by the 52nd. To secure the means of crossing it, a party, consisting of the grenadier company 33rd Madras Native Infantry, under Lieutenant Watson, and a few troopers of the 4th, under Major Jenkins left the camp at 2 o'clock in the morning of the 26th. At daybreak, as they were nearing Katangi, Jenkins and Watson, who were riding in front of their column, were suddenly fired at, and almost immediately surrounded. How they escaped it is difficult to imagine. It is, however, a fact, that notwithstanding all the efforts made by the Sipahis, they fought their way through them and reached their men. These were

A Madras
column
ma-
hes
at
5
ad Native
Infantry

At a
vanced
party
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them

fights
thru
th n

* MacGregor's body was found by the officers of the Madras column with one ball through the neck, both arms broken, and his body perforated with thirty or forty bayonet wounds. Major Erskine had previously offered eight thousand rupees for his release.

not numerous enough to take the aggressive. Jenkins, there
 and waits for the main body fire, drew them up on a hill difficult to
 escalade, and there awaited the arrival of
 the main column.

To this column on the point of starting about 6 o'clock in
 the morning information arrived in an exaggerated form of
 the events at Katangí. The two European officers were reported
 killed, and the rebels were said to be pressing on in force.
 Iager to avenge their officers and relieve their comrades the
 gallant native soldiers of the coast army hurried forward. On
 reaching the mouth of the gorge leading to Katangí they found
 the 52nd had taken up a very strong position, both flanks
 covered by thick jungle. Without hesitating, they opened fire
 from the guns and then attacked the rebels with the bayonet
 and drove them before them. On reaching Katangí
 they were joined by Jenkins and Watson. The
 pursuit was continued beyond that place. In
 Katangí the lady of MacGrigor, murdered that
 morning, was found. The rebels suffered severely. A hundred
 and twenty five dead were actually counted on the field, and it
 is certain that many more were wounded. On the side of the
 victors one man was killed and fifty were wounded. The
 column then returned to Jabalpúr.

This was not by any means the only skirmish which took
 place in the Sagar and Narbada territories during
 the autumn of 1857. In my story of the trans-
 actions at Sagar, I have alluded to the conduct of the
 Banpúr Rajah. This rebel chief, still hoping to
 gain greatly by the downfall of the British had
 after a great deal of promiscuous plundering taken up a
 position at Niráulí about nine miles from Sagar, and had
 strongly intrenched it. Against this position a force was sent
 from the Sagar fort on the 15th of September, under the
 command of Lieutenant Colonel Dalzell, 42nd
 Native Infantry. The expedition was not success-
 ful, for, though the rebels suffered severely from
 the fire of the British guns Colonel Dalzell was
 killed and the loss of the attacking party in killed
 and wounded was very severe. The intrenchment was not
 stormed.

This affair did not increase the chances of the restoration of
 order. The remnant of the 52nd Native Infantry, numbering

some five hundred and thirty men, continued, after its defeat at Kutangi to ravage the country. Joining the adherents of rebel Rajahs these men took advantage of the withdrawal of the Madras column from Damoh to plunder that place and to release the prisoners left there. They then took possession of a strong fort, about thirty miles from Sagar called Garhakot, situated on a tongue of land in an angle formed by the rivers Sonar and Gulhairi, and from this they constantly sallied forth to plunder and destroy. In fact as the year drew to a close, in spite of the fall of Dehli the daring of the rebels increased whilst the handful of British, shut up in the stations at long distances from each other and powerless to interfere effectually, could do little more than hold their own. Several skirmishes indeed occurred but with no decisive result. In one of these early in November, near Jabalpur, the Madras troops defeated the enemy but their commander, Captain Tottenham was killed. In others, the defeat of the rebels merely signified a disappearance from one jungle to appear immediately in another.

The country
is still
ravaged by
the rebels

In preceding pages of this chapter I have alluded to the conduct of Captain Ternan in the Narsinhpur district. I must devote a few lines to the military operations in that quarter. The garrison of Narsinhpur consisted of four companies of the 28th Madras Native Infantry under Captain Woolley. These Sikhs unlike the bulk of their brethren in Bengal, continued through out the period of 1857-58 loyal and true. In November 1857, led by Woolley and accompanied by Ternan, they restored order in the disturbed parts of the district co-operating for that purpose with a detachment sent from Sagar under Captain Roberts of the 31st Bengal N I and Captain Mayne of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry. Its action was most successful. The districts north of the Narada were cleared of rebels and, in a hand to hand encounter with the largest body of them, the rebel leader Ganjan Singh, a landowner of considerable consequence was slain, and nearly all his followers were destroyed. Ternan who had his horse shot under him in this encounter, then urged a rapid march upon Singhpur a place held by a noted rebel called Dalganjan.

Woolley
operated on
the Narsinh
pur district.

Woolley

Ternan

Roberts.

Mayne

* The following is the official report of this gallant operation. On this occasion Captain Ternan took a party of the Irregular Cavalry (some of the

His advice was followed, and Dalganján was taken and hanged. The following month another fatal blow was dealt to the insurgents near Chitrápúr. When Woolley reached this place it was found evacuated. Ternan, however, pushing on a small party in search of the rebels, succeeded in surprising them and capturing their tents, a 4 pounder gun, and many native weapons. This enterprising officer followed up the blow in January 1858 by completely defeating the invading rebels from Rátgarh and Bhopal at Malanpúr. By this vigorous stroke Ternan finally cleared Narsimhpúr district of all rebels of consequence.

Before describing the measures ultimately taken to reverse the British authority throughout this part of India it is necessary that I should take the reader for a moment to Nagód.

Nagód is a military station in the Uchahára district, distant forty eight miles from Rówah, a hundred and eighty from Allahábád and forty three miles from Sígár. The garrison in 1857 consisted of the 50th Bengal N I., commanded by Major Hampton. Up to the 27th of August this regiment had displayed no mutinous symptoms, and the men were regarded by their officers as staunch and loyal. It happened, however, that at the time the 52nd Native Infantry decamped from Jahulpúr in the manner already described, a rumour reached Nagód that Kunwar Singh was marching on that place. The men of the 50th were accordingly ordered to prepare to march against that warrior. They appeared delighted at the order, made all the necessary preparations with alacrity, and on the date above mentioned marched. They had not, however, reached the second milestone from Nagód when a voice from the ranks gave the order to halt. The regiment halted. Some of the men then told the officers that their services were no longer

3rd Irregular Cavalry known as Talis Horse who had remained loyal) in advance of the rest of the troops and coming on Ganján Singh—"of Sínjápúr also called Dalganján Singh—"surrounded by about two hundred armed followers charged him at once under a sharp fire. The success of the troops was most complete. Captain Ternan behaved with much distinction and his horse was shot under him." Not a few days afterwards as Friskine says but then and there being completely surrounded Ganján Singh and his chief followers were taken prisoners, and the chief himself and several others hanged the next day. Most of the rebels were killed during the action however.

required, and that they had better go. Opposition was useless. A few faithful men escorted the officers and their families to Mirzapur, whilst the remainder, returning to Nagod, plundered and burned the place and then inaugurated in the district a career similar to that of their brethren of the 52nd.

but they
in boy
and savage
the district

Réwah I have already stated, is a small native state, ruled by a quasi-independent Rajah, recognising the suzerainty of the British bound to them by treaties, and having a British Resident at his court. In 1857 the resident political agent was Lieutenant Willoughby Osborne, an officer of the Madras army, possessing great strength of will, a courage that never faltered, and resolute to do his duty to the utmost. Left unfettered Willoughby Osborne almost always did the right thing but, like many other men conscious of their powers, he writhed under the sway of self-appreciative mediocrity. Happily, at Réwah, he was unfettered.

Réwah

Willoughby
Osborne

The town of Réwah lies little more than midway between Allahabad and Sagar, being a hundred and thirty-one miles south west of the former, and one hundred and eighty-two miles north east of the latter. It is built on the banks of a small river the Behar, a tributary of the Tons*. Around it runs a high and thick rampart still nearly entire, flanked by towers many of which have fallen into decay. Within this outer defence a similar rampart immediately environs the town, and still further inward a third surrounds the residence of the Rajah. It is a decaying place, and the population in 1857 scarcely exceeded six thousand.

Descriptive
of the town
of Réwah

The residence of a Rajah whose ancestors had been proud of their independence surrounded by districts in which mutiny was rampant, lying many miles from the route of the British armies between Calcutta and the North West, Réwah, in June and July of 1857, seemed utterly lost. Not, however, to Willoughby Osborne. The first point to which that able officer directed his efforts was to win the Rajah. His character had, indeed,

Glance at the
political
situation of
Réwah

* The list of places at the commencement of this volume. Of the three rivers known as the "Tons" that here is mentioned is the South Western Tons which rises in the state of Mahrar.

already gained the respect and admiration of the prince, but in such times as were then upon them it became necessary that the princes of India, especially the small Pájahs, should feel that they had everything to lose, nothing to gain, by the success of the mutineers. Osborne succeeded in instilling that feeling into the mind of the Rájah. On the 8th of June he was able to announce that the Rajah of Rewah had placed his troops at the disposal of the Government of India, that the offer had been accepted, and that eight hundred of those troops, with two guns, had been sent to Amarpatan—a place commanding the roads to Jabalpur, Nagód, and Sagar—ready to oppose insurgents from any of those stations and to intercept communications with the rebellious villages on the Jannah. He dispatched about the same time eleven hundred of the Rajah's troops and five guns to the Katri pass, about midway to Mirzápur, and whence a rapid advance could be made on that important commercial city, on Banáras, or on Chunar, as might be deemed advisable. A week later he obtained the Rajah's sanction to send seven hundred troops to Bandah, and he induced him to issue a proclamation promising rewards to any of his soldiers who should distinguish themselves by their gallantry and loyalty.

The measures taken by Willoughby Osborne had a very marked influence on affairs in Bundelkhand. There, as in the adjacent territories the smaller chieftains, mostly men of impoverished fortunes, thought the opportunity too favourable to be lost. They, too, rose in revolt. But Osborne was incessantly on the watch. By the skilful disposition of the Rajah's troops, and by the display of an energy which never tired, he baffled all the earlier efforts of the rebels. By the exercise of similar qualities he kept open the important line of road between Mirzapur and Jabalpur, a necessary part of the available postal route between Calcutta and Bombay. In a few weeks he was able to take an active offensive against the insurgents. He defeated them at Kanchanjur and Zarah, then advancing on their stronghold—Muhar—he stormed that city on the 20th of December, pushed on to Jakhani, captured that place, thus opening thirty six miles of road in the direction of Jabalpur.

Tact and
judgment
displayed by
Willoughby
Osborne.

He gains the
Rájah

and sends his
troops to
it and the
districts.

Excellent
effect of
Osborne's
policy on Bun-
delkhand.

He takes
the hill
of Mhar
in great
force.

At a date considerably later he, in the most gallant manner, captured the important fort of Bujraglugarh. Owing solely to the indefatigable exertions of this gallant Englishman, the rebel cause not only found no footing in Bundelkhand, but it lost way in the adjacent territories.

Nagpur, till 1853 the capital of the Bhonslá dynasty, and since that period the chief town in the Central Provinces and the head quarters of the Chief Commissioner, is a large straggling city, about seven miles in circumference, having in 1857 a population somewhat exceeding a hundred thousand. Close to the city, on its western side is a lilly ridge running north and south, known as the Sítalálí, possessing two summits one at each extremity, the northern being the higher, the southern the larger, but both commanding the city.

Outside of but near the city were the arsenal—containing guns, arms, ammunition, and military stores of every description—and the treasury of the province containing a large amount of cash. To protect these and the city, the Commissioner, Mr George Plowden, had, of European troops, one company of Madras artillery, whose head quarters were at Kámthí eleven miles distant. The local

native troops at his disposal were thus stationed—at Kámthí or in Nagpur itself, the head quarters of the 1st infantry, the 1st Cavalry, and the artillery of the Nagpur irregular force, at Chaudá eighty five

miles south of Nagpur, were the 2nd Infantry, and a detachment of the 1st, of the same force, at Bhandari forty miles to the east of Nagpur, was another detachment of the 1st Regiment, the head-quarters and greater part of the 3rd Regiment were at Biláspúr, a hundred and thirty seven miles still further in the same direction, the remainder of that regiment was at Biláspúr on the Arjá a town in the same division. These, I have said, were local troops. Kámthí was likewise the head-quarters of a brigade of the

Madras army. The troops stationed there in 1857 were the 4th Madras Light Cavalry, the 17th, 26th 32nd, and 33rd Native Infantry, and the European artillery already alluded to. Brigadier H Prior commanded the Nagpur subsidiary force.

Very soon after the events of May 1857 at Miráth became known to the native population of the Central Provinces, symptoms of disloyalty began to be manifested by the troops,

and performs
wonders.

Nagpur

Description
of the
position

Mr George
Plowden.

The local
troops.

and those
of the regular
army at
Kámthí.

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and sends his
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Excellent
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Outside of but near the city were the arsenal—containing guns, arms, ammunition, and military stores of every description—and the treasury of the province containing a large amount of cash. To protect these and the city, the Commissioner, Mr George Howden, had, of European troops, one company of Madras artillery, whose head-quarters were at Kámathi eleven miles distant. The local

native troops at his disposal were thus stationed: at Kámathi or in Nagpur itself, the head-quarters of the 1st infantry, the 1st Cavalry, and the artillery of the Nagpur irregular force, at Chandí eighty-five miles south of Nagpur, were the 2nd Infantry, and a detachment of the 1st, of the same force, at Bhándarí forty miles to the east of Nagpur, was another detachment of the 1st Regiment, the head-quarters and greater part of the 3rd Regiment were at Biláspur, a hundred and thirty-seven miles still further in the same direction; the remainder of that regiment was at Bilaspur on the Arka a town in the same division. These, I have said, were local troops. Kámathi was likewise the head-quarters of a brigade of the Madras army. The troops stationed there in 1857 were the 4th Madras Light Cavalry, the 17th, 26th, 32nd, and 33rd Native Infantry, and the European artillery already alluded to.

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and performs
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Nagpur

Population
of the
place.

Mr George
Howden.

The local
troops.

and those
of the regular
army at
Kámathi.

especially by the cavalry portion, of the local force. In the position he occupied, ruling a large city, dependent for physical aid upon a few European gunners and five native regiments Mr Plowden could not afford to pass unnoticed even the symptoms of mutiny.

Still less could he afford it when all the circumstances of the intended rising, to the extent even of the signal which was to set it in action,* were, on the 13th of June, revealed to him.

Mr Plowden then resolved to act and to act promptly. He arranged with Colonel Cumberlege, who entirely trusted the men of his own regiment—the 4th Light Cavalry—that the troopers of

the local regiment should be disarmed on the 17th of June. Colonel Cumberlege performed the task with skill and tact, and without bloodshed.

Mr Plowden followed up this blow by so strengthening the two peaks on the Sitahaldi hill, that they might serve as a refuge for the residents of Nagpur in the event of an outbreak

in or about the city. He at the same time converted the Residency into a barrack in which the civil and military officers should congregate during the night.

The precautions were effective. Notwithstanding serious alarms, no outbreak actually occurred. The Madras soldiers remained faithful, and, when a column comprising many of them was despatched to Jalilpur,† the departing men were replaced by others of the same army not less loyal and true.

The position was the more difficult in that the province of which it was the capital was isolated. No part of it was used as a high road for troops. No Europeans could be spared for it from their more pressing duties of crushing the revolt in Oudh and in the North West

Provinces. Its safety was in the hands of the Commissioner. For it he was responsible. It was his duty, with most inadequate means, to assure it.

Fortunately, Mr George Plowden, who represented the Government at Nagpur, was a gentleman of lofty courage and imperturbable nerve. Without

* The mutiny was to have broken out on the 13th of June: the signal to have been the ascent of three fire balloons from the city. The confession of one of the ringleaders, caught in the act of seducing the men of the 1st local infantry, gave the first intimation of the plot.

† See page 70.

appliances, he acted as though he possessed them. Left without external resources he regulated his conduct as though they were abundantly at his command. And he succeeded. Eventually when the first fever heat of mutiny had subsided he restored their arms to the local troops. There is no truer test of a man than this capacity to meet dangers and difficulties when he is unarmed—to look them calmly in the face—to remain cool and unperturbable in their presence. If to do this thoroughly, to face disaffection boldly, and by daring self-assertion to force it to inaction, finally to submission—if this be a proof of greatness—then most assuredly Mr George Howden deserves to be classed amongst the great men brought to the front by the Mutiny of 1857.

Great credit
due to Mr
George
Howden.

CHAPTER IV.

THE DOMINIONS OF THE NIZAM.

It will clear the ground if before I record the action of the British generals which restored order throughout central India, I deal with the events in a part of the country already slightly touched upon in the first chapter of this book, and upon the issue of which depended, to a very considerable extent, whether the rebellion would or would not extend throughout the length and breadth of southern and western India. I refer to the dominions of the Nizam.

Those dominions—called after the capital, Haiderabad, the abode of Haider—occupy a portion of India south of the Vindhya range, and enclose about ninety five thousand three hundred and thirty seven square miles. Measuring from their extreme point in the north east, they extend four hundred and seventy five miles to the south west and in their widest part they give almost a similar measurement. On the north east they are bounded by the central provinces, of which Nagpur is the capital, on the south west by portions of the Madras Presidency, on the west by the Bombay Presidency, and on the north west by a portion of the same presidency, by the dominions of Sindhia, and by the Sagar and Narbada territories. A consideration of this proximity to so many inflammable points will convince the reader how dangerous would have proved a Haiderabad in arms, how essential it was that tranquillity should be maintained within her borders.

When the year 1807 dawned the Nizam was Nasir ud daulah. This prince died however, on the 18th of May, and was succeeded by his son Afzul ud daulah. The minister, Salar Jang nephew of his predecessor,

the troops* By that time it had become known that the influence of Salar Jang was not less weighty with the new ruler than it had been with his predecessor That loyal minister, on learning that a large mob had assembled near the mosque known as the Mekka mosque, and had hoisted there a green flag sent down a corps of Arab mercenaries upon whom he could rely to disperse them Subsequently he arrested the principal leaders of the movement, and for the moment the plague was stayed

and by Salar
Jang.

Bad feeling
produced on
the popula-
tion by the
news from
the north
west

Only, however, for the moment The information which poured daily from the outer world into the city, often in an exaggerated form made every day a deeper impression upon the minds of the more bigoted of the population They argued that, whilst their co religionists had risen for the faith in the north west it was not becoming in them to sit idle in the south They recalled to the minds of listeners, likewise impressionable and fanatically disposed that little more than half a century had elapsed since Dohli, the capital of the Muhammadan world of India, had fallen into the hands of the infidel, that a supreme effort had now recovered it and that, if that effort were supported by the entire Muhammadan community of the Dakhan, the recovery would be made complete, the gain would become permanent These were no idle words They sank deep into the minds of the people of Haidarabad—a people that had never known Euroj can rule, and that had never welcomed its approach to their borders In a few weeks they produced corresponding acts

Muhy at
Haidar
abad.

mutineers

Salar Jang
warns the
Resident.

A little before 5 o'clock on the evening of the 17th of July, five hundred of the Rohilah troops in the service of the Nizám, supported by some four thousand of the mob of Haidarabad, rose in insurrection and marched on the Residency, demanding the release of thirteen and deserters, who, caught red handed in revolt, had been made over by Major Davidson to Salar Jang That minister, who was not very well served by his agents only heard of the outbreak just

* The garrison at or near Haidarabad consisted of a battalion of artillery, the 7th Madras Light Cavalry the 3rd Madras Europeans the 1st, 22nd 21th 34th 41st, 42nd and 49th Native Infantry The force known as 'The Haidarabad Subsidiary Force,' was commanded by Brigadier afterwards Sir Isaac Coffin.

on the eve of its occurrence. He at once sent a special messenger to warn the Resident. Major Davidson, however, in anticipation of some such movement, had improvised defences all round the Residency, had mounted guns on the newly erected bastions, and had warned his military secretary, Major Briggs to arrange the troops at his disposal in the manner best calculated to meet a sudden attack. Seven minutes then sufficed to send every man in the Residency to his post. The insurgents came on, in the manner of undisciplined fanatics, drunk with excitement, without order, and without leading, properly so called. A fire of grape from the ramparts sent them reeling back. They came on again, only similarly to be received, and similarly to retire. Staggered by this reception they were beginning to recover from their mental intoxication, when a charge of the Nizam's troops decided them to flee in confusion. Many of them then took refuge in a two-storied house, at the end of a narrow street. In this place it was resolved to allow them to stay till the morning. They did not, however, avail themselves of the permission. Mining under the floor, they escaped during the night. In this attack on the Residency, several of the rebels were killed, in their flight from the Nizam's troops more were taken prisoners. Amongst the latter were the two ring leaders, Torabáz Khan and Maulavi Alla ud din. The former, attempting to escape, was shot dead, the latter was tried, convicted, and transported to the Andaman Islands.

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and capture
of their
leaders

The manner in which this wanton attack terminated produced a very salutary effect on the minds of the Hyderabad population. It showed them very clearly that their own rulers, men of their own faith, sided with the British. It needed but one word from Salar Jung to rouse the entire country. Not only was that word not spoken but the fanatical Muhammadans were made clearly to understand that, in the event of their rising, they would have to deal not with the British only, but with their own Government as well.

Good effect
produced
at Hyderabad
and I.

Still the situation grew daily more critical. The city of Hyderabad had ever been filled with military adventurers. The custom of importing Arabs from beyond the sea and of forming of them regiments

The situation
still critical

of peculiar trust, had long prevailed. But, in addition to the *Arafs*, there used to come from every part of India those adventurous spirits to whom the sober administration of the British gave no avocation. From Rohilkhand, from the Panjab, from Sindh, from Delhi, and from the border-land beyond the Indus, men of this stamp had never been wanting. To them were added, in the autumn of 1857, adventurers more dangerous still. The mutinied and disbanded Sipahis who had been unable to reach Delhi, or whose offers had been rejected by Sindhiá, poured in shoals into Haidrabad. Combining with the other classes I have mentioned, and who gave them a cordial welcome, they helped to swell the ranks of the disaffected and to impart to them a discipline in which the others were lacking.

The presence of these men added not a little to the difficulties of Salar Jang and the Nizâm. Every rumour of misfortunes befalling the British arms, which reached the city, roused feelings which might at any moment prelude an outbreak. If we think of all that was happening in the North-Western provinces—of the miseries of Kanlipur, of the long siege of Delhi, of the league of Lakhnâo, of Havelock's three retirements, of the events at Agra, at Indur, at Jhansi, at Bandah—we shall understand very easily why this was so. It must be remembered, too, that rumour magnified every skirmish into a battle, every repulse of the British into a catastrophe, whilst it but faintly whispered, or whispered only to discredit, the victories gained by the foreigners. When we think of the news of these disasters coming upon an inflammable people, hating, with the intolerant hate of religion, the dominant infidel, armed to the teeth, and chasing under their forced inaction, we may well wonder how peace was, by any means, preserved.

But peace was preserved—mainly owing to the excellent understanding between the Government of the Nizâm and the British Resident. Whilst the former used all those arts which a powerful native government has so well at command, to check the fanatical ardour of the disaffected, the Resident, acting in concert with the Nizâm, applied for a larger force of European troops to overawe the same class. In

consequence of these representations Davidson received later in the year a reinforcement of a regiment of cavalry, a regiment of infantry, and some artillery.

Whilst thus securing his base, Major Davidson was not unmindful of another means for employing the trained soldiers of the Nizâm—the soldiers of the Haidarabad contingent, led by English officers—in a manner which might transfer the sympathies of the great bulk of the people from whose ranks these soldiers were drawn, to the British cause. Acting in concurrence, then, with the Nizâm and Salar Jang, and with the full approval of the Government of India, he formed towards the beginning of 1858 a brigade from the regiments of the contingent, and sent it to act in central India. This brigade was composed of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th regiments of cavalry, of the 3rd and 5th regiments of infantry, and of three field batteries of artillery. The splendid deeds of these troops will be narrated in their proper place. But I will not wait to record that the other purpose which had suggested this action to Major Davidson was entirely accomplished. The successes obtained by these soldiers elated the relations they had left behind them, and these came, in a very brief period, to regard as their own the cause for which their kinsmen were fighting. From that time forward all anxiety ceased in Haidarâbâd itself. In some parts of the districts the disturbances which arose were speedily quelled, and, with one exception, no chieftain of rank showed the smallest inclination to question the wisdom of the policy adopted by the Nizâm and his minister.

That exception was the Rajah of Shorapur*. Shorapur is a small territory situated in the south west angle of the Nizâm's dominions. The Hindu chief who had ruled it had fifteen years prior to 1857, fallen into pecuniary difficulties so great that he found himself unable to fulfil his obligations to his suzerain, the Nizâm. Certain arrangements, unnecessary here to detail, followed, which ended, after the death of the Rajah, in the administration of the country falling for a time into the hands of the British. This arrangement lasted

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Success and
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Davidson's
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Shorâpûr

unable to

Its condition
antecedent
to the
mutiny

* For a most interesting account of the Rajah of Shorâpûr and the causes which led him to revolt I refer the reader to the *Story of My Life* by the late Colonel Meadows Taylor, one of the most charming of autobiographies.

till 1853, when the country was handed over to the native ruler in a very flourishing condition. The young Rájah, however, soon dissipated his resources, and, finally, became so embarrassed as to be utterly reckless. He was in this state of mind when the events of 1857 occurred. With the record of the disasters attending the British came whispers of the advantages which must accrue to him from a successful rebellion. The Rájah had not the strength of mind to resist the temptation. Intoxicated by the promises made him, he called together the men of his own clan, and began to levy Rohilla and Ardhmercenaries.

Full intelligence of the doings of the Rájah was quickly conveyed to Major Davidson. Well aware that to prevent an outbreak even by an extravagant display of force was far wiser and far cheaper than to allow it to come to a head, Davidson at once took decisive measures. Acting in concert with Lord Dalhousie, who displayed on this occasion, as on every other, a far-sighted policy and a rare unselfishness, he called up, with the sanction of that nobleman from the Bombay Presidency a force under Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm, consisting of a detachment of European troops, the Maratha Horse, the 15th Bombay Native Infantry, and a battery of artillery. This force he located at a point equidistant between the Shorápur and the southern Maráthá country. At the same time he arranged that a force from the Madras Presidency, under Major Hughes, should watch the eastern frontier of Shorápur, whilst he detached four hundred men and two guns of the Hyderabad contingent, commanded by Captain Wyndham, to occupy Lingsugur, ready to act in concert with either of the other forces, as necessity might require.

Before these preparations had been completed Cuthbert Davidson, hoping to save the Rájah from his own folly, despatched to his court, early in January 1858, one of his own most trusted assistants, Captain Ross Campbell. Campbell, however, only wasted his efforts. The Rájah had given himself to the fatal party. Not only did he continue deaf to all entreaties but he was, it is believed, prepared to connive at the murder of his guest. This, at least, is certain, that Captain Campbell received an intimation from the Rájah's

Colonel Malcolm's force, which was expected that night, before attempting any thing further

But the Rajah did not wait for Malcolm. Dispirited by the failure of his attack on Wyndham, and aware that reinforcements were approaching, he gave up the game as precipitately as he had entered upon it, and, accompanied by a few horsemen, fled that night towards Haidarabad. Arriving there, with but two followers in his train, he made a fruitless attempt to gain the protection of the Arabs. Despairing of a refuge, he was found wandering in the bazaar, was apprehended, and taken to Salai Jang, who made him over to the Resident.

The departure of the Rajah led to the immediate evacuation of Shorapur by the hostile bands. Colonel Malcolm, who arrived on the evening of the 8th, entered the town the following morning and found it almost deserted. Captain Ross Campbell assumed charge of the administration of the country.*

So ended the only serious attempt made to disturb the tranquillity of the Dakhan†. The preservation of that tranquillity was essential to the maintenance of the British power in India. There can be no question but that the rising of Haidarabad, headed by the Nizam, would have been a blow struck at the heart. The whole of western and southern India would have followed. Central India, the dominions of Holkar, and Rajputána could not have escaped, and it is more than probable that the communications between Calcutta and the North West would have been severed. That this calamity did not occur is due to many causes. The far-sighted and generous policy of Lord Elphinstone did much, the Governor of Madras, Lord Harris, contributed all that was possible for a man in his high position to contribute. Major

* The story of the Rajah's end is tragical. He was sentenced to death but the Governor General commuted the punishment to four years imprisonment after which he might be restored to his territory. The very day the Rajah received this news he shot himself, Colonel Meadows Taylor thinks accidentally — *Vide Story of My Life*, Vol. II.

† The literal meaning of the term 'Dakhan' is "south." Hence the south of India is called 'The Dakhan' i.e. "the south." It is often incorrectly spelt 'Deccan,' 'Dekhan,' 'Dekkan.'

Cuthbert Davidson displayed a skill, a tact, and an energy far above the average; he was well served by his subordinates Colonel Malcolm, Major Hughes, Captain Wyndham, and their comrades executed with marked ability the tasks entrusted to them. But the efforts of these men, great and valuable as they were, would have been utterly un-
but mainly
by the
Nizam and
Salar Jang
 availing had the Nizam and his minister not
 seconded them. For three months the fate of India
 was in the hands of Asrûl ud dâulâh and Sâlar Jang. Their
 wise policy proved that they preferred the certain position of a
 protected state to the doubtful chances of a resuscitation of the
 Delhi monarchy under the auspices of revolted Sepâhia.

BOOK LIV—CENTRAL INDIA, KĪRWĪ GWĀLIĀR, AND THE
SOUTHERN MARĀTHĀ COUNTRY.

CHAPTER I

SIR HUGH FOSB AND CENTRAL INDIA

In a previous chapter of this history* I stated that Colonel Durand had been appointed to act as agent for the Governor-General at Indur in consequence of the departure of the agent, Sir Robert Hamilton, to Europe on leave. Sir Robert Hamilton, on hearing of the mutiny at Mirath, at once asked permission, though he had been but six weeks in England, to return and join his appointment. The application was granted, and Sir Robert arrived in Calcutta in August 1857.

Very soon after he had reached Calcutta, Sir Robert Hamilton was called upon by the Government to state the measures which he considered necessary for the restoration of tranquillity in central India. There were very many reasons why it was natural that the Government should be anxious to have his views on this important subject. Sir Robert Hamilton was a very eminent public servant. He had passed the greater part of his career in high official positions in central India. Not only had he traversed every inch of that territory, but he knew the exact distances between village and village throughout it, the lay of the ground, the disposition of the people, the peculiarities which constituted either a bond or a division between the several districts. Sir Robert had trained

* Sir Robert
Hamilton

mutiny at

arrives in
Calcutta

Q. 2. Mr. H. F. of Sir R. Hamilton to all the Government regarding central India

This plan approved, Sir Robert Hamilton proceeded to India, and arrived there on the 16th of December, 1857, and not only resumed the appointment of Governor General's Agent for central India, but took up likewise the political functions in respect of all the chiefs in the Sagar and

Sir Robert relieves Howard and assumes political charge of the country to be traversed by the British forces.

Narbada territories, which, till then, had been exercised by the Commissioner of those territories

The day that witnessed the return of Sir Robert Hamilton greeted likewise the arrival of the officer who had been nominated by Lord Canning to command the force which, having its base at Mun, was to work up to the southern bank of the Jamnah. That officer was Major General Sir Hugh Rose, K C B.* Sir Hugh Rose bore, even then, a high character for ability, decision, and firmness. Entering the army in 1820, he had early

Character and antecedents of Sir Hugh Rose

given proof of those qualities, and when, in 1840 the Government of the Queen decided to detach several British officers to serve in Syria with the view of checking the progress of the rebellious Pasha of Egypt, Lieutenant Colonel Rose proceeded thither in the capacity of Deputy Adjutant General. Here he distinguished himself no less by his judgment than by his daring courage. In a hand to hand encounter with the Egyptian cavalry, in which he was wounded, Colonel Rose captured with his own hand the leader of the enemy, an exploit which procured for him a sash of honour from the Sultan and the Order of the Nishan Istihar set in diamonds. For his conduct in Syria too, he was decorated with the companionship of the Bath. A little later he was nominated by Lord Palmerston Consul General of Syria.

in Egypt

When, a few years subsequently, Russia was preparing to make her bid for the inheritance of the "sick man," Colonel Rose was nominated secretary to the embassy at Constantinople. Later on, just before the storm broke, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe proceeded to England, and Colonel Rose succeeded him as *chargé d'affaires*. Holding that office he not only penetrated the designs of Russia, but detected that the one means by which England could foil them was to put her foot down, and say, "One step further constitutes war." Impressed with this idea, when

at Constantinople

* Afterwards Field Marshal Lord Strathnairn, G C B, G C S I, &c.

Prince Menschikoff endeavoured to impose upon the Sultan terms which would have annihilated the independence of Turkey, and the Sultan, turning to the British *charge d'affaires* implored him to give a material pledge of the support of England by bringing the British fleet into Turkish waters. Colonel Rose took the responsibility upon himself, and ordered the fleet, which was then lying before Malta, to Besika Bay. The fact that such an order had been sent answered for the moment the purposes of the Sultan. Russia was checked, and if she renewed her attack it was because the same firmness and the same clear sightedness were not apparent in the conduct of the British ministers who approved the admiral for refusing to comply with Colonel Rose's requisition.

Subsequently Colonel Rose served in the Crimean war. He was recommended for the Cross of the Legion of Honour for his conduct at Alma, was repeatedly mentioned for distinguished conduct in the trenches before Sebastopol, and had two horses shot under him at Inkerman. I cannot omit to add that Marshal Canrobert then commanding the French army in the Crimea recommended General Rose for the Victoria Cross for his gallant conduct on three different occasions, and that the claim was not preferred solely because general officers were expressly excluded from the decoration. For his services in this war General Rose received the Turkish order of the Medjidie, was nominated a Knight Commander of the Bath, and received a step in rank for distinguished conduct in the field.

When the mutiny broke out in India Sir Hugh Rose proceeded at once to that country. He landed in Bombay on the 19th of September, was brought on the general staff of the army from that date and was shortly appointed to the command of the force acting in Malwa the operations of which I have recorded in this volume*. He proceeded accordingly to Indur in company with Sir Robert Hamilton, who had taken the only route then open that led to Bombay.

Simultaneously, almost, with the appointment of Sir Hugh Rose to command one of the columns indicated, Brigadier General Whitlock of the Madras army was nominated to direct the other

In the
Crimea.

Sir Hugh
lands in
Bombay.

General Whitlock is
appointed to direct the
Madras column.

The proceedings of this officer will be related in the next chapter. This will be devoted to the operations of the Mau column.

The force now called the Central India Field Force, of which Sir Hugh Rose took command on the 17th of December, consisted of two brigades—the first being at Mau the second at Sihor. The brigades were thus formed. The first under the command of Brigadier C. S. Stuart of the Bombay army, was composed of a squadron 14th Light dragoons, a troop of the 3rd Bombay light cavalry, two regiments of cavalry Hyderabad contingent, two companies of the 86th Regiment,* the 20th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry, one regiment infantry Hyderabad contingent three light field batteries—one belonging to the Royal Artillery one to that of Bombay, the third to Hyderabad—and some sappers, the second commanded by Brigadier Stuart, 14th Light Dragoons of the head-quarters of the 14th Light Dragoons, head quarters of the 3rd Bombay light cavalry, one regiment of cavalry Hyderabad contingent, the 3rd Bombay European Regiment,† the 24th Bombay Native Infantry, one regiment of infantry Hyderabad contingent, a battery of Horse Artillery, one light field battery, one battery Bhopal artillery, one company Madras sappers a detachment of Bombay sappers, and a siege-train; this latter was manned, when brought into action, by draughts from the field batteries.

From the second chapter of the last book the reader will have gathered some idea of the hard work which had already devolved upon this force, he will have seen how the men composing it had triumphed over obstacles, had beaten every enemy, had proved incontestably that they were made of the stuff which required only leading to conquer. They had now once more a leader. Personally, indeed, that leader was a stranger to them, but his reputation had gone before him, and that reputation was of a nature to make the men grudge even the short period of repose which it was necessary that they should take.

That repose was necessary for the perfect carrying out of the plan devised by Sir R. Hamilton with Sir Colin Campbell in Calcutta by virtue of which a second force, that to be commanded

An account of the progress of the force.

A short period of repose was necessary to enable the force to move in concert with it.

* The remainder of the companies of this regiment joined just before the attack on Chandni.

† Now the 2nd Battalion, Leinster Regiment.

river, and then completely invested the place. Fronting the eastern face he posted the Bhopál troops, facing the northern, the 3rd Bombay light cavalry and the cavalry of the Haidarabad contingent. With the remainder of the force he occupied the plain across which runs the road to Sagar. He then reconnoitred the ground preparatory to selecting sites for his breaching batteries.

The enemy, falling back as Sir Hugh advanced, had re-occupied the town. Issuing from its walls into the thick jungle already spoken of, they made thence, during the 20th, several raids on the camp followers and baggage animals of the force, and at night even attacked the position held by the Bhopál troops. They were, however, repulsed with slight loss.

Early the following morning Sir Hugh Rose made a move forward. Crossing the Sagar road with the 3rd Europeans, followed by the 18 pounders, howitzers, and mortars, and the guns of the Haidarabad Contingent, he entered the jungle. But no sooner had he reached a point well within its thick covering, than the enemy, who had been lurking near, fired the jungle grass on all sides. For a few moments the position was perilous, but Sir Hugh, turning back beyond the range of the flames, sent his sappers to cut a road for the guns up the height to the north of the town. This operation and the bringing up of the guns occupied the greater part of the day.

Meanwhile the remainder of the force had occupied the town, and driven the enemy within the fort.

At 3 o'clock the summit of the hill fronting the northern face of the fort was gained. Sir Hugh at once selected sites for his breaching batteries, and set the sappers to work. By 8 p.m. the mortar battery was ready. Whilst it was being thrown up the 6-pounders of the Haidarabad contingent maintained a constant fire of shot and shell on the fort, whilst the 3rd Europeans employed their Enfield rifles to keep down the matchlock fire of the enemy. At 11 p.m. the mortar battery opened fire, and continued it all night. The breaching batteries were completed by daybreak.

These opened fire early on the morning of the 27th, and continued it all that day and the day following. At 10 p.m. on

The rebels make an offensive defence

The rebels fire the jungle and force Sir Hugh to change his point of attack.

Sir Hugh gains the town.

Sir Hugh's mortar batteries open on the fort.

the 28th a large breach had been made, and two men went forward to examine it. They had just returned when a sudden rush of camp followers and cattle drivers from the rear gave intimation that some thing startling had happened. It transpired immediately that a rebel force was advancing to the relief of the place.

The breach
ing has been
open

It was so indeed. The Rajah of Banpur whose doings in the vicinity of Sagar I have already recorded,* was advancing on the rear of the besieging force with a considerable body of revolted Sipahis and other levies. He came on with great boldness, his standards flying and his men singing their national hymns. But, if his appearance at this critical juncture was a surprise to Sir Hugh Rose, it was a surprise that did not embarrass him. Instead of ceasing his fire against the fort he redoubled it. To deal with the Rajah of Banpur, he at the same time detached a small force, consisting of a detachment of the 14th Light Dragoons, the 3rd Bombay cavalry, the horse artillery and the 5th Hyderabad infantry. It did not require extraordinary exertion to effect this object. The confidence of the Rajah and his followers vanished as they heard the tramping of the horses of the British and Indian cavalry. They did not wait to be charged but throwing away their arms and ammunition, made off with such celerity, that, though hotly pursued, a few only were cut up.

The Rajah of
Banpur
marches to
relieve the
place

hot vanishes
on the
approach of
the British
troops

The attempt at relief, apparently so formidable, was really a stroke of fortune for Sir Hugh. It had been made, evidently, in concert with the rebels within the fort, and its failure so disheartened them, that they silently evacuated Rahatgarh during the night, escaping by a path the precipitous nature of which seemed to preclude the possibility of its being used by man.† Their flight was not on the whole to be lamented for Rahatgarh was found

Rahatgarh is
thereupon
evacuated

* Vide page 66 and the pages following.

† The most amazing thing was to see the place from whence they had escaped. To look down the precipitous path made one giddy—and yet down the place where no possible footing could be seen they had all gone—men and women—in the dead of the night! One or two mangled bodies lay at the bottom attesting the difficulty of the descent. Nothing but despair could have tempted them to have chosen such a way.—*Dr Lore's Central India during the Rebellion of 1857-58*—a book to which I am much indebted.

to be so strong as to make it tenable by a few resolute defenders against numbers greatly superior

The rebels were pursued, but without much effect, they had gone too far before the evacuation of the place had been discovered. A little before noon on the 30th Sir Hugh received information that the Rájah of Banpur, reinforced by the garrison, had taken up a position near the village of Barodiá, about fifteen miles distant. He at once ordered out the horse

The rebels
took up a
position at
Barodiá.

artillery, two 5½-inch mortars, two guns of the reserve battery, the 3rd Europeans the majority of the cavalry, and a section of the Madras sappers, and went in pursuit. About 4 o'clock he came upon

them posted on the banks of the Bindá, and prepared to dispute his passage. Sir Hugh at once attacked and, though the rebels fought well he forced the passage of the river. The country on the other side was thick and bushy, and the rebels took

where they
were attacked
and beaten
by Sir Hugh

every advantage of it. From the river to Barodiá Sir Hugh had to fight his way step by step. He did not do this without loss. Two officers* were killed and six were wounded. The casualties

among the men were likewise severe. In the end, however the rebels were completely defeated, and, though the rebel Rájah was not captured, he owed his safety only to his acquaintance with the intricacies of the jungle. The force returned to Rahatgarh about 2 o'clock in the morning. It found there a supply of provisions sent from Sagar escorted by a detachment of the 31st Regiment Native Infantry.

The fall of Rahatgarh had effected two most important objects. It had cleared the country south of Sagar of rebels had reopened the road to Indur, and had made it possible for the general to march to the relief of Sagar, now beleaguered for nearly eight

He not gained
by the fall
of Rahatgarh

months

The state of Sagar has been recorded in a preceding chapter of this volume. Its situation remained unaltered. Although, during the interval since we left it, the garrison had made occasional sallys more or less successful, it may be stated generally that the rebels

Sagar since
the reader
last visited
it.

had retained possession of the strongholds all over the district,

* One of these was Captain Neville RE. He had joined the force only the day before. Captain Neville had served throughout the Crimean war, in which he greatly distinguished himself.

and that, by means of these they had possessed likewise the country. The manner in which they had used their usurped power had made the peasantry look earnestly to the time when the law enforcing rule of the British should be restored.

That time had now arrived. Sir Hugh Rose marched from Ráhatgarh direct on Sagar. He entered that place on the morning of the 3rd of February, escorted by the Europeans officers and others, who had held the fort, and who had gone forth to welcome their deliverers. The 31st Native Infantry was one of the very few regiments of the Bengal army which, retaining its arms, had remained faithful throughout that trying period. The greater honour to the 31st for its companion infantry regiment had revolted, and it had been tempted on all sides.

Sir Hugh
marches on
Sagar
and enters
it

The 31st
Native
Infantry

Some of those companions had now to be dealt with. Twenty five miles to the east of Sagar stands, on an elevated angle of ground, the strong fort of Garhakótá. The eastern face of this fort is washed by the wide river Sonar,* the western and northern faces by the nullah Gidári, with precipitous banks, the south face possesses a strong gateway flanked by bastions, and a ditch twenty feet in depth by thirty in width. So strong are the parapets of this fort that when, in 1818 it was attacked by Brigadier Watson with a force of eleven thousand men, he was unable, in three weeks to effect a breach in them, and was glad to allow the garrison to evacuate the place with all the honours of war! In February 1858 it was held by the revolted Sipahis of the 51st and 52nd Native Infantry, and other rebels, well supplied with ammunition and provisions.

The fort of
Garhakótá.

Its great
strength

Sir Hugh Rose sent a small force to destroy the fort of Sanoda on the 8th, and on the 9th of February marched towards Garhakótá. He arrived within sight of it at half past 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 11th. Whilst the men were taking up their assigned positions he made a reconnaissance, which was not concluded.

Sir Hugh
arrives
before it and
reconnoitres

* The Sonar rises in the Sagar district at an elevation of one thousand nine hundred and fifty feet above the sea. It holds a north-eastern course of one hundred and ten miles receiving the Barma on the right and eight miles lower down falling into the Ken on its left.—THORNTON (New Edition)

till 8 p.m. He found that the rebels had thrown up earthworks
 on the road to the south, by which they had expected him to
 arrive, and that they were occupying a position close to the
 village of Basiri, near the fort in some force. Notwithstanding
 the lateness of the hour, he at once drove them from
 the positions they held, and occupied Basiri, nor,
 though during the night the rebels repeatedly
 attacked him, could they regain the posts they had

lost

The next day Sir Hugh commenced his attack. He first
 caused a breaching battery to be thrown up opposite the western
 face. A 24 pounder howitzer working all day from this battery
 soon silenced the enemy's guns. Lieutenant Strutt
 of the Bombay artillery, already referred to in these
 pages succeeded in dismounting one of the enemy's
 guns which had been worked very successfully
 against the assaults. It was this shot, "one of the many
 good shots made under fire by Lieutenant Strutt" which in Sir
 Hugh's opinion made the Sikaris reflect on the
 casualties which might befall them. Certainly,
 after their experience of Strutt's correctness of aim,
 they lost heart. In the night they consulted, and

determined to escape if they could. Unfortunately Sir Hugh
 Rose's force was so small, a great part having been left at Sagur,
 that he had been unable to place a portion of it in a position
 which would guard the gateway. By this gateway, then the
 Sikaris made their way into the country during the night of
 the 12th. They were however, pursued early the following
 morning for twenty five miles by Captains Hare, with his
 Haidarabad cavalry, two troops of the 14th Light Dragoons
 under Captains Neel and Brown, and a division (two guns) of
 horse artillery under Lieutenant Crowe. Hare came
 up with the rebels at the Bias river, near the village
 of Pina, led his guns and cavalry across it, opened
 fire on the enemy, then charged and pursued them
 for some distance, inflicting considerable loss.

Garhikotā was found full of supplies. Sir Hugh had its
 western face destroyed and returned to Sagur on the 17th.

Jhansi, a hundred and twenty five miles to the north, was
 the next point to be aimed at. But between Sagur
 and Jhansi lay the passes of Malthon and Madanpur
 the forts of Surahi and of Maraura the towns of

Shahgarh and Bampur* After overcoming the certain obstacles which these places would probably offer, Sir Hugh would have, before marching on Jhansi, to effect a junction with his 1st brigade under Brigadier Stuart

Before setting out on this expedition there were other considerations demanding attention Sir Hugh could scarcely move from Sagar until he should receive certain information that Brigadier Whitlock's column had started from Jabalpur for that place

Considerations
to which
demanded
some delay

Meanwhile he would have time to repair damages and to store supplies The necessity for this was the more pressing inasmuch as it had been ascertained that the districts through which the force would have to march still occupied by rebel Sipahis or disaffected chiefs, would supply little or nothing in the way of commissariat The hot season, too, was setting in,

and it was certain that not a blade of grass would survive a few weeks of its duration Sir Hugh foresaw all this, and employed the enforced delay in laying up supplies

Excellent
use to which
the delay
was put

He caused to be collected sheep, goats, oxen, grain, flour, and large supplies of tea and soda water Much of the grain was sent by the loyal Begam of Bhopal The sick and wounded men he transferred to the Sagar field hospital, to be sent away or to rejoin as opportunity might offer He re-supplied the siege train with ammunition, and strengthened it by the addition of heavy guns, howitzers, and large mortars from the Sagar arsenal He obtained likewise an additional supply of elephants, and, what was of great consequence, he secured summer clothing for his European soldiers

At length news came that Whitlock had left Jabalpur Sir Hugh's preparations were now as complete as they could be made Accordingly a start was determined upon On the evening of the 26th of February Sir Hugh detached Major Orr's column of the Haidarabad contingent to march on a route parallel with his own, and at 2 o'clock he set out with the remainder of the troops The following day he took, after some shelling, the fort of Barodá Pressing forward, he found

Heard that
Whitlock had
left Jabalpur
Sir Hugh
take the
route to
Jhansi

* Maraura lies thirty seven miles north of Sagar, and twenty two west by north of Shahgarh. Shahgarh lies forty miles north-east of Sagar Bāṅṅu is in the Lalitpur district

himself, on the 3rd of March, in front of the pass of Malthon. This pass of great natural strength, had been fortified, and was now held in force by a mixed army of Sipahis and local levies. A reconnoissance having convinced Sir Hugh of the great loss of life which would inevitably attend a direct attack upon it, he determined then only to feign an attack in front, whilst, with the bulk of his force, he should gain the table land above the hills by a flank movement through the pass of Madanpur. With this view, early on the morning of the 4th of March he detailed a force,* under Major Scudamore, to manœuvre the pass, whilst with the remainder, now strengthened by the junction of the Hyderabad troops, he moved on Madanpur.

The pass leading to this town forms a narrow gorge between two ranges of hills, thickly covered with jungle and brushwood, and capable of offering a solid defence. The rebels had not only crowned the heights on both sides of the gorge, and planted guns in the gorge itself, but they had sent, to a considerable distance in advance, skirmishers, who, concealed in the jungle, would be able to harass an advancing enemy. The British troops, in making the turning movement contemplated, marched for about six miles along the foot of the hills which they then began to ascend.

Almost immediately the enemy opened fire. The crests seemed alive with their infantry, whilst their guns from the gorge poured in a continuous fire. Sir Hugh sent the 3rd Europeans and the Hyderabad infantry to storm the heights, brought his guns to the front, and returned the enemy's fire.

The British skirmishers drove back the rebel footmen, but as these retired another artillery fire opened from a commanding position at the further end of the pass. So galling and so heavy was this fire that for a short time the British advance was checked. Sir Hugh even ordered the guns to retire some yards. Before this could be done Sir Hugh's horse was shot under him, and the artillerymen were forced to take refuge behind the guns. Bullets fell like hailstones, and the number of killed and wounded increased every moment.

* Consisting of the 24th Bombay N.I., three guns Bhopal artillery, one howitzer, a detachment 11th light dragoons, and the 3rd Bombar cavalry.

The halt, however, was only temporary. The guns of the Haidarābād contingent coming up at this conjuncture opened with shell on the enemy's masses to the left of the pass in support of the guns in action. Under cover of this combined shower, the 3rd Europeans and the Haidarābād infantry charged. Asiatics can stand anything but a charge of European infantry. They had here a splendid position, and a large force of the three arms to hold it, but the sight of the charging infantry struck awe into them. Far from awaiting, with their superior numbers, the hand-to-hand encounter offered, they fled in disorder and dismay. They were followed through the pass by their enemy, and only halted to take breath when they found themselves within the town of Mandanpur.

But it is
overcome by
a charge of
infantry

That town, however, was to be no secure refuge to them. Sir Hugh Rose brought his howitzers to the front and opened fire upon it. For a few minutes the rebels replied, and then fled to the jungles behind. The cavalry, sent in pursuit, followed them to the walls of the fort of Surahī.

Sir Hugh
drives them
1/2 mile from
the town

The effect of this victory was very great. It so daunted the rebels that they evacuated, without a blow, the formidable pass of Mālthion, the fort of Narhat to the rear of it, the little fort of Surahī the strong fort of Marāūra, the fortified castle of Banpur—the residence of the rebel Rājā called after it—the almost impregnable fortress of Tal Bahat on the heights above the lake of that name. They abandoned also the line of the Binā and the Betwā, with the exception of the fortress of Chandri, on the left bank of the latter river.

Great res-
ults gained
from this
victory

Leaving Sir Hugh Rose to reap the consequences of his victory at Madanpur, I propose to return for a moment to the division of the Haidarābād contingent left at Mandesar under Majors Orr and Keatinge.

The 1st
brigade

In a preceding page of this volume I have shewn how Durand, before marching on Indur, had left, for the conservation of peace and order in western Malwa a detachment of the Haidarābād contingent of all arms at Mandesar under Major Orr, with Major Keatinge as political agent and military governor of the province. There they remained until the arrival at Indur of Sir Robert Hamilton. That high official at once directed Orr and Keatinge

Orr and
Keatinge
re-opened
the Agra road.

to march up the Agra road, and to restore on it the postal and telegraphic communications which had been destroyed.

A more interesting march was not undertaken during the entire period of those troublous times. Keatinge and Orr were the first representatives of the British power who had been seen in that part of the country for many months. As they marched up the Agra road huge coils of telegraph wire were brought by night, and placed on the roadside, by people who dreaded lest the wire should be found in their possession. From the centre of haystacks, likewise postmasters recovered the mail bags which had been left with them when the outbreak occurred at Indur. The little force re-establishing the wires as it pushed on, proceeded as far as Guna where to await the arrival of the 1st Brigade under Stuart on its way to Chanderi.

To the proceedings of that brigade I must now invite the reader's attention.

In pursuance of the instructions of Sir Hugh Rose, Stuart had left Maud in the 10th of January, and marched upon Guna, the road to which had been cleared by Orr and Keatinge in

the manner just described. About seventy miles to the east of Guna lies the important post of Chanderi. Chanderi is a very famous town. Its splendour in the prosperous times of the Mughul empire had made it notorious. "If you want to see a town whose houses are palaces, visit Chanderi," was a proverb in the time of Akbar. In the reign of that illustrious prince it was described as a city possessing fourteen thousand houses built of stone, three hundred and eighty-four markets, three hundred and sixty caravanserais and twelve thousand mosques. Since that period, it is true, the rule of the Marathas had worked a great change in its prosperity. In later years too, its manufactures had suffered from competition with Manchester. But its fort still remained, strong, menacing, defiant, with a long history, testifying alike to its prestige and to the valour of its defenders. Situated on the summit of a high hill, defended by a rampart of sandstone, flanked by circular towers, the fort of Chanderi seen by an approaching enemy, looked worthy of its reputation. To this place in February 1858, fled the *Squalus* boat in the action already detailed by Sir Hugh Rose, to join there the men who had sworn to defend it successfully or to perish.

Against it Brigadier C S Stuart, joined by Orr and Keatinge, marched from Gunah. On the 5th of March he reached a place, Khukwasas, six miles from Chanderi. Between Khukwasas and Chanderi the road lay through a dense jungle. Stuart, therefore sent two companies of the 86th foot and the 25th Bombay Native Infantry to the front in skirmishing order. After marching three miles, he arrived at a narrow pass between two high hills—a place offering splendid capabilities for defence. To the surprise of Stuart, no defence was offered. Two miles further, however, the road was found barricaded. The engineers began to clear away the barricades, but they had not worked long before the enemy were seen to climb the hill to the left. On reaching it they opened out a musketry-fire. From this point of vantage they were soon dislodged by a small party of the 86th, and, the barricades having been removed the artillery advanced, covered by the 86th on the right, and the 25th Native Infantry on the left. They had not gone far, however, before a very heavy fire opened upon them from the wall of an enclosure about a mile distant from the fort. The 86th dashed forward to gain this enclosure. One officer of the regiment, Lieutenant Lewis, and the political agent with the force Major Keatinge,* of the Bombay artillery, outrunning the men, gained first the top of its wall, and jumping down, followed by a few men, drove out the enemy. Stuart pursued his advantage and did not halt till he had occupied the hills to the west of the fort.

Stuart
at vantage
ag 1st
Chanderi.

Opposition
of the
enemy

Gallantry of
Lewis and
Keatinge

The next few days were spent by Stuart in clearing the neighbouring villages, in reconnoitring, and in planting his guns in a commanding position. On the 10th the breaching batteries opened fire and by the evening of the 16th effected a breach which was reported practicable. Stuart had with him, as I have already stated but two companies of the 86th. The remainder were marching to join him, and on the 15th were only twenty-eight miles distant. On the afternoon of that day the officer who commanded them received a despatch from Stuart telling him

Preparations
for the
storm.

* The same who had accompanied Orr in the opening of the Agra road, now General Keatinge V O

that the breach would probably be practicable on the morrow, and, that if he would push on and join him on the 16th, he, Stuart, would defer the assault to the day following. The commanding officer set out at once, and his men pushed on with so much alacrity, that, though they had already marched fifteen miles that morning, they joined Stuart by 10 o'clock on the 16th.

Thus reinforced, Stuart, early on the morning of the 17th, sent his stormers, men of the 86th and of the 25th Native Infantry, to the attack. Their impetuous rush carried all before them. Major Keatinge, who accompanied the party, and who led it into the breach, was struck down, severely wounded. But his fall did not stop the stormers. The rebels hurled themselves over the

parapets to avoid the rush they could not withstand, and most of them escaped. A letter which the Bugadier had sent the previous day to Captain Ahlott commanding a party of cavalry, and requesting him to invest the north side of the fort, reached that officer too late. But the place was taken with all its guns.*

Sir Hugh Rose heard of the storming of Chandéri on the 18th. Informed that the garrison had escaped northwards, he sent a detachment of the Hyderabad contingent to intercept them. This force came up with a few stragglers only, but captured some camels and ponies. On the 19th he marched to Chauchanpur, one march, fourteen miles, from Jhansi. After a rest here of about two hours, he despatched the cavalry, horse artillery, and light field-guns of the 2nd brigade to reconnoitre and invest that place.

To the fall of Jhansi Lord Canning and Lord Elphinstone attached the greatest importance. They regarded that fortress as the stronghold of rebel power in central India, the main strength of the formidable rebel force on the Jannah. It was a place, moreover, in which the slaughter of English men and women had been accompanied by circumstances of peculiar atrocity, and where hatred to the English name had been illustrated by acts of the most wanton barbarity. Nevertheless, anxious as was Lord Canning, anxious as was Sir Colin Campbell himself, that the blow, the most effective of all to the rebel cause in

* The casualties in the capture were twenty nine, including two officers.

central India, should be struck, they were both so little appreciative of the enormous value of delivering that blow at once, whilst the success of Sir Hugh Rose's brigades was yet fresh in the minds of the rebels, that, on the very eve of the crisis, they both sent orders to defer the attack on Jhansi, in order to divert the force elsewhere. From the dangerous consequences of their own orders they were saved by the firmness and decision of Sir Robert Hamilton.

Causes which prompted Lord Canning and Sir G. Campbell to order the diversions of the force from Jhansi.

I have already stated that Sir Hugh had sent the cavalry and horse artillery of his 2nd brigade, on the afternoon of the 20th, to reconnoitre and invest Jhansi. He was about, a few hours later, to follow with his infantry, when an express arrived in camp bearing two despatches. One of these was from the Governor General to Sir Robert Hamilton, the other from the Commander in Chief to Sir Hugh Rose.

Sir Hugh Rose and Sir R. Hamilton receive despatches

The purport of these two despatches was identical. They represented that the Rajah of Charkhari (in Bundelkhand), a man who, throughout the trying period of 1857-58, had shown unwavering fidelity to his British overlord, was being besieged in his fort by Tantia Topi and the Gwalior contingent, and they ordered Hamilton and Rose to march at once to his relief, Whitlock's force not being near enough to effect that purpose.

ordering the former to march on Charkhari

Charkhari was about eighty miles from the ground on which Sir Hugh's force was encamped, on the direct road to Bandah. Jhansi was within fourteen miles. To the mind of a soldier the idea would naturally present itself that the surest mode of saving the lesser and more distant place was to attack at once the more important and nearer fortress, that to act on the principle indicated in the despatches would be to act in defiance alike of the rules of war and of common sense. So it appeared to both Hamilton and Rose. But Sir Hugh was a soldier. He had received a positive order. Foolish though he knew that order to be, he was bound to obey it unless the means could be devised of superseding it by authority which he might deem higher and more potential.

Reasons why the order appeared devoid of use to Hamilton and Rose

Sir Robert Hamilton devised those means. How, I will relate in his own simple words. "Sir Hugh Rose considered the order of the Commander in Chief imperative. There was not anything

The great strength of the fort of Jhānsí, natural as well as artificial, and its extent, entitle it to a place among fortresses. It stands on a elevated rock, rising out of a plain, and commands the city and surrounding country. It is built of excellent and most massive masonry. The fort is difficult to breach, because composed of granite, its walls vary in thickness from sixteen to twenty feet. It has extensive and elaborate outworks of the same solid construction, with front and flanking embrasures for artillery fire, and loop holes, of which in some places there were five tiers, for musketry. Guns placed on the high towers of the fort commanded the country all around. On one tower, called the "white turret," then recently raised in height, waved in proud defiance the standard of the high spirited Rani.

Great strength of the fort of Jhānsí

The fortress is surrounded on all sides by the city of Jhānsí, the west and part of the south face excepted.

The steepness of the rock protects the west, the fortified city wall springs from the centre of its south face, running south east, and ends in a high mound or mamelon, which protects by a flanking fire its south face. The mound was fortified by a strong circular bastion for five guns, round part of which was drawn a ditch, twelve feet deep and fifteen broad, of solid masonry.

The city of Jhānsí is about four miles and a half in circumference. It is surrounded by a fortified and massive wall, from six to twelve feet thick, and varying in height from eighteen to thirty feet, with numerous flanking bastions armed as batteries, with ordnance, and loop holes, and with a banquettes for infantry.*

The city of Jhānsí

The town and fortress were garrisoned by eleven thousand men, composed of rebel Sipahis, foreign mercenaries, and local levies and they were led by a woman who believed her cause to be just, and who, classified according to Channing's definition of greatness, was a heroine, though of the third order.

Garrison of the town and fortress.

In his long reconnaissance of the 21st of March, Sir Hugh Rose had noted all the strong points of the defence, and had examined the lay of the ground. He noted the many difficulties presented to the attack, by

Result of Sir Hugh's reconnaissance

* Sir Hugh Rose's despatch, dated the 30th of April, 1858, from which this description is taken almost textually. Sir Hugh adds, further on "A remarkable feature in the defence was that the enemy had no works or forts outside the city."

left to my discretion in my letter from the Governor General it was clear to me it would be a great political mistake to draw off from Jhansi which our cavalry were investing and our force within fourteen miles moreover, supposing the force moved on Charkhari it was not possible to march the eighty miles before the rebels had carried the fort, the Rajah having no provisions and having lost the outworks according to my intelligence I, therefore took on myself the responsibility of proceeding with our operations against Jhansi, trusting to that course as the most effective to draw the enemy from Charkhari and so I wrote to the Governor General' *

It was a responsibility which only a strong man would take, thus to act in direct opposition to the orders of the two highest officials in the country, but under the circumstances it was a responsibility which it was necessary to assume. It gave a decided character to the campaign, and enabled Sir Hugh Rose to carry to a glorious conclusion the task which he had taken in hand at Mau.

I recd by Sir Robert Hamilton from the necessity of pursuing the vicious course indicated by the Commander-in-Chief Sir Hugh Rose set out at 2 o'clock on the morning of the 21st for Jhansi. He arrived before that city at 9 o'clock, and, halting his troops in the open about a mile and a half from the fortress proceeded with his staff to reconnoitre. He did the work completely, for it had struck 6 p.m. before he returned.

Between the open ground on which Sir Hugh had halted and the town and fortress of Jhansi were the ruined bangalows occupied nine months before by Europeans, the gaol, the "Star" fort † and the Sepah lines. Near the town were several large temples and tops of tamarind trees. On the right of the halting ground, stretching to the north and east of the city, was a long belt of hills, through which ran the Katpi and Urechh roads, to the left were other hills and the Dittā roads, due north was the fortress on a high granite rock, overlooking the walled-in city ‡.

* Memorandum submitted by Sir Robert Hamilton to Lord Palmerston, dated the 20th of March 1862.

† Vol. III page 122.

‡ Lowe's *Central India*

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besieged less determined. Women and children were seen assisting in repairing the defences of the walls, and in carrying water and food to the troops on duty, whilst the Rání constantly visited the troops and animated them to enthusiasm by her presence and her words.

For breaching purposes Sir Hugh had been able to employ only two 18 pounders, the remainder of the guns being laid so as to employ the enemy incessantly, and to damage the buildings inside the city. The progress made by these 18-pounders was, owing to the great strength of the walls, extremely slow. But on the 29th the parapets of the mamelon bastion were levelled by the fire from the left attack, and the enemy's guns there rendered useless. The two following days the cannonading continued with great spirit. A breach had been effected, but it was barely practicable, the courage of the enemy continued unabated, danger seemed only to increase their resolution. Such was the state of affairs when a new danger arose for the besiegers. On the evening of the 31st of March intelligence reached Sir Hugh Rose that an army was advancing from the north for the relief of the fortress!

This was the army of Tántiá Topi. The career of this able Maratha leader will be told at fuller detail in a subsequent chapter. Suffice it to say that, after his victory over Wundham and his subsequent defeat by Sir Colin Campbell, Tántia had crossed the Ganges and subsequently, in obedience to orders from Háo Síhib, the nephew of Nána Síhib, had proceeded to halpi. Thence, complying with orders from the same quarter, he had, with a small force of nine hundred Sipáhis and four guns, moved on Charkhárf, and, on the eleventh day, had taken it, capturing twenty four guns and three lakhs of rupees. Just at this time he received a letter from the Rání of Jhánσί, begging him to come to her help. Again he asked for orders, and again received the full approval of his superior. His force, by this time had been increased by the junction of five or six regiments of the Gwáliár contingent and the levies of rebel Ríjhs to twenty two thousand men and twenty eight guns. Leading it himself, he marched on the English camp before Jhánσί.

and the
besieged,

At length a
breach is
effected,

continued

when an
army ad-
vances to
relieve the
place.

Tántiá Topi

captures
Charkhárf,

and marches
to relieve
Jhánσί.

described, Brigadier O S Stuart, with the detachment of the 1st brigade, had moved round the hill into the plain on the right of the enemy, in order to check a large body of them, who were taking advantage of the battle raging in front of the line to move off towards Jhānsi. Stuart attacked, defeated them, and drove them back, hotly following them. So close, indeed, was the pursuit, that they had no time to re-form, but fled in confusion, leaving gun after gun in the hands of the victors, and numbers of their own men dead or dying on the field.

This was the vision that came to add to the dismay of Tāntiā Topi.

It had the effect of forcing upon him a prompt decision. The day he saw was lost, but there was yet time to save the second line and his remaining guns. I have said that the ground upon which he rested was covered to the front by jungle. This jungle was dry and easily kindled. He at once set fire to it, and under cover of the smoke and flames, commenced a retreat across the Betwā, hoping to place that river between himself and the pursuers.

His infantry and horsemen led the retreat, his guns covered it. Right gallantly and skilfully they did it, and he did succeed in crossing the Betwā with his reserve and guns and some of the fugitives of the first line. But he was not the safer for the passage. The British horse artillery and cavalry had dashed at a gallop through the burning jungle, and they were resolved not to cease the pursuit till they had captured every gun that had opened against them. They carried out their programme to the letter. The pursuit did not cease till every gun had been taken. Fifteen hundred rebels were killed or wounded on this day. The remainder, with Tāntiā Topi at their head, fled towards Kalpi.*

Whilst this battle had been raging, the besieged had redoubled their fire. Mounting the bastions and the wall they had shouted and yelled, and poured down volleys of musketry, seemingly threatening a sortie. Never, however, did the besiegers' batteries

* Tāntiā states that four or five guns were saved but these must have been additional to the twenty-eight field pieces accounted for. He adds that he was followed in his flight by only two hundred Sāhis.

ply with more vigour or with greater effect. The vision meeting the eye of those who manned the wall, moreover, did not long continue to inspire. Suddenly the yells and the shouts ceased—a sure sign that the garrison had recognised that the hour of deliverance had not arrived for them.

are after
wards it
couraged.

The victorious army, returning from the pursuit, its morale strengthened as much as that of the enemy had deteriorated, resumed its former positions the same evening. Sir Hugh Rose determined then to take the promptest advantage of the discouragement which, he was well aware, the defeat of Tantia Topi could not fail to produce on the minds of the garrison. He poured in then, a heavy fire all that night and the day following. On the 2nd the breach in the city wall having been reported practicable, though only just practicable, Sir Hugh determined to storm the place the following morning. He made his preparations accordingly. His plan was to make a false attack on the west wall with a small detachment under Major Gall, 14th Light Dragoons, as soon as the sound of his guns should be heard, the main storming party was to debouch from cover, and enter the breach, whilst on the right of it attempts should be made to escalade the wall. The right attack, composed of the Madras and Bombay Sepoys, the 3rd Bombay Europeans, and the infantry of the Mairatābad contingent, was divided into two columns and a reserve. The right column was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Luddell the left by Captain Robinson—both of the 3rd Europeans—the reserve by Brigadier Stewart, 14th Light Dragoons. This attack was to attempt to gain the town by escalade. The left attack, composed of the Royal Engineers, the 68th Foot, and the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, was similarly divided. Its left column, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Lowth 86th Regiment was to storm the breach the right, led by Major Stuart, 86th Regiment, to escalade the rocket tower and the low curtain immediately to the right of it. The reserve was commanded by Brigadier C. S. Stuart.

Sir Hugh
pours in a
heavy fire
on the fort
all the night

and prepares
to attack.

At 3 o'clock on the morning of the 3rd of April the storming parties marched to the positions assigned to them, to await there the signal from Major Gall's party. No sooner was it given than the stormers dashed

General
J. H. M.

to the front. On the left, Lieutenant Jerom's, 86th, supported by Captains Darby and Brockman, led the stormers of Colonel Lowth's column up the breach in the most gallant manner, driving the enemy before him. At the same time Major Stuart attacked the rocket tower, and though met by a strong opposition, forced his way by it into the town. Lowth then collected his men, and despatched a portion of them against that section of the rebel forces which was engaged in opposing the right attack. Taking these in flank and rear, this detachment, led most gallantly by Brockman, forced the rebels to let go their hold on the defences, thus greatly facilitating the difficult task of the right attack. With the remainder of his troops, Lowth prepared to march on the Rán's palace.

The right attack on hearing the signal, had marched silently from their cover in three bodies. No sooner, however, had the troops composing it turned into the road leading towards the gate which was the object of their assault than the enemy's bugles sounded, and a very heavy fire opened upon them*. Through this fire the stormers had to march upwards of two hundred yards. Steadily they pushed on, and planted the ladders in three places against the wall. For the moment, however, it was impossible for the stormers to ascend. "The fire of the enemy waxed stronger, and amid the chaos of sounds of volleys of musketry and roaring of cannon, and hissing and bursting of rockets, stink pots, infernal machines, huge stones, blocks of wood, and trees—all hurled upon their devoted heads—the men wavered for a moment, and sheltered themselves behind stones"†.

Notwithstanding this momentary check, the sappers, animated by their officers, kept firm hold of their ladders, and, in spite of the superhuman efforts of the enemy, maintained them in their position against the wall. How long this lasted it is difficult to state. Minutes seemed hours, when, happily, Major Boileau, Madras Engineers, who had gone back to report the state of affairs to the Brigadier, brought up a reinforcement of a hundred

* "For a time it appeared like a sheet of fire, out of which burst a storm of bullets round shot, and rockets, destined for our annihilation"—Lowe's *Central India*.

† Lowe, *ibid*.

men of the 3rd Europeans. The stormers then rushed to the ladders, led by their engineer officers. Some were found too short others broke down under the men, but Lieutenant Dick, Bombay Engineers gained, by means of one of them, the summit of the wall, and, fighting against enormous odds called upon the men to follow him. Lieutenant Meiklejohn of the same noble regiment mounted by another, and then boldly jumped down into the seething mass below. Lieutenant Bonus also of the Bombay Engineers reached the wall by a third. The men pressed on from behind, but before they could, in any number join their officers, Dick had fallen from the wall dying pierced with shot and bayonets, Bonus had been hurled down, struck in his face by a log or stone, Fox of the Madras sappers who had also reached the wall had been shot in the neck, Meiklejohn had been cut to pieces. But the stormers pushed on in streams from some eight ladders and at length gained a footing on the rampart dealing and receiving death from the enemy who still continued fiercely to contest every point of the attack.

The ladders
too short or
too weak

Gantry of
Dick,

of Meikle
John,

of Bonus

of Fox

The right
attack gains
a footing
on the
ramparts.

It was at this crisis that the stormers of the left attack, led by Brockman, who looking along the wall from the breach which he had won, had seen the failure of the attack and had resolved on the instant to do all in his power to aid his countrymen to repair the momentary damage, made the charge upon the flank and rear of the defenders of which I have spoken. Its effect was marvellous. The defenders relaxed their hold, the opposition ceased, and the stormers of the right attack jumped down and mingled with their comrades.

The left
attack gains
timely aid

The defence having thus given way the stormers made their way through the city to the palace, Lowth leading the way. The police had been prepared by the rebels for a resistance in the last resort. The conflict, as the stormers forced their way through the streets, was severe. At the palace it was desperate. The houses on both sides of the street leading to it had been set on fire, and the heat was fearful. When too, the courtyard of the palace was reached, it became apparent that the resistance had only begun.

The stormers
reach the
palace

houses on

which after
a desperate
contest they
gain

Every room was savagely contested. Fruitlessly, however. From chamber to chamber the enemy were driven at the point of the bayonet. At length the palace itself was gained. The opposition, however, had not even then entirely ceased. Two hours later it was discovered that fifty men of the Rani's bodyguard still held the stables attached to the building. These men defended themselves to the last before, after a desperate encounter, they were disposed of. But the men who accomplished this task, the 86th and the 3rd Europeans, were compensated for their toil and danger by recapturing a British flag.*

This occurrence had but just happened when Sir Hugh, who had been present throughout with the first attack, received information that a body of the rebels, numbering about four hundred, driven from the town, after having vainly tried to force the pickets of one of the cavalry camps, had taken up a position on a hill to the west of the fortress, where they had been surrounded by the cavalry. Sir Hugh instantly sent against the hill the available troops of all arms under Major Gall. This gallant officer sent to storm the hill a detachment of the 24th Bombay Native Infantry. The 24th went at the rebels with a will, and killed all but about twenty, who retreated to the summit and there blew themselves up. The 24th lost an officer and several men in this attack. Another body of about fifteen hundred who had collected in one of the suburbs of the town, declaring they would defend it to the last, were driven out, about the same time, with a loss of three hundred of their number.

All that night, and throughout the following day, desultory fighting continued, the enemy being either slaughtered or driven under the shelter of the fort guns. Sir Hugh was meanwhile engaged in organizing measures for an attack on the fortress. But the Rani saved him further trouble on that score. On the night of the 4th, despairing of a successful defence of the fortress, and, hoping that her presence at Kalpi might induce

* This was a Union Jack of silk, which Lord William Bentinck had given to the grandfather of the Rani's husband, with the permission to have it carried before him, as a reward for his fidelity.—Sir H. Rose's despatch.

Tántiá Topí once more to aid her, she evacuated the fortress with her remaining followers. She rode straight for Kalpi, and arrived there the very evening on which Tántiá, who had travelled more leisurely, reached that place. Sir Hugh sent a cavalry force in pursuit of her, but the start had been too great. A few of the fugitives were, however, cut up.

The Ránf
evacuates
the fortress
and rides
for Kalpi

The fortress of Jhānsi was occupied by Sir Hugh Rose on the morning of the 5th of April. The loss sustained by him during the operations against it, including the action on the Betwá, amounted to three hundred and forty-three killed and wounded, of whom thirty-six were officers. The enemy's loss was computed at five thousand. One thousand dead bodies were actually burned or buried in Jhānsi itself.

Sir Hugh
occupies the
fortress

The mode by which Jhānsi was captured attests the merits of the noble soldier who planned and carried out the attack. Never was there a more complete combination of daring and skill, of foresight and resolution. The result was worthy of the plan, and of the genius which formed the plan.*

Credits due
to Sir Hugh
Rose.

Sir Hugh's object now was to march on Kalpi, to drive the rebels from that stronghold on the Jamnah whence they had so constantly menaced the communications of the British. Kalpi was the arsenal of the rebels, the head quarters of the nephew of Náná Sāhib, and was extremely well provided with artillery and warlike stores. It lies on the Jamnah, a hundred and two miles to the north-east of Jhānsi, and only forty six to the south-west of Kānpūr. The occupation of this place would enable Sir Hugh to touch the left rear of Sir Colin Campbell's army, and, in co-operation with him, to clear the triangle, the angles of which were Jhānsi, Kalpi, and Agra—Gwāliár being nearly midway in the line uniting Jhānsi and Agra.

Importance
of capturing
Kalpi

* The following extracts from Sir Hugh Rose's despatch attest the great strength of the town and fortress. "It was not till Jhānsi was taken that its great strength was known. There was only one part of the fortress, the south curtain, which was considered practicable for breaching. But, when inside, we saw this was a mistake, there being at some distance in rear of the curtain a massive wall fifteen or twenty feet thick, and immediately in rear of this a deep tank cut out of the live rock."

For seventeen days Sir Hugh's little army had known no repose. The halt at Jhansi of nearly nineteen days which followed the capture of the place was, however, in no sense devoted to repose. Much had to be done in Jhansi itself: the arrangements for a fresh campaign had to be organised, provisions had to be laid in, the magazines to be replenished. At length all was ready. Leaving at Jhansi a small garrison consisting of the head quarter wing of the 3rd Bombay Europeans, four companies 24th Bombay Native Infantry, the left wing 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry, a hundred troopers Haidarabad contingent, half a company Bombay sappers, and three guns Bhopal contingent—the whole under the command of Colonel Liddell, 3rd Europeans—Sir Hugh detached, on the night of the 22nd of April, a detachment under Major Gall to watch the rebel garrison of Kota reported to be at a place called Mau, in the neighbourhood, and set out himself with the 1st brigade at midnight on the 20th, leaving directions for the 2nd brigade to follow two days later. Major Orr had been previously detached with the bulk of the Haidarshah force to prevent the Rájahs of Banpur and Shahgarh and any other rebels from crossing the Betwa and doubling back southwards.

Leaving for a moment these several officers engaged in carrying out the orders entrusted to them, I propose to return for a moment to the Rani of Jhansi and Tantia Topi. These two important personages had arrived, as I have said, at Kalpi the same day. The first act of the Rani had been to implore the nephew of Nana Sahib, known as Rao Sahib, "to give her an army that she might go and fight." The following morning Rao Sahib ordered a parade of all the troops at his disposal. These consisted of some regiments of the Gwalhar contingent, several regiments of the regular native army recruited to nearly full strength, the contingents of various rebel Rájahs, and the remnant of the Jhansi garrison. Rao Sahib reviewed these troops, addressed them, and then directed Tantia to lead them against the English. Tantia obeyed, and hoping to meet them when possibly all their forces might not be reunited, marched to Kunch a town forty two miles from Kalpi on the Jhansi road, and there took up a strong position, covered by

Sir Hugh
halts at
Jhansi to
arrange for
a march on
Kalpi

Dispositions
made by
him with
that object

The Rani of
Jhansi at
Kalpi

Her appointment
to Rao
Sahib

who holds a
review
and orders
Tantia Topi
to march
against the
English

woods and gardens, with temples at intervals between each of them, surrounded by a strong wall, and there threw up intrenchments

Meanwhile the English force was advancing on Kunch Major Gall harassed by the enemy on his march, had reached the town of Puch fourteen miles from Kunch, on the 1st of May. Here he was joined the same day by Sir Hugh Rose and the 1st brigade Major Orr on his side had crossed the Betwa, attacked the Ryahs of Banpūr and Shahgarh at Kotra, and had taken one of their guns. He had however, found it impossible to cut them off, and they had succeeded, for the time, in escaping southwards, supplies and carriage being furnished them by the treacherous Rajah of Jigni. By Sir Hugh's direction, Major Orr then marched on Kunch.

He marches
on Kunch
Movements
of Gall
of Rose
and of Orr

The country between Puch and Kunch was studded with little forts, which, up to the time of which I am writing, had been occupied by the enemy. From those they could undoubtedly cause considerable annoyance to small detachments, but in the presence of the large force now collecting at the former place, they deemed it advisable to abandon them and concentrate at Kunch.

The reb. is
concentrate
on Kunch

Sir Hugh was joined by his 2nd brigade strengthened by the 71st Highlanders on the 5th of May. He at once marched on Lohari ten miles nearer Kunch thence to put into action the plan of attack which he had matured. But, when he arrived at Lohari he was informed that the rebels were in possession of the fort of the same name close to it. He immediately detached Major Gall, with a wing of the 3rd Europeans some artillery and dragoons, to attack it. Gall took the fort, losing two of his officers and some men, out of the garrison not one escaped. Sir Hugh, meanwhile, had matured his plans.

Sir Hugh
sends Gall
to capture
Lohari,

An Asiatic army, Sir Hugh was well aware, always expects a front attack. He had also noticed that nothing disturbs such an army so much as a turning movement. Instead, therefore of sending his troops against a position which the rebels had carefully prepared, Sir Hugh resolved to make a flank march with his whole force on the 6th to a position at once

and makes
a flank
march to
turn the
reb. in
position.

facing the unfortified side of the town of Kunch, and threatening seriously the enemy's line of retreat from that place to Kalpi.

With this view Sir Hugh broke up from his encamping ground early on the morning of the 6th, and, making a flank march of fourteen miles, brought his force into the position contemplated. His 1st brigade, forming his left, rested its extreme left on the village of Nagupura, his 2nd brigade forming the centre occupied the village of Chumair. Major O'rs Haidarabad force, forming the right, occupied the village of Umri. This position was two miles from Kunch.

It was 7 o'clock in the morning before the troops sighted the rebels though still invisible to them. Sir Hugh, who had marched with the 1st brigade, ordered them a dram of rum and some biscuit,* whilst he galloped to inspect the arrangements made in the centre and on the right. In an hour he returned, and ordered Major Gall, with a detachment of cavalry, to reconnoitre the wood, garden, and temples which lay between him and Kunch, covering that advance by a fire of shot and shell. At the same time he directed the siege guns to take up a position whence they could play upon the town.

Gall soon returned with a report that the enemy had retreated through the wood to the part of it near the town, having in their rear a body of cavalry, that the siege guns had had the effect of driving the rebels on the right of the wood into the town, but that some outworks were still occupied by them.

Sir Hugh determined at once to clear the wood and the outworks with his infantry, and then to storm the town. Covering his left wing with a wing of the 86th, and the whole of the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, in skirmishing order, and supporting their flanks with cavalry and horse artillery, he sent them into the wood. Advancing in perfect order, the gallant Sipahis of the 25th Native Infantry cleared the wood, temples, and walled gardens in front of them, whilst the 86th, making a circuit to

* The men had nothing to eat that day till 8 P.M., except the small amount of food they carried in their haversacks.

their left, carried all the obstacles in their front, and then, bringing their left shoulders forward, advanced, despite a heavy fire of artillery and musketry, through the north part of the town and took the first. This operation, performed by the 1st brigade, drove the enemy's right on their centre.

The 1st
brigade
drives the
rebel right
on its centre

Meanwhile, Brigadier Stuart, commanding the 2nd brigade, having observed a body of rebel infantry strongly posted in cultivated ground threatening the line of attack of his brigade, marched to dislodge them. The rebels contested their position with great valour, and it was not until the 1st brigade establishing itself in the manner already described, threatened their flank, that they gave way. It had been intended that Brigadier Stuart should then march straight into the town but with the view of cutting off the rebels, he moved to the south of it and missed them.

an affair
is
aid to the
1st brigade

Major Orr's force had, whilst this was going on, advanced through the wood, round the town, to the plains traversed by the road to Kalpi.

Major Orr moves to
cut off the rebels

Although the operations of which I have given an outline had taken only an hour, and the rebels in that short period had been completely defeated they managed nevertheless, to gain with the bulk of their forces the Kalpi road in advance of their pursuers, and on both sides of this road they were now endeavouring to restore some sort of order in their masses so as to check by every means in their power the ardour of the pursuit. When Sir Hugh Rose, then, emerging from the narrow streets of the town, formed up his brigades for a renewed attack, he beheld the enemy retreating in a long irregular line, covered by skirmishers at close distances the skirmishers supported by groups who acted to them as a sort of bastions.

The enemy
nevertheless
gain the
Kalpi road
in full
retreat.

The terrific heat of the day and the power of the sun, which had made itself felt with fatal effect on many of his European Infantry soldiers,* forbade him further to risk those soldiers in a pursuit which could not fail to entail a sacrifice of many valuable lives. He, therefore, halted them, whilst he launched in pursuit the cavalry of both

The heat of the sun
forces Sir Hugh to
halt his infantry
but he launches the
cavalry in pursuit

* Many of the Sikhs were also struck down by the sun.

brigades and of Major Orr's force,* and the horse artillery and field guns

Then was witnessed action on the part of the rebels which impelled admiration from their enemies. The manner in which they conducted their retreat could not be surpassed. They remembered the lessons which their European officers had well taught them. There was no hurry, no disorder, no rushing to the rear. All was orderly as on a field day. Though their line of skirmishers was two miles in length, it never wavered in a single point. The men fired, then ran behind the relieving men, and loaded. The relieving men then fired, and ran back in their turn. They even attempted, when they thought the pursuit was too rash, to take up a position, so as to bring on

it an enfilading fire. Their movement was so threatening that Sir Hugh ordered Prattyjohn, 14th Light Dragoons, to charge the enfilading party, an order carried out by that most daring officer with great gallantry and success. Still, however, the rebels

maintained the order of their retreat, nor was it until many of them had been killed, and all their guns had been captured, that the survivors were driven in on the main body. Then, for the first time, they lost their nerve; then they crowded

into the Kalpi road, a long and helpless column of runaways. But the pursuers were completely tired; they were unable to

move faster than at a walk, the cavalry horses were knocked up; and, whilst the guns could not approach near enough to fire grape, the cavalry could only pick up an occasional straggler. When,

then, a few hundred yards further, broken ground, over which the rebels scattered, supervened, the pursuit came to an end. It had produced great results. The rebels

lost nine guns, a quantity of ammunition and stores, and five or six hundred men killed and wounded. The mutinous 52nd Bengal Native Infantry, which covered the retreat, was almost annihilated. The English loss was three officers and fifty-nine men killed and wounded, in addition to many struck down by the sun.

The defeat at Kunch sowed great mistrust among the rebels. The infantry Sijáhis taunted the cavalry troopers with having

* Except a party left to watch the Jalaun road and the rear

utmost to reap full advantage from it. An intercepted general order by their general in chief issued about this time, directed that no attack should be made upon the European infidels before 10 o'clock in the day as fighting in the sun either killed them or sent them to their hospitals. But in spite of the heat Guláuli was reached on the 15th, communications were opened with Maxwell and Sir Hugh in accordance with his inviolable custom, made prompt arrangements for engaging the enemy.

Who now constituted the enemy? I have related how, in the panic caused by the rumour of Sir Hugh's onward march only eleven rebel Sipahis had been left in the town and fort. A few days later, however, the unexpected arrival of the Nawab of Bandah with two thousand horse some guns and many followers—the remnant of the force defeated by General Whitlock at Bandah, in the manner to be told in the next chapter—and his energetic exertions, backed by those of the Raut of Jhansi, produced one of those changes from despair to confidence which mark the Indian character*. The Sipahis who had left returned, and, exhorted by their leaders to hold to the last kalpi their only arsenal and to win their right to paradise by exterminating the infidel English,† declared their resolution to defend it to the last.

Although as a fortification Kalpi had but little to boast of its position was unusually strong. It was protected on all sides by ravines, to its front by five lines of defence and to its rear by the Jamnah, from which rises the precipitous rock on which stands the fort.

Between the British camp and Kalpi indeed, existed a most extraordinary labyrinth of ravines over which artillery and cavalry could make no progress but which furnished an interminable cover of the most formidable description for infantry. On the so to speak, tongues of land formed by the prolongation of the ravines, the rebels had rapidly thrown up intrenchments, and had cut trenches near to these in a manner rendering it impossible that they should be turned. Even should they be driven out of the intrenchments it was within the power of the rebels to fall back on eighty-four temples built as well as the

* Sir Hugh B. see a despatch, the 21st of May, 1858.

† Intercepted letter, *idem*.

walls round them, of the most solid masonry. These temples constituted a second line of defence, the outwork of ravines a third, the town of Kaljia a fourth, another chain of ravines a fifth, and the fort the last.

On the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th, constant skirmishes occurred between the two armies, the enemy being the attacking party. On all these occasions they were repulsed but the British suffered much from the sun, as well as from the incessant toil, anxiety, and heat. On the 19th a mortar battery established on the right front of the British position opened on the town. On the 20th a detachment from Colonel Maxwell's brigade consisting of two companies of the 88th, and a hundred and twenty Sikhs crossed the river, and joined Sir Hugh Rose. On the 21st the batteries from Maxwell's camp opened on the fort and town. On the 22nd Sir Hugh determined to deliver his long meditated blow.

Skirmishes
between the
two armies.

Maxwell
reinforces
Sir Hugh.

This attack, headed by the Nawáb of Bandah and by Rao Sahib, nephew of Nana Sahib, though intended only as a feint, soon made itself felt, and the British left became heavily engaged. Still Sir Hugh, confident as to the real object of the enemy, did not move a man from his right. He contented himself with replying to the enemy's guns with his guns in a style which soon forced the rebels to lumber up and fall back. But the attack on his left not only continued, but became very real indeed. Still Sir Hugh did not move a man from his right. It was well he did not. Suddenly, as if by magic, the whole line of ravines became a mass of fire, the enemy's batteries opened, and their infantry, climbing from below, poured in an overwhelming musketry fire on the right of the British line. The suddenness of the attack, the superior numbers of those making it, and the terrible heat of the day gave the rebels a great advantage. Another point, too, was in their favour. Many of the Enfield rifles had become clogged by constant use in all weathers, and the men, after a few discharges had found it very difficult to load them. The sun, too, had struck down an unusual number of the Europeans. When, then, the rebels, starting up in great numbers from the ravines, poured in volleys which the British replied to only feebly, when they saw that each discharge from the thin red line became weaker than that preceding it, they began to gain a confidence they had never felt before. They pressed on with loud yells the British falling back until they approached the British light field guns and mortar battery. Then it was that Brigadier C. S. Stuart, dismounting, placed himself by the guns, and bade the gunners defend them with their lives. The 86th and 25th Native Infantry, in their extended line, disputed the advance step by step. Still the rebels pressed on,*

* "Well do I remember" writes to me a very gallant officer, who greatly distinguished himself throughout this campaign, 'Well do I remember that day. Nearly four hundred of my regiment 'the 86' were *hors de combat* the native regiment was not much better, and thousands of yelling savages were pressing on a river in our rear. We were well nigh beaten, when the Camel corps came up and about one hundred and fifty fresh troops soon turned the tide and sent the bháng possessed enemy to the right about again. It was the Camel corps

and it seemed as though from their very numbers they must prevail, when Sir Hugh, to whom news of the attack had been conveyed, brought up the Camel corps, which had opportunely crossed the river that very morning, at their best price, then, dismounting the men, and leading them forward himself at the double, charged the advancing foe, then within a few yards of the British guns. For a moment the enemy stood, but only for a moment. A shout, a dash forward from the whole line, and they went headlong into the ravines below. Not only was the attack on the right repulsed, but the victory was gained! The attack on the left collapsed when it was seen that that on the right had failed, and the guns, gaining the rebels' flank, inflicted great loss on them as they fled. Sir Hugh followed them up so closely that he cut off a number of them from Kalpi. The fire from Maxwell's batteries made those who reached that fast foot that it was no secure place of refuge. They evacuated it accordingly during the night. The rest of their force, pursued by the horse artillery and cavalry, lost their formation and dispersed, losing all their guns and baggage. Even the Rani of Jhansi, who fled with them, was compelled to sleep under a tree!

Sir Hugh
brings up
the Camel
corps at the
critical
moment,

and gains
the day

The rebels
evacuate
Kalpi

Tells of
which the
English
troops were
subjected
during the
campaign.

The position of the troops, their sufferings, the feelings that animated them, are thus graphically described by an eye witness who, throughout its duration, took part in the campaign, and who subsequently gave to the world an eloquent record of the achievements of his comrades. 'This was,' writes Dr Lowe,* "a hard day's work, and a glorious victory won over ten times our number under most trying circumstances. The position of Kalpi, the numbers of the enemy, who came on with a resolution and a display of tactics we had never before witnessed, the exhausted, weakened state of the general's force, the awful suffocating hot winds and burning sun, which the men had to endure all day, without time to take food or water, combined to render the achievement one of unsurpassed

that literally saved Sir Hugh Rose's division. The enemy were within twenty yards of our battery and outpost tents the latter full of men down with sunstroke. Another quarter of an hour and there would have been a massacre. Ever since that day I have looked upon a camel with eyes of affection.

* Lowe's Central India during the Rebellion of 1857-58

difficulty Every soul engaged in this important action suffered more or less. Officers and men fainted away, or dropped down as though struck by lightning in the delirium of a sunstroke, yet all this was endured without a murmur, and in the cool of the evening we were speculating upon the capture of Kalpi on the morrow.

Before daybreak the following morning Sir Hugh marched on that place. His 1st Brigade, under Brigadier C. S. Stuart, he sent through the ravine following the course of the Jumnah, whilst he led the 2nd himself along the Kalpi road.

Colonel Maxwell's batteries still continued to shell the fort and the villages in front of it. As the two brigades advanced, however, these villages were abandoned by the rebel, and it soon became apparent that no serious resistance was contemplated. When the two brigades, having overcome all obstacles in their path, united near the town, and advanced into it, they were not opposed, the rebels had fled, quitting for ever the arsenal which had served them so long and so well.

The capture of Kalpi completed the plan of the campaign for the column having its base at Mau, which Sir Robert Hamilton had submitted to the Governor General and the Commander in Chief towards the close of the preceding year. In all respects that plan had been carried out. Marching from Mau in November Sir Hugh Rose had, in five months, traversed central India, crossing its numerous rivers, storming strong forts, taking many towns, defeating armies vastly superior in numbers led by men and by a woman whose

* Brigadier C. Stuart C.B. commanding the 2nd brigade had reported sick after the battle of Khatwa and the command had devolved upon Lieutenant Colonel Campbell, 71st Highlanders.

† The following description given by an eye witness proves how the rebels had used the position of Kalpi and the good stead in which it had stood them. After enumerating the quantities of ammunition, lead, iron, brass gun carriages, gun moulds &c. found in the fort Dr Lowe adds — The enemy had erected houses and tents in the fort, had their smiths' shops, their carpenters' shops. Their foundries for casting shot and shell were in perfect order, clean and well constructed, the specimens of brass shell cast by them were faultless. In the arsenal were about sixty thousand pounds of gunpowder, out of it were large heaps of shot and shell ranged after the fashion of our own. It would appear that the enemy had prepared for a long stand here. — Lowe's Central India.

and adding, with regard to Whitlock's force, that "it would be otherwise employed as a movable division." The general who had conducted the campaign was about to dissolve the force and to proceed to a cooler climate for the recovery of his health. How all these arrangements were suddenly altered I shall tell in another chapter. Meanwhile it is my duty to record the operations of the other column, which, with Jalalpûr as its base, had been directed to move on Bandah, subduing the rebel Rájahs en its route.

CHAPTER II

KIRWÍ AND BANDAH.

On the 16th of November, 1857, Brigadier General Whitlock, of the Madras army, was appointed to the command of a division for service in the Nagpur Sagar, and Narbadá territories. His force was to consist of an artillery brigade, composed of two troops of horse artillery and three companies of foot artillery, with two light field batteries attached, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel W. H. Miller, of a cavalry brigade composed of the 12th Lancers and the 6th and 7th Madras Light Cavalry, commanded by Colonel A. W. Lawrence, of one brigade of infantry, composed of the 3rd Madras Europeans and the 1st and 5th Madras Native Infantry, commanded by Colonel Carpenter M. A. of a second infantry brigade, composed of the 43rd Light Infantry and the 19th and left wing of the 50th Madras Native Infantry, commanded by Colonel McDuff 74th Highlanders. There were also details of sappers and miners. The force was to be massed at Jabalpur, and to march thence towards Bandah.

The composition of General Whitlock's force

A small force, previously detached from the Madras presidency, or serving in the central provinces, was already at Jabalpur*. This force consisted of six hundred and fifty men of the 33rd Madras Native Infantry, under Colonel Miller, a hundred and twenty men 28th Madras Native Infantry, under Lieutenant Standen, a hundred and twenty men of the 1st Nagpur Rifles†, three hundred men 4th Madras Light Cavalry, under Lieutenant Colonel Cumberlege, three hundred men 6th Madras Light Cavalry, under Lieutenant Colonel Byng, a hundred and fifty men 2nd Nizam's Cavalry, under Captain Macintyre,

The force at Jabalpur is detailed

* Vide page 70 of this volume

† The Nagpúr local force had been retrained by Mr. Plowden

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* Vide page 70 of this volume

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to halt
(see) &
Whitlock's
arrival

a total of eight hundred and ninety infantry and seven hundred and fifty cavalry. This small column had orders to halt at Jabalpur pending the arrival of General Whitlock and his force.

General Whitlock reached Hamthi on the 10th of January. He was unable, from various causes, to leave that place till the 23rd of the same month. Setting out on that date, he arrived at Jabalpur on the 6th of February.* Part of his 1st Brigade reached on the 6th, the remainder a few days later.

Whitlock
reaches
Jabalpur

On the 17th of February General Whitlock, leaving a small garrison at Jabalpur, soon to be increased by the arrival of Brigadier McDuff's brigade to a tolerable strength set out for Sagar. He moved in the direction of Jakhani, with the object of overawing the mutinous landowners in the Rewah district. He reached that place, previously captured by Willoughby Osborne, on the 24th, and was there met by the loyal Rajah of Urehan. Halting here one day, he set out on the 26th for Damoh, and arrived there on the 4th of March. It is worthy of remark that during this march of fifteen days General Whitlock, though strongly urged by Major Erskine, the political officer accompanying his force, to drive the rebels from the strong places they occupied, and from which they still continued to harass the districts between Jabalpur and Damoh,

He sets out
with part of
his force for
Sagar

refused to send a single detachment for that purpose from his force. He preferred, he said, to keep it massed in his hand. The result was that, although Whitlock's column secured the ground on which it encamped, secured into submission the villages through which it marched, and even recovered Damoh, it left the population of the districts still occupied by rebels astonished at the regard paid to the latter.

His move-
ments are
characterised
by extreme
caution

On the 5th Whitlock rode into Sagar, accompanied by some horse artillery and cavalry. Sagar had previously been relieved by Sir Hugh Rose, but on reaching it

Whitlock
reaches
Sagar

Whitlock at once sent an express to Damoh for two hundred European and seventy native infantry to come in by forced marches, he also detached a small body of Europeans to escort treasure from Jabalpur, whilst the remainder of the force he kept halted at Damoh under the command of Brigadier

* The distance is a hundred and forty-eight miles.

Carpenter. He, however, returned and resumed command on the 12th.

On the 17th Whitlock, still halted at Damoh, received the Governor General's orders to march on Nagod and Panah by way of Hattah, and to afford aid to the loyal Rajahs of Bundelkhand, notably to the Rajah of Charkhari. Lord Canning's despatch further directed Whitlock to communicate his movement to Sir Hugh Rose, so as to enable that officer to work in concert with him.

Whitlock is ordered to march on Nagod and to communicate with Sir Hugh Rose.

In compliance with this order, Whitlock left Damoh on the 22nd of March, and, entering Bundelkhand, arrived at Panah without molestation on the 29th. Evidently a man of extreme caution, Whitlock halted here to obtain information regarding the position of the enemy and the practicability of the roads. The reader, if he refer to the preceding chapter, will see that this was the precise period when the Government would have diverted Sir Hugh Rose from his attack on Jhansi in order to succour Charkhari, then besieged by Tantia Topi, and that activity on the part of General Whitlock was specially desirable. But no activity was displayed. The force remained halted at Panah till the 2nd of April. Whitlock, having by that time come to a resolution, marched on it by Marwa Ghât, a route almost impossible for guns and vehicles. So difficult was the road that on reaching Mandala, at the foot of the pass, Whitlock had to halt for three days to repair damages. Whilst thus halted, he received (3rd of April) a despatch from Sir Hugh Rose, directing him to move with all expedition upon Jhansi. Whitlock was unable to leave Mandala till the 6th of April. He then marched, by way of Chatipur, on Bandah, reached Chatrpur on the 9th, surprised the rebels the following night whilst evacuating the fort of Jhangan, then marched on Mahoba and thence on Bandah.

Whitlock reaches Panah and halts to obtain information.

His extreme caution.

Proceeds by a difficult route towards Bandah still slowly and cautiously.

Advances and reaches Bandah.

The rebel Nawab of Bandah, was playing the part of an independent prince in the district which took its name from the chief town. The Nawab had been well supplied with information regarding Whitlock's movements, and, judging him to be a man of a cautious and anxious temperament, determined to attempt to lead him into a trap. No sooner, then, had he been

The Nawab of Bandah endeavours to draw Whitlock into a trap.

certified of the advance of the English general than he directed the troops he had stationed at Mahola, and which consisted of eight hundred and fifty men of the mutined 50th Bengal Native Infantry, two hundred men of the 23rd Native Infantry, the 2nd Regiment Irregular Cavalry Gwalior contingent, and half a battery of guns, to evacuate that place and take up a position in ambush at Kabra, whence they should fall upon English troops as they would pass it before dawn. At the same time the Nawab took care that Whitlock should be informed that he would encounter no enemy south of Bandah.

Had the courage of his troops equalled the cleverness of the Nawab, the plan would have succeeded. Whitlock so far fell

into the trap that he believed there were no rebels before him. His troops were actually marching through Kabra an hour before daybreak, when the enemy opened upon them a heavy fire. The surprise was but for a moment. The Horse Artillery, the Lancers, and the Haidarabad Irregulars galloped forward, and soon compelled the rebels to

retreat. Unfortunately, in the pursuit which followed, the principal body of the British force took, in the dark, a wrong direction, so that but few of the enemy were cut up. The attempt, however, clearly indicated to Whitlock what was in store for him at Bandah. He pushed on, however, and on the early morning of the 19th found the rebel force,

headed by the Nawab, occupying the plain south of the town, and barring his entrance into it. The Nawab's forces consisted of seven thousand men, of whom rather more than one-third were regular troops. The position he had taken up was strong.

The ground was very much intersected by ravines and water-courses and of these the rebels had taken skilful advantage.

Whitlock had broken up his camp at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 19th. At 5 o'clock his advance guard, commanded by Colonel Apthorp, and consisting of three companies 3rd Madras Europeans, two guns Mein's

troop Horse Artillery, some Haidarabad Irregulars under Macintyre, a few of the 12th Lancers, and a detachment 1st Madras Native Infantry, came upon the enemy. Apthorp was at once directed to turn the right of the rebel position, whilst the main body should threaten it in front. These orders were carried out to the letter. Apthorp's men had, however, no easy

and succeeds
The Nawab's
troops re-
prise the Eng-
lish but the
latter soon
recovering,
fell on them

The Nawab's
troops take
up a strong
position in
front of
the town

Where he is
attacked by
Whitlock

task. It was difficult to get at the rebels. When Apthorp had carried one ravine he found them in force in the next. There must have been much in the nature of the ground to screen human life, for though the fight lasted seven hours, from 5 o'clock till noon, the casualties on the British side amounted only to thirty-nine, of whom four were officers. Several deeds of heroism were performed. The coolness of Apthorp was the admiration of every one. Young Colbeck, of the 3rd Europeans met a glorious death leading his men to the charge of the first nullah. Captain Macintire, of the Haidarabad cavalry—which lost twenty killed and wounded—greatly distinguished himself, as did likewise Brigadier Miller, Sergeant-Major Alford, of the Madras Artillery, and Captain Clifton, 12th Lancers. At length the position was forced, and the Nawab fled, with two thousand followers, to Kalpi leaving behind him seventeen guns, the town of Bandah, and a palace filled with property of great value. The rebel loss in the battle was variously estimated at from four to six hundred men. General Whitlock established his head quarters in Bandah, to wait there till the remainder of his force should join him.

Gallantry of
Apthorp
Colbeck,
Macintire,
Miller
Alford and
Clifton.

The Nawab is
completely
defeated.

The second brigade, under Brigadier McDuff, reached Jabalpur on the 18th of March, and set out for Sagar on the 24th. In order, however, to prevent the mutineers from heading backwards into the Mirzapur district, Whitlock sent instructions to this brigade to change its course and to proceed to Nagod. McDuff, therefore, on the 27th of May reached Bandah on the 27th of May. He found Whitlock still halted there.

Whitlock is
joined by
McDuff's
brigade.

Whitlock, on being joined by McDuff's brigade, resolved to march to the assistance of Sir Hugh Rose at Kalpi, and he indicated the 29th as the day of departure on that errand. But Sir Hugh Rose, as we have seen, had completely defeated the rebels before Kalpi on the 23rd, and had entered that place on the 24th of May. Information of this reached Whitlock in time to change his plans regarding Kalpi.

The reader who has followed me through this and the preceding chapter, will not have failed to see how, in every particular, the action of Sir Hugh Rose had cleared the way for the action of General Whitlock. It was Sir Hugh, who at Garhakota and on the Betwa, had disposed of the enemies with whom, but for that,

In every
particular
Sir Hugh
Rose had
cleared the
way for
Whitlock.

Whitlock would have had to deal The defeat of Tánti Topi on the Betwá alone made it possible for Whitlock to march on Bandah Yet—extraordinary perversity of Fortune—whilst Sir Hugh and his force endured all the hardships of the campaign, and did by far the most important part of the fighting, Whitlock and his little army, up to the time of the capture of Bandah, gained all the substantial advantages The spoils of Bandah, which would not have been gained but for the action of Sir Hugh Rose, were allotted to Whitlock's force alone!

Perversity of
fortune

The same blind goddess, not content with one perverse distribution of her favours, now set about to perpetrate another Whitlock had but just renounced his intention to march to the assistance of Sir Hugh Rose at Kalpi, when he received orders from Lord

Whitlock is
ordered to
march on
Kirwi

Canning to march against the Rao of Kirwi

Kirwi, formerly better known as Tiróha, is forty five miles from Bandah, and seventy from Allahabád The Rao of Kirwi, Madhava Rao, had succeeded to the throne by adoption, when he was only four years old

Sketch of
Kirwi

When the mutiny broke out in 1857, he was then a boy of but nine years, under the tutelage of Ram Chandrá Rám, a man enjoying the confidence of the Government of India, and appointed by it to watch the interests of the young Rao during his minority The Rao was thus, in equity, the ward of the Government of India It has been commonly asserted that there were two Raos of Kirwi* This statement has no foundation There was, indeed, a discarded relative of the immediate predecessor of Ram Chandrá Rám, to whom he, Madhava Rao, was required to pay a monthly stipend of two hundred rupees, and to whom the title of Rao was granted by courtesy But this person, Naráyan Rao, was absolutely without position or influence, and he would not have presumed even to whisper an interference in the affairs of the state

The situation at Kirwi, then, was simply this that the Rao was a minor, only nine years old, and the affairs of the principality were practically conducted by Ram Chandrá Rám, the nominee of the Government of India But, though Ram Chandrá was the nominee of the Indian Government, and though he practically managed the state of Kirwi, the feeling amongst the landowners

* I fell into this mistake in the first edition of this work.

of the principality, great and small, was, in 1857, inimical to the British. It seems to me very natural that it should have been so. Many years before, in 1827, Amrit Rao, the then ruler, had deposited two lakhs of rupees, at 6 per cent interest, in the hands of the Government of India, for the perpetual maintenance of charities and temples which he had established in the holy city of Banaras. Ten years later, in 1837, the Government of India had reduced their rate of interest to 4 per cent, and Venayak Rao, the son and successor of Amrit Rao, in order that neither the charities nor the temples might feel the loss, and in the view, moreover, of increasing their resources had then deposited in the hands of the Government three additional lakhs, making a total of five lakhs, the interest of which was to be paid annually for the purposes above stated. The interest was punctually paid during the lifetime of Venayak Rao, and for three years after his death, when for some reason which the Government of India has never divulged, the payment of the interest ceased.

Madhava Rao was then only seven years old, and no suspicion of treason, or felonious intent attached then to the child, but his advisers and other pious Hindus, men of blameless life and integrity of purpose, were so shocked at the sacrilegious and fraudulent withholding of the interest on sums deposited for a special purpose by the Raos of Kirwí, that they paid the missing amount out of the estate of the principality. But a very bitter feeling was engendered throughout its broad lands. Princes, priests, and people alike felt that no faith could thenceforward be placed in the promises of the Supreme Power.

When, then, the mutiny broke out in the North West Provinces, when the Rani of Jhansi, whose cause, judged from the standard of the prescriptive rights of native princes, was eminently a just cause, broke into rebellion, when the earlier occurrences in the vicinity of Bundellhand seemed to presage the fall of British rule, it is not surprising that Ram Chandra Ram, noting the outraged feelings of the people, and their sympathy with the leader of the movement in the Duab the heir of the Peshwá Nana Sáhib, to whom the Rao of Kirwí, was collaterally related, should have found his task more than ordinarily difficult. But, loyal to the British overlord, he did his duty truly and zealously.

Their
ally as
Rájhava
Govind
stimulate
their dis-
affection

who declare
for Náná
Sáhib

Up to the third week of May, 1853 the young Ráo, himself innocent of mischief, for, it cannot be too often insisted, he was only nine years old, had enjoyed blissful visions of a fortunate future. He did not know that Kirwí had been placed on the list of the

Causes which prompted the Ráo still to hope after Ban lah had fallen.

places to which a severe lesson was to be administered, for the discontent of his people had taken a very passive form. For a long time it was covered from danger by the Nawáb of Bandah, but, when Bandah fell on the 19th of April, the young Rao was made to write to Sir Robert Hamilton professing loyalty to the British and offering to admit British troops into his capital.

A little later, when he, Sir Hugh unaided by Whitlock, had taken Kalpi, and when, on the 2nd of June, Whitlock left Bandah, to march on their palace the Ráo waited till that general had reached Bharatkup, ten miles from Kirwí, and then rode out and tendered to him the welcome only offered to those supposed to be friends.

On hearing that Whitlock is marching on Kirwí they ride out and surrender.

Whitlock's march on Kirwí had been made possible by the annihilation of the forces of the Nawáb of Bandah at Kalpi. That chieftain fled from Bundelkhand, never again, during the war, to reappear within its borders. Still, the young Rao had committed no overt act of rebellion, he was yet virtually a ward of the British Government, he had surrendered without resistance to the British general, and there was

By this act the evils of Kirwí devolve without fighting on Whitlock & Co.

assuredly no reason why the great disaffection of his people should be punished in his person as though it had been active treason.

But, at Kirwí, there was an accumulation of treasure. The young Rao was very rich, and it was found not difficult to trump up a case against him.

For Whitlock, moving from Bandah on the 2nd of June,* had entered Kirwí without opposition on the 6th. Not a shot had been fired against him, but he resolved nevertheless to treat the young Ráo as though he had actually opposed the British forces. The reason

Enormous amount of treasure found at Kirwí

for this perversion of honest dealing lay in the fact that in

* The very day on which it will be seen, one of Sir Hugh's columns started to encounter more dangers at Gwalior.

the palace of Kírwí was stored the wherewithal to compensate soldiers for many a hard fight, and many a broiling sun. In its vaults and strong rooms were specie, jewels, and diamonds of priceless value!

It was nothing that the young Rao, to whom this wealth belonged, was himself but a lad of nine years, innocent in his own person of treason, that the Indian Government was his guardian, and, as such, responsible, during his minority for his acts, that the tutor of the young boy, Ram Chandra Rám, who doubtless had been the interpreter of the outraged feelings of the nobles of Kírwí, had been appointed to his post by British authority. The wealth was coveted and the wealth was taken—taken as prize money, to be squabbled over by those who took it without firing a shot.*

The question of the proprietary right in this booty, strangely declared to be prize money, was ultimately argued before the High Court of Admiralty. By this court the claim of Sir Hugh Rose's force to share in the prize, which had come into British possession mainly in consequence of his action, was rejected, the claims of the commanders of other co-operating but independent divisions and columns were rejected, the claims of the Commander in Chief in India and his staff, who were hundreds of miles from the spot, and whose action did not influence the capture, and the claims of the officers and men of General Whitlock's force, were admitted to an exclusive right in the prize of Bandah and Kírwí.

The right to the booty subsequently argued before the High Court of Admiralty

Its decision

Possibly the reader may feel some interest as to the future of the innocent boy, Mádhava Rao, whose property was thus unceremoniously disposed of. A treatment similar to that meted out by the Government of India to another of their wards, Dhulip Singh of the Panjáb, was extended to this boy of nine. His estates were confiscated. He was then† 'pardoned in consideration of his youth, and is now being educated at Barab as a ward of the British Government. A provision of Rs. 30,000 a year has been made for him'‡. What became of

* Vide Appendix A

† "Fitchison's Treaties" vol. iii p. 142 (edition 1863)

‡ The proof that the Government of India were actually the trustees of the Rao's estate is to be found in the fact that in 1857 they were actually regulating the property making all important appointments and authorising all the expenditure, through the Administrator General of Bengal and his officers

CHAPTER III.

SIR HUGH ROSE AND GWÁLIÁR.

It has already been related that Tantia Topi after his defeat at Kunch, had fled to Chirkí—about four miles from Jalaur—where his parents resided. He remained there during Sir Hugh Rose's march to Kalpi and during the events which led to the capture of that place. Learning that Rao Sahib and the Rani of Jhínsa had fled, after their defeat at Galanli towards Gopálpur, forty six miles south west of Gwáliar, Tantiá girded up his loins and joined them at that place.

Movemen
at 14 &
Topi to
Pá of
Jhínsa and
Rao Sahib
after a
fall of Kalpi

Their affairs seemed desperate. Not only had they lost their hold on central India, on the Sagar and Narbadá territories and on Bundelkhand but their enemies were closing in on every side. Roberts had already detached from Rajputana a brigade under Colonel Smith to co-operate with Sir Hugh Rose. The force under that officer was at Kalpi about to be distributed in the territories west of the Jannah. Whitlock had conquered Bandah and plundered Kirwá. On three sides then on the south east and the west they were encompassed by foes. Nor towards the north did the prospect look brighter. There lay the capital of Maharajah Sindhiá overlooked by a wall of girt and almost inaccessible rock. Sindhiá was not less their enemy than were the British. In the darkest hour of the fortunes of the British at a time when hostility seemed to promise him empire Sindhiá had remained faithful to his overlord. It was not to be thought of nor was it thought possible, that in the mid day of their triumph he would turn against them.

The
confinement
of
their affairs

Surrounded
by enemies

The situation then seemed desperate to the rebel chieftains. But desperate situations suggest desperate remedies, and a remedy which on first inspection might well seem desperate, did occur to the fertile brain of one

Desperate
remedy
suggested,

of the confederates To which one it is not certainly known But, judging the leading group of conspirators by their antecedents—Ráo Sáhib, the Nawáb of Bandah, Tantia Topi, and the Ráni of Jhánsi—we may at once dismiss the two first from consideration They possessed neither the character nor the genius to conceive a plan so vast and so daring Of the two who remain, we may dismiss Tántiá Topi Not that he was incapable of forming the design, but—we have his memoirs—and in those he takes to himself no credit for the most successful act with which his career is associated The fourth conspirator possessed the genius, the daring, the despair necessary for the conception of great deeds She was urged on by hatred, by desire of vengeance, by a blood stained conscience by a determination to strike hard whilst there was yet a chance She could recognise the possibilities before her, she could hope even that if the first blow were successful the fortunes of the campaign might be changed, she possessed and exercised unbounded influence over one at least of her companions—the Rao Sáhib The conjecture, then, almost amounts to certainty that the desperate remedy which the confederates decided to execute at Gopálpur was suggested and pressed upon her comrades by the daring Ráni of Jhánsi

The plan was this To march on Gwáhar by forced marches, Her plan. to appeal to the religious and national feeling of Sindhiá's troops, to take possession of his capital by force if it were necessary, and then from the precipitous rock of the Gwáliár fortress to bid defiance to the British

The scheme was no sooner accepted than acted upon Envoies proceeded in a vanguard of the column to tamper with and, if possible to gain over Sindhiá's troops, The confederates accept it and march on Gwáhar the column followed more leisurely, yet with a celerity adapted to the occasion, and reached the Morar cantonment formerly occupied by the contingent, in close vicinity to Gwáhar, during the night of the 30th of

considerable chief of the Maráthá race, and his word, if spoken for religion and race, would have found a response all over central and western India. For four months he had probably the fate of India in his hands. Had he revolted in June, the siege of Dehli must have been raised, Ágra and Lakhnao would have fallen; it is more than probable that the Panjab would have risen. That, under such circumstances, possessing strong military instincts and chafing under a great ambition, Sindhia should have remained loyal is most weighty testimony to the character of the English overlordship, and to its appreciation by the greater princes of India. That Sindhia was greatly influenced in the course he followed by his shrewd minister, Rajah Dinkar Rao, and by the appeals from the fort of Ágra of the able British representative at his court, Major Charters Macpherson, may be admitted. But neither Sindhia nor Dinkar Rao liked the English personally. Both the one and the other would have preferred an independent Gwalhar. But, though they did not like the English personally, they had great respect for the English character. Recollecting the state of north western and central and western India prior to the intro of Marquess Wellesley, they could feel, under the English overlordship, a sense of security such as their fathers and their fathers' fathers never possessed. They had, at least, secure possession of their holdings. No one from outside would venture to molest them as their ancestors had been molested. The question, then, would rise—and it was in answering this that the influence of Major Charters Macpherson came most beneficially into play—"Granting that, by joining the mutineers, we could confine the English to Bengal, would Gwalhar gain by their expulsion? It is doubtful there would be many competitors for supremacy, and—who knows? The King of Dehli might, with the aid of Sipahis, become supreme or the Sikhs of the Panjab or Naná Sahib, or perhaps even Holkar. The risk is too great, for, adhering to the English, we shall be safe in the end."

His gr at
influ nce

For four
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of India
in his hands

Probable
reasons for
his loyalty

In some such manner reasoned Sindhia and Dinkar Rao. They argued the question in the light of the interests of Sindhia, and in that light, held over before them by the steady hand of Charters Macpherson they cast in their lot with the British.

But not in this manner reasoned many of the great families

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Her plan.

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Morár cantonment formerly occupied by the contingent, in close vicinity to Gwáhlár, during the night of the 30th of May

Maharajah Sindhiá was informed that night of the arrival of

Maharajah
Sindhiá.

his dangerous visitors Probably no prince had ever been placed in circumstances of stronger temptation

than was Maharajah Sindhiá during 1857-58 The descendant by adoption and the representative of the family of the famous Maháji Rá, of the Daulat Rá who had fought for the possession of India with the two Willeseys, he was still the most

considerable chief of the Maráthi race and his word, if spoken for religion and race, would have found a response all over central and western India. For four months he had probably the fate of India in his hands. Had he revolted in June, the siege of Dehli must have been raised, Ágra and Lakhnao would have fallen, it is more than probable that the Panjab would have risen. That, under such circumstances, possessing strong military instincts and chafing under a great ambition, Sindhia should have remained loyal is most weighty testimony to the character of the English overlordship, and to its appreciation by the greater princes of India. That Sindhia was greatly influenced in the course he followed by his shrewd minister, Rájah Dinkar Rao, and by the appeals from the fort of Ágra of the able British representative at his court, Major Charters Macpherson, may be admitted. But neither Sindhia nor Dinkar Rao liked the English personally. Both the one and the other would have preferred an independent Gwalhar. But, though they did not like the English personally, they had great respect for the English character. Recollecting the state of north western and central and western India prior to the rule of Marquess Wellesley, they could feel, under the English overlordship a sense of security such as their fathers and their fathers' fathers never possessed. They had, at least, secure possession of their holdings. No one from outside would venture to molest them as their ancestors had been molested. The question, then, would rise—and it was in answering this that the influence of Major Charters Macpherson came most beneficially into play—"Granting that, by joining the mutineers we could confine the English to Bengal would Gwalhar gain by their expulsion? It is doubtful there would be many competitors for supremacy, and—who knows? The King of Dehli might, with the aid of Sipahis become supreme or the Sikhs of the Panjab, or Náná Sahib, or perhaps even Holkar. The risk is too great, for, adhering to the English, we shall be safe in the end."

It is great influence

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But not in this manner reasoned many of the great families

The same
reasons do
not affect the
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Marathá
people,

of Gwáliar, the bulk of the army and of the people. These men could recognise only what was passing before their eyes. Their eyes looked back with longing to the past when the empire was dangling before the Marathá race, and they never attempted

even to open the book of the future. They could only see, in 1857, the British power struck down, and an opportunity offering itself to their master such as the great Madhájí would have given half his years to have clutched. They could not understand their Maharajah's inaction, his attempts to befriend the British in the hour of their adversity. They had sympathy

who in
consequence
vent their
discontent on
Sadhá.

with the men of his contingent when they revolted and murdered their officers. The higher and more influential amongst them assailed Sindhia with persuasions and entreaties, and, when they

found these fail, they began even to talk of dethroning him and setting up another ruler in his place.

The fall of Delhi, the British successes in Lakhnau and in north western and central India, had by no means changed these sentiments. The mutation caused by lost opportunities had produced a state of mind eager to grasp at any chance to mend the situation or to be rid of it.

Such was the state of general feeling in Gwáliar when, on the night of the 30th of May, information was brought to the Maharajah that Tantia Topi, the Rani of Jhansi, and other chieftains, with a force estimated at seven thousand infantry, four thousand

cavalry, and twelve guns, had reached Morar. No one knew better the general state of feeling about him than the Maharajah.

But he never wavered. The conviction of the ultimate triumph of the English was never stronger within him than at this apparently inauspicious moment, and, notwithstanding the ill concealed hostility of many of his adherents, he determined to seize the offered opportunity and do battle with the rebels.

Accordingly, at daybreak on the 1st of June, he marched out and took up a position about two miles to the eastward of Morar. He had with him six thousand infantry, about fifteen hundred cavalry, his own bodyguard six hundred strong, and eight guns. These he ranged in three divisions, his guns in the centre, and waited for the attack. About 7 o'clock in the morning the rebels

He marches
to meet
Tántia.

advanced, covered by mounted skirmishers, with camels carrying guns of small calibre. As they approached, Sindhiá's eight guns opened on them. But the smoke of the discharge had scarcely disappeared when the rebel skirmishers closed to their flanks, and two thousand horsemen, ^{is completely defeated,} charging at a gallop, carried the guns. Simultaneously with their charge Sindhiá's infantry and cavalry, his bodyguard alone excepted, either joined the rebels or took up a position indicative of their intention not to fight. The rebel cavalry, pushing their advantage, then attacked the bodyguard, with which was Sindhiá himself. A portion of the guardsmen defended themselves with great gallantry, and did not cease to fight till many of their number had fallen. But, as it became more and more apparent every ^{a d flies to} moment that it was useless to continue the un- ^{Ágra.} equal contest, Sindhiá turned and fled accompanied by a very few of the survivors. He did not draw rein till he reached Ágra.

The first part of the Rán's bold plan had thus succeeded. She and her confederates delayed not a moment to carry it out to its legitimate consequences. They entered Gwáliár, took possession of the fortress, the treasury, the arsenal and the town, and began at once to form a regular government. Naná Sahib was proclaimed as Peshwá, and Ráo Sahib as governor of Gwáliár. Plentiful largesses were distributed to the army, alike to the Gwáliár troops as to those who had come from Kalpi. Ram Rao Govind, one of the Sindhiá's disgraced courtiers, was appointed prime minister. The royal property was declared confiscated. Four Maratha chiefs, who had been imprisoned by Sindhiá for rebellion, were released, clothed with dresses of honour, and sent into the districts to raise troops to oppose the British in any attempts they might make to cross the Chambal. The command of the bulk of the troops, encamped outside the city, was entrusted to the Ráni of Jhánsi. Those within the town obeyed the orders of Tantia Topi. Letters were at once despatched to the rebel rajahs still in the district, notably to the Rájahs of Bampur and Shahgarh, to join the new government at Gwáliár.

The rebels enter Gwáliár and form a government out there

and prepare to hold the place and the surrounding territories

The intelligence of the success of this audacious enterprise reached Kalpi on the 3rd of June. Before I refer to the action taken by Sir Hugh Rose, it is necessary that I should state

The story returns to Sir Hugh Rose

the exact positions of the various portions of the force with which he had conquered Kalpi on the 24th of May

As soon as, by the occupation of Kalpi on the 24th of May, Sir Hugh Rose had discovered the flight of the rebels, he sent out parties to discover the line they had taken. Information was soon brought to him that, whilst a few had crossed the Jamnah into the

Duah, whilst a few more had been checked in attempting the same course by Colonel Riddell,* the main body had bent their steps in almost a south westerly direction to Gopalsúr. To pursue these latter he at once organised a column composed of the 25th Bombay Native Infantry the 3rd Bombay light cavalry, and a hundred and fifty Hindustani cavalry, and despatched it under the command of Colonel Robertson, on the track of the rebels

Robertson set out from Kalpi on the 25th of May, the rain falling heavily. This rain, which continued throughout that day and the day following much impeded his progress. He pushed on, however, as fast as possible, and, traversing Mahona and Indurki

found that the rebels were but little in advance of him. At Irawan, reached on the 29th supplies ran short, and as none were procurable in the district the column had to wait till they could be sent up from Kalpi. On the 2nd of June Robertson received these and was joined by two squadrons of the 14th light dragoons, a wing of the 86th foot, and four 9 pounders. The following day he reached Mubárar fifty five miles from Gwalíar. Here he was startled by information of the attack made by the rebels on Gwalíar and of its result

An express from Robertson, sent from Irawan, and which reached Kalpi on the 1st of June, gave Sir Hugh the first in-

* Colonel Riddell, who was moving down the north bank of the Jamnah with the 3rd Bengal Europeans, Alexander's Horse and two guns, caught sight of a body of the rebels escaping from Kalpi a few miles above that place on the south bank of the river on the 23th of May. He instantly sent the 3rd Europeans across, who captured the camp equipage the enemy not waiting to receive them. Colonel Riddell's force had previously had several skirmishes with detached parties of insurgents. A small party of his troops had proceeded to Kalpi in boats joining Sir Hugh Rose. On their way they were threatened by a numerous body of rebels near Bháulpur. Lieutenant Sherriff who commanded the party, had at once landed 150 men, defeated the rebels and captured four guns.

formation that the rebels had taken the road to Gwalhar. Instantly Sir Hugh despatched General Stuart with the remainder of his brigade, consisting of the other wing of the 86th foot, a wing of the 71st Highlanders, four companies of the 25th Bengal native infantry, one squadron 14th light dragoons, No 4 light field battery, two 18 pounders, one 8 inch howitzer, and some sappers, to join Robertson and to march on Gwalhar. Stuart reached Atakona on the 3rd—the day on which Robertson had reached Mohárar—and there he too received the first information of the startling occurrences at Gwalhar.

Sir Hugh
knew that
the rebels
were
on Gwalhar
and at once
despatched
Stuart's
brigade in
that direction

The order which had sent Stuart to Gwalhar was dictated by a sound military instinct. But no one—not even Sir Hugh Rose, had imagined the height of daring to which the Rani of Jhansi would carry her audacious plans. The rebels might march on Gwalhar, but no one believed they would carry it by a *coup de main*. It seemed more likely that they were marching into a trap, to be kept there till Stuart's force should fall on their rear.

No one
divined that
the daring of
the rebels
would be
so successful

How the "impossible" happened has been told. The information of it reached Sir Hugh on the 4th of June, after he had resigned his command and applied for leave on medical certificate. In a moment he realised the full danger of the situation. Gwalhar had fallen into the hands of the rebels at the time of year most unfavourable for military operations. Another week and the monsoon rains would render the black soil untraversable by guns and would swell the rivers. Under those circumstances, the transport of siege-guns in the absence of pontoons, which Sir Hugh did not possess, would be most difficult if not impossible. He realised moreover the great danger which would inevitably be caused by delay. No one could foresee the extent of evil possible if Gwalhar were not promptly wrested from rebel hands. Grant them delay, and Tantia Topi, with the immense acquisition of political and military strength secured by the possession of Gwalhar, and with all its resources in men, money, and material at his disposal would be able to form a new army on the fragments of that beaten at Kalpi, and to provoke a Maráthá rising throughout India. It might be possible for him, using the dexterity of which he was a master, to unfurl

The effect of
his success
upon Sir
Hugh Rose.

He realised
the enormous
losses at
stake

the Peshwa's banner in the southern Maratha districts. These districts were denuded of troops and a striking success in central India would probably decide their inhabitants to pronounce in favour of the cause for which their fathers had fought and bled.

Thus reasoning, Sir Hugh considered, and rightly considered, that the time for ceremony had passed. He at once resumed the command which he had laid down,* and, leaving a small garrison at Kalpi, set out on the 3th of June with a small force† to overtake Stuart's column.

With a view to aid Sir Hugh in his operations against Gwáliár, the Commander in Chief placed at his disposal, by telegraph, Colonel Riddell's column previously referred to and Brigadier Smith's brigade of the Rajputaná field force. The only other troops of which it was possible for Sir Hugh to avail himself were those composing the small garrison of Jhánsí, under Lieutenant Colonel Hicks of the artillery, and the Haidarábád contingent, commanded by Major Orr.

The Haidarábád contingent, after their hard and splendid service, had received orders to return home. They had already started, many of them, indeed, were far advanced on their road. But the moment the intelligence of the events passing at Gwáliár reached them they one and all expressed their earnest desire to take part in the operations of their old commander.

Whilst Sir Hugh Rose himself proceeded by forced marches to join Stuart, he directed Major Orr to move to Panwar, on the road between Sípri and Gwáliár, to cut off the retreat of the rebels to the south, and Brigadier Smith, who was near Chanderi, to march with his brigade direct to Kotah kí sarai, about five miles to the south east of Gwáliár. To Colonel Riddell, escorting a large supply of siege-guns, he sent instructions to move with his column by the Agra and Gwáliár road. He hoped that all

* It is said that for this breach of red tape rules Sir Hugh was severely reprimanded by Sir G. Campbell. Undoubtedly strict routine required the previous sanction of the Commander in Chief. But there are circumstances which require that strict routine must be laid aside and this was one of them.

† 1st Troop Bombay horse artillery, one squadron 15th Light Dragoons, one squadron 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry, Madras sappers and miners.

the columns of operations would be at their posts by the 19th of June

Setting out, as I have said, on the 5th of June, and making forced marches in spite of a heat which occasionally rose to a hundred and thirty degrees in the shade, Sir Hugh overtook Stuart at Indurki on the 12th, and, still pushing on, reached Bahadurpur, five miles to the east of the Morar cantonments on the 16th. There he was joined by Brigadier General Robert Napier, whom he last heard of at the storm of Lakhnao, and who at once assumed command of the 2nd brigade.

Sir Hugh
overtakes
Stuart and
reaches
Morar

There he
is joined by
General
Napier.

Sir Hugh had reached Bahadurpur at 6 o'clock in the morning of the 16th of June. He at once directed Captain Abbott with his Haidarabad cavalry to reconnoitre Morar. On receiving Abbott's report that the rebels were in force in front of it, Sir Hugh galloped forward himself to examine the position. He noticed that the side of the cantonments fronting the British position was occupied by strong bodies of cavalry, flanked to the right by guns, supported by infantry in considerable numbers.

reconnoitres
the rebel
position

The position offered strong temptations to a commander who knew the value of time and promptitude in war, and who considered that minor difficulties must give way when a chance should present itself of overcoming a great obstacle. I shall tell in his own words the effect produced on Sir Hugh Rose by his examination of the position of the rebels before Morar.

I imagine
which decided
him to attack

"My force had had a long and fatiguing march, and the sun had been up for some time. Four or five miles more march in the sun, and a combat afterwards, would be a great trial for the men's strength. On the other hand, Morar looked inviting with several good buildings not yet burnt, they would be good quarters for a portion of the force, if I delayed the attack until the next day the enemy were sure to burn them. A prompt attack has always more effect on the rebels than a procrastinated one. I therefore countermanded the order for encamping and made the following arrangements to attack the enemy."

told him the
own wish.

* Only a small portion of this brigade was present the bulk of it having been left at Kalpi.

† Despatch of Sir Hugh Rose dated the 15th of October, 1858.

during the day by Strutt, always to the front, and by Light-foot

The result, then, had justified Sir Hugh's daring. Not only had he dealt a heavy blow to the rebels, but he had gained a most important strategical point

Result of the battle

Sir Hugh Rose's success was speedily followed by an exploit on the part of Brigadier Smith, fruitful in important consequences. That gallant soldier, coming up from the south east had to make his way through the difficult and hilly ground on that side of Gwalior before he could reach Kotah ki sarai. Picking up on his way the small field force from Jhansi, he reached Antri, with his brigade,* on the 14th of June, and was joined there the following day by Major Orr and his Haidarabadi men. Under orders from Sir Hugh Rose Smith marched from Antri early on the morning of the 17th of June, and reached Kotah-ki-sarai, five miles to the south-east of Gwalior, at half past seven o'clock that morning.

Brigadier Smith advances from the south east

and reaches Kotah ki sarai

Smith had met no opposition in marching into Kotah ki sarai, but on reaching that place he observed masses of the enemy's horse and foot occupying the hilly ground between himself and Gwalior. As these masses showed a strong disposition to attack him, and as, hampered with a large quantity of baggage, Smith did not regard his position as a very secure one he determined to take the initiative. Reconnoitring the ground in front of him, he found it very difficult, intersected with nullahs and impracticable for cavalry. He discovered, moreover, that the enemy's guns were in position about fifteen hundred yards from Kotah ki sarai, and that their line lay under the hills, crossing the road to Gwalior. Notwithstanding this, Smith determined to attack. First, he sent his horse artillery to the front, and silenced the enemy's guns which lumbered up and retired. This accomplished, Smith sent his infantry across the broken ground, led by Rames of the 95th. Rames led his men, covered by skirmishers, to a point about

and covers the rebels massed between him and Gwalior

Difficult nature of the ground before him,

he nevertheless resolves to attack.

* The brigade was thus composed: a wing 8th Hussars, a wing Bombay Lancers, II M & 95th Foot, the 10th Bombay Native Infantry, and a troop of Bombay Horse Artillery.

He attacked them accordingly. Placing his cavalry and guns on his flanks, and the infantry in the centre, *The battle of St. Albans* he took ground to the right, the 86th leading the way, with the view of coming upon the road leading to cantonments, and the occupation of which would have turned the left of the rebels. Sindhu's agent, however, *The guide loses his way* who had promised to lead the troops to this road, lost his way, and Rose found himself in front of a masked battery in the enemy's centre. *and the army debouches on the wrong front* This at once opened upon the assailants and its fire was rapidly followed by a musketry and artillery fire from both sides of it. Sir Hugh answered with his guns, at the same time pushing forward his infantry to gain the required turning position on the right. This once gained, he formed to the front, and, reinforcing his left, which bore for a moment the whole weight of the enemy, pushed forward. The advance was decisive. The enemy limbered up and gave way on all sides. *The rebels fall back* The gallant Abbott with his Hindustani men had meanwhile galloped across the nullahs further to the right, and dashing through the cantonments at a more northerly point, endeavoured to cut off the retreat of the rebels. But the broken ground he had had to traverse had enabled these to take their guns across the stone bridge which spans the river at the back of the cantonment on the road to the city. The main body of the enemy, driven through the cantonments, fell back on a dry nullah with high banks running round a village, which they had also occupied. Here they maintained a desperate hand-to-hand struggle with the British. The 71st Highlanders suffered severely, Lieutenant Neave, whilst leading them, falling mortally wounded, nor was it till the nullah was nearly choked with dead that the village was carried. On this occasion, Lieutenant Rose of the 25th Bombay Native Infantry greatly distinguished himself. The victory was completed by a successful pursuit of the rebels by Captain Thompson, 14th Light Dragoons, with a wing of his regiment. The wing of the rebel force which he destroyed had been turned by Abbott's advance already spoken of. Thompson, following up the rebels caught them in the plains and made a great slaughter of them. The guns were splendidly commanded

during the day by Strutt, always to the front, and by Light foot

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discovering the rebels massed between him and Gwáhar

Difficult nature of the ground before him,

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Rames had the infantry to the front
 and, after overcoming many obstacles
 with their guns and to retire up the ravines and across the hills
 Rames found them so retiring when, after surmounting the difficulty I have recorded he gained the abandoned intrenchment. Whilst he was continuing his advance across the broken and hilly ground, Smith moved his cavalry across the river Umrah, close to Kotah kisari. He had hardly crossed when his men came under fire of a battery which till then had escaped notice. At the same time a body of the enemy threatened the baggage at Kotah kisari. Matters now looked serious. But Smith sent back a detachment to defend the baggage and rear, and pushed forward with the rest of his troops. The road, before debouching from the hills between his position and Gwáhir, ran for several hundred yards through a defile along which a canal had been excavated. As he entered this defile and during his march through it, he encountered considerable opposition. At length he bore it down, emerged from the further end, joined Rames, then, keeping his infantry halted to hold the defile he ordered a cavalry charge. This was most gallantly executed by a squadron of the 8th Hussars, led by Colonel Hiel and Captain Henege. The rebels, horse and foot gave way before them. The Hussars captured two guns and continuing the pursuit through Sindhu's cantonment, had for a moment the rebel camp in their possession.

Amongst the fugitives in the rebel ranks was the resolute woman who, alike in council and on the field, was the soul of the conspirators. Clad in the attire of a man and mounted on her back, the Rání of Jhansi might have been seen animating her troops throughout the day. When inch by inch the British troops pressed through the defile, and when reaching its summit Smith ordered the Hussars to charge, the Rání of Jhansi boldly fronted the British

horsemen When her comrades failed her, her horse in spite of her efforts, carried her along with the others With them she might have escaped but that her horse, crossing the canal near the cantonment stumbled and fell A husar close upon her track, ignorant of her sex and her rank, cut her down She fell to rise no more That night her devoted followers, determined that the English should not boast that they had captured her even dead burned the body

Thus died the Rani of Jhansi My opinion of her has been recorded in a preceding page Whatever her faults in British eyes may have been, her countrymen will ever believe that she was driven by ill treatment into rebellion; that her cause was a righteous cause, and that the treatment she received at the hands of Lord Dalhousie was one of the main causes of the disaffection in Bundelkhand and Central India in 1857-8 To them she will always be a heroine *

The charge of the 8th Hussars was the last effort of Smith's force † Upon the return of the squadron, the officers and men were so completely exhausted and prostrated from heat, fatigue, and great exertion, that they could scarcely sit in their saddles and were, for the moment, incapable of further exertion † But the enemy, recovering, were again threatening Smith then determined to content himself with holding the defile, the road, and the adjoining hills for the night He drew back his cavalry accordingly, and brought up his baggage The enemy held their ground on the heights on the other side of the canal

Smith falls back for the night on the head of the defile

The position thus taken up by Brigadier Smith left much to be desired It left his left and rear threatened, his baggage within range of the enemy's guns, and his whole force cramped Sir Hugh, on receiving an account of the action, with characteristic promptitude despatched Colonel Robertson, with the 25th Bombay Native Infantry three troops 14th Light Dragoons and four guns to reinforce him

Dangerous nature of his position.

Sir Hugh reinforces him

The next day Sir Hugh was reinforced, and his 2nd brigade, commanded by Robert Napier, brought to its full strength by the arrival of the Kalpi garrison His arrival left him free to act

The 2nd brigade joins Sir Hugh who resolves to "finish" with the rebels

* Vide pages 110 139, of this volume, and pages 120 1 of Vol III

† Brigadier Smith's report.

Leaving Napier in Morar with the troops he could spare,* Rose marched in the afternoon with the rest of the force to join Smith. The distance was long, the heat terrible, the march harassing in the extreme. No less than a hundred men

Harassing
nature of his
march

He opens
communication
with
Smith

of the 86th were struck down by the sun †. Nevertheless, Sir Hugh pushed on, and bivouacked for the night on the rocky ground between the river and Smith's position.

The first thing that struck Sir Hugh on reconnoitring the following morning was the possibility of cutting off the main body of the enemy from Gwáliár by forcing their left. The next, the extremely cramped and dangerous nature of his own position. The rebels, too, showed every indication that they intended an attack, for with the early dawn they began a heavy fire from their guns, whilst masses of their infantry were seen moving to positions from which they could manœuvre with advantage against the British position. On the principle, then, that when one is disadvantageously posted an attack is often the best defence, Sir Hugh resolved to become the assailant.

People as to
anticipate
the rebels
attack and
to cut them
off from
Gwáliár

The rebels, as we have seen, were occupying the heights separated by the canal from those gained by Brigadier Smith. That they meant to attack was evident. They spent the early hours of the morning in strengthening their right with the view of assailing the weakest point of the British line, the left. The sun had not risen very high when Sir Hugh received an express from Sir Robert Hamilton to say that he had received certain information that the rebels certainly intended to attack him that day. There was no time for further consideration.

* These were—One troop Bombay horse artillery, three troops 14th light dragoons, three troops 3rd Bombay light cavalry, fifty men 1st Haidarábád cavalry, 3rd Haidarábád cavalry, two squadrons Meade's horse, 21st company Royal Engineers wing 3rd Bombay Europeans, four companies 24th Bombay native infantry, three guns Haidarábád artillery.

† Of these men, Sir Hugh reports that they "were compelled by sun sickness to fall out and go into *dolis*." These same men, the next day unimpaired of their illness fell in with their companies, and took part in the assault of Gwáliár. These men, be it remembered, formed part of the unreformed British army, an army never surpassed by any other in the world. A "doli" generally but incorrectly spelt "dholey"—for it is ignorant of the letter "h" and possesses but one "o" and no "y"—is an inferior kind of palanquin.

Sir Hugh at once directed Brigadier Stuart to move with the 86th regiment, supported by the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, across the canal, to crown the heights on the other side of it, and to attack the left flank of the rebels. As a diversion in favour of this attack he sent Colonel Raines with the 95th regiment from his right front, across the canal in skirmishing order over the shoulder of the hill on which a division of the rebel force was in an entrenched position, covered by guns. This movement was supported by the 10th Bombay Native Infantry. Sir Hugh at the same time ordered up the 3rd troop Bombay Horse Artillery, supported by a squadron of the 8th Hussars to the entrance of the pass towards Gwalíar. The remainder of the force he disposed in support of the attacking columns and for the defence of the camp from the rear.

Sir Hugh sends Stuart to turn the left of the rebels

while Raines makes a diversion

Lieutenant Colonel Lowth led the 86th, in accordance with the orders he received, against the left of the rebels. These fell back rapidly on the battery, while the 86th pressed them so hard that they made no stand even under their guns. The 86th gave them no time to rally. Brockman's company, led by that gallant officer, then only a lieutenant, dashing with a cheer at the parapet, crossed it and took the guns which defended the ridge, two 6-pounders and a 9-pounder. Brockman, with great smartness, turned one of these guns on the rebels, and was engaged in turning the other, when Raines, advancing with the 95th, came up, took command, and completed the operation which Brockman had so well begun.

Stuart attacks

succeeds

Brockman captures three guns.

Raines completes the operation

Meanwhile the 10th Bombay Native Infantry, led by Lieutenant Roomo, moving up in support of the 95th, and protecting the right of the assaulting force, found itself exposed to a fire of musketry and artillery from the heights on the enemy's extreme left. Roomo was equal to the occasion. Wheeling to the right, he advanced with half his regiment in

* For his splendid services, Brockman obtained his brevet majority as soon as he got his company, though not until after another officer, whose name I will not mention, had attempted to "annex" his services. The fraud was, however, discovered and rectified with the full sanction of Lord Strathnairn (Sir Hugh Rose).

General entry of
Roon e and
the 10th Bom
bay Native
infantry

skirmishing order, the other half in support, cleared the two nearest heights of rebel infantry, and captured two brass field pieces and three mortars which were in the plain below

The day was now won, the heights were gained, Gwalhar lay as it were, at the feet of the British "The sight," writes Sir Hugh ' was interesting To our right was the handsome palace of the Phulbagh with its gardens and the old city, surmounted by

Gwalhar lies
at the feet of
the British

the fort, remarkable for its ancient architecture, with lines of extensive fortifications round the high and precipitous rock of Gwalhar To our left lay the Lashkar, or new city, with its spacious houses half hidden by trees' In the plain between the heights and the city was a great portion of the rebel forces just driven from the heights, and now, under the influence of panic, endeavouring to seek a refuge in one or other of the walled enclosures or fortified places towards which they were moving

Sir Hugh
resolves to
occupy the
city at once.

The sight of these men at once suggested to Sir Hugh that it would be possible to complete his work that day "I felt convinced" he wrote in his despatch, ' that I could take Gwalhar before sunset

He at once, then, ordered a general advance Covering his extreme right with the 3rd troop Bombay Horse Artillery and a troop of the 8th Hussars he ordered Colonel Owen, with the 1st Bombay Lancers, to descend the heights to the rear, make his way into

the road which led through the hills to the south, and thence attack the grand parade and the new city Covering his advance then, with No 4 Light field battery, and two troops 14th Light Dragoons, he moved forward his infantry from the left the 86th leading from that flank, the 95th forming the right

This prompt advance completely paralysed the rebels Their guns, indeed, opened fire, but the main object of their infantry seemed to be to escape The British infantry were

The British
carry the
Lashkar

approaching the plain, when Owen's Lancers, who had gained the point indicated, charged across the grand parade and, carried away by their ardour,

followed the rebels into the Lashkar In this charge a gallant officer, Lieutenant Mills, was shot through the heart James followed up this charge with a dash on to the parade-ground with two companies of the 59th, and took two 18 pounders and

they should attempt to capture the fortress with their joint parties, urging that, if the risk was great, the honour would be still greater. Waller cheerfully assented, and the two officers set off with their men and a blacksmith, whom, not unwilling, they had engaged for the service. They crept up to the first gateway unseen, then the blacksmith, a powerful man, forced it open, and so with the other five gates that opposed their progress. By the time the sixth gate had been forced the alarm was given, and, when the assailants reached the archway beyond the last gate, they were met by the fire of a gun which had been brought to bear on them. Dashing onwards, unscathed by the fire, they were speedily engaged in a hand-to-hand contest with the garrison. The fight was desperate, and many men fell on both sides; but the gallantry of Rose and Waller and their men carried all before them. Rose especially distinguished himself. Just in the hour of victory, however, as he was inciting his men to make the final charge, which proved successful, a musket was fired at him from behind the wall. The man who had fired the shot, a mutineer from Barchi, then rushed out and cut him across the knee and wrist with a sword. Waller came up and despatched the rebel; too late, however, to save his friend.* But the rock fortress was gained.

I have said that when Sir Hugh saw that success was certain he sent a despatch to Brigadier-General Robert Napier requesting him to pursue the rebels as far and as closely as he could.

Napier started on this service at 9 o'clock on the morning of the 20th with about five hundred and sixty cavalry, of whom

* Sir Hugh Rose, in his despatch, thus alludes to this officer: "But the gallant leader, Lieutenant Rose, who has been twice specially mentioned by me for good and gallant conduct, fell in the fort, mortally wounded, closing his early career by taking the fort of Gwálár by force of arms."

His brigadier, Brigadier C. S. Stuart, thus referred to him in his brigade orders: "Brigadier Stuart has received with the deepest regret, a report of the death of Lieutenant Rose, 25th Bombay Native Infantry, who was mortally wounded yesterday, on entering the fort of Gwálár, on duty with his men. The brigadier feels assured that the whole brigade unite with him in deploring the early death of this gallant officer, whose many sterling qualities none who knew him could fail to appreciate."

sixty were dragoons, and Lightfoot's battery of artillery, and, pursuing the rebels rapidly, came up with them, about twelve thousand strong, at Jáurá-Álipúr, shortly after sunrise on the 21st. Napier, reconnoitring, found them drawn up in two lines. The first, consisting of infantry and a bullock battery of six guns, had its right resting upon Álipúr; the second, composed of cavalry and horse and field artillery, rested on a village in rear of the front line. They were the entire remnants of the Kalpi army, with additions picked up at Gwáliár.

Napier receiving Sir Hugh's order to pursue,

pursues, and finds the rebels at Jáurá-Álipúr

Finding the ground to his right open, Napier directed Captain Lightfoot to take up a position on the left flank of the enemy, about three hundred yards from them, and to enfilade them. He then ranged his cavalry behind a rising ground, which afforded partial concealment, ready to act as soon as the fire from Lightfoot's guns should be felt.

His guns take the rebels.

This soon happened. Lightfoot's horse artillery, escorted by Abbott's cavalry, dashed at a gallop towards the enemy's left, and opened fire at the distance indicated by Napier. After a few discharges the ranks of the rebels wavered, then they began perceptibly to thin. Then Lightfoot limbered up and again pushed on at a gallop, whilst the 14th Light Dragoons, led by Prettjohn, and the Haidarábád cavalry, led by Abbott, dashed into their ranks.

The fire causes them to waver,

The result was decisive. Prettjohn's distinguished valour and Abbott's gallant leading were especially conspicuous. The dash of Lightfoot's horse artillery was superb to look at. "You cannot imagine," writes an eye-witness, a cavalry officer, "the dash of the artillery: it was wonderful. We could scarcely keep up with them." But, in fact, every man behaved like a hero: each vied with his comrade. After a brief resistance the rebels broke and fled, hotly pursued.* They lost twenty-five guns,

and when charged, break and flee.

* An officer who served with great distinction throughout this campaign writes me: "The courage of General Napier in ordering this attack, and the dash and vigour with which it was delivered, so surprised the enemy, that, as we afterwards ascertained, they believed us to be but the advanced guard of a strong force coming up. Just after the action General Napier received a despatch from Sir Hugh Rose ordering him not to attack in consequence of the strength of the enemy."

all their ammunition, elephants, ten's carts, and baggage, and had three to four hundred men killed. Never was a rout more complete *

The capture of Gwalhar and the dispersion of the rebel army closed the campaign which will for ever be associated with the name of Sir Hugh Rose. In a previous chapter I have alluded to the personal character, strong and firm as iron, and yet singularly sympathetic, which had chained success to all the incidents of that most eventful campaign. I may be pardoned if I briefly recapitulate here all that had been accomplished, a period falling somewhat short of six months. On the 6th of January, 1858 Sir Hugh Rose had left Indur, and on the 24th he laid siege to Rahatgarh. On the 28th he defeated in the field the Rajah of Banpur. On the 29th he took Rahatgarh, on the 3rd of February he relieved Sagar, on the 18th he took the strong fort of Garhakóta, on the 4th of March he forced the pass of Madanpur, on the 17th his 1st brigade stormed the fort of Chandern, on the 22nd he invested Jhansi, on the 31st he defeated Tantia Topi on the Betuá, on the 3rd of April he stormed Jhansi. On the 6th of May he defeated Tantia Topi and the Rani of Jhansi at Kunch, on the 23rd he beat the rebels at Galauli, near Kalpi, and occupied that fort the following day. In this chapter I have told how, roused from a bed of sickness by the news of the capture of Gwalhar by the rebels, he pursued them with unrelenting vigour and stayed not his hand till he had recovered all that they had temporarily gained. In every undertaking he was successful, and he was successful, because, careless of himself he thought of the great end he had in view, and spared no means to attain it.

After the victory at Gwalhar, Sir Hugh Rose proceeded to Bombay to assume command of the army of that Presidency †. The force with which he had won so many victories was to a great extent, broken up

* Tantia Topi who was present on this occasion, thus describes the affair. "We reached Jaurá Alipur and remained there during the night. The next morning we were attacked and fought for an hour and a half. We fired five shots and the English army fired four shots and we then ran off, leaving all our guns."


† The following farewell order was issued on this occasion by Sir Hugh Rose. "The Major General commanding, being on the point of resigning the command

MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE CAMPAIGNS OF MALWA & CENTRAL INDIA

English Miles
0 20 40 60 80

GIKAWAR
NIN
Ahmedabad
G of Cambay





The 95th regiment was ordered to occupy the rock fortress. The 71st Highlanders, the 86th regiment, and the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, with detachments of cavalry and artillery, remained at Morár. The 3rd Bombay Europeans, the 24th Bombay Native Infantry, with cavalry and artillery, were sent to Jhánsí. Of these troops the command devolved upon Brigadier-General Robert Napier. Brigadier Smith's brigade was distributed in three portions, respectively at Gwáliár, at Síprí, and at Gúnah. It seemed as though they were about to enjoy the rest they had so gloriously earned. But appearances were deceitful. Though one bitter enemy, the Rání of Jhánsí, had disappeared, there had escaped another, not less implacable, perhaps even more fertile in resources than that resolute lady. Though beaten at all points, that other adversary had never despaired. Not many weeks elapsed before the cities, the villages, and the jungles of Central India once more resounded with the name of Tuntia Topí.

and the
regiments
of the
force are
distributed.

The
prospects of
peace are
illusive

of the Puná division of the Bombay army, bids farewell to the Central India Field Force, and at the same time expresses the pleasure he feels that he commanded them when they gained one more laurel at Gwáliár. The Major-General witnessed with satisfaction how the troops and their gallant comrades in arms—the Rajpútáná brigade under General Smith—stormed height after height, and gun after gun, under the fire of a numerous field and siege artillery, taking finally by assault two 18-pounders at Gwáliár. Not a man in these forces enjoyed his natural health or strength, an Indian sun and months of marching and broken rest had told on the strongest, but the moment they were told to take Gwáliár for their Queen and country they thought of nothing but victory. They gained it, restoring England a true and brave ally to his throne, putting to rout the rebel army, killing many of them, and taking from them in the field, exclusive of those in the fort, fifty-two pieces of artillery, all their stores and ammunition, and capturing the city and fort of Gwáliár, reckoned the strongest in India. The Major-General thanks sincerely Brigadier General Napier, Q.B., Brigadier Stuart, C.B., and Brigadier Smith, commanding brigades in the field, for the very efficient and able assistance which they gave him, and to which he attributes the success of the day. He bids them and their brave soldiers once more a kind farewell. He cannot do so under better auspices than those of the victory of Gwáliár.

CHAPTER IV.

THE SOUTHERN MARATHA COUNTRY AND THE GRAND JACOB.

In the first chapter of this volume I have brought the record of affairs in the southern Marátha country up to the spring of 1858. In Belgauon and the neighbouring districts the crisis had passed away. It needed only the continuance of the same firm and conciliatory rule to ensure that it should never return.

It happened, however, at this period (March and April 1859) that Mr G. B. Seton Karr, exhausted by the double labours which had devolved upon him, applied to the Government of Bombay to be relieved of a portion of his overwhelming duties. Mr Seton Karr had, unquestionably, reason to believe that the Government, should it accede to his request, would grant him an option in the matter, or, at all events, would relieve him of the less important routine duties appertaining to the administration. But he was mistaken. The Government, in sanctioning Mr Seton Karr's request, desired him to retain in his own hands the civil administration of the territory, and to transfer the charge of the political agency to his assistant, Mr

Charles Manson.

Than Mr Manson there was not a more high minded, a more generous or a more earnest officer in the Bombay Civil Service. He was devoted to his profession; he gave to it his whole soul and his undivided energies. He was in the prime of life, intelligent, energetic, decided. But—he had been employed on the detested Indian Committee—and he belonged to a school of politics differing in one essential point from that of which Mr Seton Karr was a leader. The reader will have already discovered the title of that school. Mr Seton Karr was strongly in favour of the maintenance of the native

aristocracy, an upholder of the rights and customs held and enjoyed by native landowners at the time they came under British rule. He believed that, so long as the British respected those rights and customs, it would never be necessary to employ force, that persuasion and management would effect the required end. How he had tried, and tried successfully, that policy I have already shown. The success had proved to him its efficacy. Mr Manson belonged to a more modern school. In one of the letters which Mr Seton Karr addressed to him, before the transfer of the political duties ~~has~~ jestingly referred to as "an admirer of Lord Dalhousie." This, at least, is certain, that in a crisis such as that which was then prevailing, he gave his preference to measures stronger than those which Mr Seton Karr deemed suited to the occasion.

School of
which Sir
Manson was
a partisan

Mr Seton Karr was greatly disappointed by the decision of the Government, but the reason adduced by that Government was one to which he could take no exception. Lord Elphinstone desired that the whole of the southern Maráthá country should be placed under the control of one officer as Commissioner, and, in the circumstances of the time, he deemed it further advisable that that officer should be a soldier. Now Colonel Le Grand Jacob already exercised political authority in one part of the territory. On the 6th of December he had suppressed a mutiny in Kolhápúr, and had, by his firmness and strength of character, impressed the Bombay Government with the conviction that he was peculiarly qualified to wield political power in troublous times. Lord Elphinstone, then, transferred to him in the new arrangement a similar authority in the other part, with Mr Manson as political agent under him. If, however, the reason for the transfer was sufficient in that it cast no slur upon Mr Seton Karr, it did not the less cause considerable misgivings to that gentleman, for, knowing as he did the native chieftains, he felt that a change would create suspicion in their minds, a change more especially which transferred political action from himself to an officer who had been engaged in the Inámi Commission, and that, if that change were followed by a relaxation of the ties which bound them to the suzerain power, it might even produce a catastrophe.

Reasons
adduced by
the Bombay
Government
for the
change

Colonel
Le Grand Jacob
is appointed
a prime
political
agent to the
entire terri-
tory

Reasons why
Mr Seton
Karr
opposed the
change

Previous to the assumption of the charge of the political duties of the Belgaon districts Mr Seton harr had been gradually engaged in disarming the country—a work in which he had been most ably assisted by Colonel George Malcolm, commanding the Southern Maráthá Horse, and holding military charge of the southern Maráthá territory. It would be difficult to over estimate the services rendered by this able and gallant officer. His regiment mainly preserved order in that excitable country. In a previous chapter I have referred to his services at Shorápúr. Prior to

Colonel
George
Malcolm

here and
La Louche
Native
Infantry

that event, on the 29th of November, 1857, he had led his cavalry supported by one company of the 2nd Native Infantry, against the fortified village of Halgilli, which had become the head-quarters of

the disaffected. For some days previously these men had been held in check by detachments of the horse, first under Kerr, subsequently reinforced by La Louche, of the same regiment. These officers had, by spirited charges, driven the enemy into the town, and were struggling with them desperately in the

Malcolm
a river and
the place is
stagnant.

streets when Malcolm, with a fresh party, arrived. His men at once dismounted, and assisted by the Sipáhs of the 28th Native Infantry, scrambled over the flat-roofed houses of the village dashed upon the rebels, and decided the victory. The country, how-

State of the
country
generally

ever was still uneasy. Both above and below the gháts British authority had met with resistance, but, except that in some cases the guns and the arms

had not been entirely delivered up, the danger from such disturbances was considered to have passed away when Colonel Jacob took charge. Within a very short time of that event, however, a new peril appeared in another quarter.

Nárgund,

Of the chief of Nárgund I have spoken in the first chapter of this volume*. That this chief was thoroughly dis-

affected there can be no doubt. Mr Seton harr had even suspected him of treasonable correspondence with the chief of Shorapur†. But up to May 1858 he had been managed. He had even, under the gentle pressure exercised by Mr Seton harr, sent up a correct list of the guns and ammunition he possessed, and somewhat later, urged by Mr Manson, had even begun

I cannot
exercise
upon the chief
by Seton-
harr and
Manson.

* Vide pages 16 to 28

† Vide page 86

to despatch them to Dharwar. Those who are aware of the reverence and affection with which a native chief regards his guns will realise the sacrifice which the Rajah made to meet the expressed wishes of the Government.

Matters were thus progressing the chief doubtless secretly disaffected, yet complying under gentle pressure with the orders of the Bombay Government, when, about the 25th of May, intelligence reached him that Mr Seton Karr had been removed from the political charge of his country, and that Mr Manson had been gazetted his successor.

The chief hears that at Seton Karr has been replaced by Manson.

This intelligence changed all the good dispositions of the chief of Nargund. Although he did not personally dislike Mr Manson he regarded him as the living representative of the hated system of Inám examination—a system which as I have said, had worked with most disastrous effects on the chiefs of the Southern Marathá country. At that moment, too, Mr Manson was specially obnoxious to him for, only a few weeks previously, whilst still serving under Mr Seton Karr, he had arrested and carried off as a prisoner his own dearest friend, the chief of Jamkhándi*. The conviction at once took possession of him that the change was aimed against himself, that he was to be arrested, as his friend had been arrested and thrown into a dungeon†. In his fear and trepidation, the chief sent a confidential agent to Dhárwár to inquire of the magistrato the meaning of the portentous change.

Reasons why the chief of Nargund dreaded Mr Manson.

He fears to be arrested.

But, before he could receive an answer those about him had begun to work on a nature constitutionally timid and nervous. His habitual advisers and companions had not even then despaired of receiving a summons to join the victorious standard of the heir of Peshwa.

Influences which work on the chief of Nargund.

All seemed yet possible. Tantia Topi was confronting the British in Bundelkhand, Kalpi was yet held and one good victory might give them all they desired. These men took advantage of the consternation caused in the chief's mind by Mr Manson's appointment to inspire him to resist, to cast

* Only a short time previously the Rajah of Nargund had met Mr Manson at the chief of Jamkhándi's house, visiting him apparently on friendly terms.

† So penetrated was he with this idea, that he despatched that day a letter to his half brother at Ramdrúy in which occurs the passage "I had rather die than be arrested as Jamkhándi was."

defiance in the teeth of the foreigners who had persecuted themselves and their brethren

These men were not alone in their endeavours. The chief's wife, a lady of great personal attractions, and twenty years younger than he was, had renounced all hopes of a natural heir. She loved power, and the chance of her possessing power after her husband's death rested on the prospect of her becoming the adoptive mother of a reigning boy. And, the British Government having refused to the chief the right to adopt, this prospect was possible only in the event of the British rule being supplanted by that of the Marathá. Thus favoured counsellor added, then, her entreaties to those of the chief's companions.

The chief of Nargund gave way. That day he recalled the guns which had progressed only a few miles on the road to Dharwar, began to store provisions, and on the 27th of May, possessing only three obsolete rusty cannon and a swivel gun, declared war, with all the formalities used by the Maráthás, against the British Government.

Mr Manson had taken up his duties as political agent on the 16th of May. From that date till the 26th he had remained with Colonel Jacob at Kohlapúr, transacting business with him. On the 26th he set out for the northern states of the territory, with the view of judging for himself of the state of the country, and of using his influence with the chiefs. Four hours after he had set out, Jacob received a telegram from General Lester, commanding at Belgáon, stating that an insurrection had broken out near to Dharwár, and that the Nargund chief was believed to be supporting it, as he had recalled some of his guns on their way to be given up. Jacob at once sent a horseman with this news to Manson, informing him also that he had telegraphed to the general to send, if the report were true, a sufficient force to Nárgund, and recommending him to return to

Kohlapúr

Jacob's messenger reached Manson at Kurindwád. Englishmen in India are so accustomed to authority, and to all the incense which waits on authority, that, except in rare cases, they judge men and affairs, not as they are, but as, to their

complacent minds, they wish them to be. Now, Manson had always been on the most friendly terms with the chief of Nargund. He had no adequate conception of the depth of bitterness and the dread his connection with the Inam Commission had roused in the mind of that Maratha noble. It was not possible, then, that he should imagine for a moment that his nomination to the control of political affairs, in place of Mr Seton Karr, would rouse the chief to madness. Still believing, then, in the friendly professions of the Rájah, and in the persuasive power of his influence over him, he sent back word to Jacob that from Kurundwád he could reach Nargund by a cross road, that he would arrive there in time to prevent, probably, the development of the intended mischief, but that, if too late to prevent such development, he was confident of being able to prevent the chief's half brother, the lord of Rámdrug, from joining the rebellion. Having despatched this reply, Manson posted horses along the road to Rámdrug, and sent off by a horseman a letter to Colonel George Malcolm, commanding at Kaladji, requesting him to push on to Rámdrug with a body of his regiment, the Southern Maratha Horse.

Manson
confident in
himself

determines
to push on
to Nargund

and sends to
Malcolm for
military aid

But, before this message reached Malcolm, that noble and daring officer had taken the field with two hundred and fifty horsemen to attack the insurgents, who had already plundered the treasury of one of the district stations of Dharwar. Mr Manson, then, though he rode hard, reached Rámdrug to find it unoccupied with him the twelve troopers who had accompanied him from Kholapur, and there were as fatigued as he himself was. There he learned from the chief the treason of his half brother, he read the compromising letters from the latter, urging the Rámdrug chief to follow his example, and, entreated by that chief not to pursue his journey to Nargund, he resolved to join the force in the field under Malcolm.

Malcolm
meanwhile
had taken
the field.

He had

Manson
reaches
Rámdrug.

and resolves
to endeavour
to join
Malcolm

He sets out
that evening

and, tired
stopping near a
temple to
sleep

Tired as he was, Manson set out in a palanquin, escorted by his troopers, that evening. Better had he taken his rest at Rámdrug and made the journey to Malcolm in one day, for, exhausted by the long day's work, he and his followers stopped about 10 o'clock at a temple near a little village on the way and slept.

The chief of Nargund is male a quainted with Manson's movements, A report of all Manson's movements had been duly carried to the chief of Nargund. When the news reached him of the halt at the temple, he reasoned as an untutored Asiatic will always reason. His enemy was in his power, he would slay him*. He conceived that, having declared war against the British, he had a perfect right to destroy the members of that nation wherever he might find them. Accordingly about midnight, he sallied forth with some hundreds of followers, and, approaching the spot, poured in a volley, which killed the sentry, and then sent in his men to finish the work with the sword. Manson, roused from his sleep, fired his revolver at his assailants, but he was immediately overpowered, his head was cut off, and his body thrown in the fire, still burning, which had been kindled by his followers. Having killed as many of these as he could find, the chief returned with Manson's head to Nargund, and suspended the bloody trophy over a gateway†.

Meanwhile, the insurgents who had plundered the treasury, had marched southwards and joined Bhím Ráo, the chief of Kopuldrug. There they were attacked by a Madras force from Ballárl under Colonel Hughes already mentioned for his soldier-like conduct at Shorápur, and who, in daring and manly qualities in the capacity to manage men and to direct operations yielded to none who came to the front in the mutiny. This gallant soldier pushed forward with an energy surpassing that of the rebels, caught them, as I have said, at Kopuldrug, and stormed the place, killing Bhím Ráo, the chief of Hémbari, and many of the defenders.

Malcolm, on his side, had no sooner heard that Nargund was in revolt than he felt that a moment's delay would provoke the rising of the entire Maráthá country. With only two hundred and fifty cavalry at his disposal he marched, then, immediately against the

* It was the reasoning of Jael, wife of Heber the Kenite, whose conduct was infinitely more treacherous.

† Read also Sir George Le Grand Jacob's *Western India before and during the Mutinies*. The account of the suspension of the head over a gateway rests entirely on native testimony. When the place was taken it was found floating in a well.

place, assisted by the wily Brahman officials, who believed he was marching on destruction

At the same time he wrote to Belgoon, asking for some infantry and some guns

The authorities there sent him two companies of Europeans, one of native infantry, and two guns under Captain Piget

He is re-inforced by infantry and guns.

Riding on with these, only five days after the insensate declaration of war, Malcolm appeared before Nargund

He had scarcely dismounted before news reached him that the rebels were marching to attack him

The rebels march to attack him

His heart bounded with joy "I have them now," he said. Mounting his troopers as quickly as possible, he went to the front

It was true, they were advancing But when they saw Malcolm and his horsemen they hesitated, then halted and, in the manner of natives,

Malcolm rebuffs and defeats them

began to close in on their centre Then, wavering, they fell back

By this time Malcolm had collected his men Riding at their head he charged, overthrew the rebels—who, however, fought well in groups—drove them back,

followed them up into the town, and forced the surviving combatants to take refuge in the fort

and captures the town.

There remained now only the fort, a very strong one, so strong, that if defended, it would have defied the efforts of the

small assailing force But Malcolm knew the natives well

"Give them a quiet night," he said, "and they will save us the trouble"

The rebels evacuate the fort in the night

He was right On the morning of the 2nd of June the strongest fort in the southern Maratha country was found deserted

The chief, accompanied by six of his principal advisers attempted in the guise of a pilgrim, to escape the

The chief attempts to escape in disguise

fate he had provoked Every possible ruse was had recourse to by the fugitives to baffle the pursuit

which, they soon learned, had been instituted after them The man who had been deputed for that

task, Mr

Frank Souter,* possessed qualities which did not permit him to be easily baffled

but is captured by Frank Souter

He met ruse with ruse, and after a hot pursuit, captured the chief on the night of the 3rd †

* Afterwards S r Frank Souter, Superintendent of Police in Bombay He died in 1887

† The chief of Nargund was tried at Belgoon on the 11th of June He

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He is reinforced by infantry and guns.

Nargund

The rebels march to attack him

When they saw Malcolm and his horsemen they hesitated, then halted and, in the manner of natives, began to close in on their centre. Then, wavering, they fell back. By this time Malcolm had collected his men. Riding at their head he charged, overthrew the rebels—who, however, fought well in groups—drove them back, followed them up into the town, and forced the surviving combatants to take refuge in the fort.

Malcolm charges and defeats them

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There remained now only the fort, a very strong one, so strong, that, if defended, it would have defied the efforts of the small assaulting force. But Malcolm knew the natives well. "Give them a quiet night," he said, "and they will save us the trouble." He was right. On the morning of the 2nd of June the strongest fort in the southern Marathá country was found deserted.

The rebels evacuate the fort in the night

The chief, accompanied by six of his principal advisers, attempted in the guise of a pilgrim, to escape the fate he had provoked. Every possible ruse was had recourse to by the fugitives to baffle the pursuit which, they soon learned, had been instituted after them. The man who had been deputed for that task, Mr Frank Souter,* possessed qualities which did not permit him to be easily baffled. He met ruse with ruse, and after a hot pursuit, captured the chief on the night of the 3rd †

The chief attempts to escape in disguise

task, Mr

but is captured by Frank Souter

* Afterwards Sir Frank Souter, Superintendent of Police in Bombay. He died in 1887.

† The chief of Nargund was tried at Belgaoon on the 11th of June. He

On learning of Mr Manson's death, Colonel Jacob had taken the promptest measures to control the northern states of the territory. He forced the chief of Miraj, the best fortified town in the country, to give a pledge of his fidelity by surrendering his ammunition. Shortly afterwards the death of General Lester led to the nomination of Colonel Jacob as Brigadier General in military command in the southern Maratha country.

Under General Jacob's firm rule the country above the gháts soon subsided into quiescence, but below the mountains, along the Goa frontier, the Sáwant rebels still continued to keep a large number of Madras, Bombay and Portuguese troops regular and irregular in the field. Want of concert, however, naturally resulted from the action of troops serving under commanders independent of one of the other. Eventually, in November, the Portuguese Viceroy, at a conference with General Jacob, consented to place the whole of his field detachments under the command of the officer who should unite that of the Bombay troops. Under this agreement Brigadier General Fitzgerald of the Madras army took command of the united forces, and an organised plan was arranged. This was to hem in the tract occupied by the rebels and to inform them that unless they surrendered by the 20th November they would be hunted down without mercy. On that date the band had dwindled to the number of eighty persons. These surrendered to the Portuguese commander on the night of that day, and their ringleaders were subsequently transported to the Portuguese possessions in Taimor.

Thenceforward the peace of the Southern Marathá country was assured.

pleaded guilty and in his plea stated that it was the fear of arrest that had caused him to commit the bloody deed. He was executed in the presence of all the troops and of a large number of natives on the 12th. It remains only to add that the bodies of the wife of whom I have spoken and the chief's mother were found in the Málparba river on the night of the 3rd. S. R. G. Le Grand Jacob states in the work already referred to, that they drowned themselves unable to bear up against the disgrace.

and "one a talukdar—who had remained faithful amid great temptations, and who were not only declared "the sole hereditary proprietors of the lands which they held when Oudh came under British rule," but were promised additional rewards. Rewards and honours in proportionate measure were likewise promised to others in whose favour similar claims should be established to the satisfaction of the Government. But, with these exceptions, the proprietary right in the soil of the province was confiscated to the British Government, which would dispose of that right in such manner as might seem fitting. To the chiefs, talukdars, and landowners, however, who should make immediate submission, surrendering their arms and obeying the orders of the Chief Commissioner, the proclamation promised the safety of their lives and of their honour, provided that their hands were "unstained with English blood murderously shed." For any further indulgence, the proclamation added, and with regard to the condition in which such men might thereafter be placed, "they must throw themselves upon the justice and mercy of the British Government." The proclamation promised, in conclusion, that to those amongst the classes referred to who should come forward promptly and give the Chief Commissioner their support in the restoration of peace and order, the indulgence would be large, and that the Governor General would be ready to view liberally the claims which they might thus acquire to the restoration of their former rights. Further, that while participation in the murder of Englishmen and Englishwomen would exclude those who had participated in it from all mercy, those, on the other hand, who had protected English lives would be specially entitled to consideration and leniency.

In the letter to which I have referred as accompanying the proclamation the Foreign Secretary, Mr G F Edmonstone, was, as I have already stated, careful to lay down that it should not be published until Lucknow should have been conquered or should lie at the mercy of the conqueror. It further prescribed that, when published, the proclamation was to be addressed only to the non-military inhabitants of the province, and in no sense to the mutinous Sipahis. It expressed likewise the conviction of

Rewards it
promises to
the innocent

punishment
to the
criminals

manner as

Conditions of
commutation
of punishment

Participation
in the
murder of
Englishmen
and English
women to
exclude from
mercy

Mr Edmon-
stone's
accompany-
ing letter

Lord Canning that the tone of apparent severity which characterised the proclamation was necessary, inasmuch as the announcement in such a state paper of a liberal and forgiving spirit would be open to misconstruction, and it added that, in reality, the spirit of the proclamation was merciful and even lenient, in that it promised exemption, almost general, from the penalties of death and imprisonment to the rajahs, talukdars, and zamindars, who had fought and conspired against the Government, that even the confiscation of estates was rather a merciful commutation of a severer punishment than a harsh measure of justice. The letter concluded with suggestions to Sir James Outram regarding the manner in which it might be requisite for him to deal with mutineers of varying grades of guilt.

fully explains the mercy that underlies the apparent severity of the terms of the proclamation

Sir James Outram received the letter and the proclamation on the 5th of March. Reading the latter by the light of its actual contents, apart from the commentary furnished by the letter, he arrived at a conclusion regarding it the very reverse of that which Lord Canning had endeavoured to impress upon him. Lord Canning, when sending him the proclamation, had said in so many words by the mouth of his Foreign Secretary, "Do not judge the proclamation simply by itself, as a paper dealing out stern justice to conquered revolters. Rather, looking at the measure of punishment which those revolters have brought upon themselves, see whether the proclamation does not in every case, except the case of atrocious murder, pronounce a mitigation of punishment capable of still further mitigation." But Outram, disregarding this exhortation, looked at the proclamation without sufficient reference to the circumstances which had made it necessary, and condemned it. In a letter to the Foreign Secretary, dated the 8th of March, he declared his belief that there were not a dozen landowners in Oudh who had not, in some way or other, assisted the rebels, and that, therefore, there would be but few exceptions to the sweeping confiscations proposed by the Governor General, he expressed his conviction that as soon as the proclamation should be made public nearly all the chiefs and talukdars would retire to their domains and prepare for a desperate resistance. He proceeded even to

Outram reads the proclamation in a sense different to that intended by Lord Canning

and condemns it.

Embodies his views in a letter

urges extenuating circumstances for those who had revolted, by declining his opinion—which, it must be admitted, was founded on fact—that the landowners had been very unjustly treated in the land settlement after the annexation, that apart from this, their sympathy with the rebels had been, in the actual circumstances, only natural—that it was not until the British rule in Oudh had been brought to a virtual end by the mutineers that the rajahs and talukdars had sideled against the Government, that they ought to be treated rather as honourable enemies than as rebels, that they would be converted into relentless enemies if their lands were confiscated, maintaining a guerilla war, which would “involve the loss of thousands of Europeans by battle, disease and exposure,” but that if their lands were secured to them, they would at once aid in restoring order and would so co-operate with the paramount power as before long, to render unnecessary the further presence of the large army then occupying Oudh.

To this letter Lord Canning replied on the 10th, in a brief despatch, the nature of which renders still clearer the really merciful intentions of his proclamation. Referring to the promise of safety of life and honour to the talukdars, chiefs, and landholders unstained with English blood murderously slain, who should surrender at once and obey the orders of the Chief Commissioner Lord Canning authorised Sir James to amplify it by an addition which, if not very wide in itself, intimated as clearly as possible the merciful intentions of the Governor General. “To those amongst them,” ran this addition, “who shall promptly come forward and give to the Chief Commissioner their support in the restoration of peace and order, this indulgence will be large, and the Governor General will be willing to view liberally the claims which they may thus acquire to a restitution of their former rights.”

Three weeks later Lord Canning replied at greater length to Outram's remarks. In Mr Edmonstone's despatch, dated the 31st of March, Lord Canning admitted that the people of Oudh occupied a position, with respect to their allegiance to the British Government, differing widely from that of the inhabitants of the provinces which had been longer under British rule. But, in the Governor-General's opinion, that difference constituted no valid ground

Lord
Canning's
Despatch

renders his
merciful in-
tentions still
clearer

It is good
and more
elaborate
to us

for treating the chiefs and talukdars in the lenient manner suggested by Outram. Arguing in the spirit of the letter of the 3rd of March he again insisted that in the presence of a great crime, exemption from death, transportation, and imprisonment were great boons, and that to have offered more lenient terms would have been to treat the rebels—not as Outram contended, as honourable enemies—but as enemies who had won the day. With respect to Outram's contention that the injustice of the land settlement after the annexation had impelled the landowners to rebel, Lord Canning simply declined to recognise the hypothesis. Admitting that the policy of introducing into Oudh a system of village settlement in place of the old settlement under talukdars might not have been altogether wise, Lord Canning declined to believe that the conduct of the landowners was in any respect the consequence of that policy. He attributed that conduct rather to the repugnance they had felt to suffer any restraint of the arbitrary powers they had till then exercised, to a diminution of their importance by being brought under equal laws, and to the obligation of disbanding their armed followers and of living a peaceful and orderly life. For these reasons Lord Canning adhered to his proclamation.

gives ample reasons

for adhering to the proclamation

That Sir James Outram did not at once realise the statesmanlike nature and the really merciful tendencies of Lord Canning's proclamation may at once be admitted. The end of the two men was really the same, the difference was in the manner by which that end should be attained. Sir James would have carried leniency to a point at which leniency would have missed its aim. Lord Canning maintaining the right to be severe was prepared to be as merciful as Outram whenever the exercise of mercy should be politically desirable.

Real similarity in the objects at which Lord Canning and Outram alike aimed

The real character of Lord Canning's statesmanship at this period might have remained long generally unknown but for the action taken with respect to the proclamation by the then President of the Board of Control the Earl of Ellenborough. That nobleman had but recently taken over the seals of that office from his predecessor, a member of the Whig Cabinet, Mr. Vernon Smith. In due course he received about the 20th of March, a copy of Lord Canning's proclamation, unaccom-

Lord Ellenborough receives Lord Canning's proclamation

panied by any explanatory document. In point of fact, Lord Canning, in transmitting the proclamation, had written to Mr Vernon Smith, a member of his own party, and who, in his belief, still held the office of President of the Board of Control a letter in which he stated that the proclamation required an explanatory despatch which he had not had time to prepare. Unfortunately, Mr Vernon Smith neglected to pass on that letter to his successor. He thus allowed Lord Ellenborough to believe that the proclamation stood alone, that it required no interpretation, and was to be judged on its merits as an act of policy.

without the letter addressed to his predecessor

explanatory of the reasons which justified it

It is not surprising that, reading the proclamation in this way, Lord Ellenborough arrived at a conclusion not very dissimilar to that with which Sir James Outram, possessing all the advantages of proximity to and personal communication with Lord Canning, had been impressed. He condemned it as likely to raise such a ferment in Oudh as would make pacification almost impossible. In accord with Outram, of whose

Lord Ellenborough arrives at a conclusion similar to that formed by Outram

views, however, he was ignorant, Lord Ellenborough believed that the mode of settling the land tenure when the British took possession of Oudh had been in many ways unjust, and had been the chief cause of the general and national character of the disaffection in that province. He concluded—agreeing in this also with Outram—that the people of Oudh would view with dismay a proclamation which cut them off, as a nation from the ownership of land so long cherished by them, and would deem it righteous to battle still more energetically than before against a government which could adopt such a course of

and embodies his views in a despatch

policy. Lord Ellenborough embodied these views in a despatch to be transmitted to Lord Canning in the name of the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, added to them an argument—also an argument of Sir James Outram—to the effect that the people of Oudh ought to be regarded as legitimate enemies rather than as rebels, and concluded it with these stinging words: 'Other conquerors, when they have succeeded in overcoming

Concluding paragraph of the despatch.

resistance, have excepted a few persons as still deserving of punishment, but have, with a generous policy, extended their clemency to the great body of the people. You have acted on a different

principle. You have reserved a few as deserving of special favour, and you have struck with what they will feel as the severest of punishment the mass of the inhabitants of the country.

"We cannot but think that the precedents from which you have departed will appear to have been conceived in a spirit of wisdom superior to that which appears in the precedent you have made. We desire, therefore, that you will mitigate in practice the stringent severity of the decree of confiscation you have issued against the landowners of Oudh. We desire to see British authority in India rest upon the willing obedience of a contented people: there cannot be contentment where there is general confiscation.

"Government cannot long be maintained by any force in a country where the whole people is rendered hostile by a sense of wrong, and, if it were possible so to maintain it it would not be a consummation to be desired."

Lord Ellenborough submitted this despatch to the Cabinet of which he was a member. It received an approval which was unanimous. Three weeks later he showed it to Mr Bright with the view of its contents being made known to the House of Commons.

* So far as Lord Ellenborough was concerned, the mistakes he committed—the penning of an acrimonious despatch without waiting for an explanation, and the disclosure of its contents to Mr Bright with a view to its being presented to the House of Commons—were fatal to his tenure of office. The matter having come under the cognizance of the House of Commons and having become the subject of a debate which at the outset seemed likely to terminate the existence of the Government, Lord Ellenborough took upon himself the sole responsibility of the despatch, and resigned his office.

This action
which is known
compels Lord
Ellenborough
to resign

Far different was the effect produced by the receipt of the despatch upon Lord Canning. He received it at Allahabad on the 13th of June. Before its contents became known, rumours circulated that the Government of Lord Derby had written a disagreeable letter to the Governor General. "I asked him," wrote at the time, one deeply in his confidence "if it was true that he had received something disagreeable. He said, almost indifferently, that it was impertinent, but he

Effect
produced
by the
despatch on
Lord
Canning

did not care much, he would answer what they wrote." He then entered into a conversation regarding his Oudh policy. The next day, when the despatch had been read by others, the prevailing feeling regarding it was that it was offensively impertinent, with a look of epigrammatic point in the concluding sentences—those which I have quoted—of which the writer was

Indignation
it caused
in the minds
of his
entourage.

evidently proud. But, above all, there arose a feeling of indignation that a despatch so insulting should have been published for the benefit of the natives, many of them still in revolt, as well as of the Anglo Indians.

But Lord Canning had, at this crisis a support not less grateful than the confidence of the friends about him.

Lord Canning
was urged from
England not
to resign.

The same mail brought him a copy of a resolution of the Court of Directors expressing continued confidence in their Governor General. Letters were received from Mr Sidney Herbert, from Lord Gran-

ville, from Lord Aberdeen, and from many other leading men, expressing sympathy and regard. In almost all these Lord Canning was urged not to resign, but to carry on his own policy calmly, and to leave to the Government the odium of recalling

He had no
thought of
doing so.

him. Lord Canning never thought of resigning. He regarded Lord Ellenborough's despatch as Achilles would have regarded a javelin 'hurled by the feeble hand of Pyram' and, far from allowing it to

disturb his equanimity, he sat down coolly and calmly to pen a vindication of his policy.

Curiously enough, ten days after that vindication had been drafted and despatched—on the 27th of June—Lord

He received
a letter from
Lord Derby

Canning received a long private letter from Lord Derby himself on the subject of the point of difference. In this letter Lord Derby expressed a general

confidence in Lord Canning's policy, he attributed Lord Ellenborough's despatch to the conduct of Mr Vernon Smith in withholding the covering private letter which accompanied the Oudh proclamation, and which gave the only intimation that further explanations would be forwarded. Lord Derby con-

virtually
asked him
to stay on.

cluded by virtually asking, almost pressing Lord Canning to stay on, and spoke of the probability of Lord Stanley going to the Board of Control. To one

in Lord Canning's position such a letter from the chief of the cabinet of which Lord Ellenborough had been a

member was most satisfactory. It might almost be said that his policy was vindicated by his enemies

Lord Canning's own vindication was dated the 18th of June. It began by alluding in a dignified manner to the fact that the despatch censuring himself had been made public in England three weeks before it reached his hands, and that in a few days it would be read in every station in Hindustan. Dwelling then upon

Lord
Canning's
reply to the
despatch

the pain which the censure of his conduct by the Court of Directors would cause him, and upon the manner in which the publication of it would increase his difficulties, he declared that no taunts or sarcasms, come from what quarter they might, would turn him from the path which he believed to be that of public duty. Expressing, then, his conviction that a change in the government of India at that time, taking place under circumstances which would indicate a repudiation of the policy pursued towards the Oudh rebels, would seriously retard the pacification of the country, he proceeded to declare his belief that that policy had been from the first merciful without weakness, and indulgent without compromise of the dignity of the Government, that it had made manifest to the people of reconquered districts all over India, in-

Preliminary

cluding Oudh, that the indulgence to those who should submit and who should be free from atrocious crime, would be large, and that the Oudh proclamation, thoroughly consistent with that policy, offered the best and earliest prospect of restoring peace to that province on a stable footing.

Stating then, in dignified language, that although in a time of unexampled difficulty, danger, and toil, he would not lay down of his own act the high trust which he had the honour to hold, yet that if, after reading the vindication of his policy, the Court of Directors should see fit to with-

Preliminary

hold their confidence from him, he then preferred his respectful yet urgent request that he might be relieved from the office of Governor General. Lord Canning proceeded to reply to Lord Ellenborough's strictures, and to assert the grounds upon which his convictions of the soundness of his policy rested.

With respect to the former, Lord Canning referred to the extraordinary manner in which Lord Ellenborough's despatch had almost justified the people of Oudh, as if they were fighting in a righteous cause—a manner quite legitimate in a member of the legislature, but

He starts upon
Lord Ellen-
borough's

quite unjustifiable in a minister of the Queen of England who herself was actually Queen of Oudh also. He declined to discuss the policy which in 1855-56, had dictated the annexation, it was not his act nor had he ever been empowered to

and points
out the
object of his
despatch
might have
caused to
Ind. A.

undo it. But he felt it incumbent upon him to point out the disastrous results which might follow, should the people of Oudh be encouraged, by such reasoning as that contained in the despatch, to continue their resistance. At the actual moment, the chiefs of the various sections of rebels in Oudh

were united neither by a common plan nor by a common sympathy, but he added, if it should become manifest that the British Government shrank from a declaration of its right to possess Oudh, the Begam, as the representative in the field of the late reigning family, would draw to herself all the sympathies of the country, and all the other factions would merge in hers.

Defence of
his pro-
clamation.

Lord Canning prefaced the defence of his proclamation by stating that he had early in the year proceeded to Allahabad chiefly that he might be able to investigate the state of Oudh, that he soon determined to make a difference in the measures to be adopted for

the pacification of the country, between the continued Sipáhs and the Oudh rebels, that the latter should not be put to death for appearing in arms against the authorities, unless they had committed actual murder, that the general punishment for rebellion in Oudh should be confiscation of estates a punishment recognised by Native States as the fitting consequence of the offence, and one which in no way affected caste, nor the honour of the most sensitive Bráhman or Rájput; a punishment which admitted of every gradation according to the severity or lightness of the offence, which would enable the Government to reward friendly talúkdárs and zamindárs, and which, in point of fact, would, in many cases, constitute a kind of retributive justice—many of the talúkdárs having acquired their estates by spoliation of the village communities, that as a matter of strict justice, it would only be right to restore these estates to the village communities, but that, as there would be many practical difficulties to such a course it would be better to take the forfeited estates of the rebellious talúkdárs as Government property, out of which faithful villages and individuals might be rewarded.

With this vindication ended practically the crisis caused by Lord Ellenborough's hasty act. The result was to seat Lord Canning, in the presence of a ministry of an opposite party, more firmly in the saddle, and to give him greater strength to carry out the policy which he believed to be adapted to the circumstances. In another way his hands had been strengthened at this crisis.

Final result on Lord Canning of the Ellenborough letter

The nomination of Sir James Outram to the Supreme Council enabled Lord Canning to place at the head of the Oudh province a man who, imbued with his own views, was certain to carry out his policy with the vigour arising from conviction.

The new Chief Commissioner of Oudh was Mr Robert Montgomery. Mr Montgomery was a man who, with a thorough acquaintance with administrative duties, combined great decision of character, a sound judgment, and a thorough knowledge of native character. He had been the right hand of Sir John Lawrence in the Panjáb, had been the firm advocate of those resolute measures which made the fall of Dehli possible, and, in the earlier stages of the mutiny, when Sir John Lawrence was absent from Lahore, had himself directed the measures for disarming the native troops which carried out in time, had unquestionably saved the province. In questions of administrative policy Mr Montgomery, as I have said, agreed in principle with Lord Canning.

Mr Robert Montgomery

He had

If a character and antecedents.

Such was the man to whom, in the month May 1858 Lord Canning entrusted the carrying out of the policy towards Oudh embodied in his famous proclamation. Mr Montgomery, without ignoring the proclamation, did not put it into rough action. He used it rather as a lever, by the judicious employment of which he could bring about the results at which the Governor General professedly aimed. The situation was, for the first three months of his tenure of office, in many respects remarkable. The larger number of the relations, adherents, and dependants of the deposed royal family had their dwellings in, or belonged, by family association extending over many years to the

Mr Montgomery's act on regarding the proclamation

The situation in Oudh.

* Afterwards Sir Robert Montgomery, K.C.S.I., and till recently a member of the Council of India. He died in 1887.

city of Lakhnao Considering the part which
 Lakhnao that city, and more especially the classes of its
 inhabitants to which I have referred, had played in the rebellion
 it was especially necessary to exercise over it a strict super-
 vision In the provinces an entirely different feeling
 prevailed There the rule of the king of Oudh had
 The provinces planted no seeds of loyalty or devotion Alien in
 religion and in race to the great bulk of the people of Oudh,
 the king and his courtiers had been tolerated, first,
 because they were there, and secondly, because they
 Feeling of the people towards the king had exercised no strict supervising power, but had
 been content to be the nominal rulers of the great
 landowners permitted to carry on, very much in
 accordance with their own wishes, their feudal rule The central
 power, as exercised by the kings of Oudh had interfered to put
 a stop to rapine and oppression only when that rapine and
 oppression had attained a magnitude so great that to ignore the
 evil would have produced a national rising The sentiment
 felt then, by the great body of landholders towards the royal
 family of Oudh was not loyalty, it was not affection, it was
 not sympathy, it was scarcely contentment Perhaps the term
 that best describes it is the term toleration They had been
 content to tolerate that family as exercising a kind of normal
 suzerainty which permitted them to do just as they liked

Towards the British rule, exercised as it had been by the
 civilians who had immediately preceded Sir Henry
 Lawrence they entertained a different feeling In
 The feeling regarding British rule strong contrast with the selfish sway of the Muham-
 madan kings of Oudh, the British rule had made itself
 felt in every corner of the province The reforms it had intro-
 duced, the inquiries which it made, had been so sweeping, that
 an almost universal feeling had risen amongst the
 very hostile landowners that it was not to be endured If the
 king of Oudh had been King Log, the British rule
 was the rule of King Stork The landowners of Oudh then
 had hailed the mutiny, not from affection towards the deposed
 dynasty, but from hatred of its successor Indifferent as they
 were to the persons and the race of their Muhammadan kings,
 they would have gladly ejected the British to restore them

When, then, Lakhnao had fallen, the talukdars and the land-
 owners generally were as far as they had ever been from sub-
 mission to the British authority Could the Begum show a

strong front, they might yet combine with her for the restoration of the ancient dynasty in the person of one of its members. But as there did not appear in the field any face sufficiently strong to rally round, the landowners and other rebel leaders fought each for himself, each hoping that some great benefit would accrue to him out of the general turmoil.

But they have
no central
rallying
point.

This disunion greatly diminished the difficulties which Montgomery might otherwise have had to encounter had there been one fixed purpose and concentration of action among the malcontents. But still the task before him was no light one. He met it with all the skill, the temper, and the judgment which might have been expected from so experienced a ruler of men. He exhausted every means of persuasion at the same time that he brought clearly to the view of the landowners the fixed determination of the British Government. He was thus able to restore in some few districts the lapsed British authority. To reorganise that authority in those deaf to his persuasions he was content to wait until the forcible measures inaugurated by his military coadjutor, Sir Hope Grant, should produce their natural results.

This fact
diminishes
the task
before
Montgomery.
The difficulties
which are
nevertheless,
great.

He meets
them

restores
in some
districts
the authority

What those measures were I shall relate in the next chapter

CHAPTER II

THE PACIFICATION OF OUDH

WHEN I last referred to General Hope Grant,* he was marching to the fort of Jalalabad near Lakhnao. The date was the 16th of May. Leaving his force to enter that place, the general, just then nominated a Knight Commander of the Bath for his services in the field, rode into Lakhnao to consult with Mr Montgomery, the recently appointed Chief Commissioner. Montgomery informed him that the Kánhpur road was again endangered by Beni Mádhú an influential tálukdar, who had likewise caused proclamations to be distributed in Lakhnao warning the inhabitants to quit that city, as it was to be attacked. On receiving this information, Hope Grant, taking with him the 53rd Foot instead of the 38th and substituting Mackinnon's battery for Olpherts's, returned to Jalálábád, and started thence in pursuit of Beni Mádhú on the 20th of May.


For some time Beni Mádhú was invisible. Hope Grant followed him to Jasauli, eight miles from Banul, where he had been reported to be 'with a force of eighty-five thousand men', but the tálukdar and his men had vanished. On the 4th of June the Sikh Itájah of Kapurthala joined Sir Hope with nine hundred Sikhs and three brass 6 pounders.

Hope Grant posted this reinforcement at the Dinní bridge, and, leaving the pursuit of Beni Mádhú, marched against a body of rebels less fabulously numerous, but more really formidable—being fifteen thousand strong—who had taken up a strong position at Nawabganj on the Faizalíd road, eighteen miles from Lakhnao. Grant's division was tolerably strong †. Leaving, then, a small force at the other Nawálganj,

Then leaving the pursuit, he then went to the other Nawabganj.

* Vol IV page 319

† It consisted of the 1st and 2nd Battalions Rifle Brigade the 5th Punjab



on the Kanhpúr road, he marched on Chinhat. There he found another column, twelve hundred strong, under Colonel Parnell. Placing his baggage under charge of that officer, he quitted Chinhat at 11 o'clock on the night of the 12th of June to march against the rebels.

These latter had taken up a position exceptionally strong. They occupied a large plateau, covered on three sides by a stream crossed by a bridge at a little distance from the town. On the fourth side was jungle.

Strong position of the rebels

Grant halts near the rebels

Hope Grant, having with him a trustworthy guide, led his force across the complicated country between Chinhat and the plateau during the night, and reached the bridge mentioned about half an hour before daybreak. He halted his column to allow his men to rest and get their breakfast, and then marched on the rebels. His plan was to turn their right and interpose between them and the jungle. His men would do the rest.

At daybreak Hope Grant crossed the bridge and fell on the rebels. He took them completely by surprise. Their forces, divided into four parts, each commanded by a separate leader, had no time to concentrate, and had made no plan to act with unanimity. Hope Grant had struck at their centre, and this move had greatly contributed to their confusion. Still, they fought very gallantly. "A large body of fine daring zamindár men" wrote Sir Hope in his journal. "I brought two guns into the open and attacked us in rear. I have seen many battles in India, and many brave fellows fighting with a determination to conquer or die, but I never witnessed anything more magnificent than the conduct of these zamindárs." They attacked Hodson's Horse, who could not face them, and by their wantsteadiness imperilled the two guns attached to their regiment. Grant at once ordered up the 7th Hussars, and directed one of the batteries to open on the zamindárs. The fire from four

and surprised them

Gallantry of the rebels

Infantry, five hundred Hodson's Horse under Lieutenant Colonel Daly, one hundred and fifty Wales Horse under Prendergast, two hundred and fifty Bruce's Horse Police, under Hill, the 7th Hussars under Colonel Sir William Russell, two squadrons Queen's Bays, Mackinnon's Horse Artillery, and Gibbons and Carleton's batteries. The whole of the cavalry was commanded by Colonel Hagart.

* *Incidents of the Sepoy War*, by Sir Hope Grant and Captain Knollys.

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guns of this battery mowed them down with terrible effect, but did not force them to retire. After the guns had played upon them some time, the 7th Hussars came up, and, charging through them twice, forced them to give way. The fact that round the two guns of Hodson's Horse there lay, after the combat was over a hundred and twenty five rebel corpses, testifies to the valour of these gallant levies. After three hours' fighting the rebels fell back, leaving on the field six guns and about six hundred dead. The British lost sixty seven in killed and wounded. In addition, thirty three men died from sunstroke, and two hundred and fifty were taken into hospital.

This victory had very important results. The rebels had from all sides been flocking to Nawabganj to swell the formidable column already there. But Hope Grant struck dismay all around. The defeat was so crushing that the fugitives left the vicinity of Lucknao, each of the four parties taking a different direction. The concentrating movement was thus effectually stopped.

Sir Hope left his force at Nawabganj and returned to Lucknao to consult with Montgomery, whom this victory had allowed for the first time to breathe freely. From Lucknao he was ordered by Sir Colin Campbell, in the third week of July, to march to the relief of Mán Sing, a famous Rájah,* who, having at one time taken part with the rebels, had listened to the advice of Mr Montgomery, and returned to his allegiance. For this he had been denounced by his former associates, and at the moment was attacked in his fort by a body of them twenty thousand strong with twenty guns.

It being of great importance to retain the adherence of so powerful a chieftain, Hope Grant at once despatched the 90th regiment, the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, Braúyer's Sikhs, Mackinnon's troop of horse artillery, and four hundred cavalry to Nawabganj to supply the place of the troops he should take on thence, and with these latter† he set out on the 22nd of July.

* Vol. III. page 267.

† The 1st Madras Europeans the 2nd battalion Rifle Brigade the 1st Punjab Infantry, the 7th Hussars five hundred Hodson's Horse twelve light guns and a train of heavy guns.

Before starting with Sir Hope on this expedition it may be convenient to the reader to realise as far as possible the exact position at the moment of the several rebel parties in Oudh. Of these counting as one the forces of the Begam and her alleged paramour, Mamu Khán, there were nine of great and many of smaller dimensions. The nine greater divisions disposed at the time of sixty or seventy thousand armed men, with forty or fifty guns. More than half of these were said to have their head quarters under the command of the Begam and Mamu Khán at Chauka Ghát, on the Gaghra not far from Faizábad, but a considerable body of them were besieging Man Singh. The remainder—led by such men as Rambakhsh, Bahadúr Singh, Chandábakhsh, Guláb Singh, Narpát Singh of Ruyá a notoriety, Bhopál Singh, and Firuzsháh—were scattered all over the province, never long at the same place, hoping that a chance blow might give them victory or plunder.

The position of the rebel parties in Oudh

Hope Grant, urged by letters from Man Singh to the effect that, unless speedily relieved, he could not answer for the consequences, pushed on rapidly, so rapidly, indeed, that the rumour of his advance had all, or almost all, the effect of the advance itself. When within a few days' journey of Man Singh's strong hold of Sháhganj, he learned that the besieging force had melted away!

The rebels abandon the laager of Sháhganj on Sir Hope's approach.

It was perfectly true. On hearing that the English army was advancing by rapid marches, the besiegers took fright, and broke up into three divisions. One of these fled towards Gondah, a second to Sultanpur, on the Gumti, a third to Tanda on the Ghágra.

and broke up into three divisions.

Hope Grant moved then, not the less rapidly, on Faizábad, thence he proceeded to the ghat of Ajudhia and found a considerable body of rebels pushing forth in boats to the opposite side of the river. He opened on these and sank all but one. The crews for the most part escaped. The next day he had an interview with Rajah Man Singh.

Hope Grant moves on to Faizábad.

But he did not rest idle at Faizábad. Sultanpur having been indicated to him as the next point of attack, Hope Grant detached thither a column composed of the 1st Madras Fusiliers, the 5th Punjab Rifles a detachment of 7th Hussars, three hundred Hodson's Horse,

and sends them on to Sultanpur

and a troop of Horse Artillery under the command of Brigadier Horsford. Horsford was delayed by heavy rain, but at last, on the 7th of August, he set out, and on the 12th arrived within four miles of the town, separated from it by the river Sai.

Horsford, having ascertained by means of a reconnoissance that the enemy were in force, that the river was peculiarly favourable for defence, and that his progress would be disputed, reported that state of affairs to Hope Grant. Almost simultaneously with the arrival of that report, Hope Grant received a telegram from the Commander in Chief informing him that the Sultaupur rebels numbered fourteen thousand men, that they had fifteen guns, and that it was advisable that he should reinforce Horsford with the Rifle Brigade.

Nothing loth, Hope Grant ordered up the 53rd from Daryabad, and, taking the Rifles with him, pressed forward to reinforce Horsford. He reached that officer on the 24th of August and, at once changing the position of the British camp, resolved to cross the following morning. The remainder of that day he employed in making rafts. On these, early on the morning of the 25th, he sent over the 1st Madras Fusiliers and the 5th Punjab Infantry, then, though with great difficulty and after one or two mishaps, he landed on the opposite bank two 9 pounder guns. Colonel Galwey, who commanded, then gallantly attacked and carried two villages in his front, at a point where the river forms a bend and where the rebels had a picket. The Rifles were sent over in support of this advanced party.

It was not till the 27th of August that the main body had completed the passage of the river, and even then the heavy guns, artillery park, hospital, and a wing of the 53rd were left on the further bank. Nor did the British force even then attack. On the evening of the 28th, however, the rebels became the assailants, but, after a sharp fight, they were repulsed and fled, abandoning Sultaupur to the conqueror.

It is difficult to follow the Oudh rebels in their continuous marches and counter-marches. But few of the old Sipahis, the men who had been the backbone of the mutiny, were now among them. Their fluctuating numbers were composed almost entirely of the ad-

Hope Grant
learned the
strength of
the rebels at
Sultaupur

and pushed
on to aid
Horsford

After
crossing the
river

and a series
of combats,
the rebels
abandoned
Sultaupur

The marches
and counter-
marches of
the rebels.

Willayat
Shah.

manded by the gallant De Kantzow, to protect Powain, and they urged the corpulent Rajah of that place to keep his levies, two thousand strong, in constant training. This measureerved Powain, but in other parts of Rohilkhand it was found difficult to put down disorder. Towards the end of August, indeed, Ali Khán Mowáti, acting in concert with the Nizám Ali Khán above alluded to, approached so near Pilibhit as to menace Nuriah, a large village ten miles only from that British military post.

The rebels
menace
Nuriah.

The force at Pilibhit was commanded by Captain Robert Larkins, 17th Panjab infantry. It consisted of the 2nd Panjab cavalry under Captain Sam Browne,* the 17th Panjab infantry† under Captain Larkins, the 24th Panjab pioneers‡ under Ensign Chalmers, and a detachment of Kumáun levies under Lieutenant Cunliffe. Both Captain Larkins and the chief civil officer, Mr Malcolm Low, considered that the occupation of Nuriah by the rebels was at all hazards to be prevented. Larkins accordingly detached a hundred men of the 24th pioneers and one hundred 2nd Panjab cavalry, under Lieutenant Craigie, to hold that village, Mr Low accompanying the party.

Larkin sends
a body of
men under
Craigie to
hold the
village.

Craigie—who, as senior officer, commanded—reached Nuriah on the 28th of August. On the following morning the rebel chiefs I have named came down with three guns, three hundred infantry, and a hundred cavalry to attack the place. Craigie made excellent dispositions to meet them outside the town, and checked their advance. So well did the rebels fight, however, that, when nineteen of their cavalry met in a band to hand encounter a party of the 2nd Panjab cavalry under Risaldar Hakdád Khan, fourteen of the nineteen were killed fighting. This occurred on the left flank. On the right flank Craigie repulsed them in person. They then fell back on Sirpurah, three miles distant.

Craigie
encounters
the rebels,

and compels
them to fall
back.

Larkins, hearing at Pilibhit the enemy's fire, thought it advisable to reinforce Craigie. Accordingly he directed a hundred and fifty 2nd Panjab cavalry, and a hundred

* Now Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel Browne, V C, K C B

† Now the 25th Native Infantry

‡ Now the 32nd Native Infantry

Kumánn levies to proceed at once, under the orders of Captain Sam Browne, to Nurrah. Browne set off at once, and reached Nurrah at 4 o'clock that evening.

Browne is
sent to
enforce
C angle

He at once reconnoitred the rebel position. It was ground or mound amid the *débris* of the ruined village of Sirpurah, separated from Nurrah by an inundated tract of country nearly a mile in width, the inundating water varying from one to two feet. It was possible, however, to assail the position from the other side. The energetic magistrate Mr Malcolm Low, having procured him guides in the persons of an old woman and a boy, Browne started at midnight to make the *detour* necessary for the

on a rising

Browne
reconnoitred

From that

and resolved
to make a
detour and
attack the
rebels

success of

Taking with him two hundred and thirty Panyib cavalry, a hundred and fifty 17th Native Infantry, a hundred 24th pioneers, and a hundred Kumánn levies, Browne worked round the enemy's right flank, and by daybreak reached a position on his left rear admirably adapted for his purpose. The fatigue had been great, and Browne halted for a few minutes to refresh men and horses. Whilst so halting the rebels discovered him, and at once made preparations to resist him, bringing three 9 pounders to bear on his advance, and posting one on their proper right flank. There was no time for further rest so Browne at once moved forward.

He gained a
position on
the left rear
of the rebels
when he
discovered it

discovered

He then
advanced

Covering his front with skirmishers, and giving them strict orders not to fire, but to use the bayonet only, Browne pushed his infantry forward through some grass jungle which served to screen their movements. Very soon, however, the enemy's guns began to play on his cavalry on the left, which were marching on the open road. Browne, who was with that cavalry, seeing the effect which one of them, fired with grape at eighty yards was producing, galloped up to it, accompanied only by an orderly, and at once engaged in a desperate hand-to-hand encounter with the gunners, hoping to prevent them working their piece till the skirmishers should come up. Surrounded by the enemy, who attacked him with great fierceness, Browne attained his

The enemy's
gunners
the advance

object. He did prevent the waving of the gun until the skirmishers came up and relieved him. In the fight however, he was first wounded on the knee, immediately afterwards his left arm was severed at the shoulder. As he received this terrible wound, his horse, struck in the face, reared up and fell back on him. Just then the Wirdi major of his regiment, followed by two or three others rushed in, and, though the former was severely wounded, they kept the rebels at bay, and saved their commanding officer. Immediately afterwards the infantry came up, bayoneted the gunners and secured the gun which Browne had captured.*

To go back for a moment. Whilst Browne was thus engaging the gunners the skirmishers had advanced steadily without firing a shot until close to the position, when a body of the enemy's infantry lying in the grass jumped up and fired. On this the skirmishers, firing a volley dashed on, secured the gun, and, aided by the supports and reserve carried the position.

The cavalry on the right, meanwhile, pushing on, had, simultaneously with their comrades on the left, attacked the enemy's flank, and captured one gun. This completed their discomfiture. They broke and fled into the jungle, followed, as far as it was possible to follow them, by the victorious horsemen. Their loss had been heavy, amounting to three hundred men killed, their four guns, their ammunition, and their stores. The two rebel leaders escaped, though one of them Nizam Ali Khan, had been wounded.

In eastern Oudh, near Allahabad, there were about this time

* Few more gallant deeds than this were performed during the war. Mr Malcolm Low who was near Browne at the time considered the daring act of prowess to have been the means of preventing the rebel gunners reloading and firing upon the infantry at the most critical period of the whole action. Sir William Mansfield stated that in his opinion and in that of Sir Colin the affair was very brilliant and as quite one of the best things we have seen of the sort the attack by you having been made in a most soldierly manner and *secundum artem*. Captain Browne received the Victoria Cross for his daring. The reputation of this gallant officer as a man of great ability and conduct had already been made and he had subsequently shown himself as qualified to conduct large operations in the field as he was willing to risk his life in the cause of duty.

many bold and daring talukdars the men who had already caused trouble to Longden at Áramgarh, and who were at this time exerting themselves to the utmost to stimulate opposition to the British. They went so far, indeed, as to threaten with condign punishment any member of their class who should submit to or accept the friendship of the common enemy. On these threats they acted. Bahu Ramprasad Singh, a talukdar of Snraon who had displayed British sympathies, was attacked by some of these confederated rebels, who burned his house, sacked the town, and took himself and his family prisoners. On the intelligence of this outrage reaching Allaha bad Lord Canning hastily organised a small force, signatel the Surion field force, composed of two hundred and sixty of the 32nd foot, eighty of the 54th foot, the 7th Panjab infantry, seventy men Brasyers Sikhs fifty two troopers 6th Madras light cavalry, sixty sables Lahor light horse, detachments of horse and foot artillery, and nine guns and mortars, and placed them under the command of Brigadier Berkeley, C B, with directions to reassert British authority in that part of the country.

Eastern Oudh.

8 p.m. is
sacked by
the rebels

to be do

A British
force is sent
under
Berkeley to
clear the
district

* Berkeley crossed the Ganges on the 12th of July, and on the 14th came in sight of a body of rebels at Dahm. Dahm was not properly a fort. It was rather a large area of jungle surrounded by a dilapidated earthen wall and ditch, and fenced with a thorny abattis. In the centre of the enclosure was a square brick house. On Berkeley's approach the rebels retired within the enclosure, allowing the British to occupy the village and the jungle outside without opposition. Berkeley awaited for the arrival of his heavy guns, and then opened fire, but the result, owing to the dense nature of the jungle, not being satisfactory he sent on his infantry to storm. The result was entirely successful. About two hundred and fifty rebels were killed in the ditch alone, as many more, chased through the jungle, were cut down by the cavalry and the horse artillery.

Dal dā

is captured
by Berkeley

Resting on the 15th, Berkeley proceeded on the 16th to the fort of Tirul, seven miles north of Snraon. He found this fort in the middle of an impenetrable thorny jungle, through which a few paths were cut in directions only known to the natives of the place, and it had walls, bastions,

Description
of Surion

ditches, escarpments, like a miniature fortress with a stronghold in the centre, into which the garrison could retire on being closely pressed. There were only three guns on the bastions, but the walls were loop-holed for musketry. So thick was the jungle around that Berkeley could scarcely gain a view of the fort, he therefore deemed it prudent to employ his mortars and a 24 pounder before sending in his infantry. This plan succeeded. The enemy evacuated the place during the night, leaving behind them their three guns and their gun-ammunition. The fort was then destroyed.

By a somewhat similar train of operations Berkeley captured and destroyed a fort at Bhairpur. Having thus completed the work entrusted to him, he returned with his field force to Allahabad. After a brief interval he was again sent out to demolish other forts in Oudh at distances accessible from Allahabad. In this manner he extended his force as far as Partabgarh. Pushing on, then, to Sultanpur, he touched Hope Grant's force and they united the line of posts direct from Allahabad to Lucknow.

The force under Rowcroft, and the Pearl brigade acting with it under Captain Sotheby, whom we left at Amroha at the end of April had fallen back on Captain Ganj. In the interval there was occasional sharp fighting. On the 9th of June a detachment of both services, led by Major Cox, the sailors commanded by Lieutenant Turnour, and some twenty marines by Lieutenant Pym marched on Amroha, where it had been ascertained, Muhammad Husen had arrived in force. Cox divided his detachments into two parts, one led by himself, the other—to which were attached the sailors and marines—by Major J. F. Richardson. Setting out at 2 o'clock in the morning and arriving at daybreak within a mile of Amroha they were suddenly met by a heavy fire from skirmishers thrown out by the rebels. Pym and the marines drove these in. Cox then opened fire with his guns. Then, failing an attempt made to outflank him, he drove the rebels out of the place.

Nine days later a larger detachment of Rowcroft's force again attacked the same rebel leader at the head of four thousand men at Harba, and inflicted on him a defeat so crushing that he fled from that part of the country.

A little later Rowcroft moved with his force to Hir, in the Goráhpur district to guard the frontier until the advance of Sir Hope Grant in force should sweep the districts below him.

Rowcroft
then falls
back on
Hir

Isolated actions in the more western part of the province produced results not less beneficial. It happened that on the 7th of August a rebel band, the advance of the force of the rebel Furuzshah, attacked the station of Mohan on the river Sai, seventeen miles from Lakhnao on the road to Pathgarh. Mohan was one of the places in which British rule had been re-established, and was at the time the head quarters of the Deputy Commissioner of the district, Mr. Pat Carnegie, already mentioned in these pages.* At Mr Carnegie's disposal was a native police battalion. The river Sai close to Mohan, was traversed by a bridge. On the evening of the 7th of August the rebel band referred to, numbering two hundred infantry and a hundred and fifty cavalry—the advance guard of a larger force—drove in the police pickets crossed the bridge, and made every preparation to attack the town the following morning.

The rebels
at last
Mo an.

Information of this attack reached Colonel Eveleigh, CB commanding at Nawabganj, at 5 o'clock on the morning of the 8th. An hour later Eveleigh set off with three hundred Sikh cavalry under Godby, two horse artillery guns, twenty five gunners mounted to support the guns and twelve rank and file of the 20th foot mounted on lancers and reached a point three miles from Mohan. Conceiving that were he to continue his direct advance the rebels would acquire information of his approach, Eveleigh turned off from that point to the village of Husenganj—a village between Mohan and Risulabad, the general headquarters of Furuzshah, and the occupation of which would cut the rebels' line of retreat. His foresight was justified, for, on coming within a mile of Husenganj, he perceived the rebels falling back on that place from Mohan. He immediately pursued them with his small force but finding that his guns could not travel fast enough to overtake them, he pushed forward his cavalry under Godby. The result was satisfactory. Godby laid low forty five of the rebels and cap-

Eveleigh
marches
against
them

and defeated
them.

tured their only gun, a brass 3 pounder, together with one elephant and two camels *

Nearer to Lakhnao between the Rohilkhand frontier and that city, a gallant deed performed by the Kavanagh whose immortal heroism was recorded in the last volume,† tended greatly to the pacification of the district in which it occurred

Of the district of Malsabad, twelve miles north west of the capital Mr Kavanagh was Assistant Commissioner. Eighteen miles further to the north west, lay the town of Sandela occupied chiefly by Pathans, possessing many brick built houses and a small mud fort, and situated in a level plain. The Pathans of this place had displayed a determined hostility to the British, and had lost no opportunity to threaten their posts and to intercept their communications. It occurred to Kavanagh a daring man, fertile in resources and full of the love of adventure that it would be possible to put an end to these excesses by the capture of the town. He proposed, therefore to Captain Dawson, commanding one of the new police levies to attack Sandela. Dawson agreeing, they stormed the place on the 30th of July, and drove out the rebels. Thenceforward the town remained in the occupation of the British. Kavanagh displayed great daring on this occasion. Nor was his tact inferior to his courage. By a really display of that quality, he won over several zamindars to the British cause and even engaged them to maintain a number of matchlockmen at their own expense for its support.

The banks of the Ganges in Oudh, even so far down as Allahabad, required during these three months of July, August, September, very close watching. They were infested by bands of rebels, some of whom pillaged the villages in Oudh, others, crossing the river, attacked and plundered those in British territory. To remedy this evil, river steamers were employed during the rainy season, when the river was navigable. On one occasion, towards the end of July, information having reached the authorities that the rebels had collected many boats, ready, whenever a favourable opportunity should offer, to cross into

* This act on had the effect of clearing the rebels from many of the districts of Unao and Malsabad.

† Vol IV page 116

British territory, a force of a hundred and twenty Sikhs and two guns were despatched in a steamer to destroy the boats. They did destroy some twenty boats but the forts which the rebels occupied were too well armed and too strong to be attacked. The expedition against these was deferred, but on several occasions in August and September small detachments were sent up the river to check the predatory instincts of the rebels, and in most cases this object was accomplished.

At the period at which we have arrived, the end of September 1858, the position occupied by the British in Oudh was very peculiar. They held a belt of country right across the centre of the province, from east to west, whilst the districts north and south of that belt were either held by the rebels or were greatly troubled by them. North of the belt were the Begam, Mamu Khan, Firuz Shah, Narpat Singh, and leaders less notorious with their followers, south of it were Beni Madhu, Hanmant Singh, Harichand, and others. Besides these, in the north eastern corner of the province, near the Nipal frontier, Nana Sahib and his adherents were believed to be actively intriguing.

In October the cessation of the rains made the movement of troops again possible. The rebels were the first to take advantage of the change of season. On the third of October Harichand, with six thousand men and eight guns, crossed the Gumti ten miles north of Sandela. His force, increased by the junction of several zamindars and their following to twelve thousand men and twelve guns, arrived within three miles of that post on the morning of the 4th. Sandela was occupied by the Captain Dawson already spoken of, with his newly raised police battalions and other infantry levies fourteen hundred strong, and five hundred irregular cavalry levies. On the approach of the rebels in such overwhelming force, Dawson placed his infantry in the small mud fort, and sent his cavalry to Mallabad. He kept the rebels at bay till the 6th, when Major Maynard, with a detachment of the 88th foot, two 9 pounder guns, two 2½-inch mortars two hundred and fifty police cavalry, and six hundred police foot, joined him, taking up the five hundred cavalry on the way. Maynard at once attacked the rebels and drove them to Ianu about four miles distant where they took up a very strong position. On the evening of

Position
in Oudh
occupied by
the rebels

The rebels
took
Sandela,

are held in
check by
Dawson,

driven back
by Maynard,

the 7th, Brigadier Barker reached Sindola with a strong column,* attacked the rebels on the morning of the 8th, and, after a desperate battle, completely defeated them. His loss, however, was severe, being eighty two of all ranks killed and wounded. Major Seymour, Queen's Bays, Major Maynard, whose charger was hacked to death with talwars when in the thick of the fight, and Lieutenant Green of the Rifle Brigade who received thirteen wounds including the loss of his left arm and the thumb of his right hand, greatly distinguished themselves on this occasion. The rebels lost a large number of men, especially in the pursuit, which promptly followed on the victory. A few days later, after a hard day's fight, accompanied by many casualties, the victors stormed the fort of Birwah.

About the same time, the 5th of October, Brigadier Eveleigh defeated the rebels at Mianjany, between Lakhnao and Kanhpur, took two guns, and placed about two hundred of them *hors de combat*, and on the 8th Sir Thomas Seaton added to his former laurels by intercepting a large body of the rebels on the frontier near Shahjahanpur, killing three hundred of them and taking three guns. The same day an attack upon Lowain was repulsed by the Rajah of that place, with trifling loss.

These were the small actions which indicated the re-opening of the campaign. The comprehensive plan which the Commander in Chief, now become Lord Clyde, had drawn up during his stay at Allahabad, came into operation only on the 15th of October. This plan was devised on the principle of acting by columns in all the districts simultaneously, so that driven out of one district, the rebels might not be able, as they had previously, to take refuge in another. Thus, by Lord Clyde's plan, one column was drawn from Rohilkhand for operations in the north west of Oudh, clearing Mohamdi, Naurangabad, and similar places of importance, and proceeding then to establish itself at Sitapur. For operations in the Baiswara country, four brigades were detailed. Another column was posted to

* Two field batteries, two squadrons Queen's Bays six hundred and seventy native cavalry sabres two hundred and fifty 88th Foot one hundred 3rd battalion Rifle Brigade nine hundred police battalion.

guard the Duah, another to guard the Kanhpúr road, whilst other smaller columns, starting from Lakhnao, Nawáhnj, Dajabad, and Faizábád, were ordered to be kept movable.

The reader will at once conceive the general purport of the plan. The brigades detailed for duty in the Baiswara country would occupy the whole of the Faizabad district between the Ganges and the Ghághra. Pushing then northward, they would reconquer the country between the Ghoghra and the Rápti, holding out a hand to Rowcroft's force, on their right, in the Gorakhpur district. Simultaneously the Rohilkhand force would reconquer Sitapur and the places in the Khairábád division. Then, with his right firmly fixed, as a pivot at Bahámpur and a point beyond the Rápti, Lord Clyde would wheel his main force round to the right till its left point should touch the Rohilkhand column, when the whole, sweeping onwards, would clear the northernmost parts of the province, and drive the surviving rebels who should refuse to surrender, into the jungles of the kingdom of Nipal.

The plan
more in
detail

On the 23rd of October Lord Clyde despatched instructions in the same spirit to Sir Hope Grant. That officer was directed, in co-operation with Brigadiers Pinckney and Wetherall, to make a circuit, moving up the Ganges as far as Jagdispur, then, turning ~~sharp~~ to his left and moving southward by Jais, place himself between Parshadapur and Amethi, dispersing any rebels on his way. The brigadiers mentioned received at the same time detailed instructions as to their action, so as to make it co-operate with Sir Hope's movement, and thus ensure the success of the general plan.

Instructions
sent to Sir
Grant

Hope Grant, in obedience to these instructions, started immediately, arranging with Brigadier Wetherall, who was marching up from Saran to join him on the 4th of November, and attack the fort of Rampur Kasá held by an active partisan named Ram Ghulam Singh. But Wetherall, reaching the vicinity of Rampur Kasá on the morning of the 3rd resolved, despite of the orders he had received to wait for Sir Hope, to assail the place at once. Fortune greatly favoured him. Rampur Kasá was in very deed a stronghold. Its outer fortifications, formed of mud ramparts, had a circumference of three miles. Within this area, surrounded up to the outer works by a dense jungle,

Wetherall
marched on
Rampur
Kasá

was another fort, and within this again a stone building
 So much for the interior. But beyond, and sur-
 rounding the outer ramparts, there was again a
 dense jungle in every direction save in that of the
 north-west, and beyond the ramparts was a formidable abattis.
 The ditch was deep but narrow, and there were rifle pits in the
 part which in fortification, would correspond to the berme.*
 It happened, however, that on one side the ditch and ramparts
 had not, for a very small space, been completed and
 it fortunately happened that Wetherall lighted on
 this particular spot. At any other point he would
 certainly have been repulsed, but at this he effected
 an entrance, and carried the place and its twenty-
 three guns, with a loss of seventy-eight men killed,
 and wounded. The rebels lost about three hundred men.

Hope Grant first heard of Wetherall's success on the afternoon
 of the 3rd. He at once joined him at Rampur Kas. Thence,
 in pursuance of his instructions, he proceeded to
 Amethi. This fort likewise was almost covered by
 jungle. It was garrisoned by four thousand men,
 fifteen hundred of them Sipahis and thirty guns.

Grant arrived within two miles of its north-eastern face at
 2 o'clock on the afternoon of the 7th of November. A recon-
 naissance, promptly made, assured him that the rebels were
 bent on resistance. On returning from this reconnaissance he
 found a messenger from Lord Clyde, stating that he was
 encamped three miles to the east of the fort. The
 Commander in Chief, in effect, having failed to
 induce the Rajah of Amethi to come to terms, had
 marched from Patnagarh on the 6th, to bring him
 to reason. This active measure succeeded. The Rajah rode
 into camp on the morning of the 8th, and tendered his submis-
 sion, yielding his stronghold.

Amethi taken, Grant, carrying out the orders of Lord Clyde,
 proceeded to Shankarpur to attack it from the north,
 whilst Wetherall and Pinckney should invest it on
 the east and south, and Eveleigh on the west. In
 performing his part of the combined movement,
 Eveleigh was delayed by the bad roads and the opposition of
 the rebels. He defeated these on the 8th at Morahan, and on

* See Hope Grant's Incidents of the Sepoy War

the 9th he took the fort of Samri, but these operations so delayed him that he was unable to arrive in time to take up a position to cut off the retreat of the chief of Shankarpur and his followers.

The chief was no other than Bēni Mādhu, and he had with him a following estimated at fifteen thousand men. The Commander in Chief, anxious to avoid bloodshed, had offered him very favourable terms if he would surrender. Bēni Mādhu had returned the proud reply that he would yield his fort as he could not defend it, but that he would not yield himself as he belonged to his King! That night he and his followers evacuated the fort by its uninvested face. Not, however, with the freedom from molestation they had hoped for. Fleeing hastily to Dundia Khēra, they were encountered on the way by Evelegh, and defeated, with the loss of three of their guns.

The fort
surrenders,

Bēni
Mādhu
escapes,

and is
encountered
and beaten
by Evelegh
on his
retreat

Shankarpur was at once occupied by Grant who then marched on the Ghaghrá, which he crossed in face of the rebels, led by the Rajah of Gondah and Mehndi Huson, on the 27th of November, pursued the enemy twenty four miles, and captured four guns. Marching thence towards Rāi Bareli, he beat the rebels again at Machhigaon on the 4th of December, taking two guns, reached the fort of Banhisá, whence he extracted five guns, on the 5th, Gondah on the 9th, and Balrampur on the 16th. Lord Clyde, meanwhile, having learned the direction taken by Bēni Mādhu, took Evelegh's brigade with him, marched on Dundia Khēra, and attacked and completely defeated that chief on the 24th of November, taking all his guns. Bēni Mādhu, however, escaped. The other columns had by this time formed a complete cordon round the circumference of eastern Oudh. They now closed in, and marching from their different points of departure, and on a common centre, traversed the whole territory, demolishing forts and strongholds, and re-establishing the civil power as they advanced.

Converging
marches
of Grant,

Lord Clyde

and the
other
columns

Whilst the east was being thus pacified, the Bareli column, commanded by Colin Troup, employed all its efforts to bring about a similar result on the western side. Crossing the Rohilkhand frontier in the end of October, Troup advanced on Sitapur, dispersed the talukdars

The column
of Bareli

takes up its
position in
the converg-
ing line,

and sweeps
chiefs
surely.

who attempted to oppose him in the vicinity of that place, captured Mithanli on the 8th and gave a final defeat to the rebels at Mehudi on the 18th of November. Columns, meanwhile, under Gordon, Carmichael, and Housford, were engaged in clearing the country south of the Ghaghra, and before these the irreconcilable chiefs, men of the stamp of Beni Mallu, and Beni Madhu himself, fell back.

Hope Grant, I have said, had reached Balrampur on the 16th of December. There he learned that Bilá Rao, brother of Náná Sahib, had taken refuge in the fort of Tulsipur, twelve miles distant, with a number of followers and eight guns, and that he had been

joined there by Muhammad Husen and his adherents. Grant at once directed Rowcroft to move from his position at Hir, and, reinforcing him with the 53rd, directed him to attack Tulsipur. Rowcroft obeyed orders, found the enemy drawn up to receive him, beat them after a feeble resistance, but could not pursue them from want of cavalry. Hope Grant, fearing lest the rebels should escape into the Gorakhpur country, then took up the pursuit himself, and, cutting off Balá Rao from Gorakhpur, ascertained that he had retreated with six thousand men and fifteen guns along the margins of the jungles to a place near

and sweeps
the rebels
into Nipal.

Kandakot, where there was a half ruined fort at the confluence of two rivers. Manœuvring with great skill, and placing his columns in a position so that escape to any other quarter but Nipal was impossible, Grant moved against them on the 4th of January, 1859, and drove them across the border, taking all their guns.

Whilst Grant was thus engaged, Lord Clyde, sending Eyelgh to the west to join Troup, was engaged in sweeping the country from the points occupied by his troops towards the Nipal frontier. Moving on to Sikrora, with Grant's force forming his right, touching, as we have seen, Rowcroft's force on the extreme right, and which formed, as it were, the pivot, Lord Clyde drove the Begam and Náná Sahib before him from Bondi and Bahrutich, then advancing on Nanpara, cleared the country between it and the Ghaghra, then marching on Binki, close to the Nipal frontier, he surprised the camp of the rebels, defeated them with great slaughter, and drove them

On his side,

Lord Clyde
sweeps the
remains of
rebels into
Nipal.

into Nipal. This act and that of Hope Grant at Tulipur, referred to in the preceding paragraph, cleared Oudh of the last remnants of the rebels. Sir William Mansfield wrote that he considered the mutiny crushed out, and Lord Clyde, sharing that opinion, left the province under the military care of Sir Hope Grant, instructing him to keep the frontier of the border of Nipal closely shut up, so as to prevent, if possible, the escape of any rebels into the lower country.

Considering the mutiny crushed he makes over command to Hope Grant and leaves.

The spirit, however which had animated the rebel chieftains to sustain against the British a struggle which, during six months at least had offered not a single ray of success, was not entirely extinguished.

The spirit of the rebels is not however extinguished.

Sir Hope Grant, taking leave of the Commander in Chief, proceeded to join Brigadier Horsford's force on the Rapti. An incident had occurred just before his arrival, which showed the great care required in attempting to ford Indian rivers. Horsford had driven a strong rebel force across that river, and, in fording it in pursuit of them, many men of the 7th Hussars and the 1st Punjab Cavalry had been swept away by the force of the current and lost. Amongst these was Major Home, of the 7th Hussars. After some search his body was drawn out of a deep hole, his hands having a fast grip of two of the rebels whilst the bodies of two troopers who perished with him were found, each with his hands clutching a rebel sawár.*

Danger of fording Indian rivers.

From one side only, from the side of Nipal was further danger to be apprehended. On this side the frontier had a length of about a hundred miles formed of mixed hill and jungle, and with such a frontier it was always possible that, despite the best dispositions on both sides, the strictest precautions would be evaded.

The Nipal frontier.

At this crisis the real ruler of Nipal, the Maharajah Jang Bahadur, behaved with the loyalty that had throughout characterised his dealings with the British. Not only did he inform the armed rebels who had crossed the border that he would afford them no protection, but he allowed British troops to cross the border to disarm any considerable body there assembled. Under

Loyalty of Jang Bahadur.

this permission, Brigadier Horsford early in the year, entered the Sonar valley, and, crossing the Rapti at Sidonia Ghát, came upon a body of rebels and captured fourteen guns, and, later on, Colonel Kelly, of the 34th, caused the surrender of six guns, after having chased the rebels with great loss under the hills. Under the pressure thus exercised, a moiety of the fifty thousand who had crossed into Nipál one by one threw away their arms, and returned to their homes, trusting they would be allowed to settle down unmolested.

A few, more hardened in crime, and therefore more helpless of mercy, still continued to hold out, and some of the—*the* regiments which had perpetrated the Kahnpur massacre, the 1st, the 53rd, and the 56th Native Infantry, led by Gujadar Singh, a rebel whose hate to the British had not been lessened by the loss of an arm when fighting against them—succeeded in crossing the border, invading Oudh, marching on Sikrora, and filching thence two elephants, and finally, when pursued from that place by Colonel Walker and the Queen's Bays, with two guns, in taking up a position at Bangion, a small dilapidated fort on the river Nadi, at the entrance of the Ghungle jungles. There, at the end of April 1859, Colonel Walker, reinforced by four hundred men of the 53rd, and sixty of the 1st Sikh cavalry, attacked and completely defeated them.

Notwithstanding that the hot weather had set in, Sir Hope Grant deemed it of pressing importance to drive the remainder of the rebels from the jungles. Learning that the last remnant of their disorganised forces was at the Serwa pass, Grant moved against them in person, dislodged them by a turning movement, and then pursued them across the hills. The pursuit gave ample evidence of the state of exhaustion to which the rebels had been reduced. Without food and without arms, without money and without artillery—for they lost here their last two guns—they were thenceforth powerless. Pursuit ceased, and Grant contented himself with posting troops at different points along the frontier as a precautionary measure. His only regret now was that Naná Sahib and his brother Bala Rao had found refuge in Nipál. To the very last the former had been

possessed Oudh by a title far sounder than that which she had set up in 1856, the title of conquest. She holds it now on a basis even stronger, on the basis of the affections of a people whom she has conciliated, and of a territorial aristocracy whose rights whilst defining, and in some instances curtailing, she had made inalienable

that of the
past must in
period be
best of all.

CHAPTER III.

THE PANJAB AND THE NORTH WEST.

BEFORE proceeding to recount the other great military measure with which the story of the mutiny fitly closes, it is necessary that I should ask the reader to accompany me to the Panjáb to see how the fall of Delhi, made possible by the noble self denial of Sir John Lawrence, affected that border province. From the Panjáb the reader will return through the profligate provinces of the north west to Agra, in close vicinity to that Gwalhar but just reconquered by Sir Hugh Rose. In the succeeding book I shall record the most romantic episode in the history—the pursuit, from many starting points and by many independent columns, of the famous Tantia Topi.

The decision at which Sir John Lawrence had arrived at the end of July 1857 to evacuate the Panjáb of troops in order to reinforce General Wilson's army before Delhi, had not been formed without most serious and anxious consideration. On the one side, he had had before him General Wilson's letter announcing that unless he were reinforced from the Panjáb he would not be able to maintain his position, still less to assault the city, and the inner certainty that if General Wilson were to raise the siege of Delhi the Panjáb would rise in insurrection. On the other, he had the knowledge that the effective force of Europeans at his disposal, including the sick and convalescent, but not including the force under Nicholson, did not exceed four thousand men, and that these were not more than sufficient to maintain order in the Panjáb, even whilst the general feeling of the Panjabis should remain loyal, most insufficient should a striking reverse of fortune, such as the raising of the siege of Delhi, turn the Panjabis against him. He had before him, in fact, a choice of two risks—the risk of a general rising in the Panjáb, caused by the effect which would certainly be produced in the minds of the Panjabis by a retreat from Delhi, and the

Sir John
Lawrence's
position
early in
September
1857

risk of rebellion induced by the knowledge that the Panjab had been denuded of British.

Of the two risks the second was undoubtedly really the lesser. To a nervous man to a man fearing responsibility, however, the second risk would present dangers affecting to such a degree his position, that he would certainly shrink from incurring them. A man of that stamp charged with maintaining British rule beyond the Satlej would have argued that his primary duty was to protect the Panjab and that he dare not for the sake of the uncertain chance of conquering Dehli, risk the safety of that province. 'True' he would have said, "true it is that if the march of Nicholson's column enable Wilson to take Dehli, our situation will be ameliorated. But Wilson might be repulsed, Wilson himself thinks it is quite a toss up whether he will succeed or whether he will fail. And, if he fail the situation of the Panjab without Nicholson's column will be a thousand times worse than if I were to retain it.

Everything then depends upon a very doubtful 'if', and, responsible for the Panjab as I am I dare not incur the risk.' But Sir John was not a nervous man, and he had no fear of responsibility. He saw clearly that the one chance of preventing the further spread of the mutiny was to strike a blow at its heart. That heart palpitated at Dehli. Every risk, then which strengthened the blow to be struck at Dehli was a prelude to safety.

How Nicholson's column successfully worked out the great result aimed at has been already recorded in the so pages. Dehli fell. But in the interval Sir John Lawrence had to meet the other risk of which I have spoken. Nicholson's departure at the end of July had left in the Panjab about four thousand European troops including those sick and convalescent. Of these three regiments were in the Peshawar valley but so reduced by sickness that for the active work of a campaign they could not muster more than a thousand bayonets, one regiment, the 24th held Lajori, one, sent from Simla held Multan and Ferozpur, another furnished detachments to hold Pawalpindi, Amritsar, and Jalandhar. Sir John at once made preparations to meet the new situation. He first formed a movable column. For this purpose he drew from the 24th Foot from

Comparison
of the two
risks, one of
which he was
obliged to
run

Reasons for
his tie to
in favour of
the bold
policy

The Panjab
when
Nicholson
left it at the
end of July

How Sir
John
prepared to
meet the
possible
evil.

two to three hundred men, and joined with them four hundred Panjab infantry and a few horsemen. The other troops alluded to being required for the purpose of watching, as at Peshawar, the frontier, and elsewhere the disarmed native troops, eighteen thousand strong, this column really constituted the only force which could be used in the event of an insurrection provoked by the hopes which the march of Nicholson's column might inspire in the minds of the disaffected.

The doubts which Sir John Lawrence had entertained regarding a prolonged continuation of the loyalty of the Panjabis were quickly justified. Nicholson had crossed the Satlaj on the 30th of July. Early in September it was discovered that the inhabitants of the lower Hazárah country had conspired to revolt. Mostly Muhammadans, the people of that tract and of the adjoining hills had been tempted by the long successful resistance of Delhi to plot the downfall of their English masters. They had evidently been close observers of the state of affairs, for they had arranged that their continued loyalty should depend on the turn affairs should take at Delhi. If that royal city should not fall before the 10th of September, on that day they would revolt.

Disaffection
in the lower
Hazárah
country

* In this case to be forewarned was sufficient. Lady Lawrence, who was then at the hull station at Marri received the first intimation of the intended revolt. She quickly entered into communication with Mr Edward Thornton, Commissioner of Rawalpindi. That gentleman concerted at once with the other officials to baffle the conspirators. In a few hours their leaders were arrested, and the plot was thus nipped in the bud.

Their plot
was discovered
and baffled.

A few weeks later, a conspiracy of a similar nature actually came to a head in the country between Láhor and Multán. On the evening of the 14th of September, the very day on which the assault of Delhi was delivered, a Muhammadan official of the postal department arrived at Láhor from Gughaira, and, making his way to Sir John Lawrence, reported "with some what of a malicious twinkle of the eye, * that all the wild tribes inhabiting the jungle country between Láhor and Multán had risen. Questioned further, he declared that the insurgents

Rising in
the country
between
Láhor and
Multán.

numbered a hundred and twenty five thousand. Though Sir John knew this number to be greatly exaggerated, yet, well aware of the wild and reckless character of the tribes, to whom the tale referred, he felt certain that a rising of a formidable character had taken place, and that it was a case to meet which it was necessary to take prompt and decided action. Within

three hours then, of the receipt of the message, he had despatched one company of European infantry, two hundred Sikh cavalry, and three guns to the headquarters of the insurgents. Small though the force was, totally inadequate to deal with any large body of rebels, the celerity with which it had been organised and despatched compensated for every disadvantage. The very rumour of its

advance struck terror into the insurgents. They at once took refuge in the almost impenetrable jungles which formed their normal habitation. Their retreat did not in the least relax Sir John's endeavours to crush them. He sent reinforcement after reinforcement to his small column, and very speedily ensured the submission of the disaffected tribes.

This was the last attempt made by any portion of the population of the Panjab to rise in revolt. The fall of Delhi occurred about the same time to convince even the most disaffected that the star of England was still in the ascendant. The occurrences that

followed seemed to add daily confirmation to this opinion. The relief of Lucknow, the capture of that place, followed by the reconquest of Rohilkhand, and accompanied, almost, by Sir Hugh Rose's splendid campaign in Central India, came as proof upon proof that the power which had won India was resolved to maintain it. In the latter half of the year 1858

one or two disturbances occurred which by their exception to the general rule and by their easy suppression, served to prove the real tranquillity of the province.

In July 1858 a portion of the 18th Panjab infantry, stationed at Derá Ishmál Khán on the Indus, planned a mutiny. The portion referred to was composed of Sikhs, known as the Malwá Sikhs, and numbered about a hundred. For some cause unknown they proposed, it was said, to murder their officers

to seize the magazine and the fort and to re-arm the 39th regiment native infantry, which had been disarmed some time

previously. Fortunately, on the 20th of July, the plot was discovered. Major Gardiner of the 18th Panjab native infantry, and Captain Smith of the artillery, proceeded at 10 o'clock in the evening of that day, to the lines of the regiment and summoned two of the Malwás. One, a Sipahi, came out at once, when Major Gardiner ordered him to be confined. On hearing the order he ran off, pursued by the guard. Just as the foremost men of the guard had reached him a Malwar Jamadar rushed out, cut down one man and wounded another, and fled with the Sipahi. A few days later they were captured, and the revolt, of which they had been the ringleaders, was suppressed.

Suppressed
by Major
Gardiner

At Multan an attempt made, the following month, to dispose quietly and peaceably of some of the disbanded regiments, terminated in bloodshed. At that station there were the 62nd and 69th native infantry and a native troop of horse artillery. These men were a source of great embarrassment to the authorities for it was considered unsafe to re-arm them, whilst, disarmed, they required European troops to guard them. It was resolved, as a middle course, to disband them by fractions, and allow them to depart quietly to their homes. The Sipahis acquiesced in the decision when the decision was made known to them. Subsequently, however, they conceived the impression that it was intended to attack and destroy them piecemeal on their way home. Imbued with this idea, they rose in revolt. When the mid day gun fired on the 31st of August, they seized clubs and whatever else they could find in the shape of weapons and rushed to attack the European and Sikh troops. Those troops consisted of a hundred and seventy artillerymen a wing of the 1st Bombay Fusiliers, the 11th Panjab Infantry, and the 1st Irregular Cavalry. The men of this small force who happened to be on guard were taken by surprise, and five of their number were beaten to death with clubs. Lieutenant Miles, Adjutant of the Bombay Fusiliers, who came up at the moment, was dragged from his horse and killed in the same manner. As soon, however, as the bulk of the Europeans and Panjabis realised the state of affairs, they came up in strength, and showed no mercy to the assailants. The 11th Panjabis were especially furious at the unprovoked attack

Malwa

Embarrassment caused to the authorities there by the disarmed regiments

The men of which under the impression that they are about to be massacred, rose in revolt.

Suppression of the revolt.

Of the thirteen hundred men who made it few lived to return to their native land.

Passing downwards through the territories of the loyal chieftains of the Cis-Satlej states—of the Rājā of Patialā who at the very outset, cast in his lot with the British, protected the stations of Amālāh and Karnāl when the British army marched on Delhi, guarded the grand trunk road from Karnāl to Delhi, co-operated with Van C. Rildart in Hisar and maintained a contingent of five thousand troops for service with the British of the Rājā of Jind who, emulating his brother Rājā in loyalty, left his own country undefended to march against Delhi and in many other ways rendered assistance to the good cause—and of the Rājā of Nāthi who aided in holding Lohiana, supplied an escort for the sugar-train, gallantly opposed the Ishāhī mutineers, and performed various other excellent services—the reader will traverse the pacified Delhi territory till he reaches the district of Itawāh. Here he will make a short sojourn before proceeding to Agra.

The Itawāh district had, in common with other districts in the Jāmna Dab, been included in the brigade command assigned to Sir Thomas Stenton*. The attention of that gallant soldier was, however, more constantly directed to the side of Behlkhānd than to the more peaceful districts to the south of him. In those districts he had restored order and had generally re-established the civil administration. The only chance of a renewal of disturbance in them arose from the possibility of some fugitive rebel from the country west of the Jāmna endeavouring to restore the fortunes of his followers by a raid into a settled but little guarded country. It was this possibility which occurred in the Itawāh district.

The defeat of Sindhiā's rebellious troops at Gwahar by Sir Hugh Rose had let loose on the country a number of turbulent partisans, who, escaping from the battle, had sought refuge in the ravines of the Jāmna. Prominent among these was an adventurer named Rūp Singh. This man followed by a few soldiers of the regular Gwahar contingent, a certain number of the fugitives

of Sindhia's army, and other rabble, crossed the Jamnah and made his appearance at Ajtmal, twenty five miles from Itawah, in the month of July. Though he was routed by a force sent from Itawah and forced to flee, he did not abandon the district. And, what was of more consequence, other adventurers, animated by similar aims, sprang up about the same time, and rivalled him in his endeavours to harass and plunder the newly pacified territories. Amongst all these marauders, however, Rup Singh Rup Singh maintained the pre-eminence. Often beaten, he always managed to elude his pursuers. During long periods he was not heard of. But during those periods daily accounts of robberies and stoppage of traffic on the Jamnah reached the authorities. It was then discovered that Rup Singh had taken possession of a fort at Barhi, near the junction of the Chambal with the Jamnah, and that from this place he levied contributions on travellers by land and water. and his river party

The exactions of this adventurer and of others like him reached at last so great a height that, in the month of August, a small force, five hundred and fifty men of all arms,* was despatched from Itawah to destroy or disperse them. This force, commanded by Lieutenant Lachlan Forbes, of the 2nd Grenadier Bn., accompanied by Lieutenant Gordon of the Madras Engineers, in command of his sappers, and by Mr. Lance, the able and energetic magistrate of the district, embarked in boats, and proceeded down the river towards Birhi. It had reached Garha Kudur, a fortified village three miles from that place, and was still in the boats, when Rup Singh attacked it. Gordon's men at once disembarked, in spite of opposition, drove away the rebels who embarked, dropped down to Birhi and took the place. After destroying three of the bastions of the fort and rendering it generally indefensible, Lance pushed on to Chakarnagar, the resort of another rebel chief, completely defeated the rebels there, and fixed that place as the headquarters of a small detachment to control the country. In these operations Lance was greatly assisted by Lieutenant Forbes. This A force proceeds against him from Itawah
destroys Barhi
and occupies Chakarnagar

* During 1858-9 the force at Itawah commanded by Lieutenant Lachlan Forbes consisted of six companies of infantry, three troops of cavalry, and three guns called "the Itawah Yeomanry Levy," also four companies of infantry and one troop of cavalry, styled "the Itawah Military Police Battalion."

energetic officer raised, drilled, and led the local levies, and on more than one occasion during the trip down the Jamnah, when the fire was most severe, he landed with a few of his men, drove off the rebels, and thus enabled Lieutenant Gordon and his Madras sappers to pass unscathed. Mr James Collett an engineer on the East India Railway, and who volunteered to work a gun on board Lance's boat displayed likewise great courage and great skill. He was badly wounded. The operations thus gallantly carried on for a time pacified the districts. But in October Rup Singh reappeared on the Kuāri* with a following of four hundred men and attacked a British picket on the Itawah side of that river. Captain Allan, in command of a few levies—a hundred and forty infantry and twenty five sawārs—happened to be at the moment at Sabson, not very far from the point of Rup Singh's action. He at once went in pursuit of him, caught him near the village of Kuari, completely defeated him, and captured all his camels and pack cattle. The band of the rebel leader then dispersed, and from that time the Itawah district was undisturbed.

Allan beats
Rup Singh
on the
Kuāri,

when the
band
dispersed

In Agra, since the relief of that place by Greathed, matters had remained fairly tranquil. In the early part of 1858 Brigadier Showers had been sent to command the district and to perform in its vicinity the work which he had so successfully accomplished in the Dehli districts after the capture of the imperial city†. One of Showers's first acts was to work vengeance on some local rebels who had plundered the town of Bah and murdered the authorities. This was done on the 20th of March. Showers, making a long night march, surprised the rebels at Kachru and captured the ringleaders. But the task allotted to him and to the civil authorities in the fort was long and difficult. Not only were the districts swarming with small bands of insurgents, but the whole of the

Showers at
Agra.

Disturbed
state of the
districts.

* The Kuāri rises about sixty miles to the north west of the fort of Gwāliar, flows first to the north west, subsequently east, and finally south east. Its course is semicircular in its general outline and has a length of one hundred and eighty five miles. The route from Agra to Gwāliar crosses it at Hingona, and that from Itawah to Gwāliar, near a village also called Kuari, forty five miles above its mouth.

country west of the Jamnah was in a state of complete insurrection. Gwalhar lies but sixty five miles from Agra, and it is no exaggeration to state that, until the capture of Gwalhar by Sir Hugh Rose in June 1858, the influence of Maharajah Sindhia over his own people was not to be counted upon, and that Agra was at any moment liable to an attack in force from any number of rebels.

This situation was entirely appreciated in Agra. The guns of the fort remained pointed at the native town—the focus of a rebellion which might at any moment break out. Every precaution was indeed, taken to prevent or rather to ward off, such an event, but the fact that no European living beyond the range of the guns of the fort felt his life secure for a moment shows how deep was the impression that a revolt was a mere question of opportunity. The slightest event might bring it on. The news of a disaster in the Duab or in central India, the appearance on the Jamnah of a mutinied contingent or of Santa Topi—any one of these eventualities would most certainly precipitate a catastrophe.

Throughout this crisis the civil authorities at Agra—Colonel Fraser, Mr E. A. Read, and their colleagues—displayed a coolness of judgment and a readiness of resource which left nothing to be desired. The self denying energy with which they devoted themselves to the task of reorganising where reorganisation was possible, of meeting great and pressing wants from exhausted resources, of providing all the military and civil requirements day by day and of infusing their own brave spirit into those whose fortunes were at the lowest, deserve a far longer and a fuller notice than I am able to give them in these pages. The history of the occupants of Agra is the history of men who, deprived of the stimulus of action, of the excitement of the camp, of the joyous sound of the clash of arms, devoted all their energies to their country, and deserved fully the credit and the glory always assigned to deeds more showy but not more meritorious.

Amongst the useful measures carried out during the period of which I am writing was the raising of a corps of cavalry, subsequently known as Meadows Horse. At the end of the year 1857 the want of native troopers and mounted orderlies at Agra had been greatly felt, and as

The guns

Apprehen
sions at
Agra.Colonel
Fraser
and Mr
E. A. Read.The great
desiresMeades
Horse

there were in the fort officers whom the mutiny had deprived of their employment, it was considered advisable to raise a regiment on a military footing. The task of raising it was, in December 1857, committed to Captain R. J. Meade.

This officer, who will occupy a conspicuous figure towards the close of the next chapter, had been for some years brigade major of the Gwáhar contingent and in that office had won the confidence of the officers under whom he had served. He possessed a thorough acquaintance with the language of the people and he invariably gave all his energies to the duties confided to him. It would have been impossible for a general in command to have had under his orders an officer who would more resolutely carry into execution the orders he received.

A body of a hundred Sikhs and Panjabi Muhamma-
lans formed the nucleus of this new regiment. To them Meade added some forty odd Eurasians and native Christians, chiefly drummers and bandsmen, taken from the disbanded native regiments. These were ultimately increased to eighty five, and were formed into a Christian troop. As none of these men had ever previously crossed a horse some of Meade's difficulties may be imagined.

At the end of January 1858 Meade obtained an accession of forty five mounted Jats, sent from Rohitak under a Jamádar of good family by Mr J. Campbell, collector of that district, and a little later the new commandant induced Baldeo Singh Thakur of Jhara to raise from men of his class in the neighbourhood of the Chambal, a troop of seventy horsemen. In this manner the regiment was formed, and Meade was, in a short time, able to form it into six class troops*. The labour of drilling the men and teaching many of them to ride may be imagined when it is considered that none of the men had served in the cavalry or as soldiers at all. Working incessantly himself, and aided by such men as Sergeant Hartigan, V.C., of the 9th Lancers, and who subsequently gained a commission in the 16th, by Cockburn whose gallantry has been referred to in a previous volume, and by others, Meade was able, by the beginning of March, to show a fair proportion of his regiment fit for service. Brigadier

The regiment
is formed.

* 1 Sikhs, 2 Panjabi Muhammadans, 3 Jats, 4 Christians, 5 Gwáhar Thakurs, 6 Mixed.

Showers, who inspected them during that month, expressed himself well satisfied alike with men and horses

From this time up to the beginning of June Meade's Horse were constantly employed in maintaining order in the neighbourhood of Ágra and it would be difficult to exaggerate the services they rendered in this respect to the administrative and military authorities in the place

and renders
good service
in the
vicinity of
Ágra.

But in June the aspect of Ágra suddenly changed. How on the 1st of that month Mahárajah Sindhia was attacked and driven to flight by the rebels under Tántia Topí I have recorded in a previous chapter. The Maharajah, abandoned by all but a few faithful men, fled to Dholpur, intending to push on to Ágra. The news of his misfortune had, however, preceded him. Showers instantly despatched a squadron of Meade's Horse to escort the fleeing sovereign with all honour into the capital of the north west provinces. The Maharajah, who reached Ágra on the 2nd of June, remained there till the 14th, and left it that day escorted by two squadrons of Meade's Horse to Dholpur, thence to proceed to join Sir Hugh Rose, expected to reach Morar on the 16th. News of Sir Hugh's arrival on that day having reached the Maharajah, he set out on the morning of the 17th, still escorted by the two squadrons, and made the march, fully sixty five miles within twenty four hours. The events which followed have been recorded in the preceding book.

Send a after
his defeat,
to escort
to Ágra

Returning to Ágra, I have only to record the fact that on the defeat of Tántia Topí on the 17th and 19th of June, at Morar and at Gwáliár, Brigadier Showers sent out a detachment, consisting of the 3rd Europeans and a battery of guns, to cover Bharatpur, upon which place he believed the rebels to be marching. The demonstration was successful, inasmuch as the presence of the detachment induced Tántia Topí to bend his steps southwards. As soon as his march in that direction was definitely known, the detachment returned by way of Fathpur Sikri to Ágra. Thenceforward that city and the districts east of the Jamnah experienced the full relief caused by the crushing defeat, at a point so close to the British districts, of the army chieftain whose name up to that time had been a terror of hope to the marauder.

Showers
never
pre-ent
to the
from the
westward

Set of
Ágra by the
the city of
and the

Tantia Topi had fled from Sir Hugh Rose at Gwalior, had fled from Napier at Jaora Alipuri, but whither? All that was known was that when he had fled from the last named battle field he had taken a southerly direction. Who could say how long he would maintain that direction? It is time now that we should follow him and recount in some detail the measures adopted by his pursuers to overtake him.

BOOK XVI—TÁNTIÁ TOPÍ AND THE QUEEN'S PROCLAMATION.

CHAPTER I

THE PURSUIT OF TÁNTIÁ TOPÍ.

TÁNTIÁ TOPÍ, accompanied by Ráo Sahib and the Nawáb of Bandah, had fled from the field of Jaura Alipur on the 22nd of June. The information which had induced Brigadier Showers to send a detachment to cover Bharatpur was perfectly correct for Tántia as soon as he had ascertained he was no longer pursued, had turned his steps north westwards. On reaching Sarmathura, however, he learned the dispositions made by Showers. Foiled on one side, he pushed on directly westwards hoping to gain Jaipur, in which city he believed a strong party was prepared to rise in his favour.

Tántia Topí
baffled by
showers,

pushes
onwards
Jaipur

On this route I propose to leave him, whilst I trace the positions taken up by the several British columns upon which the pursuit of him was to devolve.

I have already shown how on the 29th of June Sir Hugh Rose made over the command of his force to Brigadier General Robert Napier, and proceeded to Bombay to assume command of the army of that presidency. The season for active military operations on the black and spongy soil of central India had now passed away, and Napier hoped before the country should harden he would be able to afford some rest to his overworked soldiers. With this object he made arrangements for comfortably housing a portion of them at Gwahar itself. Here he quartered three squadrons of the 14th Light Dragoons, Morde's Horse, a wing of the 71st Highlanders, the 86th Foot, the 25th Bombay

Napier can-
tens his force
at Gwahar.

Native Infantry, a company of Bombay Artillery, a company of the Royal Engineers and a Light Field Battery. To rest at and to hold Jhansi he detached a squadron of the 14th Light Dragoons, a wing of the 3rd Bombay Cavalry, the 3rd Bombay Europeans, the 24th Bombay Native Infantry, a company of Bombay Sappers, and three guns of the late Bhopal Contingent. Brigadier Smith's brigade—which, it will be remembered, took an active part in the operations against Gwalior—consisting of two squadrons of the 8th Hussars, two of the 1st Bombay Lancers, the 95th Foot the 10th Bombay Native Infantry, and a troop of Bombay Horse Artillery, marched to occupy Sipri, whilst Mayne's Irregular Cavalry took up their position at Gunah.

But these were not the only troops which in the month of July 1858 occupied positions overlooking the area on which only it was likely Tántiá Topí would act. In a previous page I have recorded how General Roberts commanding the Rájputáná field force, had detached a column under Brigadier Smith to cover and to aid in the operations of Sir Hugh Rose. Roberts's force, diminished by the departure of that column, still consisted of the 83rd Foot, a wing of the 72nd Highlanders wings of the 12th and 13th Bombay Native Infantry, two squadrons 8th Hussars two of the 1st Bombay Lancers, three hundred Bhiluch Horse, a light field battery, and a siege train of six pieces. At the end of June Roberts lay with this force at Nasirabad.

Upon him it fell to strike the first blow against the fugitive leader. On the 27th of June Roberts learned from Captain Elen, the political agent that Tántiá Topí had sent emissaries to the disaffected party in Jaipur assuring them that he was marching on that place, and begging them to be in readiness to join him. Roberts took his measures accordingly. On the 28th of June he set out from Nasirabad, and marching rapidly, reached Jaipur before Tántiá.

Tántiá again sailed, turned southwards and made a raid on Tank, followed by a light column under Colonel Holmes.* The

* Consisting of cavalry and horse artillery, some native infantry, and two hundred of the 72nd Highlanders.

Nawáb of this place, Wazir Muhammad Khan, was by no means disposed to submit to the dictation of a Marátha fugitive with English troops at his heels. He, therefore shut himself in his citadel with the men he could depend upon. The remainder of his force, with four guns he left outside with orders to face the rebels. But, instead of facing them, this force received them as brethren and made over to them the four guns. With this addition to his army Tántia started off southwards to Madhupura and Indragarh, forty five miles north east of Kota, still pursued by Holmes and at a longer interval by Roberts.

Tántiá moves
on T k
followed by
Holt's co. a
light column

Tántiá takes
four guns at
Tonk and
moves off

The flight and the pursuit were alike retarded by the rains, which fell during this month with remarkable force, so much so that the river Chambal, swollen to a torrent, barred Tántia's passage from Indragarh to the south-eastward. Changing his course, then, he took a south westerly course to Bundi, capital of the native state of the same name. The Maharáo of Bundi, Ram Singh had more than once displayed a disposition to strike for independence, but even he was not prepared to link his fortunes with those of Tántia Topí. He shut therefore, the gates of Bundi in the face of the fugitives. Tántia, pursued, as he thought, by Holmes, had no time to stop to use force, but marched a few miles southward, then, making a sudden tour westward, crossed the Bundi hills by the Kínah pass, and made for the fertile country between Nasirábád and Nimach, a country which had already been the scene of warlike operations and the larger towns in which had more than once shown a disposition to favour the rebellion. Tántia was able to change his course without fear of being disturbed by Holmes, for on leaving Bundi he had loudly asserted his intention to continue his course due south and he counted that information thus disseminated would deceive his pursuers.

Tántiá
halted by
the rise of
the Chambal,
moves
towards
Bundi

then turns to
the country
between
Nasirábád and
Nimach

Pushing on then, Tántia took up a position between the towns of Singaur and Bhiswará both in the Udaipur state, on the Nasirábád and Nimach road*. Roberts, meanwhile had been obliged, in consequence of the continuance of the

* Singaur is seventy four miles north of Nimach sixty nine south of Nasirábád and eight miles south of Ajmer. Bhiswará is more than a mile from it.

heavy rain, to halt at Sarwár an elevated plateau about thirty miles from Ajmír. On the 5th of August, however, the roads having been reported passable, Roberts broke up and marched towards Nimich. On the 7th, when at Dabla, ten miles from Sangánir, he received information regarding the position taken up by Tántiá close to that place.

The town of Sangánir is on the left bank of the little river Kotáriá. On the other side, and more than a mile up the stream, is the town of Bhilwára, in the front of which Tántiá lay encamped.* Roberts was well aware that all his cavalry and a portion of his infantry under Holmes were following on the track of the rebels. He himself was in front of them. The opportunity was too good to be thrown away. He resolved, though he had no cavalry, to attack.

The rebel infantry and guns had taken up a position in front of Bhilwára. Their horse, however, were thrown forward on the left, across the Kotáriá up to Singánir, and on the right to the other side of that town, the whole forming a horseshoe figure of about a mile and a half, connected by skirmishers. Their elephants and baggage were in the rear on the line by which they must retire if beaten.

Roberts advanced his infantry, covered by skirmishers a short distance in front, cleared Sangánir of the few rebels who had penetrated within it, forced the rebel horse across the river, and, bringing his guns to the river bank, opened on the enemy's right. Under this fire his infantry, played upon by the rebel batteries, crossed the river, and took up a position on a rising ground, their right on a village, their left on a small tank. The guns then were sent across. Seeing this, Tántiá attempted no further resistance, he withdrew his guns and infantry, massing his cavalry on the intervening plain to cover the retreat. He retired unscathed, except by the guns, for Roberts had no cavalry to send after

* *Blackwood's Magazine* August 1860. This number contains an admirably written account of the operations of Generals Roberts and Michel against Tántiá Topí. It is difficult to exaggerate the obligations under which the author lies to the writer of this article, himself an actor in the scene.

him,* and proceeded to a village called Kotrá in the Ūdaipur country.

The next day Roberts was joined by his much required cavalry, which had made a march of thirty miles. He then set out in pursuit of the rebels, doing twenty miles daily till, on the afternoon of the 13th, he came up with their advanced guard at Kankāuli,† a town seventy-nine miles to the north-west of Nímach and a hundred and seventy-one to the north-east of Disá, situated on a lake not far from the Arávali hills. On driving in the rebel outposts, Roberts learned from prisoners and villagers that their main force was occupying a position on the Banás river, seven miles distant.

It is here he
joined by his
cavalry, and
pursues

and
over-takes
Tántiá,

Tántiá Topí, who was, according to his light, a religious man, had devoted that 13th of August to a visit to the shrine of Náthdwára,‡ reputed one of the most sacred in India. On his return at midnight he heard for the first time of the close vicinity of the English. Dreading an attack, he determined to decamp at once. But his infantry refused to move. They said that they were worn out by the long marches, and must rest, that they would march in the morning, and the guns should march with them, that the cavalry might act as they pleased. Under

Tántiá loses
an important
day in
retreating to
exercise.

His infantry
refuses to
move

* Tántiá merely records of this action: "We were there" (Bhilwára) "attacked by the English force, and I fled during the night accompanied by my army and guns."

† The excellent information obtained by General Roberts enabled him, in more than one instance, to traverse the chord of a circle whilst the rebels had gone round by the arc. The method employed by Roberts to obtain this accurate information is thus succinctly described by the author of the article in *Blackwood*, already referred to: "The method which General Roberts adopted for obtaining information was to have about twenty cavalry in advance, close to the rebels. They left connecting links of two or three men every few miles, so as to keep up the chain of communication. The advance party was composed, half of Baluch horse, who had no sympathy with the rebels, but could not communicate very well with the villagers, and half of horsemen belonging to the Rājā of Jaipur, who were supposed as Rājputs, to be on good terms and able easily to communicate with the villagers, but not to be very warm partisans of the British. By this mixed party correct and immediate intelligence was constantly supplied."

‡ Náthdwára is a town in the Ūdaipur State, situate on the Banás river, twenty-two miles from Ūdaipur. The shrine there attracts countless multitudes of pilgrims.

these circumstances, Tantia had no other alternative but to fight

At day break, then, he ranged his men as skilfully as the nature of the ground would allow. His position was strong. In front of him flowed the Baná, which, covering his centre, then made a bend which protected his right. His left rested on some steep hills. The ground he occupied was a low, steep ridge, which formed the bank of the river. Before him, on the opposite bank, was an open plain eight hundred yards wide, across which his enemy must march.

At 7 o'clock on the morning of the 14th Robert's marched across it. In vain did Tantia's four guns, well protected by a natural parapet sweep that plain. In spite of the effect they produced—and it was considerable—the British and Native infantry reached the left bank, forded the river, and scaled the heights on the enemy's left and centre. The night, where the guns were posted being thus left unsupported abandoned the pieces under a volley from the 13th Bombay Native Infantry. The cavalry, led by Colonel Naylor then dashed across the stream, and came upon the rebels scattered over the plain. Naylor pursued them for two miles his men dealing and receiving death. He then formed up his men, and, under orders from the general, kept up a steady and orderly pursuit for fifteen miles, killing numbers of stragglers, and capturing three elephants and a quantity of baggage. Two miles further on, the rebels having reached a village surrounded by jungle, determined to make a stand. Naylor, finding that the number of men whom he could then muster amounted only to a hundred and fifty, and that the country was quite unfit for cavalry, upon this abandoned the pursuit.

Tantia Topí, having shaken off his pursuers, pressed, now without guns, eastward, hoping to find the Chambal fordable, and to place that river between himself and the English. Roberts, divining his intention, followed in the same direction, and the fourth day

* *Blackwood's Magazine*, August 1860. Tántiá Topí writes thus of this action: "The next morning we moved towards Patan and, after proceeding about one mile the English army arrived and an action took place. We left our four guns and fled."

after the action reached Puna, a town north of Chitor, not far from the high road between Nimach and Nasirabad. Here he met Brigadier Parke, commandant of the Nimach brigade, who, some days before, had started from that place in anticipation of orders to cut off Tantiā from the south. Roberts now made over to him the 8th Hussars and the Baluchis, and begged him to continue the pursuit.

Parke set out at once, but, some of the horses of the 8th Hussars being knocked up, he deviated from the exact course followed by Tantiā to proceed to Nimach, where he knew he could obtain about fifty fresh horses. Here he was met by conflicting news regarding the fugitives. On the one side he was assured by experts that it was absolutely impossible that Tantiā could cross the Chambal at that season of the year, and that he was bent on pushing southwards, on the other, Captain Showers, the political agent at Udaipur, who was then at Nimach, had received information from the spot that Tantiā was determined to cross the river. Unfortunately, Parke believed the experts. Proceeding to Morasa, fifteen miles from Nimach and thirty from the Chambal, he halted there a few hours to obtain more exact information. When it came it told him that the informant of Captain Showers was right, and that Tantiā was attempting the Chambal. Parke hurried after him, reached the river after a hard march, only to find it just fordable, but rising rapidly to see "a few disabled ponies standing on the left bank, and the rebels disappearing among some mango trees in the west horizon." Tantiā had escaped. Parke returned to Nimach to rest.*

Tantiā, meanwhile, having crossed the Chambal, pushed for Jhāra Patan, thirty miles distant. Jhāra Patan is a handsome town in the Jhalawar State, ninety miles to the east of Nimach and two hundred and sixteen to the north of Sagar, built on the model of Jaipur. The Rāna of that state, Prithi Singh, great-grandson of the famous Zalim Singh, the founder of the principality, was loyal to his British over-

pursued by
Parke

Parke makes
a divergence
to Nimach
for fresh
horses,

and is
deceived by
false in-
formation

in consequence of
which Tantiā
escapes.

Tantiā
is over on
Jhāra Patan.

The Rāna
loyal to the
British

is described
by his troops.

lord Ho had no idea of yielding without a struggle, but his troops, when drawn up to repel the Maratha invader, behaved precisely as Sindhiá's troops had behaved at Gwahlár on a similar occasion—they fraternised with the rebels. Tántia at once took possession of the Ráná's guns, more than thirty in number, his ammunition, bullocks and horses, and surrounded the palace. The next morning he visited the Ráná, and demanded a contribution in money. The Rána offered five lakhs, but, this sum not being deemed sufficient,

Tántia takes
possession of
Jhálra Patan
and levies a
heavy contribu-
tion.

Ráo Sáhib, acting as representative of the Peshwa, sent for him and demanded twenty-five. Ultimately the Pana agreed to give fifteen. Of these he actually paid five, but, having been insulted and ill treated, he escaped that same night and fled to Mau, leaving some barrels of powder handy for his wife and family to blow themselves up if threatened with insult.*

Tántia, freed by the rising of the Chumbal from all chance of immediate pursuit, halted five days at Jhálra Patan. He states that he employed the money taken to issue three months' pay to his troops at the monthly rate of thirty rupees to each trooper, and twelve rupees to each foot soldier. Whilst so halting, he and his comrades, Rao Sahib and the Dandah of Bandah, conceived a very bold idea. This was no less than to march on Indur, and summon Holkar's troops to join the representative of the liege lord of the Maráthás. Could he succeed in reaching the capital of Holkar before the small body of troops which the news of his approach would probably bring to the same spot from Mau, the fraternisation would be certain, and the result would spread to all Holkar's subjects. Impressed with this idea, Tántia marched with his army, now reinforced by the Jhaláwar levies and all the Ráná's guns,† nearly direct south to Rájgarh‡

Tántia
on the
the idea of
the league
Indur

and tries to
carry it out.

* This account is taken mainly from Tántia's memoirs. The writer in *Poetwood* states that the war contribution amounted to sixty thousand pounds, whilst forty thousand pounds more was collected from Government property. As Jhálra Patan was a very rich town this was very likely the case.

† Tántia says eighteen, but as he had no guns when he arrived and as three were abandoned and twenty seven captured a few days later at Rájgarh, he must have taken all.

‡ There are to be seen well known towns of this name, and probably many more. The Rájgarh referred to in the text is in Málwa.

But, whilst Tántia had been resting at Jhálra Patan, the officer commanding in Malwá Major General Michel, had, as it reading his thoughts despatched from that place a force,* under Colonel Lockhart, to cover Ujjen, due north of Indur Lockhart, proceeding further northwards, reached Susnir, a place about seventeen miles to the west of Rajgarh. Not believing himself strong enough to attack Tántia, he intrenched himself, to await the arrival of a small reinforcement, under Colonel Hope, coming from Man. He met this reinforcement at Nálkerih, about three miles to the south of Susnir. At the very time of this junction Tántia was marching on Rajgarh, within a few miles of him.

Lockhart
move on the
line on which
Tántia is
advancing

* At this period, the end of August 1858, a change took place in the personnel of the British command. Major General Roberts who had up to that time commanded in Rajputáná, was transferred to the military and political control of the Gumat division. His place was taken by Major General Michel of the Royal army, commanding in Malwá, a command which he was now to hold in conjunction with that in Rajputána. Michel was a zealous, active, resolute, and capable officer thoroughly impressed with the necessity of pursuing the fugitive chieftain without cessation.

Michel
replaces
Roberts

Michel joined the united columns of Lockhart and Hope at Nálkerih. He had no information regarding Tántia Topi, but a vague rumour prevailed that he was moving in a north easterly direction. Marching was, in every sense of the word, difficult. Although the month of September had arrived heavy rain, the precursor of the break up of the monsoon, was falling, and the saturated cotton soil of Málwa resembled a sea of black mud. Still it was necessary to move, and Michel moved in the right direction. With great difficulty he transported his little army to Chápára, about midway to Rajgarh. The following day the rain having ceased, Michel pursued his march towards that place. The heat was so great and the sun's rays were so terrible that some of the artillery horses dropped

Takes
command at
Nálkerih

and
pursued

* Three hundred and fifty 92nd Highlanders, four hundred and fifty 10th Bombay Native Infantry, one squadron Bombay 3d Light Cavalry, and two guns Lt Marchand's battery Bengal Artillery

dead in the traces. Still Michel pushed on, and, about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, halting on a rising ground he had the gratification of beholding Tántia Tópi's army encamped near the walled town of Rajgarh.

To traverse three miles of black soil and then, at the approach of night, to a track with a tired army a fresh body of men in the position they had chosen, was not for a moment to be thought of. Michel, then, waited for the morning, but when morning dawned Tántia and his men had disappeared. Michel at once sent his cavalry on their track. This track was distinguished, first, by the marks of the gunwheels and the elephants then, more decidedly by three guns lying abandoned on the road. A little further on the rebel force was descried, drawn up in two lines, the second on higher ground than the first, and the guns on ground above both. The cavalry then halted to await the approach of the infantry and guns.

The infantry and guns did not let Michel wait long. As soon as they came up the action began with an artillery fire from both sides. Then the English infantry, deploying went at the rebels. The latter did not wait the conflict but gave way and fled. Getting entangled in intersecting roads, they fell into most horrible confusion. The British horse artillery, galloping forward in alternate divisions of two guns, kept up a fire on the retreating masses whilst the cavalry, threatening their left flank, forced them to incline towards the north.* In the pursuit, twenty-seven guns were taken.

Tántia, driven towards the north wandered about for some time in the jungle country on both sides of the Betwa and eventually made for Sonny—in an easterly direction. But, whilst thus seeking a place of security, new enemies were gathering round him.

* Of this action Tántia writes: "On reaching Rajgarh the English army came up and attacked us. We left our guns and fled. It would be incredible were it not true that a force so large, numbering at least eight thousand with thirty guns, should allow itself to be defeated by less than one sixth of its number in men and guns without drawing a drop of blood. Yet so it was. It is the more strange as about half the rebels had been trained and disciplined by Europeans, the 12 guns were effective pieces of larger calibre than the English 9 pounders the 12 muskets bore the Tower mark and their swords were excellent, yet not one man of the British force was killed or wounded."

To Brigadier Parke, who had left Nimach on the 5th of September, was entrusted the duty of covering Indur and Bhopal, thus leaving Michels force to follow Tantia from the west whilst Smith's brigade should advance from the north, and the Jhansi column under Colonel Liddell from the north-east

With this disposition opens a new phase of the pursuit. The desert of Tantia Topi near Rajgarh almost coincided in time with the conclusion of the rainy season, for, although rain continued for some days to fall further operations had become possible. We are now entering upon the cold weather campaign. In this new actors appear upon the scene. The Central India field force once more invites the attention of the public. It seems fitting, then that before describing the events of that cold weather campaign I should trace the operations of General Napier and of Brigadier Smith from the period when we left them up to the middle of September. Meanwhile we must suppose Tantia Topi to be making the best of his way, by circuitous paths from Rajgarh to Sironj.

At the beginning of July we left General Napier's division at Gwalhar and Jhansi, Brigadier Smith's brigade at Sipri, and Mayo's Irregulars at Gunah, all resting after the extraordinary fatigues and exposure of the Central India campaign. To the superficial glance order had been restored in Sindhu's dominions. The Maharajah, grateful to the English more fervent than at any previous period in his desire for their success, was doing his utmost to forward the views of the army administrators for the success of the troops. Sir Robert Hamilton, located at Gwalhar was engaged in re-establishing political relations with the petty states around. The situation was full of promise, and yet, all the time, it was hollow and unsound.

During the whole of July the European troops had rest. The comparatively trifling matters which required attention in the districts were easily disposed of by the employment on detached duty of the men of Meade's Horse, a regiment daily rising in estimation. But on the 2nd of August an incident occurred which led to very serious complications. A chief of Sindhu's territory, named Man Singh, Rajah of Narwar, had quarrelled with his hege lord. To avenge the wrong which, he conceived, had been inflicted upon him by Sindhu and which will presently

The strategy
reverts to
Napier's
bunite

The situation
at Gwalhar
is apparently
peaceful.

Revolt of
Man Singh
Rajah of
Narwar

be related, and encouraged possibly by Tántia's action in the south, this chieftain, summoning his followers, twelve thousand strong, surprised on the 2nd of August the strong fort of Paurí, eighty three miles by the Síprí road south west of Gwáhar, and eighteen to the north west of Síprí, but recently supplied with six months' provisions and ammunition. Now, Smith's brigade was at Síprí. On the 4th he learned of the act of rebellion perpetrated by Mán Singh. On the 5th he started from Síprí with a force composed of two squadrons of the 8th Hussars two of the 1st Bombay Lancers a wing of the 90th, and three field guns, and, marching as rapidly as the roads would permit, reached the vicinity of Paurí early on the morning of the 7th. On approaching the place, Mán Singh sent a messenger with a flag of truce to the brigadier, to assure him that he had no quarrel with the English, that his contention was with the Mahárájah alone, and to supplicate earnestly for an interview. Smith granted the request and saw the chief that day. In an earnest manner, totally devoid of pretension, Mán Singh told his story to the brigadier. He and his family, he said, had ever been loyal servants to the Mahárájah. During the lifetime of his father, nothing had occurred to mar the good feeling which had previously existed. But on his father's death, the Mahárájah had insulted and robbed him by refusing to recognise his right to succeed to the principality of Narwár* and the estates adjacent. It was to recover these or, at all events, to avenge himself on the Mahárájah, that he had drawn the sword and seized Paurí which formed a part of his ancestral possessions but, he added earnestly, "I have no connection with the rebels, and no quarrel with the English." The plea, though true, and convincing the listener of its truth, was not of a nature which, in those times, could be accepted by an English commander. Smith was responsible for the peace of the country near Síprí, that peace had been violated by Mán Singh, and Smith had but one plain duty,

He seizes
Paurí

Smith starts
for a N. of
to recover
the place

In review
between
himself & a
& Mán Singh

Grievances of
the latter

Smith
rejects his
plea

* Narwár is a very important place with an interesting history. It lies forty-four miles south of Gwáhar. In 1814 Narwár, with the lands pertaining to it, was assessed by the Gwáhar Government at 2250 000 rupees annually. Little wonder, then, that the despotic ruler of the native State in which it lay should covet it.

to see that the violators were punished and that peace was maintained. He informed Man Singh of this necessity. Man Singh was obstinate, and expressed his determination to resist.

and prepared
to be
go
Pauri

Pauri was strong, well supplied with provisions and ammunition and its garrison, originally only two thousand, had been increased during the few days since the capture to nearly double that number. Amongst the new comers was a chief, Ajit Singh by name, nephew of Man Singh. Smith's force amounted only to eleven hundred men of all arms and his three pieces were field pieces. He was thus far too weak to undertake a siege, and the place was too strong to be carried by a *coup de main*. Under these

strength and
number of
troops

circumstances he deemed it prudent to maintain his position near the place, while he sent to Gwalior an earnest request for reinforcements. On receiving this requisition Napier felt the enormous importance of settling the matter with as little delay as possible. Examples of that sort in a country long under Marathá rule are apt to be contagious, and there was every probability that if Man Singh were allowed for any length of time to parade his defiance of the British, chieftains more powerful than he might follow his example. Napier, then, determined to take the matter into his own hands. He started accordingly on the 11th

Smith sends
a
valley
for the force
ments

with five guns and four mortars escorted by six hundred horse and foot reached Sipri on the 17th and joined South on the 19th of August. He began operations the next day. For twenty four hours he poured a vertical fire into the fort from his mortars, and then began to use his breaching batteries. This demonstration quite satisfied Man Singh. On the night of the 23d he, Ajit Singh, and their followers evacuated Pauri, and made their way southwards through the jungles. Napier entered Pauri the following morning then equipped a light column under Robertson 25th Bombay Native Infantry—an officer whose gallantry and soldierlike conduct have often been mentioned in these pages—and sent him in

Napier sets
off from
Gwalior to
relieve
him.

Man Singh
evacuates
the place

pursuit of the rebels. Napier himself having destroyed the fortifications of Pauri and burst the guns, retired to Sipri to make arrangements for the further pursuit of Man Singh should Robertson fail to capture him.

Robertson
pursues

That zealous officer left Panri on the 26th of August, on the track of Man Singh. He had with him a squadron of the 8th Hussars, a squadron of Meade's Horse, two 9 pounders, one 6 pounder, one 5½-inch howitzer, a hundred men of the 86th, a hundred and twenty of the 95th, two hundred 10th Bombay Native Infantry, and two hundred 25th Bombay Native Infantry. Pushing on by forced marches through the jungles crossing difficult rivers, and conquering every obstacle, Robertson on

Robertson
overtaken
Ajit
Singh's
troops at
Bijapur

the 3rd of September ascertained that the rebels were at Byapur, near Gunah, twenty three miles distant. His determination was instantly taken. Leaving the bulk of his troops to guard the camp and baggage, he mounted on elephants and camels seventy five men of the 86th, ninety of the 95th, and

a hundred each of the 10th and 25th Native Infantry, and with those and fifty men of the 8th Hussars, and a hundred and fifty of Meade's Horse, he set out that night. At daybreak the following morning he came in sight of the rebels occupying a rising ground on the opposite bank of the Parbatí river. They

surprised
them,

had no scouts and, the light being still grey, Robertson was able to cross the river unperceived and to send his cavalry round to take up a position

in rear of the rebel camp. These movements were executed with so much care and precision, that, when the cavalry were taking up the position indicated, the rebels were actually stripping to bathe in the river, preparatory to their morning meal. The surprise was complete. Of organised

and cut
them up

resistance there was none, but the casualty list showed that the rebels, though taken unawares,

defended themselves bravely. Lieutenant Fawcett 95th, was killed, Captain Poore and Lieutenant Hanbury, 18th Hussars, and Lieutenants Stewart and Page, of Meade's Horse, were wounded. The remaining casualties in killed and wounded amounted to eighteen.

It was discovered after the action that it was not Man Singh's but Ajit Singh's band which had been routed. The

Composed on
of the routed
for a

astute Man Singh on learning that he was pursued had divided his partisans into three divisions, with instructions to traverse separate roads and to com-

bine at an appointed place. It was one of these divisions, six hundred strong, and composed as was ascertained after the action, of men from the Malajath's bodyguard, from the

Gwahiár contingent and from the 3rd, 40th, 47th, and 50th regiments native infantry which had been encountered. They were all dressed in red, and had percussion firelocks. About three fourths of them were killed,* but Ánt Singh escaped.

Robertson marched from the scene of action to Gunáh, where he arrived the middle of September. With this march may be said to terminate the campaign of the rainy season in the districts to the west and south-west of Gwahiár bordering on Rajputána. It is now fit that we should follow the various columns in the cold weather campaign against Tántia Topí and his allies. Of these that against Tántia Topí demands precedence.

I left that chieftain making his way about the jungly country on both sides of the Betwa towards Sironj. He duly reached that place about the middle of September, he and his men utterly exhausted. A rest of eight days, made sweeter by the absence of all fear—for the heavy rain that was falling would, they well knew, make the roads impassable to their enemy—set them on their legs again, and even restored to them their former audacity. On the conclusion of that period, the rains having ceased, Tántia led his men, with the four guns he had taken at Sironj against Isagarb, a town with a fort, he longing to Sindhia, in the hilly and difficult country south of Sipu. Here he demanded supplies, but, the townspeople refusing them, Tántia stormed and plundered the place, and took seven guns. He and his associates halted there for a day to consider their further plans. Their deliberations then culminated in a determination to divide their forces, Tántia proceeding with the bulk of them and five guns to Chanderi; the Rao Sahib with six guns and fewer followers making his way to Lal Bahat by Lalatpur; this plan was carried out.

What Chanderi was, the reader will recollect who has followed the history of Sir Hugh Rose's central Indian campaign†. It was now held for Sindhia by a loyal soldier, a man who had no sympathy with

Close of the rainy season campaign

the cold weather campaign

The story reverts to Tántia Topí

who rests at Sironj

Takes guns and supplies from Isagarb

who has followed the history of Sir Hugh Rose's central Indian campaign†
Tántia is requested at Chanderi

* The number of killed is often exaggerated, but on this occasion between four and five hundred dead bodies were actually counted on both sides of the river.

† Pages 103-5.

rebels. He repulsed, then, Tantia Topi's appeals, and when the Maráthá chief attempted to storm the place he repulsed his attacks. Tantia wasted three days in an attempt to gain a place the possession of which would have been of incalculable use to him, and then, baffled though not and moves on Mangrauli, on the left bank of the Betwa, about twenty miles south of Chanderi. He was marching, though he knew it not, on defeat, for the English were to meet him there!

I must now return to his pursuers. I have already stated the position of the several English columns, how Brigadier Parke was covering Indur and Bhopal, how Colonel Liddell with the Jhínsí force was covering the country to the north east. I have now, only to add that Brigadier Smith, relieved by the capture of Pauri, had taken up a position north of Sironj. In the inner part of the circle, the outer rim of which was occupied by these columns General Michel was acting.

Enabled at last, towards the end of September, by the cessation of the heavy rains to act freely, Michel, believing he should find Tantia in the Betwá valley, went in pursuit of him in a north easterly direction. As he marched, he heard of the various depredations committed by the fugitives, and he felt sure he should find him. On the 9th of October, marching towards Mangrauli, information reached him that Tantia had occupied the high ground near the place, and was waiting for him.

Tantia had arrived there that very morning. He had not sought a battle, but as the ground was favourable he resolved to risk one. His position was strong, and the five guns he had placed in the front of his line commanded the ground along which the English must advance. When, then, Michel sent his men forward, Tantia's guns opened a destructive fire. Grown bolder by despair, Tantia at the same time sent his cavalry to menace both flanks of the few assailants. For a moment the position of these seemed critical, the more so as some of the outflanking horsemen penetrated between the main body and the rear guard. But whilst they still hesitated to come on to risk a hand to hand encounter, the British troops advanced steadily, and, gaining the crest,

charged the guns. Then all was over. Tántiá and his men abandoned their guns and fled. The want of sufficient cavalry did not allow Michel to pursue them.*

who, how-
ever is
beaten, and
flees.

Tántiá crossed the Betwá and fled first to Jakláun, and then, next day, to Lálitpur, where he rejoined Rao Sahib, who, it will be remembered, had six guns. Tántiá remained here, but Rao Sáhíb with the bulk of the troops and the guns, set off the following day, and marched in a south-easterly direction. Michel meanwhile, ordering Smith to watch the left bank of the Betwa, followed Rao Sáhíb, and, making his way with great difficulty through the dense Jakláun jungle came suddenly upon him at Sindwáha, about thirty miles east of the Betwa. Warned by the inopportune sound of a bugle in the British camp, Rao Sahib had time to draw up his men on a rising ground, with the guns in front. Then followed a scene almost similar to that at Mangrauli. The English threatened on both flanks, advance and capture the guns, when the rebels flee. In their flight however, they were on this occasion, less fortunate than at Mangrauli. Michel had his cavalry handy, the ground, too, was unfavourable for rapid flight. In a pursuit which covered twelve miles, the rebels then suffered severely. Rao Sáhíb, however, escaped. The English lost five officers and twenty men killed and wounded.

Tántiá d
l & Sáh b
Jo n, & d
then a par te

Michel
total y
defeats Rao
Sahib,

who
how ver
escapes,

Rao Sahib rejoined Tántiá at Lálitpur and again the two held counsel as to the future. The country north of the Narbadá seemed about to close on them. The circle was gradually lessening and in a few days they would be in the folds of the destroyer. They saw this clearly, saw that their only chance was to break through the circle and march to the south, putting the enemy, if possible on a false scent. This was the difficult part of the programme, but they laid their plans to attempt it.

The rebel
chief's units
and resol e
to cross the
Narbadá.

It is impossible to withhold admiration from the pertinacity with which this scheme was carried out. Leaving Lálitpur,

* Of this action Tántiá writes. On our march to Mangrauli we met the English army. Shots were fired for a short time, when we left all our guns and fled.

Tantiá and the Rao, whose design was to escape southwards, marched to Kajuria with the intention of recrossing the Betwa near that place and turning thence southward. But, the ford being guarded by Colonel Laddell, Tantiá turned north eastward, and made once more for Tal Bahat. There he halted to rest his men. The following day, moving direct southwards he penetrated into the Jaklaun jungles, still to the east of the Betwa. He halted one day at Jaklaun and the next at Itáwah (in the Sagar district). There he heard that the English army was on his track, so he at once broke up and pushed on towards Kurai.*

Whilst he is making that march I must return to General Michel. From the field of Sindwáha that general had marched to Láhtpur, leaping always to the westward of Tantiá with the view of baulking the intention he believed he might entertain of breaking through to the south. On reaching Láhtpur, however, a messenger from Brigadier Smith reached him with the information that Tantiá had been met marching southwards, and had probably gained the west side of the general. No time was to be lost. Michel, sending off an express to warn Paiké, and pressing southwards by forced marches, came upon Tantiá ly a cross road just as that chief was approaching the village of Kurai. Instantly the battle joined. The British cavalry separated from one another the two wings of the rebels' forces. But, whilst the British were engaged in annihilating the left wing, the right with which were Tantiá and Rao Sáhib, favoured by the jungle, managed to escape westward. Not that the left wing fought to save their comrades, they had fled in the direction from which they had advanced, and the whole of Michel's force had pounced upon them, leaving the other wing to escape. Tantiá and Rao Sáhib, in fact, purchased their retreat with the sacrifice of one half of their followers †.

This happened on the 25th of October. Tantiá pushed on to Rájgarh, molested on his way, four miles from Bagrod, ‡ by

* Itáwah lies thirty eight Kurai thirty two miles to the north west of Sagar.

† Tantiá writes of this action "The English force came up in the morning and our army became separated, I accompanied the Rao Sáhib," &c. Not a word about the sacrifice of the wing.

‡ Bagrod lies thirty nine miles to the north west of Sagar.

Retreat
of Tantá &
Rao Sâhib
to the north.

Michel learns
that Tantiá
is marching
southwards
and follows
in pursuit.

Catches him
at Kurai.

Michel
annihilates
Tantiá's
left wing
the right
wing escapes.

Colonel Charles Beecher, one of the most gallant officers of the Indian army, who, at the head of a newly raised regiment,* did not hesitate to attack his whole force. Beecher inflicted considerable loss (upwards of forty men killed), but Tantia pressed on, and, proceeding via Rajgarh, crossed the Narbadá into the Nagpur territory at a point about forty miles above Hoshangábad.

Td. ill.
n otested on
the way by
Beech r.

crosses the
Narbadá.

Thus in the dying agony of the mutiny was accomplished a movement which carried out twelve months earlier, would have produced an effect fatal for the time to British supremacy, a movement which would have roused the whole of the western Presidency, have kindled revolt in the dominions of the Nizam, and have, in its working, penetrated to southern India. It was the movement to prevent which Lord Elphinstone had adopted the policy of aggressive defence till then so successful, which Durand had exerted all his energies, and used entreaties of the most urgent character with the Government of India, had stretched to the utmost the powers entrusted to him, to hinder. And now it was accomplished! The nephew of the man recognised by the Marathás as the lawful heir of the last reigning Peshwá was on Marathá soil with an army!

Effect which
would have
been pro-
duced by the
a twelve
months
earlier

I have said that, had that event occurred but fifteen months previously, British authority in western India would, for the time, have succumbed. As it was—the event happening in October 1858, when the sparks of the mutiny in every other part of India, Oudh excepted, had been extinguished, and when, even in Oudh, they were being surely trampled out—the event caused alarm of no ordinary character to the Governments of Bombay and Madras. Although Lord Elphinstone had shown, to a remarkable degree, a true appreciation of the character of the rebellion and of the manner in which it should be met, even he could not view without grave concern the arrival of Tantia Topi and Ráo Sábib in the country of the Bhonslas, that country the annexation of which but a few years previously had moved the Marathá heart to its core. He could not but remember that a large proportion of the population of the Bombay Presidency was Maratha, and he could not foresee—

Alarm which
it caused
even in
October
1858

In Bombay

* Now one of the regiments Central Indian Horse.

who indeed, could foresee?—the effect which might be produced on the easily kindled minds of a susceptible people by the presence of the representative of the man whom many amongst them regarded as their rightful ruler

Nor could Lord Harris, who, throughout the trying times of 1857-58, had shown himself prompt to meet every difficulty, listen with an indifferent ear to the tidings that the Maratha leader had crossed the Narbadā. True it was that the Madras Presidency was separated from the country now chosen by Tantiā as his campaigning ground by the vast territories of the Nizām. True it was that the Nizām, guided by his able and far seeing minister Salā Jang had displayed to the British a loyalty not to be exceeded. But the times were peculiar. The population of the Nizām's territories was to a very considerable extent Hindu. Instances had occurred before as in the case of Sindhiā, of a people revolting against their sovereign when that sovereign acted in the teeth of the national feeling. It was impossible not to fear lest the army of Tantiā should rouse to arms the entire Maratha population, and that the spectacle of a people in arms against the foreigner might act with irresistible force on the people of the Dakhn.

Fortunately, these fears were not realised. Six years' ex

who were to receive no supplies without payment, and, if it could be managed without injury to themselves, no supplies at all.

To return to the story. Tántia, crossing the Narbadá forty miles above Hoshingabad, proceeded *via* Pathpur to Multái* in the direction of Nagpur, but, learning that a British force from that place had anticipated him, he turned sharp westward, hoping to penetrate to the country southward by an unguarded pass in the hills. He found this impossible, for Brigadier Hill of the Haidarábad contingent was watching at Melghat and Ásirgarh, further westward, Sir Hugh Rose had made preparations to prevent Tántia from crossing into Khandesh, and, further westward still, General Roberts was bringing up troops to bar Gujrat against him. Nothing could have been more tantalising, for south of the Tapti river, from the banks of which he was separated only by the narrow Satpura range, lay the country to which Nana Sahib laid claim as his rightful inheritance†. Across this, under the circumstances, Tántia dared not venture. Shut out, then, from further progress west or south, Tántia made a turn north westwards into Holkar's possessions, south of the Narbada, hoping to recross the Narbada unperceived and to penetrate thence into the territory of the Gáikwar. On the 19th November he reached Kargun, a decayed town in Nimár. Here was stationed a detachment of Holkar's troops, consisting of two troops of cavalry, a company of infantry, and two guns. These Tántia forced to join him, and then pushed on westward. On the 23rd he crossed near Phan, the great high road from Bombay to Ágra, just as it was being traversed by carts laden with mercantile stores for the use of the English. Plundering these, taking with him the natives who had been escorting the carts, and destroying the telegraph wires, he pursued his course, feeling confident of success if only he could reach the Narbadá before the English, whom he believed he had outmanœuvred, should molest him.

He did not
thence
to the south
and west
barréd
again to him

He turned to
the north
west with the
intention of
recrossing
the Narbadá
and in archi-
on Barodah.

* Multái is a town in the Betul district, twenty-eight miles east of Jabalpur. Its chief attraction is a large tank which is revered by the natives as the source of the river Tapti.

† Blackwood's Magazine, August 1850.

But Fortune did not favour him. Michel, indeed, after defeating Tántia at Kurai, had pushed on in pursuit, though not on the same track, and, with his cavalry, had reached Hoshangabad on the 7th of November. There he joined Parke, whom he had previously ordered to meet him. Leaving Parke at Hoshangabad Michel crossed the Narbada and found himself in the wild country about Betul with no accurate maps, no information of his own regarding the movements of the rebels with no prospect of obtaining any from the local authorities. Left thus to the resources of his own intelligence Michel came to the conclusion that the roads to the south and due west would certainly be barred to Tántia and that, although there was but little prospect of his attempting to recross the Narbada yet that it would not be wise on his part to move too far from that river. Impressed with this idea he ordered Parke to cross the Narbada at Hoshangabad, to march in a direction south west by west, and take up a position at Charwah, eighty miles south east from Indur, a town forming the angle nearest the Narbada of a triangle of which Melghát and Ásirgarh, both occupied by British troops, formed the other angles. In that direction, though more slowly, he moved himself.

Whilst General Michel was making these preparations south of the Narbada, the British authorities at Mau, to the north of it, were receiving disquieting rumours regarding the continued and persistent movements of Tántia westward. Dreading lest that chief should get possession of the grand trunk road, intercept supplies, and destroy the telegraph wires Sir Robert Hamilton and Brigadier Edwards who commanded at Mau deemed it advisable, before Tántia had pillaged the carts in the manner already related, to post two small infantry detachments to watch the fords above Akbarpur. A day or two later, when intelligence was received that the westerly movement was being prolonged, Major Sutherland, who commanded one of these detachments, consisting of a hundred men of the 92nd Highlanders and a hundred of the 4th Bombay Rifles, received instructions to cross the river at Akbarpur and keep clear the grand trunk road. Sutherland obeyed his orders, and passing through Than—the village

already spoken of—seventeen miles from Akbarpur, proceeded to Julwanah, thirteen miles further on, nearer to Bombay. There he was when, on the afternoon of the 23rd of November, Tántia and his troops passed through Than, plundered the carts and cut the telegraph wires, as already described.

Sutherland crosses the Narbada at a point below that traversed by Tántia.

Tántia having taken the precaution to carry off with him all the men accompanying the carts, Sutherland remained for some hours ignorant of this occurrence. He had been reinforced on the morning of the 23rd by fifty Europeans, sent on camels from Mau. The evening of that day, the report regarding the plundering reached him. The next morning, taking with him

a hundred and twenty Europeans and eighty natives, riding alternately on camels, Sutherland proceeded to Than, and inspected as far as possible the damage done.* Learning there that the rebels had taken a westerly direction, he followed hastily and came in

Sutherland locates the vicinity of Tántia and pursues him.

sight of them as they were passing through the town of Rajpur, nearly midway between Than and the Narbada. Pushing on, his men in advance still riding camels, disregarding the

enemy's stragglers and the quantities of abandoned baggage and baggage animals, Sutherland, in half an hour, had approached near enough to force a

Catches him only to see him retire.

battle. He ordered, then, his men to dismount, but the delay thus caused gave Tántia an opportunity, of which he availed himself, to retire. Before Sutherland could set out in pursuit,

he had the satisfaction of being joined by his rear guard—the men who had not been mounted, and who, in their desire for combat, had marched at a great pace. Keeping the whole

of his force dismounted, Sutherland resumed the pursuit, and after marching two miles came up with the rebels, formed in order of battle on a rocky ridge, thickly wooded, with their two guns, the

Follows the pursuit.

* * The road for eight miles was strewn with articles taken by the rebels the previous day from some merchants' carts on the main road, several carts had been brought on and abandoned when the bullocks got tired. The soldiers filled their water bottles with port or sherry of which there was enough to have stocked a large cellar but not a man got intoxicated. A cart load of books had been opened by the rebels during a halt—the contents were torn up and strewn in a circle, with a Walker's Pronouncing Dictionary left intact in the middle.—*Blackwood*, August 1860.

On the 1st of the morning the British guns of Hollar found at Kargun, pointing down the road Tántiá had with him from three to four thousand men. Sutherland had just two hundred. After a little skirmishing the smaller number charged the larger. Dashing up the road under a shower of grape they captured the guns, Lieutenant Humphries adjutant of the 92nd, receiving a sword cut from their commandant who was killed at his post. The rebel infantry then fled. The casualties on both sides were trifling. Sutherland, whose men were too tired to pursue, encamped on the ground he had gained.

The presence of the two guns with Tántiá's force had necessitated that slow march over rough ground which had allowed Sutherland to overtake him. Now that the guns were lost his men were able to display that capacity for rapid marching in which the natives of India are unsurpassed, I might almost say unequalled by any troops in the world. So quickly did they cover the ground that when at sunset the following day Sutherland reached the banks of the Narbadá, he beheld the rebel force comfortably encamped on the opposite bank. Between him and their camp flowed the waters of the Narbadá at that point five hundred yards broad its banks high and difficult. To cross it in the face of an enemy twenty times his strength would have been an impossibility even for the troops he commanded.

That Tántiá had been able to cross the Narbadá can only be accounted for by the fact that he had marched the previous afternoon, and the whole of the night, and had thus at least twelve hours' start of his pursuers. It was well for him that he had that start. When he reached the left bank of the Narbadá Tántiá had beheld on the bank opposite a party of a hundred sawars under an officer†. Under other circumstances the sight of these men might have made him hesitate. But he knew that Sutherland

* Regarding this act in Tántiá's career (after referring to the capture of the carts) "We then left the high road and proceeded westward. The next day we were surprised by the English force and leaving our two guns we fled and reached the Narbadá."

† He states Tántiá himself and I have usually found his statements corroborated by other writers. But I have been unable to ascertain who was the person or who was the officer. Probably he was a native officer.

was behind him. He therefore, plunged boldly in. The sîwars then took to flight.

At midnight Tántia having plundered a village called Chikla broke up his camp on the Narbada and marched in the direction of Barodah. It was his last chance, but it was a great one could he but arrive before the English. Barodah was the seat of a Maiatha dynasty and it was known that a large party at the court sympathised deeply with Naná Sâhib. There were in the city only one company of Europeans and two native regiments besides the troops of the Gaikwâr who were almost sure to join the rebels. Full of the hope raised by the prospects before him, Tántia pushed on rapidly, marching from the banks of the Narbadî thirty four miles straight on end. He halted at Raypura took three thousand nine hundred rupees and three horses from the chief of that place and marched the next day for Chhotâ Udaipur * only fifty miles from Barodah and connected with it by a road. Could he arrive at and quit that place unmolested his future, he thought would be assured.

Tántia p
hes
towards
Barodah

ful of hope

arr ves w t l n
fifty m l s of
Barodah

But his pursuers were too many. I left General Michel and Brigadier Parke in the second week of November at Chârwal south of the Narbada confident that Tántia's progress to the south was barred and that he would endeavour to seek some means of recrossing into Mîlwâ. Some days elapsed before an accurate account of his movements reached Michel. That able officer displayed then not a moment's hesitation as to the course to be followed. Recrossing the Narbada at the Barwâni fort he marched himself on Mîlwâ while he despatched Parke with a flying column of cavalry mounted infantry, and two guns to pursue Tántia with the utmost speed that was possible.

Michel
disoo ers
Tántia's
intent o n

and
deepa cles
larks in pur
sue t of him

Parke carried out these instructions to the letter in nine days two hundred and forty one miles for the last twenty of which he was forced to thread his way through a dense jungle he came up with Tántia on the morning of the 1st of December, at

Marching

Parke catches
Tánt at
Chhotâ
Udaipur

* Chhotâ Udaipur is a state in the Rewâ Kanthâ district, the chief of which pays an annual tribute to the Gaikwâr. It possesses an area of about eight hundred and seventy three square miles.

Chhotá Udaipur, just an hour or two after he had reached that place. Considering the climate, the nature of the country, and the other difficulties of the route, this march must be considered as rivalling any of which history makes record.

The force commanded by Parke consisted of two 9 pounder guns Bombay Artillery, fifty men 8th Hussars, fifty of the 2nd Bombay Cavalry, a party of the Marathá horse under Kerr—which, after having disarmed the southern Marathá country, had been sent from the west to join Michel—Moore's Aden Horse, a hundred of the 72nd Highlanders mounted on camels, and a hundred and twenty five Gujrati Irregular Horse. For the last twenty miles before reaching Chhotá Udaipur, this force had, as I have stated, threaded its way through a dense jungle, skilfully

Force under
Tantia's
Turks.

Discovery of
Tantia's
force.

Parke sets
his force in
battle array

Tantia's
expressions
checked

piloted by Moore with his Aden Horse. On emerging from the jungle Moore perceived the rebels. He instantly surprised their outlying picket. The ground beyond the jungle was covered with large trees, brushwood and tents still standing,* and was so broken as to be very difficult for cavalry and artillery. As Parke's troops debouched on to it he deployed his force placing some of the 8th Hussars of the Marathá Horse and the Aden horse on his right; the rest of the Marathá Horse, under Kerr, on his left, the 72nd Highlanders flanking the two guns in his centre, the remainder of the cavalry in the rear. His whole front scarcely covered two hundred yards. The rebels meanwhile, roused to action, had formed up about six hundred yards distant. They numbered three thousand five hundred men and outflanked the British force on both sides. Tantia first endeavoured to turn the British left, but Kerr, changing his front, charged with great impetuosity, and, driving the rebels from the field, pursued them for a considerable distance, laying sixty of them low. A similar attempt on the British right was met with equal success by the cavalry stationed there. Skinnerman of the Southern Marathá Horse, greatly distinguishing himself and killing four men with his own hands. In the pursuit a standard of the 5th Bengal Irregulars borne by the rebels was captured. Whilst the wings were thus engaged the two British guns had kept up

* Tantia admits that he was surprised on this occasion.

a heavy fire on the centre. But it was not long needed. With the repulse of the flanking attacks the action terminated. A pursuit along the whole line then followed.

Tántiá de-
feats his ad-
vances and
cut off from
Barodah

This engagement was fatal to Tántiá's hopes regarding Barodah. Leaving his route to the westward, he fled northwards into the jungles of Banswara the southernmost principality of Rujútana. These jungles, extremely dense in their character, are inhabited principally by Bhils a wild and uncivilised race, much given to plunder. Hemmed in on the south by the Narbada, now for ever abandoned, on the west by Gujrat, now completely guarded by General Roberts, and on the north and east by difficult ranges which separate it from Udaipur and Sirohi, and the passes across which are few and difficult Tántiá might have been excused if he had despaired of escape. But he did not despair. Rao Sahib was now his only companion the Nwáb of Bandah having in November taken advantage of the Royal Proclamation to surrender.* But these two men were, in this hour of supreme danger, as cool, as bold, as fertile in resource, as at any previous period of their careers.

regarding

Flies to the
Banswára
jungles

Desperate
joiners of
Tá and
Páo Sahib

as fertile

They remain
undaunted

And yet the British commanders had done their utmost to him in Tántiá. They really believed that at last they had him. The troops of Roberts's division were echeloned along the roads and paths and passes leading from Banswara to the west. On that side escape was impossible. A force detached from Nimach under Major Roche guarded the passes to the north and north-west. Another column sent from Man, under Colonel Benson commanded at the moment by Colonel Somerset, watched the passes leading eastward and south eastward, whilst Tántiá was cut off from the south by his recent pursuers, greatly strengthened by flying detachments, from Barhanpur and from Khandesh. To add to his difficulties, the Bhil inhabitants of the jungles of Banswara far from aiding him, followed his track as the vulture follows the wounded hare, anxious for the moment when she shall lie down and succumb.

The con-
dition of
them
is apparently
complete

But, undaunted, Tántiá pressed deeper into the jungles. On

* To be hereafter referred to

a light column to Ágra, Roche had been moved to take his place at Partágarh, whilst Pirki, plunging into the jungles from the westward, was rapidly following on the track of the fugitives.

It thus happened that when, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the 20th of December, Tántia and his followers emerged from the jungles close to Partágarh he found himself face to face with Major Roche. That officer, not having a sufficient number of men at his disposal to close the three passes, had taken up a position about two miles from the jungles whence he could march to any point at which the rebels might threaten to debouch, provided he had any information of their movements. On this occasion he had no such information. His force, too, was as I have said, small, consisting only of two hundred infantry and a handful of native cavalry. He had no chance, however, of assuming the offensive. Tántia marched straight at him, and kept him engaged for two hours, a sufficient time to enable his elephants and baggage to clear the pass. Seeing this result gained Tántia, who had thus, in spite of his many foes, escaped from the trap, marched in the direction of Mandesar, and halted for the night within six miles of that place. Thence he marched very rapidly—in three days—to Zirapur, a hundred miles east south east of Nimach, thus returning to the part of the country almost directly south of Gwalár.

But the English were at his heels. Benson who had resumed command of the Man column had received excellent information regarding Tántia's movements from Captain Hutchinson, one of the assistants to Sir Robert Hamilton. He pushed on after Tántia then, marching thirty five miles a day, caught him up at Zirapur the very day he had arrived there. Tántia completely surprised, fled without fighting, leaving six of his elephants behind him, and pushed northwards to Barod. Here another surprise followed him. Somerset had reached Zirapur the morning after Tántia had left it. He had two horse artillery guns with him. Taking fresh horses from the ammunition wagons, he attached them to Benson's two guns. With these four guns and the ammunition contained in the lumber, Somerset started at once, and, marching seventy miles

Tántia
emerges from
the jungles

heats Major
Roche

and marches
towards Ma-
desar and
Zirapur

Benson
catches him
at Zirapur
Tántia flies
to Barod

Is caught
there by
Somerset
and beaten

in forty-eight hours came upon Tāntiā at Barod. After an action fought in the usual Tāntiā Topī style, the rebels fled to Nahargarh in the Kōiā territory. Here Tāntiā was fired at by the Kūludār.*

Moving out of range, he halted for the night. Rao Sahib then sent a messenger to summon Mān Singh, the chief to whom I have referred in an earlier portion of this chapter as having rebelled against Sindhia who had appointed to meet

Tāntiā meets
Mān Singh

him at this place. On Mān Singh's arrival the rebels moved to Paron, where they halted two days.

They then pushed northwards towards Indragarh. On reaching the banks of the Chamhal, Mān Singh, for some unexplained reason, left them. On the 13th of January they reached Indragarh† where Fīruzshah, with his body-guard and

and
Fīruzshah

the mutinied 12th Irregulars, met them. To ascertain how this had been possible, I must return to the movements of General Napier and the Central

Indian force

I left General Napier just after he and his lieutenants had, at the end of September, expelled Mān Singh from the Gwalior territory. His detached parties still continued to operate in the districts to the west and south west of Gwalior, bordering on Rājputānā, and

The story
runs to to
General
Napier

the work which those parties accomplished was of a most useful character. In this manner passed the months of October and November, but in December Gwalior was invaded by a new enemy.

The pseudo-prince, Fīruzshah, already mentioned in these pages, had, after his expulsion from Mandesar by

Fīruzshah

Durand in November, 1857, proceeded with his followers to Rohilkhand to try conclusions with the British in that quarter. Expelled from Rohilkhand by Lord Clyde he

huffed in
Oudh and
Rohilkhand

entered Oudh, and cast in his lot with the unconcilables who, to the last, refused submission to the paramount power. It was only when the

native cause was absolutely lost in that province that Fīruzshah, reading the glowing accounts of his achievements which Tāntiā Topī regularly transmitted from the

* Kūludār—the commandant of a fort.

† Indragarh is a fort and town in the Bandā state, forty five miles north-east Kotā.

Chambal and the Narbadá determined to march to the assistance of one whom he could not but consider as a worthy ally. At the time that he arrived at this resolution he was at a place called Bisúah, not far from Sitapur. Marching rapidly from that place, he crossed the Ganges on the 7th of December, cut the telegraph wire on the grand trunk road, and spread the report that he was about to proceed north westwards. Instead of that, he took the road to Itáwah, baffled a gallant attempt made by Lieutenant Forbes * accompanied by Mr Humo and Captain Doyle—who lost his life—to stop him at Harchandpur, out marched a column led by Brigadier Herbert from Kánpur to pursue him, crossed the Jamnah on the 9th, and moved off in the direction of Jhánsi. He marched with such speed that on the 17th he had arrived in the vicinity of Ranód, a large town fifty miles north-east of Gunah. It was here he encountered his first check.

recollected to
join Tántia
Topt.

leaves Oudh,
baffles
pursuit,

and crosses
into S. d. & s.
country

General, now become Sir Robert, Napier, had received timely intimation regarding the course pursued by Firuzshah, and he had sent out detachments to watch the roads which that chieftain would probably follow. On the morning of the 12th of December he received from the commander of one of these, Captain McMahon, 14th Light Dragoons, located near the confluence of the Jamnah, Chambal, and Sind rivers, information to the effect that the rebels had passed into the Lohar district of Kuchwaghar, a tract of country often under water. Believing, from this, that their course would be up the jungles of the Sind river, Napier marched at 2 o'clock that day with a lightly equipped force,† intending to proceed to Dabra on the Jhansa road, thence, according to the information he might receive, to intercept the enemy.

Napier is
formed of his
movements

and pursues
him

* For his services in the Itáwah district Lieutenant Forbes received the thanks of the Governor General, published in General Orders. At the close of the war he was gazetted to be major if as soon as he should attain the rank of captain.

† Two Bombay light field battery guns, Capt G. G. Brown a hundred and fifty men 14th Light Dragoons, Major Prettjohn a hundred men 2nd Gwalár Máráthá Horse, Captain Smith, a hundred and seventeen men 71st Highlanders, Major Rich, fifty men 25th Bombay Native Infantry, Lieutenant Forbes, forty men 1st Gwalár Camel Corps, Captain Temple.

Napier halted that evening at Ántri. At 2 o'clock the following morning, however, he was roused by an express message from the political agent at Gwáhiár, Charters Macpherson, to the effect that information he had received led him to believe that the rebels would pass by Gohad, north of Gwáhiár. Instead then, of pushing on to Dabra, Napier halted till the post should arrive with letters containing the grounds for the belief expressed by Macpherson. He did well not to act upon it without due caution, for at half past 10 o'clock the tiháldar of Ántri came to him to state that he had just ridden in from Dabra and had seen there the smoke of the stinging bungulow which the rebels were then burning, and that they were taking a south westerly direction. The express from Gwáhiár had just come in time to baffle the accurate conceptions of Napier's brain, for, had it not arrived, he would have caught them at the very spot he had selected.

There was nothing for it now but to march southwards. Leaving Ántri then, immediately, Napier proceeded with great rapidity in that direction. At Bítanr, which he reached on the 14th, he learned the rebels were only nine miles in front of him. He pressed forward, then, and at that place, the Gwáhiár Maráthá Horse, for the first time under fire, came in contact with the rear guard of the enemy, and greatly distinguished themselves.

Napier continued the pursuit through Narwár, and leaving there the greater portion of the infantry and all the artillery, who could not keep up with him, took with him only thirty-eight men of the 71st Highlanders on camels, all his cavalry, including twenty five of the Balandshahí horse he found halted at Narwár, and, proceeding with the utmost speed, reached Ranód on the morning of the 17th before the rebels had arrived there. His divination that they would make their way through the jungles of the Sind river had proved to be perfectly accurate.

Tiruzshah, indeed, had preferred the more circuitous and difficult road through the jungles to the easier but more open route followed by Napier. Naturally he wished to make his way unseen, and thus to effect, with an unbidden force, the contemplated junction

Napier's accurate conception regarding the enemy's movements

are baffled for the moment by a despatch from the political agent.

Napier pursues and approaches the rebels

Catches them at Ranód.

Tiruzshah ignorant that Napier is at Ranód.

with Tantia Topi. As it was, he had marched on a line almost parallel to that followed by the English leader, and it was only the temptation to leave the jungle cover to sack Ranód which had saved him from an attack the previous day. But Napier had now reached Ranód before him, and the packing of the place was likely to be more difficult than he had anticipated. Full, however of confidence, and utterly ignorant of the arrival of the English, Firuzshah marched on that eventful morning against Ranód, guided by a zamindar of the locality, his army forming an irregular mass extended in a front of nearly a mile.

marches on
that place

Napier had scarcely time to form up the 14th Light Dragoons when the rebels were within a few yards of him. The Gwalíar Marátha horse had been impeded in crossing a deep ravine by the riding camels, and were a little behind. The force actually engaged consisted of a hundred and thirty three 14th Light Dragoons under Major Prettijohn, sixty of the Marátha Horse under Captain F. H. Smith and thirty eight of the 71st Highlanders under Captain Smith, mounted on camels and guided by Captain Temple.

Napier's
force

As soon as the rebels had arrived within charging distance, Prettijohn and his hundred and thirty three light dragoons dashed into their midst. The blow completely doubled them up. Though individuals amongst them fought bravely, the mass made no stand whatever. Their one thought seemed to be to escape. They were in full flight before the Marátha Horse could come upon the scene in time only to participate in the pursuit. That pursuit was continued for seven miles, the rebels losing six elephants, several horses and ponies, and many arms. They left a hundred and fifty dead bodies on the ground before Ranód, including those of some native officers of the 12th Irregulars the murderers of the gallant Holmes. Prettijohn having been severely wounded before the pursuit began, the command of the dragoons devolved on Captain Neel, and that officer estimated the loss of the rebels in the pursuit at three hundred. On the British side the wounded amounted to sixteen, one of these died subsequently of his wounds.

Prettijohn
charges
them and

to try and

completely
defeat,

and pursues
them

Firuzshah led the fugitives in the direction of Chandera.

away, and I will remain with you whether I have done right or wrong.' In fact, after the long chase, he felt that he was beaten.

Meanwhile, Rao Sahib, still with some three or four thousand followers, pushed first westwards, then to the south, and reached Kushaani, west of Ajmer, about eighty miles east of Jodhpur, on the 10th of February. But the avenger was on his track. Honner, who had arrived too late for the rebels at Dowisá, had, after some inevitable delay, discovered the route they had taken. He set out in pursuit on the 6th, and, marching very rapidly, reached Kushaani on the morning of the 10th, having accomplished a hundred and forty-five miles in four days. Finding Rao Sahib there, he attacked and defeated him, killing about two hundred of his followers. Rao Sahib fled southwards to the Chhatarbuj Pass and reached it on the 15th. Somerset, coming from the east, arrived within a few miles of it the same day. Unfortunately, no one with him knew the country, and many precious hours were spent in reconnoitring hours which the Rao utilised in threading the pass. Finding, however, that the British were still close to him, the Rao turned down to the Binswara jungles, closely pursued. Finding the passes leading to the south and east closed, the Rao then moved to the north-east and passed by Pathargarh where Tantia had encountered Major Locke only a few weeks before. As he fled before Somerset, who followed closely on his trail, there occurred a great diminution of his followers. Like Tantia, The rebels break up and disperse these were 'tired of running away.' The majority of them fell out of the line during the retreat, threw away their arms, and quietly took the road to their homes. Some of them, Muhammadans from Kanhpur and Barli, about two hundred in number, gave themselves up. The chiefs and the other irreconcilables made their way to the Sironj jungles, where sometimes disguised as mendicants, sometimes acting as marauders, they tried to obtain food from the villagers. Organised opposition to the British Government had disappeared.

Of the chiefs of this long campaign, five still remained in whose fate the reader is naturally interested. These Rao Sahib five were Rao Sahib, Ferozsháh, Man Singh, and Ajit Singh, and last and greatest of all, the leading spirit of the drama, the Maratha Tantiá Topi. Rao Sahib wandered from place to place till the year 1862. In that year he was arrested in the hills north of the Panjab, disguised as a pilgrim.

immediately, but Showers, starting from Kushalgarh and having the shorter road to traverse, arrived first. Showers entered the town on the morning of the 16th, just as Tántia, Rao Sahib, and Firuzshah were holding a council of war. How they escaped was a miracle—they were completely surprised. "The English force surprised us there" writes Tántia in his journal. About three hundred of his followers were killed or disabled, the remainder succeeded in escaping.

Whither? Every pass seemed closed to them. But the English columns from the south-west closing too rapidly on Dewasa had just left one opening—the opening which turning as it were the Jaipur territory, led into Marwar. Of this Tántia and his followers availed themselves, and marched with all the speed of which they were capable towards the city which gives its name to the principality. Passing by Alwar they turned westwards, and reached Sikar on the 21st. They were encamped there that night when Holmes, who had been sent from Nasirabad with a small party of the 83rd and the 12th Bombay Native Infantry and four guns, fell upon them, after marching fifty-four miles through a sandy country in twenty-four hours. The surprise was complete. The rebels abandoned horses, camels, and even arms, and fled in the utmost confusion. A few days later six hundred of them surrendered to the Rájah of Bikanér.

This defeat inaugurated the break up of Tántia's army. On that very day Firuzshah and the 12th Irregulars separated from him. Since his wanderings in the Banswará jungles, Tántia had been on very bad terms with Rao Sahib, and the day after the defeat their quarrel came to an issue. "I told him," writes Tántia, "that I could flee no longer, and that, whenever I saw an opportunity for leaving him, I would do so." Some Thákurs related to Mán Singh had joined Tántia that morning, and with them Tántia left the force to proceed in the direction of Paron, having as followers only "two janáhs to cook his food, and one *sais** (groom), two horses and a pony." In the Paron jungle Tántia met Rájah Mán Singh. "Why did you leave your force?" asked the Rájah. "You have not acted right in so doing," Tántia replied, "I was tired of running;

* "The groom," adds Tántia, "left me and ran off after eating two *stages*."

away, and I will remain with you whether I have done right or wrong." In fact, after the long chase, he felt that he was beaten.

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and was sent down to Kinkpur. There he was tried and found guilty on four separate charges of instigating and having been accessory to, the murder of Europeans, and on a fifth of having been a leader of the rebellion. He was hanged on the 20th of August of the same year. Fnuزشah was more successful in

eluding the vigilance of his pursuers, for he fled, in the disguise of a pilgrim, to Kumbhla, where, ten years ago, he was still living. The fate of the other two differed in some respects from theirs, their case constitutes in itself an episode.

The Paron jungles, in which Tantia Topi and Man Singh were hiding, constituted a portion of the large family estates of Nawar, of which Sindhia had unjustly deprived the latter. Here they were safe, safe absolutely, so long as each should remain true to the other, for no mere retainer of Man Singh would betray his master or his master's friend. The clear and acute intellect of Sir Robert Napier had

Sir Robert
Napier and
Meade
Mán Singh

recognised this fact the moment he received the report that the two chiefs in question had separated themselves from their army and taken refuge in the jungles. He had at once felt certain that to capture Tantia Topi the preliminary step was to gain Man

Singh. No star of lesser magnitude would suffice. Now, there were strong grounds for believing that it might be possible to gain Man Singh. He was a chief of ancient lineage, of lofty birth, born to great possessions. To avenge himself on Sindhia for confiscating a portion of those possessions, he had lost everything except the affection of his dependants and the ground on which he slept, he had imperilled his head. Thenceforward, so long as he remained unreconciled to his liege lord there was no prospect in the present—no hope in the future. On such a man, driven to desperation, become from a feudal lord an outcast what might not be the effect of an offer of free and absolute pardon, with the prospect of intercession with Sindhia for the restoration of some portion of his property?

Napier and
Meade
Bisal náo

Impressed with this idea Napier resolved to try the experiment. It happened that on the 27th of February Sir Robert had directed Meade, of Meade's Horse, who then commanded a detachment* at Byraon, to

* A hundred men 3rd Bombay Europeans, a hundred men 9th Bombay Native Infantry, a hundred men 24th Bombay Native Infantry, fifty men Meade's Horse

finally proceed to Sirsimao, to dislodge thence any party of rebels in the vicinity, to keep open his communications with Guwah, and, in conjunction with Major Little's force at Paia want, to clear the roads to Amroa, Agar, Thánah, Rajgarh, and Sílíl. Napier further instructed him to attack Mán Singh and Tántia Topí, then wandering in the jungles, whenever opportunity should offer

to open the
Jungles

Meade reached Sirsimao on the 3rd of March, found the place deserted, opened a communication that evening with Little and, in co operation with him, was engaged from the 5th to the 8th of March in clearing a road-way up the rugged and densely wooded pass. But, before leaving Sirsimao, Meade had ascertained that the old thakur who held that village, Naráyan Singh by name, was connected with Mán Singh and possessed much influence in the neighbourhood. On the morning of the 8th this man and his followers came to a village some four or five miles distant from the pass up which the English troops were working, and showed an evident desire to communicate with Meade. Meade, feeling the great importance of obtaining the submission of so influential a personage, proceeded to the village, reassured the old man, who was at first nervous and alarmed by his tact and kind manner, and induced him to return to Sirsimao with his followers. He saw the thakur again that evening at the village, and drew from him a promise to bring the diwan or confidential agent of Mán Singh to him within two or three days and to do all in his power to induce Mán Singh himself to surrender.

Meade gains the confidence of an influential friend of Mán Singh

The old man kept his word. On the 11th Meade had a long interview with the diwan. Through him he offered to Mán Singh the conditions he was empowered to offer—a guarantee of life and subsistence. He further requested the diwan to find out the Rajah's family and household, to invite them to come to his camp, to promise them, should they comply, to do everything in his power for their comfort, to assure them that they should not be molested by the officials of the Gwalior Durbar or by any one else. With the diwan he likewise sent one letter addressed to the family, reiterating his invitation and his promise, and another addressed to Rajah Mán Singh himself, inviting him to surrender. He expressed, moreover, upon the diwan the primary necessity of

Meade offers terms to Mán Singh

and assures him of safety and aid for his family

bringing in the ladies first, feeling sure that the Rajah would follow

It is at this point of the story that the action of Sir Robert Napier comes in. That officer, acquainted with Meado's proceedings in the matter just described, and fully approving of them, had become naturally impatient when day followed day and no result issued from a beginning so promising. He waited a week after the interview with the diwan, and when, at the expiration of that time, no tidings had been received regarding the Ranis or the Rajah he determined to put greater pressure upon the latter. He wrote then, on the 18th of March to Meado, directing him to leave his road work, as 'it is of great importance that the pressure upon

Man Singh should not be relaxed till he comes in.

reception
Mado Your letter of the 11th inst gave hopes of certain parts of Man Singh's family coming in, but, as your letter of the 13th makes no allusion to the subject, the Brigadier General concludes that the proposals have not been renewed.*

Sir Robert added that, notwithstanding that Meado had no information on the subject, he had grounds for believing that Man Singh had frequently been in the vicinity of the British force, that he had frequented places called Garla, Hatrí, Bhirwan, and Mahudra, that he had been supplied with provisions from the last named place. He accordingly directed Meado to move on Agar, and to make a road up the Musahiri Pass through the jungles from that place by Garla and Hatrí to Mahudra, and at the same time to exercise pressure upon the diwan at Sirsah by threatening to quarter his force there.

In conformity with these instructions Meado marched to the Musahiri Pass. He found the people in that part of the country extremely hostile to the British. Not a man would give him information. His surprise was great, then, when, on the 25th of March, the Rajah's diwan and his own confidential servant conducted into camp the ladies of the Rajah's household and their attendants, some seventy persons. Meado received them kindly, and sent them on to one of the Rajah's villages near Sirpí. His servant likewise informed him that he had seen Man Singh four times, and

* From Assistant Adjutant General to Captain Meado, dated 18th March, 1839.

that he had expressed his intention to give himself up in two or three days—a statement which was confirmed by the diwan.

Meade continued his march to Mahudrá, sending a party of horse in front of him with the Rajah's diwan and a munshi,* whom he instructed to open at once a communication with Man Singh. On the 31st he received at Mahudra the Rajah's final offer to surrender on certain conditions. To some of these Meade declined to agree. Finally he induced him to come in on the following conditions—1st, that he should be met at some distance from the camp by a native of position—a ceremony the omission of which is, to a native of rank, an insult. 2nd, that he should not be made over to the Gwalior Durbar but should remain in the English camp. 3rdly, that after staying two or three days in camp, he should be allowed to proceed to his home at Mauin, near Sipri, whither the females of his family had gone, to re-equip himself in a manner befitting his rank. On the 2nd of April Man Singh entered the British camp.

Man Singh
surrendered to
Meade's
conditions,

and sur-
rendered.

Tantiá Topi was still at large but Tantiá, without Man Singh, Man Singh reconciled to his enemies, was assailable. Now had arrived the time to play upon the more selfish instincts of the Rajah. He had life, and security for his life but what was life to a born feudal chieftain without consideration without esteem, without position? What was life to a vassal lord of Sindhu, disowned and hated by his sovereign? The first feeling of satisfaction at escape from death passed, and life to such a man in such a position would become a burden. But could not the position be ameliorated? Yes—a signal service—a deed for which men would be grateful—that would remove the still remaining obstacles to a return to his position among the nobles of his country.

Feelings
which bourned
the Rajah
in the
mind of Man
Singh.

On feelings such as these Meade worked with tact and skill. In many conversations which he had with the Rajah during the 2nd and 3rd of April he urged him to perform some service which should entitle him to consideration. His reasoning had so much effect, that when at 11 o'clock on the night of the second day—the

Meade was
in the
feeling.

* A "munshi" is literally, a writer or secretary. It is often used in India to signify a tutor, an instructor. Here it is used in its literal sense.

3rd—information reached Meado that the uncle of Mán Singh, Ajit Singh, already mentioned in these pages, lay, with a band of men, fifteen miles distant in the jungle. Man Singh volunteered to accompany the force of a hundred and fifty men, at the head of which Meado immediately started. The little force reached at daybreak the place where Ajit Singh had been

Mán Singh volunteered to accompany Meado in an attempt to capture his uncle

marked down, only to discover that he and his band had moved off during the night. Meado pushed on in search of him, some seven miles further, to a place where the jungle was so dense that cavalry were useless. Ajit Singh and his men were actually in this jungle hut, before Meado could surround them, they became aware of the presence of enemies, and suc-

The uncle escaped, to Mán Singh's mortification.

ceeded in getting away. No one was more mortified than Man Singh. Ajit Singh was his uncle. Ajit Singh had been his comrade on the battlefield, his ally in his revolt against Sindhuá, and, although in his fury at Man Singh's apostasy, as he regarded it, in rendering

to the English, he had threatened to take his life, yet he stood to Man Singh in a relation than which there can scarcely be a closer between man and man—friend, comrade, uncle,—and yet Mán Singh grieved bitterly that this man had not been captured by his enemies. It was a first step in moral delinquency—a prelude to one still lower!

His first step in moral delinquency.

During the three days which followed, close observation satisfied Meado that Tántia Topí was in the Parón jungle, and, working daily on Mán Singh's longing desire for restoration to his former position, he persuaded him to acknowledge that he knew where Tántia was. From this moment he had made up his mind to betray him. His only anxiety now was lest Tántia should slip through his fingers. At that very time, to his knowledge, Tántia was debating whether or not he should rejoin Ferozsháh. Tántia had

The second step.

* Ajit Singh and his band were so terrified by their narrow escape, that they marched seventy or eighty miles on end, not halting till they joined the other rebels near Sínaj.

† "I have done all I could by kind and encouraging counsel to urge him to establish by so signal an act of service" (the betrayal of Tántia Topí) "his claim to the consideration of Government, I refused him by Sir R. Hamilton's telegram of the 27th ultimo."—Major Meado to Sir R. Napier the 6th of April 1859. Sir R. Hamilton's telegram was to the effect that, if Man Singh surrendered, his life would be spared and his claims would receive consideration.

even sent his emissaries to Meade's camp to consult him on the subject. Were Tantia to go, the chance would be lost. No thought of old comradeship, of the ties of honour, weighed with him for a moment. He would at once betray him if—

He resolves
to betray
Tantia Topi.

Yes,—if he could himself recover his position. That was his one thought. 'In the course of this forenoon' (the 7th of April), wrote Meade, 'I learnt from Pribhu Lal that he thought Man Singh would do as I wished, but that he was desirous of having Sir R. Hamilton's general assurance of 'consideration' for such a service reduced to some specific promise, and that his ambition was to have Sihahad, Pauri, or some other portion of the ancient raj of Narwar, guaranteed to him in the event of his efforts to apprehend Tantia Topi being successful'.

for a consid-
eration.

It was quite out of Meade's power to make any such promise, he could only assure him that he 'might rely on any claim he might establish being faithfully considered by Government.' Unable to extract more, Man Singh clutched at the prospect which this vague promise offered, and consented to betray his friend.

even for the
chance of a
small re-
turn.

Then came Meade's difficulty. To seize such a man as Tantia Topi great caution was required. Tantia had many spies in the British camp, and to have sent a European on such a duty would have been sufficient to warn the victim. Eventually, Meade decided to send a party of the 9th Bombay Native Infantry on the service, under an intelligent native officer. The orders he gave to this native officer were simply to obey the directions of Man Singh, and to apprehend any suspicious characters he might point out. The name of Tantia Topi was not mentioned, and the men had no idea of the actual duty on which they were proceeding.

Meade sends
a party of
British accom-
panied by
Man Singh.

Whilst Meade was thus negotiating with Man Singh, Tantia Topi had lain quiet in the Paron jungles. Shortly after his arrival there, and some days before Man Singh had surrendered, Tantia had, with the approval of that Rajah, sent to obtain information regarding the position of his old comrades. The reply brought to him was that to the number of eight or nine thousand men they were in the Sonoy jungles, that Rao Sahib had left them, but that Ferozshah, the Ambarnath Nawab, and

Tantia Topi,
all the time re-
poses abso-
lutely faith in
Man Singh.

Imám Áli, Wírdí major of the 5th Irregulars, were there. The last named also sent him a letter begging Tántia to join them. It was on the receipt of this letter that, on the 5th of April, Tántia sent to consult Mán Singh as to the course he should adopt. Tántia was well aware that Mán Singh had surrendered, yet he trusted him implicitly. He had placed himself quite in his power and had chosen his actual hiding place on the recommendation of the retainer to whose care Mán Singh had consigned him with these words: "Stop wherever this man takes you!"

To Tántia's message Mán Singh replied that he would come in three days to see him, and that then they would decide on the action to be taken. Mán Singh more than kept his word. At midnight on the third day, the 7th of April, he came to the hiding place—followed at a distance by the Bombay Sipáhs. Tántia was asleep. Asleep he was seized, roughly awakened, and conveyed to Meade's camp. He arrived there by sunrise on the morning of the 8th.

Meade marched him into Sipri and tried him by court martial. He was charged with having been in rebellion and having waged war against the British Government between June, 1857, and December, 1858, in certain specified instances. No other charge was brought against him.

His defence was simple and straightforward. It ran thus: "I only obeyed, in all things that I did, my master's orders, i.e., the Naná's orders, up to the capture of Kalpi, and, afterwards, those of Rao Sahib. I have nothing to state, except that I have had nothing to do with the murder of any European men, women, or children, neither had I, at any time, given orders for any one to be hanged."

The defence displayed the existence of a feeling very common among the Maráthas. To many of these men the descendant of the Peshwa was their real lord; they know no other. Tántia Topí was born and bred in the household of Bájí Rao, who had been Peshwa of the Maráthas. From his earliest childhood he had been taught to regard the adopted son of Bájí Ráó, Nana Sahib as his master, his liege lord, whose every order he was bound to obey. Of the English he knew nothing, except they were foreigners who had robbed

Mán Singh
surprised
Tántia asleep

and conveyed
him to
Meade's
camp

Tántia is
brought to a
trial

Tántia's
defence

The notion in
the Maráthas
and in the
eyes of the
people of
India of
Tántia Topí
with respect
to the English

his earliest master of the country he had ruled, and his son of the pension guaranteed to his first master in lieu of his ancestral dominions. To them he was bound by no ties. The English Government, by depriving the heir of the Peshwá's of the income that had been allotted to his father by adoption, had forced that heir to be a conspirator, and had compelled all his dependents to be free lances.

Notwithstanding this reasoning, which was not put before the court, and which probably did not present itself to the minds of any of its members, Tántia Topi was sentenced to be hanged. The sentence was carried into effect at Sipri on the 18th of April.

Tántia is
sentenced to
be hanged,
and is hanged

Public opinion at the time ratified the justice of the sentence, but it may, I think, be doubted whether posterity will confirm that verdict. Tántia Topi was no born servant of the English rule. At the time of his birth—about the year 1812—his master was the independent ruler of a large portion of western India. He was under no obligation to serve faithfully and truly the race which had robbed his master. When that master, unbound equally by any tie to the English, saw the opportunity of recovering the territories of the Peshwá, Tántia Topi, who was his *musahil*, his companion, obeyed his orders and followed his fortunes. He declared that he committed no murder. He was not charged with committing any. He, a retainer of the ex Peshwá's family, was charged with fighting against the English. On that charge alone he was convicted and hanged. Surely, under the circumstances of the case, the punishment was greater than the offence. The clansman had obeyed his lord, and had fought with fair weapons.

Reflections on
the sentence

Doubts
whether
reflecting
posterity will
be firm it

* Since the first edition appeared Mr G. Lance late Bengal Civil Service and formerly Magistrate of Kanhpur—himself a distinguished actor in the mutiny (pages 215-6)—has written to inform me that in the records of the Magistrate's Court at Kanhpur there exists ample evidence to show that Tántia Topi was one of the most bloodthirsty advisers of Náná Sahib, and that if he did not first plan the massacre of the garrison, he assisted in it, by posting his men in ambush at the Saif Chaurá Ghat, or by giving orders to that effect to Jawála Parshad. Further, that by his presence on the spot he excited the ardour and fanaticism of the assassins. Although the fact stated by Mr Lance is sufficient to prove that Tántia Topi fully merited the penalty that was meted out to him, it yet does not justify the sentence referred to in the text. No charge relative to the massacre of the Europeans at Kanhpur was brought against Tántia Topi on his trial. He was simply charged with waging war against the British. On that charge alone he was convicted and sentenced to be

Posterity has condemned Napoleon for causing Hofer to be shot. There is considerable analogy between the cases of Hofer and Tantiá Topi. Neither was born under the rule of the nation against which he fought. In both cases the race to which each belonged was subjugated by a foreign race. In both cases the insurrection of the subdued race was produced by causes exterior to its own immediate interests. In both cases the two men cited rose to be the representatives of the nationality to which each belonged. In both—Hofer in the one, Tantiá Topi in the other—they resisted the dominant race in a manner which necessitated the calling forth of extraordinary exertions. In both cases the leader was a hero to his own countrymen. The one, the European, is still a hero to the world. The other, the Marathi—well—who knows that in the nooks and corners of the valleys of the Chambal, the Narbada and the Parbati, his name, too, is not often mentioned with respect, with enthusiasm, and with affection?

O no word, before we dismiss him, regarding his character as a general. For nearly nine months, from his defeat at Jaura Alipur by Sir Robert Napier, to his capture by an officer serving under that general, Tantiá Topi had baffled all the efforts of the British. During that period he had more than once or twice made the tour of Rajputana and Máliwa, two countries possessing jointly an area of a hundred and sixty one thousand seven hundred square miles, had crossed the Narbada, and had threatened the more vulnerable parts of western India. The qualities he had displayed would have been admirable, had he combined with them the capacity of the general and the daring of the aggressive soldier. His marches were wonderful, he had a good eye for selecting a position and he had a marvellous faculty for localities. But, when that has been said, everything has been said. Unable to detect the weak points of his adversaries, he never took advantage

of them. And it is this sentence which, I believe, posterity will not confirm. But little evidence regarding his participation in the Kánpur massacres existed at the time. "Though there was some" writes Mr. Lance, "more was afterwards elicited by me when trying numerous cases connected with the Kánpur atrocities." That eventually he would have been hanged seems certain. But it would have been better that he should have been punished for being a murderer than that, by a premature and scarcely merited sentence, he should have gained the martyr's crown.

tage of their mistakes or their too great daring, he never exposed himself in action, and he was the first to leave the field. On many occasions a judicious use of his cavalry, always superior in numbers, would have so crippled the English that further pursuit by them would have been impossible. With a little more insight and a little more daring he could, whilst retreating before them, have harassed the flanks and the rear of his pursuers, have captured their baggage, and cut up their camp followers. But he never attempted anything of the sort. Provided he could escape from one place to harass them in another, with the chance of striking at Indur, at Baidah, at Jodhpur, or at Jaipur, a blow similar to that which he had struck successfully at Gwalior, he was satisfied.

Then, again, the fact that the enemy marching against him were English sufficed, no matter how small their numbers, to scare him. A striking proof of this occurred when Major Sutherland attacked him with two hundred men, three fifths of whom were Highlanders. Tantia had a strong position, two guns, and three or four thousand men. Had the natives been well led, their numbers must have prevailed. But fighting was repugnant to Tantia. He did not understand it. He was a guerilla leader, content to fire at his enemy and then to run away. For the lives of his followers he cared nothing.

Too much praise, on the other hand, can scarcely be awarded to the English generals and officers who conducted the pursuit. Sir Robert Napier first defeating Tantia drove him into Rajputana and then shut him out from the north. Roberts then in Rajputana and later, Michel, in Rajputana and Malwa, pursued him in a circle, bounded on the south by the Nizam's territory or by Khândesh, and on the west by Gujrat. His attempts to break the rim of that circle were baffled by General Hill, by Sir Hugh Rose, and by General Roberts. Finally, all but surrounded as the circle became smaller, he broke away to the north and penetrated once more into the territories guarded by Sir Robert Napier. The English officers who pursued him showed, on more than one occasion, that they could march as quickly as he could. Witness the remarkable performances of Brigadier Parke, two hundred and forty miles in nine days of Brigadier Somerset two hundred and thirty

The fact that
the English
were so small
scared him

The English
Napier
Roberts
Michel

Remarkable
marches

of Parke,

of Sonraet miles in nine days, and, again, seventy miles
 of Holmes, in forty-eight hours, of Holmes, fifty-four miles
 of Honner through a sandy desert in little more than twenty
 four hours, and of Honner, a hundred and forty-
 five miles in four days Becher's daring, too, in assailing
 Tantiā's whole force with a newly raised regiment
 of troopers, and driving it before him, was a glorious
 act, vying in daring with Sutherland's attack above
 referred to

But these acts, daring as they were, do not stand out
 markedly from the achievements of other officers engaged in
 this pursuit. Where all did nobly it is impossible to draw a
 contrast. The historian, however, is bound to call attention to
 the skilful strategy which gave to the pursued no rest, which
 cut them off from the great towns, and which forced them to
 seek the jungles as their hiding place. This result
 General Michel accomplished in Rājputiā and
 Mīlwā, by distributing his forces in highly equipped
 columns at salient points in those two divisions,
 with orders to pursue the rebels without intermission.* It has
 been calculated that the whole distance they were pursued
 between the 20th of June, 1858, and the 1st of March, 1859
 exceeded three thousand miles, that Michel himself marched
 seventeen hundred and Parke two thousand†. There can be no
 doubt that this system, thoroughly well carried out, was the
 cause of the break up of the rebel army. When Honner beat
 it at Kushāni on the 10th of February, and the pursuit was
 taken up at once by a fresh force under Somerset, the campaign
 was virtually over. The rebels lost heart, abandoned their
 standards, and crept to their homes. It will be understood
 that these rapid pursuits were made without tents. These
 followed in the rear under charge of a small guard. They did
 not often come up for days, during which time the troops had,
 to bivouac under trees

To return. Tranquility was restored. With the
 surrender of Mān Singh the rebellion collapsed in
 Central India. So long as he was at large and
 hostile, the entire population held aloof from the
 British. The rebels could always find security in

With the sur-
 render of
 Mān Singh
 tranquillity
 returned to
 the country

* *Blackwood's Magazine*, August 1860

† Captain Flower's troop, 8th Hussars, was with Parke the whole time.

jungles in which they could not be traced. The sense they had of security was so great, that at one time Tantia Topi and Man Singh remained for days within five miles of the English army, then searching for them, their position known to the natives, not one of whom would betray them. But with the surrender of Man Singh an entire change was inaugurated. The people of Central India surrendered with him.*

* For Tantia Topi's diary of the events of the campaign, *vide* Appendix B.

CHAPTER II.

THE TRIAL OF THE KING OF DEHLI, AND THE QUEEN'S
PROCLAMATION

THE capture of Man Singh and Tantia Topi produced all over western and southern India an effect similar to that realised by the pacification of Oudh in the north western Provinces. The mutiny was now stamped out. The daring of the soldier had to give place to the sagacity and breadth of view of the statesman.

Some months before the final blow had been struck, when the rebels had lost every stronghold and been driven to take refuge in the wooded hills and the dense jungles which abound alike on the northern frontier of Oudh and in central India, Her Majesty the Queen had deemed it advisable to issue a proclamation to her Indian subjects, a message of mercy to those who still continued to resist, of promise to all. Before referring more particularly to this proclamation, it will be advisable to refer to some of the events which rendered its issue at the end of 1858 particularly advisable.

The titular sovereign of India, the King of Dehli, had been brought to trial in the Privy Council Chamber of the palace, the Diwan Khâss, on the 27th of January, 1858. Four charges were brought against him.

The first accused him, when a prisoner of the British Government, of encouraging, aiding, and abetting the Sipâhis in the crimes of mutiny and rebellion against the State; the second, of encouraging, aiding, and abetting his own son and other inhabitants of Dehli and the north west Provinces of India, to rebel and wage war against the State, the third, of having proclaimed himself reigning king and sovereign of India, and of assembling forces at Dehli and of encouraging others to wage war against the British Government, the fourth, of having, on the 16th of May, feloniously caused, or of having been accessory to, the death of forty nine people of

of Directors, for it was that Government which more than sanctioned the annexation and the antecedent acts to which I have referred. But in times of excitement justice almost always sleeps. The scape goat was of the very kind which suited the public humour. He was old fashioned, parsy, and defenceless. Against him every interest was arrayed. The Ministry, which wanted his patronage, the outsider, who saw an opening to the 'covenanted' services, the doctrinaire, on whose mind the idea of a double government grated harshly, these and other classes combined to cast stones at him. The great Company was unable to withstand the pressure. It fell, but it fell not without regret and with an honoured name. On the 2nd of August 1858 the Queen signed the Act which transferred its functions to the Crown.

No sooner had this act been accomplished than it devolved upon the first Minister of the Crown, the 1st Earl of Derby, to draw up for submission to the Queen a proclamation, forthwith to be issued by Her Majesty in Council, in which should be set forth the principles on which the administration of India should in the future be conducted. The circumstances which followed the preparation of the first draught of the proclamation by Lord Derby have been given to the world on the highest authority in a work which has brought home to every Englishman and every Englishwoman the enormous loss sustained by the country in the premature death of the illustrious prince whose noble life it so touchingly and so gracefully records*. There were expressions in that draught which seemed to Her Majesty and to Prince Albert in one case to invert, in another to express feebly, the meaning they were anxious to convey. In the memorandum with which the objections to these points were conveyed to Lord Derby, Her Majesty expressed in noble language the sentiments by which she was animated towards the great people of whom she was about to become the Empress. Empress in reality, though not then actually in name. "The Queen would be glad," continued the memorandum, after referring to the objections taken to the original draught of the proclamation, "if Lord Derby would write

is made that
a scape goat,

and doomed
to death

Lord Derby
draws up a
proclamation
for submission
to the
Queen.

Objections
taken to the
original
draught by
the Queen and
Prince Albert.

* *Life of the Prince Consort*, vol. iv. page 281.

at himself in his excellent language, bearing in mind that it is a female sovereign who speaks to more than a hundred millions of Eastern people on assuming the direct government over them, and, after a bloody war, giving them pledges which her future reign is to redeem, and explaining the principles of her government. Such a document should breathe feelings of generosity, benevolence, and religious toleration, and point out the privileges which the Indians will receive in being placed on an equality with the subjects of the British Crown, and the prosperity following in the train of civilisation."

Before the memorandum containing these noble words had reached Lord Derby, that minister, warned by a telegram from Lord Malmesbury, then in attendance on the Queen, that Her Majesty was not satisfied with the proclamation, had turned his attention to the draught, and discovering in it instinctively the faults which had been noticed by the Queen and Prince Albert, had recast it. In its amended form it met every objection, and corresponded entirely to the wishes of the august Lady in whose name it was to be issued to the people of India.

These objections anticipated by Lord Derby

The proclamation, as finally approved by Her Majesty, ran as follows —

"Victoria, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the Colonies and Dependencies thereof in Europe, Asia, Africa, America, and Australia, Queen, Defender of the Faith

The Queen's claims

"Whereas, for divers weighty reasons, we have resolved, in and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons in Parliament assembled to take upon ourselves the Government of the territories in India heretofore administered in trust for us by the Honourable East India Company

"Now, therefore, we do by these presents notify and declare that, by the advice and consent aforesaid we have taken upon ourselves the said government, and we hereby call upon all our subjects within the said territories to be faithful and to bear true allegiance to us, our heirs and successors, and to submit themselves to the authority of those whom we may hereafter from time to time see fit to appoint to administer the government of our said territories, in our name and on our behalf

"And we, reposing especial trust and confidence in the loyalty, ability, and judgment, of our right trusts and well-beloved

cousin and Councillor, Charles John Viscount Canning, do hereby constitute and appoint him the said Viscount Canning, to be our First Viceroy and Governor General in and over our said territories, and to administer the government thereof in our name, and generally to act in our name and on our behalf subject to such orders and regulations as he shall, from time to time, receive from us through one of our principal Secretaries of State

"And we do hereby confirm in their several offices, civil and military, all persons now employed in the service of the Honourable East India Company subject to our future pleasure, and to such laws and regulations as may hereafter be enacted

"We hereby announce to the native princes of India that all treaties and engagements made with them by or under the authority of the Honourable East India Company are by us accepted, and will be scrupulously maintained, and we look for the like observance on their part

"We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions, and, while we will permit no aggressions upon our dominions or our rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall sanction no encroachment on those of others. We shall respect the rights, dignity, and honour of native princes as our own, and we desire that they, as well as our own subjects, should enjoy that prosperity and that social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good government

"We hold ourselves bound to the natives of our Indian territories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to all our other subjects, and those obligations, by the blessing of Almighty God, we shall faithfully and conscientiously fulfil

"Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and acknowledging with gratitude the solace of religion we disclaim alike the right and the desire to impose our convictions on any of our subjects. We declare it to be our Royal will and pleasure that none be in anywise favoured, none molested or disquieted, by reason of their religious faith or observances, but that all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the law, and we do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority under us that they abstain from all interference with the religious belief or worship of any of our subjects, on pain of our highest displeasure

"And it is our further will that, so far as may be, our subjects, of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially

promise unconditional pardon, amnesty, and oblivion of all offences against ourselves, our crown and dignity, on their return to their homes and peaceful pursuits

"It is our Royal pleasure that these terms of grace and amnesty should be extended to all those who comply with their conditions before the first day of January next

"When, by the blessing of Providence, internal tranquillity shall be restored, it is our earnest desire to stimulate the peaceful industry of India, to promote works of public utility and improvement and to administer its Government for the benefit of all our subjects resident therein. In their prosperity will be our strength, in their contentment our security, and in their gratitude our best reward. And may the God of all power grant unto us, and to those in authority under us, strength to carry out these our wishes for the good of our people"

On the 1st of November, 1858, this noble proclamation was

The proclamation
was published
in the
throughout
India

published to the princes and people of India. At Calcutta, at Madras, at Bombay, at Lahore, at Agra, at Allahabad, at Dehli, at Rangun, at Lucknow, at Mairpur, at Kathiawar, at Nagpur, and at every civil and military station in India it was publicly read

on that day with every accompaniment of ceremonial splendour which could give importance to the occasion in the eyes of the natives. Translated into all the languages and many of the

and distributed

dialects of India, it was, at the same time, transmitted to all the native princes and was distributed by thousands for the edification of those of lower

rank and

Communicated
to the native
princes,

position. The first Viceroy of India used all the means in his power to acquaint the native princes and people that, transferred to the suzerainty and rule of the Queen, they might rely upon the strict observance of all engagements entered into with

them by the Company, that her Majesty desired no extension of her dominions, but would respect the rights, the honour, and the dignity of the princes of her empire, that, while their religion would not be interfered with, the ancient rights, customs, and usages of India would be maintained, that neither caste nor creed should be a bar to employment in her service

and to the
reliance of it in
arms

Lord Canning took every care, at the same time, that the rebels still in arms should have cognizance of the full and gracious terms offered them, terms which practically restored life and security to all

those who had not taken part in the murder of British subjects

The proclamation was received by all classes throughout India with the deepest enthusiasm. The princes and landowners especially regarded it as a charter which would render their possessions secure, and their rights—more especially the right, so precious to them, of adoption—absolutely inviolate. The people in general welcomed it as the document which closed up the wounds of the mutiny, which declared, in effect, that bygones were to be bygones, and that thenceforward there should be one Queen and one people. Many of the rebels still in the field—all, in fact, except those absolutely irreconcilable—took advantage of its provisions to lay down their arms and to submit to its easy conditions. In the great towns of India, natives of every religion and creed, the Hindus, the Muhammadans, the Parsis, met in numbers to draw up loyal addresses expressive of their deep sense of the beneficent feelings which had prompted the proclamation, of their gratitude for its contents, and of their loyalty to the person of the illustrious Lady to whose rule they had been transferred.

Its receipt on
in India
by princes
and land
owners

by rebels

The natives
draw up loyal
addresses
expressive of
their gratitude.

With the issue of the proclamation the story of the mutiny should fitly close. But those who have accompanied me so far will have seen that in Oudh and in central India the work of warfare was prolonged for six months after its promulgation. In this there is, however, only a seeming misplacement. In the jungles on the Oudh frontier and of central India there survived for that period men who were more marauders than soldiers—men whose continual rebellion was but remotely connected with the original cause of the mutiny, who had offended too deeply to hope for forgiveness. In one notable instance, indeed, that of Mán Singh, the quarrel was in no sense a consequence of the mutiny. It was a quarrel between a baron and his feudal lord. Yet it was that quarrel, not the mutiny, nor any riot connected with the mutiny, which kept the dominions of Sindhia in continual disturbance for more than six months. When Mán Singh surrendered, those disturbances ceased.

The mutiny
had really
terminated
when the
proclamation
appeared

As far as related, then, to the actual mutineers, with but a

few exceptions to the Sipahis and to all the landowners in British territories, the proclamation of the Queen was in very deed, the end and the beginning—the end of a conflict which had deluged the country with blood, the beginning of an era full of hope alike for the loyal and the misguided for the prince and the peasant for the owner and for the cultivator, for every class and for every creed

The procla-
mation the
beginning of
a new era.

One word more The history of military events has necessarily almost entirely monopolised the pages of a work the object of which was to record the rise, the progress, and the suppression of the Great Mutiny In the course of the narrative I have followed so closely the movements of the military combatants that I have been unable to devote to occurrences in districts purely civil the attention which the heroic officers who maintained those districts deserved The time has arrived when this defect should be remedied In the volume which follows this, then, will be found a record of the events which occurred, so far as I have been able to ascertain them in the several divisions and districts which formed the provinces under the rule of the several governors, lieutenant-governors, and chief commissioners who held office in 1857-8

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BOOK XVII.

CHAPTER I.

THE CAUSES OF THE MUTINY.

EVEN before the last embers of the mutiny had been trampled out, the question which had from the first puzzled every man, from the Governor General in Council to the subaltern in his modest bungalow, the question as to the original cause of the mutiny became the burning question of the day. It was a question which required a complete and accurate reply, because prompt reorganisation was necessary, and to carry out a complete scheme of reorganisation a knowledge of the circumstances which had caused the collapse of the system to be reorganised was indispensable.

What caused the mutiny?

On this question the opinion of no man was looked forward to with so much eagerness, so much anxiety, and, I may add, with so much curiosity, as the opinion of the great Indian official whose daring and unselfish policy had made possible the storming of Delhi. It was very natural that this should be so. Few men had associated more with the natives than Sir John Lawrence, few men had more thoroughly pierced to the core the national character, and few men possessed a more complete power of mental analysis. People, for the most part, did not stop to remember that, with all his gifts, Sir John Lawrence had ever been the paragon of a school—a school opposed to the tenure of land by great families, that he had favoured Lord Dalhousie's policy of annexation; and that, although he was thoroughly acquainted with the feelings of the agri-

Anxiety to know the opinion of Sir John Lawrence

Reason why his opinion should be

and why it is not to be

cultural class, he contemned those of the large proprietors, and that he knew little of the Sikhs. Further sound. more and especially, that he possessed no personal knowledge of Oudh and of its people.

It will readily be believed, then, that when the opinion of Sir John Lawrence was published it gave satisfaction only to the heedless many, none at all to the thinking few. After an exhaustive argument, Sir John Lawrence arrived at the conclusion that the mutiny was due to the greased cartridges and to the greased cartridges only. The public applauded a result so

beautiful in its simplicity, so easy of comprehension. I chumed so entirely with the ideas of men who never take the trouble to think for themselves, that by the masses, which are mainly composed of such men, it was promptly and thankfully accepted. With them it remains still the unanswerable reason for the mutiny of the Indian army. They did not stop to consider that to declare that the greased cartridges caused the mutiny was

in all respects similar to the declaration of a man who, if asked what causes a gun to discharge, should reply,—the powder. True it is that the powder, when exploded, forces out the bullet but who ignites the powder? That the greased cartridges were the lever used in many instances to excite the Sikhs is incontestable, they were explosive substances. But though explosive, they had been perfectly harmless had the minds of the Sikhs not been prepared to act upon them in the same manner that the percussion cap acts upon gunpowder.

It should never be forgotten that the greased cartridges were not the only instrument employed to create discontent in 1856-7. Before a greased cartridge had been issued the chapatis had been circulated by thousands in many rural districts. The chapati was, it is true, a weapon far less

perfect than the greased cartridge. It was, nevertheless sufficiently adapted to the comprehensions of the class to whom it was addressed—the class given to agriculture. To mind

simple, impressionable, suspicious, prompt to receive ideas, the chapati acted as a warning of an impending calamity. A Hindu can conceive nothing more dreadful than a violation of his caste and his religion. The conclusion was a foregone one. The receipt of it

He attributes
the mutiny
to the
greased car-
tridges only

Reasons why
the conclu-
sion can-
not be accept-
ed

The greased
cartridges
not the only
instrument
employed to
create dis-
content

The chap-
ati

chapatis foreshadowed a great attempt to be made to upset the national religion.

Though we might even grant, then, for the sake of argument, that the greased cartridges were not in themselves harmless yet the chapatis certainly were so. But it was these harmless chapatis which stirred up the rural populations, especially those in Oudh and in Bundelland, to participate in the rebellion. What becomes, then, of Sir John Lawrence's conclusion? It simply vanishes. The greased cartridges became dangerous only when used by others as a means to an end. Before the plans of the leaders of the revolt were ripe the cartridges and the chapatis were nothing more than gunpowder stored in a magazine. When the opportune moment arrived, when the minds of the Sipahis and the agricultural classes had been instructed to receive any ideas, however absurd, then the cartridges and the chapatis were rammed into them, and were exploded.

The cartridges
were a
like chapatis
all the same
as to an
end

But what was it that made the minds of the Sipahis, what was it that made the minds of the agricultural classes prone to conceive suspicions alike regarding the greased cartridges and the chapatis? The answers to these two questions will bring us to the real cause of the mutiny. Sir John Lawrence's conclusions were not pushed to their legitimate issue. He named only one of the means. I must go back to the cause.

The real
cause of the
mutiny

Before I express my own opinions on the matter I think it only proper that I should state the views of some thoughtful and well educated natives, with whom I have had the opportunity of discussing the subject. I may premise that it is not an easy matter to obtain the real opinions of native gentlemen on matters regarding which they know, not only that those opinions would be distasteful to the listener, but that his ignorance of aught but the superficial life of a native of position, his absolute want of knowledge regarding the religious obligations which affect every thought of his life, act as a bar to comprehension. There are few Englishmen, for instance, even amongst those who have served long in India and who have obtained credit there for understanding the native character, who will not be amazed at the revelation regarding the origin of the mutiny, or rather of the causes which led up to it, which I am about to place on record.

Native
opinion as to
the cause of
the mutiny

as the real opinion of thoughtful and educated natives of India. That it is their real opinion I who enjoyed special opportunities of conversing with them without restraint, and who possessed their confidence as far as an Englishman can possess it, know most certainly. And what is more, there are living men, Englishmen whose opportunities have been even greater, and who have communicated to me impressions absolutely confirming my views on the subject. From one of these gentlemen a perfect linguist and whose opportunities have been unrivalled I have received the following reply to my query as to the cause to which the educated Hindus with whom he was in the habit of associating attributed the mutiny. "In the opinion of the educated natives of India, was his answer, 'the gross wrongs inflicted on Nana Sahib, the injustice done to Kunwar Singh, the injuries inflicted on the Rani of Jhansi, the seizure of the kingdom of Oudh, the fraudulent embezzlement perpetrated with regard to the Rao of Kirwi, and the scores of lesser wrongs done in reckless insolence to the landowners under the administration of the north west provinces. Were Indians ever to write their account of the causes of the mutiny, it would astonish many in this country.'"

These views may be disputed. Indeed, I am confident that not one ex-Indian official among a hundred will read them without a contemptuous smile. It requires that a man shall have lived with the educated natives as intimate friends associate together in Europe that he should be able to understand it. There is too little of such intercourse in India. In fact, it is only those officers who have enjoyed the opportunity of a long residence at a native court to whom the chance of such intercourse is available.

In the first edition of this volume I expressed as my own an opinion in entire conformity with the general views I have just quoted as the views of the natives of India as to the origin of the great outbreak. I wrote—and I may say that time and a subsequent visit to India have confirmed my view—"The real cause of the mutiny may be expressed in a condensed form in two words—bad faith. It was bad faith to our

Bad faith,
and the
attempt
to force
western
ideas on an
eastern
people.

Sipahis which made their minds prone to suspicion, it was our policy of annexation, of refusing to Hindu chiefs the permission to adopt, with them, a necessary religious rite, of suddenly bringing a whole people under the operation of complex

rules to which they were unaccustomed, as in Oudh, in the Sagar and Narbada territory, and in Bundelkhand, and our breaches of customs more sacred to the natives than laws, which roused the large landowners and the rural population against the British rule.' This was my opinion then, and it is, if possible, more strongly my opinion now. I shall proceed to support it by examples.

The bad faith towards the Sipáhis goes back so far as the period immediately succeeding the first Afghan war. In that war the Sipáhis had behaved splendidly, they had fought well, they had suffered privations without a murmur, they had borne with cheerfulness

Bad faith
to and the
Sipahis,

absence from their country and their families, in a cause which was only theirs because it was the cause of their foreign masters. I recollect well meeting in 1844 at Allahábád a political officer whose conduct during his mission at Herat can never be mentioned without admiration—the late D Arcy Fodd. Speaking to

their devo-
tion when
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managed.

me of the difficulties of his position at Herát, D'Arcy Todd stated that but for the zeal, the energy, and the fidelity of the few Sipáhis who were with him he could not have stayed at Herát, he added,

"When properly treated the Bengal Sipáhi will go anywhere and do anything." Well, these men returned from Afghanistan immediately afterwards we annexed Sindh. The Bengal Sipáhis were sent to garrison a country then notoriously un-

healthy. How were they treated? The time-honoured rule which provided that they should receive a fixed extra food allowance on proceeding to certain localities was rescinded in one instance after the men had reached one of the indicated

Breach of
faith towards
the Sipahis
and the British
Government.

localities, in another instance when the regiment was in full march to it. Is it to be wondered at that the men grumbled and then actually refused to march? They committed no

violence. They simply said, "You are guilty of bad faith, we contracted to enter your service and to perform all the duties entrusted to us on certain conditions, of which the payment to us of food allowance under certain circumstances was one. We have fulfilled our share of the contract, and now you refuse to fulfil your share. We decline to work until you fulfil it." In equity the Sipáhis were right, but the Government, instead of soothing them,

The Govern-
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broken
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Sipahis
are
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acted in a high handed manner, disbanded one regiment and severely punished the men of another

This conduct produced a very bad effect throughout the Indian army. It was felt in every regiment that the word of the Government could no longer be depended upon. Nevertheless, no open indignation was manifested. The Saty campaign ensued, and

again the Sipahs fought well. The annexation of the Panjab followed. Then succeeded a long period of quiescence—a period during which seeds, sown some time before, took root, sprang up, and blossomed into regulations fraught with danger to the discipline of the Indian army.

The natives of India serve a master well when once he has shown himself capable of wielding authority. But should that authority slacken, or, worse still, should they find out that the Government they serve has placed at their disposal the means not only of shaking but even of upsetting it, then the nominal master wielding it ceases to be their real master, the substance of his power vanishes, the shadow only remains. The occurrences in the Indian army during the several years immediately preceding 1857 completely illustrate this assertion. In former days, in the time of Lake, in the time of Hastings, and even later, the commanding officer of a native regiment was supreme in all matters of discipline. Responsible immediately to his divisional commander, he could promote, he could reduce, he could punish. But, as time passed on, men were appointed to the general staff of the Indian army whose visions became clouded and whose brains became turned by the air of the new regions to which they had been transferred. Forgetting their own regimental experience, not caring to know that the routine system which suits a British regiment formed of men taught to obey the law, no matter by whom administered, is not applicable to a regiment composed of Asiatics led to obey the man in whose hands they see authority centred and him only, the men began, step by step, to introduce the British system into the native army. It would take too long to tell how gradually the real power of the commanding officer was undermined, how the Sipahi was, by degrees, taught to look upon him, not as a superior who must be obeyed, but as a very fallible mortal, peculiarly liable to err, and against whose slightest exercise of authority he had the right to appeal to the one central power,

the Commander-in-Chief. Suffice it to say that this process of sapping the powers of the commanding officer was carried to so great an extent that immediately prior to the mutiny the Sipahis had lost all respect for the authority he only nominally wielded. Nor had the Sipahi imbibed for the Commander-in-Chief the feeling which he had ceased to entertain towards his commanding officer. To him the Commander-in-Chief was but a name, he was a lay figure, living in the clouds of the Himalayas, rarely, often never, seen, but whose interposition enabled him to defy his own colonel and to set discipline at naught! The extent to which this interposition was exercised before the mutiny was dangerous in the extreme. It succeeded before 1857 in weakening the influence of all the regimental officers, and in undermining the discipline of the army.

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I have said that the refusal of the Government of India in 1843 to act up to their contract with regard to the Sipahis sent to occupy Sindh had been felt throughout the Indian army. Immediately subsequent to that event, the process of undermining the powers of commanding officers had made swift progress. When, then, in 1852, the Government most unadvisedly again attempted another breach of contract, the Sipahis, demoralised by the process I have alluded to, were even more inclined to resent it.

The progress
of demoral-
isation be-
tween 1843
and 1852.

The breach of contract referred to occurred in this manner. With the exception of six or seven regiments the Sipahis of the Bengal army were enlisted for service in India only, they were never to be required to cross the sea. But with the view of supplying the necessities of the state in Arakan and the Tenasserim provinces, six or seven regiments had been specially raised for general service, and these regiments were invariably despatched thither by sea whenever their services were there required. Lord Dalhousie, however, who had ridden roughshod over so many native customs, considered that he might set aside this one also. Accordingly, when, during the Burmese war, he wanted to send an additional regiment to Burmah, instead of despatching a general service regiment or of inviting a regiment to volunteer, he ordered a regiment stationed at Barrackpur to proceed

A proportion
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across the
sea.

thither The men of the regiment refused to go "You ask us," they said, "to embark upon a service for which we have not enlisted, and which many of us regard as imperilling our caste. We will not do it." Lord Dalhousie was forced to submit. He was very angry, but there was no help for it.

Lord Dalhousie attempts to break contact with the Sipahis

But the result on the minds of the Sipahis was most disastrous. For the first time in the history of India the orders of the Governor General had been successfully resisted. It was little to the purpose to argue that the Governor General had exceeded his powers: the blow to the discipline of the native army was not the less deadly.

The result must distress the English

The minds of the Sipahis were under the influence of this blow, and by the insane action of the head-quarter staff they were becoming more and more released from the bands of discipline towards their own officers, when the annexation of Oudh took place. How this affected them I shall state as briefly as possible.

The annexation of Oudh

A very large proportion of the army of the Bengal Presidency, and a smaller proportion of the army of the Bombay Presidency, were recruited from the kingdom of Oudh. It is scarcely too much to affirm that there was not a single agricultural family in that country which was not represented by at least one of its members in the Indian army. Service in that army, in fact, offered no inconsiderable advantages to the subjects of the king of Oudh. It made them clients,

Reason why a rise in the Company's army was popular with the ruler of Oudh when Oudh had her own king

and favoured clients, of the paramount power. Every Sipahi was, so to speak, represented at the court of Lucknao by the British Resident. His commanding officer was authorised to frank any petition he might present addressed to the Resident, and the fact that the Resident had received such petition ensured substantial justice to the claims of the petitioner in the hands of the court of Lucknao. Every one familiar with the workings of a native court will at once recognise the value at which service in the Indian army was rated by the natives of Oudh. By accepting such service they obtained an all powerful advocate to plead their cause whenever their property might be threatened, or their civil rights endangered.

The Nawabs and Kings of Oudh had from the time of Warren Hastings shown a loyalty to the British Government not to be

surpassed. During the Afghan disasters, the Gwalhar campaign, the battles on the Satlej and in the Panjab, Oudh had been the milch cow of the paramount power. She had lent that power money, she had given her best sons as soldiers, she had done all that she could do to maintain unimpaired the relations between the prince independent only in his own country and the paramount overlord.

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"But," exclaimed the advocates for annexation, "she has misgoverned." Misgovernment is a relative term. There can be no question but that in the English sense of the term there had been no good government in Oudh. But a kind of administrative system had, nevertheless, prevailed which induced the Sipahis, after the term of their service under the British flag had expired, to settle in their native country. More than that, after the natives of Oudh had had one year's experience of British government as administered by Mr. Coverley Jackson and Mr. Martin Gubbins they one and all, evinced a strong preference for the native government which had been superseded.

The plea of
misgovernment
one must
be sustained

was justified
in favour
of annexation

It is necessary to take all these circumstances into consideration when one analyses the effect which the annexation of Oudh produced upon the Sipahis of the Bengal army. In my belief that annexation gave them the greatest shock they had felt since the occurrences already adverted to, of 1843-4. It was the last and the most fatal blow to their belief in British honesty. That belief had been greatly shaken by the proceedings of Lord Dalhousie with respect to Kerauli the dominions of the Bhonslas and Jhansi. The annexation of Oudh pressed them still more closely. It made them ready to become the tools of any adventurer.

Disaffection
produced on the
minds of the
Sipahis by
that annexation.

It was not only that they beheld in that annexation a lowering of their own position as men represented at their sovereign's court by a British Resident, though that was a blow under

* We ask the attention of the reader to the recent exposure of bribery and corrupt on by officials appointed by Government made in the year 1883-9 by the Crawford Commission. If this had occurred under a native administration it would have been called "misgovernment." By what euphonious term Lord Reay characterises it I have not yet heard.

which the Indian army yet reels, for it accounts for the difficulty of procuring recruits, which subsequently embarrassed the Government. They beheld in that act, and in the manner in which it was carried out, a deliberate infringement of promises they had ever looked upon as sacred—a repayment for the good services of nearly a century such as even the most abandoned amongst their own princes would have hesitated to enforce.

These are not statements made at random. I was myself an eye witness to the effect produced upon the Sipahis by the order to annex Oudh. It devolved upon me, as Commissariat Officer of the Kanhpur division, to supply carriage and provisions for the force which, under Outram, crossed the Ganges into Oudh at the end of 1855. Over my house and office, which were in the same compound, was a Sipahi guard—a hāwaldar's party. Contrary to custom and to departmental instructions, no written orders were given to me for the requisitions. The expedition was to be a secret, I was told, and I must obey verbal orders. But, in spite of this mystery, the destination of the force became known before it set out to every Sipahi in the cantonment—to every native in the town. The effect was alarming. The natives had no doubt whatever as to the real meaning of the demonstration. For the first time in the memory of man an English regiment was about to march on Lakhnao, and an English regiment would march on Lakhnao with but one object. The agitation of the Sipahis of my guard was most marked. It was with the greatest difficulty that I was able to control them. Had they had any warning of the intended movement they would, I am confident have broken out there and there. The subordinates of the Commissariat Department themselves greatly moved, assured me that a similar feeling was manifesting itself in every regiment in the place. I make no secret of these manifestations. I reported them in the proper quarter. I communicated them even to one of the officials, a man of remarkable gifts, who had accepted a high post in Oudh, but my warnings found no more credence than did the warnings of Cassandra. They were remembered afterwards.

The annexation of Oudh, keeping in view the way in which it was carried out, was, in very deed, the act which

broke the trust of the Sipahis in their English masters. The perpetration of that deed prepared their minds to receive and to believe any matter, however absurd in itself, which might betoken English perfidy. How their minds were played upon I shall show presently. Meanwhile, it is necessary that I should indicate how it was that the landowners and agricultural classes of India became impressed with the "bad faith" of their rulers.

The annexation of Oudh removed the last remnant of confidence in the British.

The internal annexation policy inaugurated by Lord Dalhousie was, in many instances, based upon his refusal to recognize a right which the Hindus hold as an essential part of their religion—the right to adopt an heir on the failure of children lawfully begotten. In the early part of this volume I have spoken of the disaffection, the terror, the hatred of the English which this policy produced in the southern Maratha country. Carrying out this principle, Lord Dalhousie had annexed the territory of the Bhonslas, he had mocked the state of Jhansi, he had endeavoured to annex the state of Karauli, and had only been prevented by the interference of the Home Government on a threatened motion in the House of Commons. Still he continued to hold the principle in *terrorem* over the heads of the princes and chiefs of India, and the fact that the policy of "grab all" was the policy, the paramount power, and might, on the occurrence of death without natural heirs, he applied to any coveted territory, produced, it is not too much to say, "a terror" in the minds of the Hindu princes throughout India.

The mode in which the princes, chiefs, and landowners of India felt satisfied in the British.

But in another and a far more guiltless manner the Government had sown the seeds of hatred in the minds of the representatives of great families whose ancestors they had deprived of their dominions. Two instances of the action of this policy will occur at once to the reader—Naná Sahib and the Rao of Kfirw. Naná Sahib was indubitably the lawful representative, according to Hindu law, of the last of the Peshwas. When, in June, 1818, Bají Rao surrendered to Sir John Malcolm, the Court of Directors considered that an annuity of eighty thousand pounds was more than an adequate compensation for the loss of an empire. Bají Rao lived in the enjoyment of this pension nearly thirty-five years. When he died, in January 1853, Lord

The principle of granting a life annuity in exchange for a kingdom.

Dalhousie refused either to recognise his adopted son or to continue the pension.

According to European ideas this ruling was perfectly just. It strictly carried out the agreement as understood by Sir John Malcolm in 1818. But neither Baji Rao nor his retainers had so understood it. Such a settlement would have been so repugnant to the ideas and customs of the races of Hindustán, that they could not be expected to understand it. As the son of Baji Rao would have succeeded that prince as Peshwá had he remained Peshwá, so would he succeed naturally to all the rights for which Baji Rao had exchanged the dignity of Peshwá. With them it was a point of honour to recognise in the son, whether begotten or adopted, the successor to the titles and estates of his father. Whether the English recognised him or not, Náná Sábhab was still Peshwá in the eyes of every true Maráthá. The refusal to recognise him and the stoppage of the pension forced the heir of the Peshwá to conspire. It can easily be conceived how readily such a man, occupying a fortified palace close to the Oudh frontier, would hail and encourage the discontent which the nefarious annexation of Oudh, as the natives considered it, could not fail to produce.

The story of the Rao of Kirwá,† whilst reflecting still more disadvantageously on the conduct of the British Government, is similar in character and in application.

We see, then, how many of the princes and the chiefs of

* I recollect well, when I was at Banáráś in 1851-52, the Governor General's agent, Major Stewart, a man of great culture and information, told me that there was living then, in extreme poverty, in the Mirzápúr jungles, near Banáráś, a man recognised by the natives as the lineal descendant of Chet Singh, Rájah of Banáráś, expelled by Warren Hastings in 1781, and that to that day the natives salaamed to him and treated him with the respect due to the ruler of Banáráś.

† Vide page 138-42, and Appendix A. I may be permitted to note here another instance in which the British Government has applied the same unjust principle. When in 1848-49 a war broke out with the Sikhs, the King of Láhore was a minor, under the guardianship of the British Government, and in no respects responsible for the occurrences which led to the war. Yet, although his irresponsibility was officially admitted, he, the ward of the British Government, a guiltless child, was treated as though he was in all respects the guilty party. The British annexed his kingdom and gave him in exchange some kind of provision, which up to this day has never been clearly defined. The matter has only to be seriously examined for the injustice to become apparent. Most of the nobles of the Panjáb, who secretly fomented the wars of 1845 and 1848, were

India in possession, and all the chiefs not in possession, were predisposed to view with at least indifference any troubles which might assail their British overlord. Incidents like that of the Rajah of Dilléri,* of Kunwar Singh of Jangdepur, driven into revolt by the action of a revenue system which he did not understand, came at uncertain intervals to add to the general mistrust. Such incidents affected alike chieftain and retainer, noble and peasant, for, in almost every part of the country, the retainers considered their interests as bound up with those of the former.

The Western principle is perfectly logical, extreme alienates an Eastern race.

It was when the minds of all were thus distrustful that the annexation of Oudh—of Oudh which had ever been faithful, always true and loyal—came to startle them still more. It is just within the bounds of possibility that, if the system introduced by the English into Oudh had been administered in a conciliatory manner, the result might have been similar to that which was produced in a few years in the central provinces. But the Englishmen to whom the administration of the newly annexed province was intrusted were men with fixed ideas, which they rode to death—the slaves of a system which had sown disaffection all over the North-Western provinces and in Bundelkhand and which they carried out without regard to the feelings and previous habits of those with whose lands and property they were dealing. In less than twelve months the result was disaffection and dismay, the new settlement made every man in Oudh an enemy to British rule.

The annexation of Oudh is made doubly odious

by the principle of forcing Western notions on an Eastern people

With Oudh thus disaffected, the chiefs and the territorial interest doubting and trembling with the Sikhs alienated and mistrustful, there needed but one other element to produce insurrection. The country, the army, the newly annexed province were alike ready for the machinations of conspirators.

At the time of 1857 a class was ready for the machinations of conspirators.

secured in the possession of their estates, and their position, under English rule, has become trebly secure. But Mahárajah Dhillip Singh, who was, I repeat, a mere child, innocent of intrigue, and the ward of the British Government, was granted in exchange for his kingdom and its princely revenues, and for his large private estates, a life annuity only. Can we wonder that treatment of this sort, when fully realised by him, should upset the equilibrium of his mind to the extent recently witnessed by the world?

* Page 63 f.

The conspirators, too, were ready. Who all those conspirators were may never certainly be known. Most of them died and made no sign. It is, however, a fact beyond question that the Maulavi of Iaitabul—the man who was killed at Powun—was one of them. I have already given a sketch of the previous career of this remarkable man*. I have shown how, after the annexation of Oudh, he travelled over the north western provinces on a mission which was a mystery to the Europeans, how he was suspected even then of conspiring. Abundant proofs were subsequently obtained that a conspiracy had been formed by some influential people in Oudh in the interval between the annexation and the outbreak of the mutiny. Of this conspiracy the Maulavi was undoubtedly a leader. It had its ramifications all over India—certainly at Agra, where the Maulavi stayed some time—and almost certainly at Delhi, at Mirath, at Patna, and at Calcutta where the ex king of Oudh and a large following were residing.

For some time there was one thing wanting to the conspirators—the means, the instrument—with which to kindle to action the great body of their countrymen. Specially were they at a loss how to devise a scheme by which the minds of the Sipahis serving throughout the Bengal Presidency should be simultaneously affected. They were in this perplexity when they heard of the new cartridge—a cartridge smeared with animal fat and which they were told was to be bitten.

It was easy for them to make this discovery. Their spies were everywhere. The cartridges were openly manufactured at Damdamah. Eagerly looking out for a novelty to be introduced from Europe into the native army, they were the most likely men of all to detect the instrument they required in the greased cartridge. They had no sooner found it than they realised that it corresponded exactly to their hopes. It was the weapon they wanted. Instantly the chapatis were distributed by thousands to the rural population, whilst means were employed to disseminate in every military station in Bengal suspicion regarding the cartridge.

would have been felt to the extremities of western India, was, throughout the crisis loyal to his suzerain. Throughout the period between the 12th of May and the 1st of September, 1857, Sindhiá held the fate of India in his hands.

In another volume* I have described very briefly how it was that, in an unexampled crisis in the fortunes of the people with whom his ancestors had contended for empire, Sindhiá did remain loyal. I have shown that the loyalty did

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representations, backed by the solid arguments of the able representative of the British power at the court of Sindhiá, Major Charters Macpherson, prevailed over national sentiment, the solicitations of other courtiers, and the boisterous demonstrations of the people. The importance of the result to English interests cannot be overestimated. Sindhiá's loyalty alone made possible Havelock's march on, and the retention of,

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Kánhpur. It acted at the same time on the rebels like a wedge which pierces the centre of an army, dividing the wings, and preventing concentrated action. Nor, when, after the back of the rebellion had been broken, Sindhiá's army revolted against himself, was the effect much lessened. Sindhiá's great influence was still used for the English.

In considering Sindhiá's loyalty in connection with the risings of others—of all, or almost all, the rajahs and talukdárs, of Oudh, of the chiefs in Bundelkhand, in the Sagar and Nirbada territory, in the southern Marátha country, and in western Bihar—it is impossible to shut our eyes to the fact that there had been a marked difference in the behaviour of the British Government towards Sindhiá on the one side, and towards the rajahs and landowners of the countries mentioned on the other. Under circumstances of a peculiarly tempting character, Lord Ellenborough had behaved with the greatest generosity and forbearance towards Sindhiá in 1844. The Government had kept faith with him ever since. The

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reader of this volume will see that towards the rajahs and landowners of the other provinces mentioned the British Government had shown neither generosity nor forbearance. In some instances they had not even kept faith. It is scarcely necessary to point the moral.

It is, indeed, a very remarkable fact, and one which the rulers of India at the present moment would do well to bear in mind, that in the several provinces and districts traversed by our troops in 1857-8-9, the behaviour of the people corresponded to the character of our rule. Thus, in the central provinces to which the regulation system had never penetrated the people were loyal and contented, and refused all aid to Tantia Topi. In the Sagar and Narbada territories, in Oudh and in the districts bordering on that province, in the Agra division—in all of which the British hand had been heavy and the British acts opposed to the national sentiment—the people showed a spirit of opposition, a resolution to fight to the last, and in many cases a detestation of their masters, such as no one would before have credited. Cases similar to that of the Rajah of Dillhri, referred to in the earlier part* of this volume, had sown far and wide the seed of disaffection and revolt.

If these facts are as I believe them to be, correct, we have not to go far to seek the conclusion. The mutiny of the army and the insurrection in the provinces I have named were the natural consequences of an attempt to govern a great Eastern empire according to purely Western ideas.

The civilisation over refined thought it might be of thousands of years was ridiculed by the rougher race which, scorning sentiment regarded utilitarianism as its foundation stone. The governing members of that race failed to recognise the great truth upon which their forefathers had built their Indian empire, that the Western race can gain the confidence of the Eastern only when it scrupulously respects the long cherished customs of the latter and impresses upon it the conviction that its word is better than its bond. This is just the conviction which, during the thirty years immediately antecedent to 1856, the

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majority of the Hindus and Muhammadaus of India had been gradually losing, and which in 1857 they had lost

If Lord Canning had had any idea in the early part of 1857 that the isolated outbreaks which then disturbed the general serenity were part of an organised plot, he would I believe have at once taken measures to meet the difficulty. Not that at any time in 1857, he could have prevented a mutiny, but he could easily have made better arrangements to meet one. I am far however, from imputing any blame to Lord Canning in this respect. He had but recently arrived in India. His predecessor, when making over to him charge of the empire had expressed his conviction that never had the country been in so satisfactory a condition. All the time the ground was undermined, the train was long laid, the miners were at work. But how was Lord Canning to know this? He inherited Lord Dalhousie's councillors. They were satisfied, and as ignorant of the real state of the country, as was Lord Dalhousie. Lord Dalhousie had quitted India in a blaze of glory, and the new Governor General, unused to the currents of Indian thought, could for some months only steer the vessel by the advice of the officers who had helped to bring to Lord Dalhousie a renown far reaching and seemingly well deserved.

But, in fact, upon no men did the news of the mutiny descend with so startling a surprise as upon the councillors of Lord Canning. They could not comprehend it. Weeks and weeks elapsed before they could bring themselves to believe that it was anything more than a fortuitous explosion at various points, each having no concert and no connection with the other. The Home Secretary's assurances that the apprehensions expressed regarding its nature were "a passing and groundless panic," that "there is every hope that in a few days tranquillity will be restored throughout the presidency," testify to the ideas that filled the minds of these men. No admission at least is due to them that they were honest—they believed what they said. But these sayings betrayed a complete ignorance of the country and of the situation. This ignorance, this blindness to the fact that it was more even than a mutiny of the Bengal army, and not merely a series of isolated revolts with which they had to cope, was

Lord
Canning

new to India,

inherited Lord
Canning's
council

The council
of Lord
Canning

Their utter
lack of sense of
the India
situation

illustrated in a thousand ways, but in none more strongly than in the refusal to disarm regiments which were known to be mutinous. The consequences of this refusal were most serious. In the case of the regiments at Danapur, the reader will have seen that it brought revolt into western Bihar, added enormously to the dangers of Havelock, and even imperilled Calcutta.

How great Lord Canning really was, how small were his councillors, was shown when, having completely shaken off their influence, he stood alone and unshackled at Allahabad in the early part of 1858. A different man was he then from the Lord Canning of April and May 1857. His nature then displayed its real nobility. His grasp of affairs, at Calcutta apparently so small, exerted at Allahabad the admiration of all who came in contact with him. He showed a truer insight into the military position than the Commander in Chief himself. It was entirely owing to Lord Canning's insistence that the campaign in Rohilkhand followed close upon the capture of Lucknow. Sir Colin Campbell would have postponed it. But Lord Canning was too convinced of the danger of allowing a province to continue to foment rebellion, unchecked in the face of the Government, to permit the delay. He insisted with all the determination of a man whose resolution based on the logic of facts, was not to be shaken. It was Lord Canning at Allahabad who sent Lord Mark Kerr to Azamgarh, who gave his fullest support to Sir Hugh Rose, and to the generals engaged against Tantia Topi; and if in one respect, to which I have adverted, his judgment was faulty, his commission in error was the Commander in Chief and the error was a solitary one.

Nor is lesser praise due to him for the measures inaugurated at Allahabad to heal the wounds caused—he must then have seen—in a great measure by the mistakes of his predecessor. His Oudh proclamation, despite of the apparently harsh terms which it promulgated, was intended as a message of mercy, and in its application, was a message of mercy. It gave every landowner in Oudh a title better safer more valid, than the title he had lost. It insured mercy to all except to those who by their crimes had forfeited all right to it. Interpreted, as Lord Canning meant it to be interpreted, by one of the ablest administrators in

Lord Canning a real greatness of mind when he stood unshackled at Allahabad.

It is military action.

His legislation in regard to Oudh.

India, it became the charter upon which the position now occupied by the people of Oudh has been built up and secured

Never was the real greatness of Lord Canning's character more completely displayed than when the galling strictures of Lord Ellenborough's despatch were published to the world. At the moment the insult, the breach of etiquette, were lost sight of in the fear lest the condemnation of his policy proceeding from so high a quarter should afford encouragement to the rebels or weaken the attachment of the native tributaries. As soon as he ascertained that the despatch had not produced that result he was calm. He could not help seeing that it was designedly impertinent that it was intended to provoke him to resign. Conscious of the rectitude of his motives and of the soundness of his views, he laughed at the pettiness of the display. In his calm and statesmanlike answer he sought neither revenge nor triumph. But both soon came to him. The news that Lord Ellenborough had been hoisted with his own petard, the receipt of Lord Derby's almost imploring letter not to resign, followed the insulting missive with a rapidity almost startling.

Towards the men who served under him, Lord Canning displayed generosity, kindness, and forbearance. He knew that in many departments he had been badly served, yet he would rather bear the burden himself than dismiss the incapable minister. But so low did he rate the abilities of the men about him, that when he had resolved to appoint Mr Edmonstone, till then his Foreign Secretary, to be Lieutenant Governor of the North West Provinces he cast his eyes far from the men surrounding him to select a successor to that official. He had actually resolved to offer the post to Herbert Edwardes when the publication by that officer of a letter, violently polemical, caused him to reconsider his resolve. For the moment he was cast back upon the clique about him, but finally he made an admirable choice in Colonel Durand.

Judging Lord Canning's conduct after his arrival at Allahabad, it is difficult to find a fault in it. He was then the lofty minded English gentleman, the trained and skilful statesman. Every day made it more clear that the mistakes of the Calcutta period, mistakes which have been fully recorded in these

His reception
of Lord El-
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strictures.

His conduct
towards his
colleagues
and subordi-
nates.

The first
and the
last of
the great
statesman.

volumes, were due to the inexperience of a generous nature guided by men whom he had been told to look upon as masters of the situation, but who were in fact hopelessly ignorant and incapable. That Lord Canning came to know this himself was evidenced by the generosity he displayed, after the mutiny had been quelled, to those who had ventured to express very boldly their disagreement with his policy of 1857.

But, if Lord Canning was to be admired from the time of his arrival at Allahabad, Lord Elphinstone deserves the fullest meed of praise that can be accorded to him from the very first. Lord Elphinstone possessed this advantage over Lord Canning—his previous experience in India had given him a thorough knowledge of the country and the people. When the mutiny broke out at Mirath he saw it as it really was, he saw that it was no isolated outbreak, no local discontent, but part and parcel of an organised rebellion which had its main roots, indeed, in the North West Provinces, but the development of which, especially in the direction of Bombay, was certain, unless it could be promptly stopped. The Bombay Presidency, in fact, with an army partly recruited from Oudh, and composed mainly of a conglomeration of Maratha states, was in a peculiar degree susceptible. Lord Elphinstone understood the situation at once. He dealt with it in a manner possible only to a statesman of high and lofty courage, of clear intellect, and of far seeing views. The idea of waiting for the mutiny within his own borders, if, indeed, it ever occurred to him, came only to be promptly rejected. To mass the greatest number of men on the decisive point of the scene of action—that Napoleonic motto became at once his guiding principle. For that purpose he deputed his own Presidency, highly sensitive as it was, of European troops, and despatched them, as fast as he could force them to move, to the threatened points outside of it. He, too, like Lord Canning, had colleagues in his government, but here again his previous experience saved him from the mistakes which marred Lord Canning's administration during the first seven months of the mutiny. Knowing his counsellors thoroughly, he listened to them with courtesy—but he acted on his own convictions. To the men who were the instruments of his policy he gave the most complete and generous confidence. How large was his trust when he once

Lord
Elphinstone

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The policy of
offensive
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gave it Mr Forjett is a living evidence Mr Frere in Sindh, Mr Seton Karr and afterwards Colonel Le G Jacob in the southern Maratha country, Mr John Rose in Sutarah, and Colonel Malcolm, are instances of a similar import. When, in spite of all his measures to keep the mutiny from Bombay by a policy of offensive defence, the poison crept in and infected the regiments of the regular army in the southern Maratha country, how vigorous, how decided is his policy! We see here none of the hesitation, of the half heartedness, the halting between two extremes, which enabled the mutinous regiments of Danapur to disturb all the plans of the Government and to imperil the safety of the empire. Promptly, without an hour's delay, Lord Elphinstone sent for the fittest man at his disposal and told him to go to Kolhapur and at all costs quell the mutiny. Le Grand Jacob went and disarmed the rebellious Sipahis. How Lord Elphinstone was occasionally thwarted by men not immediately under his orders has been shown in the case of Woodburn. But his firmness was proof even against opposition of this description, and, after some vexatious delay, he carried out his policy.

Only those who have enjoyed the privilege of reading his voluminous correspondence during 1857-58 can form an idea of the remarkable perspicacity which characterised Lord Elphinstone's views on every point connected with the stirring events of those years. The strong and the weak points of a case, the true policy to be pursued, the proper time for putting it in action, when to withhold the blow, when to strike, the reasons for withholding or for striking, are laid down in clear and vigorous language in his letters. Reading them after the event, it seems marvellous how a man standing alone should have judged so clearly, so truly. Many of the military movements, which tended to the pacification of the country had their first inspiration from Lord Elphinstone, and the smallest of the tardy tributes that can be paid him is this—that no man in India contributed so much as he contributed to check the mutiny at its outset, no man contributed more to dominate it after it had risen to its greatest height.

In the glory of the victory, amid the bestowal of well merited rewards for military services, the great deserts of Lord Elphinstone received but small notice from the public. But it is a

The generous confidence he placed in his subordinates.

His quick decision

His correspondence not only enlightens

remarkable fact that after the death of Sir Henry Lawrence he was nominated by three successive Secretaries of State—by Mr Verney Smith, by Lord Lilenborough, and by Lord Stanley—to be successor to Lord Canning in the event of a vacancy occurring in the office of Governor General. It now becomes the duty of the historian to place him on the lofty pedestal to which his great services and his pure and noble character entitle him.

Lord Elphinstone is appointed by three successive Secretaries of State to succeed Lord Canning.

The southern Presidency was never invaded by the mutinous spirit. But not the less is a large share of credit due to its governor, Lord Harris. The responsibility which weighed upon this nobleman was very great indeed. The immunity of Madras depended upon the loyalty of the Nizâm, and, at the outset, the Nizâm had much to apprehend from his own people. It was in the height of the crisis that Lord Harris denuded his own Presidency to send troops to Hindarûlâd, and it cannot be doubted but that their opportune arrival tended greatly to the pacification of the Nizâm's dominions. The formation of the Kamthî column, of Whitlock's force, of the brigade which fought under Carthew at Kanhpur, the despatch to Bengal of the regiments which kept open the grand trunk road in western Bihâr and which afterwards co-operated against Kunwar Singh, of the troops who rendered good service in Chutia Nagpur, testify to the energy, the foresight, the devotion of the Governor of Madras. He used all the resources of his Presidency to crush outside the rebellion which never penetrated within his own borders.

Lord Harris

displayed foresight, energy and devotion

Of other actors in the rise, progress, and suppression of the rebellion I have written in the body of this history, not always perhaps, in as full detail as their splendid services demanded, but, I would fain hope, in full proportion to the scope and requirements of the work intrusted to me. It may be that some incidents have escaped me. I shall regret it much should such prove to be so, for my chief anxiety has been to render full justice to every man. This, at least, I may say, that, however ineffectively the History of the suppression of the Indian Mutiny may have been told, the character of our countrymen must be seen to emerge from the terrible ordeal of 1857-58 in a form that would gratify the most exacting people. We are, fortunately, as a nation,

The despatch to Lord Elphinstone in the course of 1857-58

accustomed to success in the field, but on no occasion in our history has the nerve and fibre of our troops, the fortitude and manliness of our countrymen of all ranks been more conspicuous—often in the face of death itself, and under circumstances which would have seemed to justify despair. But with life they never despaired. They endured all that had to be endured, with a patience and cheerfulness never to be surpassed, and sought victory when it was possible with a determination before which the strongest opposition had to yield. And in all this they were sustained and animated by our countrywomen, who, in positions and under trials to which few gently nurtured women have been subjected, showed all the noblest and most lovable aspects of woman's character. The History of the Indian Mutiny is in fact a record of the display of all the qualities for which Englishmen have been famous—of the qualities which have enabled the inhabitants of a small island in the Atlantic to accumulate the noblest and largest empire in the world, and which, so long as they remain unimpaired in their descendants, will enable them still to maintain it.

APPENDIX A.

(Pages 138-42)

IN addition to the fact stated at page 138 that Madhava Ráo, Ráo of Kirwí, was only nine years old when the mutiny broke out, and that the money paid for the maintenance of the Banáras Temples had been alienated before he sat on the gadi, and therefore never formed part of his estate and could not be liable to seizure, whatever he might do, it may be added that at the time of the Mutiny the Government of India appointed a Special Commissioner, Mr. F. O. Mayne, to inquire into the conduct of Madhava Ráo, and that that Commissioner fully absolved him from all blame (*vide* his report, dated September 8, 1858)

Not only so, but the same gentleman gave a special certificate to the Regent of Kirwí (who was also trustee of the Banáras Temples), dated February 4, 1859. A copy of that document, now before me, states: "Rám Chandrá Rám, Painsday, has always borne a high character for loyalty and respectability during the Mutiny of 1857. Being a relation of the Kirwí Peshná, he was placed in a difficult position, and discharged his duty both towards the British Government and towards his master most faithfully, at the risk of his life, and with frank and open loyalty to Government. It was he who saved the life of Mr. Cockerell, joint magistrate of Kirwí. Though he has at present frankly refused any reward for his loyal and faithful services, yet he must be well paid whenever he stands in need." This was signed by Mr. F. O. Mayne. Yet the reward Rám Chandrá Rám received was the pillage of the Banáras Temples of which he was trustee.

There is thus complete evidence that a Special Commissioner exonerated Madhava Ráo from all blame, and gave a certificate of loyalty to his adviser: we have the non age of the Ráo, and the fact that the Temple money had been seized by the Government two years before the Mutiny, and yet we are asked to believe that all these seizures took place in consequence of the Ráo's rebellion.

With reference to the statement made in the first edition that General Whitlock found in the palace-yard of Kirwí more than forty pieces of cannon, an immense quantity of shot, shell, and powder &c, a friend, who has investigated the subject of the Kirwí tragedy, writes me as follows: "As to the statement made by Whitlock and repeated by you about the active gun factories and powder mills and stands of arms, the whole is a shameless lie put forward to warrant the grant of prize money. That 'lucky' column had a keen scent for booty. Listen to a few words of

truth On the death of Venajak Rao, the 6th July, 1853, Mr Elms, the Resident, went to Kirwi, disbanded all the forces there, and carried away all the weapons of war. A prudent, though despotic, use was made of the change of ray to disarm this petty native State. The agent to the Government of India had full information of all that was going on at Kirwi up to the outbreak of the Mutiny. Is it consistent with common sense to suppose that a petty State like Kirwi could establish gun foundries and powder manufactories during the short period of the Mutiny? No money, however vast, and no hatred however bitter, could possibly create such things, without the time necessary for their establishment. Your military knowledge will make the monstrous impudence of Whitlock's assertion more apparent to you than it can be to me. He probably scraped together a few old relics and curiosities, with a few mutineers' guns and belts—hundreds of which must have been available at such a time—and on the like trumpery the he must have been built up."

I give this statement for what it is worth. To me it seems that there was, at least, great exaggeration in Whitlock's narrative, and that there were no grounds whatever for treating the Rao of Kirwi as an enemy to be plundered.

APPENDIX B

(Page 269)

Translation of Tántiá Topi's Voluntary Deposition or Statement taken in Camp Mushauri on the 10th of April, 1859, in presence of Major Meade, commanding Field Force

My name is Tántiá Topi, my father's name is Pándurang inhabitant of Jola-Pargansh, Patoda Zillah, Nagar. I am a resident of Bithur. I am about forty five years of age, in the service of Náná Sāhib in the grade of companion or a de-de-camp.

In the month of May 1857 the collector of Kānpur sent a note of the following purport to the Náná Sāhib at Bithur, viz. that he begged him (the Náná) to forward his wife and children to England. The Náná consented to do so, and four days afterwards the collector wrote to him to bring his troops and guns with him from Bithur (to Kānpur). I went with the Náná and about one hundred Sikhs and three hundred matchlockmen and two guns to the collector's house at Kānpur. The collector was then in the intrenchment, and not in his house. He sent us word to remain, and we stopped at his house during the night. The collector came in the morning and told the Náná to occupy his own house, which was in Kānpur. We accordingly did so, we remained there four days, and the gentleman said it was fortunate we had come to his aid, as the *upās* had become disobedient, and that he would apply to the general

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in our behalf. He did so, and the general wrote to Ágra, whence a reply came that arrangements would be made for the pay of our men. Two days afterwards the three regiments of infantry and the 2nd light cavalry surrounded us and imprisoned the Náná and myself in the Treasury, and plundered the magazine and Treasury of everything they contained, leaving nothing in either. Of the treasure the Sipáhis made over two lakhs and eleven thousand rupees to the Náná, keeping their own sentries over it. The Náná was also under charge of these sentries, and the Sipáhis who were with us also joined the rebels. After this the whole army marched from that place, and the rebels took the Náná Sáhu and myself and all our attendants along with them, and said, "Come along to Dehli." Having gone three coss from Kánhpur, the Náná Sáhu said that, as the day was far spent, it was better to halt there then, and to march on the following day. They agreed to this and halted. In the morning the whole army told him (the Náná) to go with them towards Dehli. The Náná refused, and the army then said, "Come with us to Kánhpur, and fight there." The Náná objected to this, but they would not attend to him, and so, taking him with them as a prisoner, they went towards Kánhpur, and fighting commenced there. The fighting continued for twenty-four days, and on the twenty-fourth day the general raised the flag of peace, and the fighting ceased. The Náná got a female who had been captured before to write a note to General Wheeler to this effect, that the Sipáhis would not obey his orders, and that, if he wished he (the Náná) would get boats and convey him and those with him in the intrenchment as far as Allabábad. An answer came from the general that he approved of this arrangement, and the same evening the general sent the Náná something over one lakh of rupees, and authorised him to keep the amount. The following day I went and got ready forty boats, and, having caused all the gentlemen, ladies, and children to get into the boats, I started them off to Allabábad. In the meanwhile the whole army, artillery included, having got ready, arrived at the river Ganges. The Sipáhis jumped into the water and commenced a massacre of all the men, women, and children, and set the boats on fire. They destroyed thirty-nine boats. One, however, escaped as far as Kolá Hankar, but was there caught and brought back to Kánhpur, and all on board of it destroyed. Four days after this the Náná said he was going to Bihár to keep the anniversary of his mother's death, they (the Sipáhis) allowed him to go, and some of them also accompanied him. Having kept the anniversary, they brought him back to Kánhpur, and they took for their pay the money they had first made over to the Náná's charge, and made arrangements to fight against Husan Fatlipur, where they heard some Europeans had arrived from Allabábad, and they told the Náná to accompany them there. The Náná refused. I and the Náná remained at Kánhpur, and sent Jawála Parshad, his (the Náná's) agent, along with them to Fatlipur. Having arrived there and been defeated they retreated to Kánhpur, and the aforesaid European force pressed them the whole way to Kánhpur, when there was a battle for about two hours, and the rebel army was again defeated, and

ran away from Ká hár. Under these circumstances the Náná and I fled to Bithúr, arriving there at midnight, and the rebel army followed us the next morning the Náná taking some cash, &c, with him, went to Pathpur. The rebel army followed, and looted the place. The Náná Bá á Sáhib, Bá á Sáhib, and myself, with all our wives, crossed the Ganges in boats, and arrived at Pathpur in the Lakhanoo territory, and put up with the Chaudhí Bhopal Singh. Some days passed, when the 42nd Native Infantry arrived at Sheorápur, and wrote to the Náná to send them some one to take them to him. I went and told them that the Náná had sent for them. In the meanwhile the English army arrived and the 42nd Regiment Native Infantry went to Bithúr, and fought there. I accompanied the said regiment, and having been defeated, we fled from Bithúr and crossed the Ganges, and came to the Náná. Some days after, I received orders from the Náná to go to Gwáhar, and to bring back with me to fight the English such of the contingent as were at Moár. According to his order I went to Moár, and brought back the contingent with me to Ká hár. The Náná had sent his brother, the Bá á Sáhib, to Ká hár, and, according to his order, I went with the army to fight against him, leaving a small force and magazine at Ká hár. Having arrived at Ká hár there was a battle which lasted eleven days. After eleven days the rebel army was defeated and we all ran away. The next day after this we fought at Sheorápur, and there also, having been defeated, we ran away, having with us fifteen guns (including one horse-artillery gun). I and the Bá á Sáhib and the Rao Sáhib who had been sent by the Náná to Ká hár, all crossed the Ganges at Náná Mau li-Ghát. We remained at a place called Kherá for the night. I got orders from the Rao Sáhib to go and take charge of the small force and magazine left at Ká hár, in obedience to which I went there. After my arrival at Ká hár, I received orders from the Náná to go and attack Chirkharí, and that the Rao Sáhib should be sent after me. Accordingly I, with nine hundred Sikhs, two hundred cavalry, and four guns, went to Chirkharí, and fighting commenced. Four days afterwards the Rao Sáhib came to Ká hár. I fought at Chirkharí for seven days, and took it. I took twenty four guns and three lakhs of rupees from the Rajah. The Rajahs of Rámpur and Sháhgarh, and Dewa Despat and Dáulat Singh, the Kuchwá á hharwá á, and a great number of people joined me there at this time. I received a note from the Queen of Jhansi to the effect that she was waging war with the Europeans, and begging me to come to her aid. I reported the news to the Rao Sáhib at Ká hár. The Rao came to Jampur, and gave me permission to go to the assistance of the Queen of Jhansi. Accordingly I went to Jhansi, and halted at Barua Sagar. There Rájah Mau Singh came and joined me. The next day, about a mile from Jhansi, the whole of our army had a fight with the English army. At this time we had twenty two thousand men and twenty-eight guns. In this battle we were defeated. A part of the rebel army, with four or five guns fled to Ká hár, and I went to the same place via Bhanden and Kunch, with two hundred Sikhs. The Queen of Jhansi arrived there the same evening as myself, and begged

the Ráo Sahib to give her an army that she might go and fight. The following morning the Ráo Sahib ordered a parade of all the troops, and told me to accompany the Queen to battle. Accordingly I, with a force, accompanied the Queen, and there was a battle at Kunch which lasted till noon. We were again defeated, and fled, and I fled to "Chirkh," which is about four miles from Jaláur, and where my parents were. The Queen of Jhansi and the force which fled with her arrived at Kalpi. The Ráo had a battle afterwards at Kalpi and was defeated, and he and his whole army arrived at Gopálpur, we all marched thence towards Gwáhar. We had one day's fight with Mahárájah Sindhiá, and defeated him. Three days afterwards all Sindhiá's army joined the Ráo Sahib, and having procured from the Gwáhar treasury, through Amarchand Batia (the Mahárájah's treasurer), the requisite funds, pay was distributed to the army. Rám Ráo Govind was also with us. Some days afterwards the English army arrived at Gwáhar from Kalpi, and a force also came from Surpúr. Fighting again took place, and continued for four or five days, during which the Jhansi Rám was killed. Rám Ráo Govind had her corpse burnt and we were all defeated and fled, taking twenty five guns with us. We reached Jáurá-Abpúr and remained there during the night. The next morning we were attacked, and fought for an hour and a half. We fired five shots, the English army fired four shots, and we then ran off, leaving all our guns. We crossed the Chámbal, and reached Lónk via Bhumukhia. The Nawáb of Tonk fought with us, and we took four guns from him. With these guns we proceeded to Bhulárá via Mahdí úr and Iniragarh. We were there attacked by the English force, and I fled during the night, accompanied by my army and guns. At that time I had eight or nine thousand men and four guns with me. We all proceeded to a village called Kotrá (about four miles from Náthduwára) and halted there for one night. The next morning we moved towards Patan, and, after proceeding about one mile, the English army arrived, and an action took place. We left our four guns and fled, reaching Patan as fugitives. (The Nawáb of Landah, who had come with us from Kalpi, and the Nawáb of Kumona, who had joined us at Indúrkí, were both with us.) On our arrival at Patan fighting commenced between us and the Rájah of that place, we conquered, and got possession of all the Rájah's guns and magazines, and surrounded his palace, in which he was. The next day I went and told the Rájah to give some money to pay the expenses of my army. He said he could give me five lakhs of rupees, but not more. I returned and told the Ráo Sahib this. The next day the Ráo Sahib sent for the Rájah and demanded twenty five lakhs from him. The Rájah declared he could not give more than five lakhs, but, after some discussion, it was settled that he should pay fifteen lakhs. The Rájah said he would go to his palace and send this sum. He went accordingly, and sent two and a quarter lakhs in cash, and promised that the rest should follow. By the next day he had paid up five lakhs.

Imám Ali, Wárid major 5th Irregular Cavalry, ill treated the Rájah very much, and the latter fled during the night. We remained there five

days, and issued three months' pay to our troops at the rate of thirty rupees each sawār, and twelve rupees to each foot soldier per mensem.

We then marched for Sironj, taking eighteen guns with us. On reaching Rājgarh the English army came up and attacked us. We left our guns and fled, and reached Sironj *via* Nujā Kūl. We halted at Sironj eight days, and having taken four guns from the Tonk Nawāb's agent at Sironj, we proceeded thence to Isāgarh. On arrival there we demanded supplies, but the Isāgarh people would not give them. We therefore attacked Isāgarh, and plundered it. The following day we halted, and the Rāo Sāhib told me to go to Chandéri, and that he would come round by Tāl Bahat. I accordingly went to Chandéri, and the Rāo Sāhib came to Lalitpur from (or by) Tāl Bahat. On my reaching Chandéri, four shots were first fired on us from the fort, which we attacked and fought with Sindhiā's agent. After three days we marched from Chandéri towards Mangráuli, taking with us eleven guns, viz., seven which we had brought from Isāgarh and the four we had got from Sironj. On our march to Mangráuli, we met the English army. Shots were fired for a short time, when we left all our guns and fled. (Of the eleven guns five were with me and six with the Rāo Sāhib. I lost my five in this fight, but the Rāo kept his six.)

(NOTE.—It would appear that the Rāo was not in this act on.) I reached Jaklaun, and the next day went to Sultanpur, where the Rāo Sāhib also arrived. After three days the English force arrived, and the Rāo Sāhib took his army to Jaklaun (about five miles from Lalitpur), and some firing took place there. I was not present in this fight. The Rāo Sāhib returned to Lalitpur, and the following day proceeded to Kajōriā (ten miles from Sultanpur) and halted there. The next day the English army came up just as we were going to march, and an action commenced which lasted an hour and a half. We then left all our guns and fled, and reached Tāl Bahat. We halted there, and the following day went to Jaklaun, and thence to a village called Itāwah, twelve miles distant, where we stopped. We there heard that the English army was coming to surprise us, and marched at night. The English force came up in the morning, and our army became separated. I accompanied the Rāo Sāhib, and we proceeded, *via* Rājgarh, and crossed the Barhādā, and got to Kagān Bātis *via* Kandulā. The troops who were with us burned the Government *thānā** and bungalows at Kandulā. The Rāo Sāhib forbade their doing so but they would not obey him. This was about four months ago. At Kaugān Bātis there were some of Holkar's troops—one hundred and forty sawāra one company of infantry, and two guns. These we forced to join us, and took them with us when we marched the following day towards Gujrat, crossing the high road where the telegraph-wire ran. The Rāo Sāhib broke the wire and plundered seven hackeries which were on the road proceeding with Government property towards Gwāhār, and seized the

* -Thānā, "a station.—G. B. M.

chaprás and chaukidars * who were with the hachenes, and took them with them. Some of the chaukidars belonging to the chauki were hanged by them. We there left the high road and proceeded westward. The next day we were surprised by the English force, and leaving our two guns, we fled, and reached the Narbadá. An officer, with a hundred men, was on the opposite bank. Our force commenced to cross, and this officer and party of sowárs ran off. We plundered a village there called Chikla, and marched thence at midnight. After proceeding thirty-four miles, we halted at Rájpurá. The next day we took three thousand nine hundred rupees and three horses from the Rááh of that place, and from it went on to Chotá Udaipur. The following day the English force surprised us, some of them were killed, and some of ours. From Chotá Udaipur we went on to Déogarh Bári, and our army became separated. There was jungle at that place, and I halted there two days. Our troops having been collected again, we started, and went to Bānswará. Our men plundered there sixteen or seventeen camel loads of cloth (some of Ahmadábád) belonging to a mahájan † which they found there. We thence went to Salomar, and I called on Kaisar Singh, agent for the Udaipur Rájah, to furnish us with supplies. He sent us some, and the following day we again started with the intention of going to Udaipur. However, *en route* we received tidings of the English force, and retraced our steps to Bhilwára. We remained there two days, and then proceeded to Partábgarh, where we fought for two hours with a body of English troops which had come from Nimach. About 8 o'clock P.M. we ran off, and proceeded about six miles to the east of Mandesar, and halted there. We then went on to Zirápúr, making fifteen stages *en route*. An English force surprised us there and we were again surprised by another force at Chaprá Bared. We fled thence to Nahargarh, the agent of the Kotá Rájah, at which place nine shots were fired at us from guns. We moved out of range, and halted there during the night, and the Ráo Sáhib sent Risáldár Nannú Khán to call Rájah, Mán Singh. The Rájah came and accompanied us—the Ráo Sáhib, myself, and our force—to a place about two miles from Parón, where we halted. We remained there two days, and on the third went on to a place about eight miles beyond Kilwári, whose name I do not remember. Rájah Mán Singh accompanied us as far as a river which we crossed *en route*, and then left us. We made two stages thence to Indragarh, and Firázsháh, with the Khás Risála (bodyguard) and 12th Irregulars, met us there. The next day we went on, making two stages to Dewás, which is fourteen miles from Jaipur. The English force surprised us there, some men on both sides were killed, and, flying thence towards Márwár, we reached a village about thirty koss from Márwár, whose name I do not remember. At 4 o'clock that night we were surprised by the English force, and the 12th irregular cavalry separated from the Ráo Sáhib's army.

* "Chaprás" a belted attendant or messenger. "Chaukidár," a watchman. "Chauki" a post, in this sense also a chauki.

† "Mahájan," banker, merchant.—G B M.

written; and no one has forced me to do so, or held out hope or promise of any sort to induce me to do so.

Signature of Tántiá Topi,
Agent of the Náná Sáhib.

Signature of Witnesses,

(Signed) Ganga Parsháí Múnshi, Meade's Horse.
Rubbá ál Náib-Kandár of Sipri

The above deposition or statement was made by the prisoner Tántiá Topi in my presence on the 10th of April, 1859, at Camp Múshaurí, of his own voluntary act and without compulsion of any sort, or promise made, or hope held out to him as an inducement to make it.

(Signed) R J MEADE, Major,
Commanding Field Force.

Certified that the above is a true and correct translation of the original deposition or confession of Tántiá Topi appended hereto.

(Signed) J J M GIBSON, Lieutenant,
Adjutant Meade's Horse

(True copy)
(Signed) R MEADE

APPENDIX C.

(Page 271)

TRIAL OF THE EX KING OF DEHLÍ.

THE Judge-Advocate-General then addressed the Court as follows:—

GENTLEMEN,—It will be my object, in the present address, to collect the different facts which have been elicited in the course of these proceedings, and to furnish them to you, as far as possible, in the order in which they originally occurred. Our investigation has involved a enquiry over a period of several months, when rebellion was rampant in this city, and I trust we have succeeded in tracing, with considerable minuteness, many of the different events as they evolved themselves during the time to which I have referred. Our labours, indeed, have not had this limit, or we should only have accomplished what might, I think, be termed the least important part of our duties. In immediate connection with the facts elicited are the charges on which the prisoner has been arraigned, and, though his former rank and royalty will doubtless add somewhat of temporary importance to the verdict which you will this day be called upon to record, yet whether it be one of acquittal or conviction, it must, I imagine,

of the 3rd Light Cavalry, who were tried by general court martial at Mirath in May last, for refusing their cartridges, had their sentence read to them and were ironed on the parade ground early on the morning of the 9th of May, and that the mutiny of the three native regiments at Mirath first openly developed itself at about half past six o'clock on the evening of the 10th of May, during which interval of nearly 36 hours there were, of course, plenty of opportunities for interchange of communications between the native troops who first rebelled at Mirath, and those who joined them at this station. To travel from one place to another by coach used ordinarily to take about five hours and that the mutineers availed themselves of this facility of mutual intercourse has, I think, been clearly established by the evidence of Captain Tytler. It appears, from his statement, that a coach full of these Mirath mutineers, came on Sunday evening to the lines of the 38th Native Infantry, doubtless to prepare the biphais of this station for the arrival and suitable reception, on Monday morning, of their rebel comrades, and, although we may not possess positive evidence to the fact yet it may fairly be presumed that Sunday evening was not the first occasion that these plotters of evil held their secret and sinister councils together. Indeed we have it on record that, even before the Court, which tried the mutinous cavalry at Mirath, I had come to any decision on their case, a compact had been entered into to the effect that, if the use of greased cartridges was persisted in, the troops at Mirath and Dehli would unite, and at once unfurl the standard of revolt, and so fully had this arrangement been perfected and agreed on, that it is related that the Sipahi guards at the gate of the palace on Sunday evening made no secret of their intentions, but spoke openly among themselves of what they expected to occur on the morrow. To understand the merits and demerits of the whole transaction it must be recollected that, at the time when these resolutions were arrived at there was not a single greased cartridge in the magazines of either of the three native regiments at Mirath, nor, as far as I have been informed of these at Dehli either. It must be further borne in mind that the native soldiers themselves were the persons who were perhaps the best informed on these points, that the cartridges for practice had, from time immemorial, been manufactured in the regimental magazines by persons of their own colour, creed, and religious persuasion, that it was absolutely impossible to palm off on them a spurious article, that the regimental khálásis, who were employed in making these cartridges, must have at once discovered their impurity, if such had really existed, that, in fact, objectionable cartridges (I mean such as would affect the religious prejudices of either Musalmán or Hindu), could not possibly have been made in their regimental magazines, as in such case the very men to be employed in their manufacture would have refused the work, but, more than this, let it be remembered that the Muhammadan has no caste, that even the hybrid such as the Muhammadan of Central India has become, half Musalmán and half Hindu, does not pretend to a loss of religion, even from touching pork. Who is there amongst us that has not and does not almost daily witness these Muhamma-

dans, in the capacity of table servants, carrying plates and dishes which openly contain the very substance which, in reference to the cartridges, has been made the pretence and the stumbling block of their offence? Even if we were to admit that all the cartridges were thoroughly saturated with pig's and with cow's fat, still what real valid objection on the score of their religion could the Muhammadan Sipáhs have had in using them? Their brothers and other relatives in the private service of officers never hesitate to handle or cook the dishes which they are required to bring to our tables. The objections of the Muhammadan Sipáhs on this head are so transparently false, that it can hardly be a matter of wonder that not one man of sense or respectability among them appears ever to have come forward to seek information or satisfy himself as to the truth or falsity of rumours so industriously circulated about these cartridges that were to be the means of depriving them of their faith. Some few—very few—honourable exceptions have certainly held aloof from and openly repudiated the conduct of their brethren, but such men have wanted neither guarantees nor explanations in regard to a matter which was patent to all, but have come to their own conclusions on a subject where error had no abiding place and mistake is incredible. That neither Musalmán nor Hindú had any honest objection to the use of any of the cartridges at Mirath or at Dehli is sufficiently proved by the eagerness with which they sought possession of them, and the alacrity with which they used them, when their aim and object was the murder of their European officers, or when, united under the banners of the prisoner at your bar, they for months constantly went forth to fight against the power to which they owed fealty and allegiance. Among the very numerous petitions which have been brought under your notice during these proceedings, it may have struck the Court as very strange that there is not a single one in which the slightest allusion is made to what the Sipáhs would have us believe to be their great and particular grievance. We have had upwards of 180 petitions before the Court, written on all possible subjects, from the tinkering of a cooking pot to the recovery of a mule or a crack in a horse's hoofs, and each thought worthy of the sign manual of royalty, but in the free indulgence of such correspondence, when they evidently unburdened their minds to their adopted sovereign, and were certainly not restrained by any delicacy of language or of feeling from venting their acerbity against their quondam European masters, we can find no trace of the original sin, no grease spot staining these effusions of disloyalty. How instructive is it, that, among themselves, and when applying to us such language as "damnable, hell-doomed infidels," they apparently forego the first specific offence, which they would have us believe has led them to mutiny and rebellion, and the perpetration of crimes at which humanity shudders. When with each other, and, as they conceived, safe from the intrusion and inquiries of British officers, that insurmountable obstacle to their fidelity and allegiance, the greased cartridge, is apparently altogether lost sight of. Not a whisper is heard of a grievance which, if a substantial one, must ever have been uppermost in the memories of all, must have been con-

usually rankling in their minds and embittering their thoughts, must have influenced them in their blood thirstiness, and to themselves have been their only extenuation for crimes such as may well exclude them from mercy. What a contrast this to their speeches when uttered with a prospect of reaching European ears. Greased cartridges are then always brought forward, the use of them forms the one continuous night mare of the Sipáhi's existence. Really, if we reflect seriously on this—if we remember that in reality there was not a single greased cartridge among either of the three regiments which first broke out into mutiny, murdering not only men, but unoffending women and children, and that the Sipáhis were perfectly aware of this, when we call to mind that, even if greased cartridges had existed, and the use of them been required at the hands of these miscreants, not one of the Muhammadans at any rate could possibly have been injured thereby in any caste prejudice, or placed even in temporary difficulty with regard to his religious tenets—when to this we add, what is well known to every one in India, whether Hindu Muhammadan, or European, viz., that the native soldier has but to ask for his discharge, and that in time of peace it is at once granted to him, without inquiry or difficulty of any kind, it seems beyond the bounds of reason to imagine that these men were drawn into acts of such revolting atrocity by any grievances either real or imagined. Let the chimeras, the disturbed dreams of fanaticism, of wickedness, or of folly have been what they may, let the instigations to evil have been as industrious as possible, and then allow that the Sipáhis to be worked upon were as credulous as the grossest ignorance could make them, still, if the greased cartridge had been the only weapon the tamperer had to work with, but the one envenomed shaft in their quiver, how easy was the remedy. It required no depth of knowledge, no philosopher to inform them that they could at once escape from every possible perplexity by simply applying for their discharge. I know not, gentlemen, what conclusion you may arrive at on this much vexed question, but, after pondering it in every way in which my reason has presented it to me, I am obliged to infer that something deeper and more powerful than the use of greased cartridges has been resorted to.

The machinery that has set in motion such an amount of mutiny and murder, that has made its vibrations felt almost at one and the same moment from one end of India to the other, must have been prepared, if not with foreseeing wisdom, yet with awful craft, and most successful and commanding subtlety. We must recollect, too, in considering this subject, that in many of the places where the native troops have risen against their European officers there was no pretext even in reference to cartridges at all, numbers of these mutined, apparently, because they thought there was a favourable opportunity of doing so, because they were a hundred to one against those in authority, and fancied that they might pillage, plunder, and massacre, not only with impunity, but with advantage. Is it possible that such fearful results as these could have at once developed themselves had the native army, previous to the cartridge question, been in a sound and well affected state? Can any one imagine that that rancorous, wide-

spread enmity, of which we have lately had such terrible proofs, has been the result of feelings suddenly and accidentally irritated? Does it appear consistent with the natural order of events that such intense malignity should start into existence on one single provocation? Or can it be reconciled with the instincts, the traditions, or the idiotic nervousities of the Hindus, that they should recklessly, without inquiry, and without thought, desire to imbrue their hands in human blood, casting aside the pecuniary and other advantages that bound them to the cause of order and of the Government? Or, more than this, can it be imagined that the three regiments at Mirath, even when joined by those at Delhi, could have conceived an idea so daring as that of overthrowing, by themselves, the British Government in India?

I think, gentlemen, every one must allow that if we had no other evidence of a plot, no testimony indicative of a previous conspiracy, the very nature of the outbreak itself must have convinced us of the existence of one. In the moral, as in the physical world, there must be cause and effect, and the horrible butcheries of the past year would remain an anomaly and a mystery for ever, could we trace them to nothing more occult and baneful than a cartridge of any kind. It will be observed, that this point of the cartridge, so openly and frequently insisted on, at Mirath and elsewhere, before the 10th of May, gradually becomes more and more indistinct as the plot gathers strength and matures itself, and, after furnishing the mutineers with their first war cry at Delhi, it seems to have answered its purpose, and thenceforward was allowed to sink into disuse and neglect. With little or no vitality at starting, it soon died a natural death, and was succeeded by a reality of purpose, and a fixedness of resolve, that would have been worthy of a better cause. If we review the actions and whole conduct of these mutineers, we shall soon see that, from the very commencement, they bear the impress of cunning and of secret combination. For instance, 85 of their comrades were ironed before them and sent off to jail in their presence on the morning of the 9th of May, but this occasioned no outbreak of fury. Not a sound or tone of dissatisfaction escaped from the men, who, then and long before, must have had rebellion in their hearts, no gesture indicative of sympathy with the culprits was exhibited by any, in fact, as far as appearances could be trusted, the Infantry regiments at Mirath, and the remaining portion of the 3rd Cavalry, were as obedient and loyal as could possibly be desired, and this deception was successfully resorted to till their plans were matured, and the moment for open revolt had arrived. The night of the 9th of May, twelve hours after the imprisonment of the 3rd Cavalry mutineers had taken place, was as favourable an opportunity as the night following, for a march upon the nearest magazine, but there had not then been time for preparing the Delhi Sipahis for a movement which the progress of events at Mirath had doubtless precipitated sooner than their first calculations had led them to expect. Hence the necessity for communicating afresh with Delhi, and acquainting the Sipahis there with the drama that was to be enacted on Monday the 11th. That such was done is established by the evidence of

Captain Tytler; for it would be difficult to assign any other motive for a carriage full of Sirdars coming over from Mirath on Sunday evening, and driving straight into the lines of the 38th Native Infantry.

Again, we can perceive, in the very hour chosen for the outbreak at Mirath, the same evidence of cunning and of craft. The plan, too, of the Mirath cantonments gave considerable facilities for carrying out their plot. The native lines are so completely separated from that portion of the cantonments where the European troops reside, that the disturbance and uproar attendant even upon open mutiny could not be heard or even known, from one to the other until specially communicated. Officers may naturally have been too intent on quelling the rebellion of their men to think of officially reporting it. Be this as it may, there would be some delay in turning out and supplying the Europeans with cartridges, assembling their officers, and marching down a distance of not less than two miles, so that, taking one delay with another, the mutineers might fairly calculate, considering it was an utter surprise to all, on 1½ hours of safe and uninterrupted progress, and, as the outbreak commenced at half-past six, this would have secured them darkness and comparative security for their further operations. This was what, in effect, actually took place. On the Europeans reaching the native lines, it was already dark, no Sirdars were to be seen, and no one could tell whither they had gone. Subsequent inquiry revealed that, guided by the instinct of cunning, the rebels had not, at first, taken the direct or main road to Delhi, neither had they left Mirath in military formation, but, as dusk set in, had gone forth in parties of five, six or ten, to their fixed place of assembly. This was judicious for their departure from Mirath, but would have been highly impolitic for their entry into Delhi, where there were no European troops to avoid. Something more imposing and demonstrative was required here, and accordingly we find them crossing the bridge simultaneously massed in columns, and in complete military array, with a portion of the cavalry sent forward as a regular advanced guard.

It is on this occasion that we first prove the mutineers in immediate connection with the prisoner at your bar. The first point to which they turn, the first person to whom they address themselves, is the titular majesty of Delhi. This circumstance has much significance, and, at any rate, tends to show that previous concert existed between them. The prisoner's complicity, however, was, immediately after, openly to commence. Scarcely had the very serious nature of the outbreak had time to develop itself, than his own special servants—in the very precincts of his palace—and almost, as it were, before his own eyes, rush to imbrue their hands in the blood of every European they can meet with, and, when we remember that two of these were young and delicate women, who could have given no offence, whose sex and age might have tamed any hearts less pitiless than those of the human demons who destroyed them, we are able to realise some slight portion of the horribly unnatural influences that appear innate to Muhammedan treachery. How otherwise was it possible that education, the pride of royal ancestry, a life of tranquil ease and com-

pirative refinement should not have exempted this old and grey-headed man from all connection with deeds which seem too barbarous for the very outcasts of humanity, or even for the untamed but less savage denizens of the jungle?

We stop to inquire whether it has been proved in this court, and will be repeated in after years, that the last king of the imperial house of Taimur was an accomplice in this villainy. The circumstances shall now be fairly stated. These murders were committed in the broad glare of day, before dozens of witnesses, and without the slightest attempt at concealment. They were perpetrated, as has been already stated, by the prisoner's own retainers and within the limits of his palace, where, be it remembered even under the Company's Government, his jurisdiction was paramount. I shall not, however, attempt to infer that these murders must have been previously sanctioned by the prisoner, mere inferences on such a point cannot be accepted in a court of justice. I prefer to quote from the evidence. It is Ahsan Ulla Khan, the physician, who is speaking, and who says, that at the time referred to, he and Ghulam Ablas, the attorney in court, were with the king, when it was told them that the troopers had killed Mr Fraser, and had gone up to Captain Douglas to kill him, and that this was instantly confirmed by the return of the palik beaters, who told them that they had witnessed Mr. Fraser's murder; that his body was in the gateway, and that the troopers had ascended to the upper building for the purpose of murdering those there. Why the witness suppresses all mention of the prominent part the king's own servants took in these massacres can easily be imagined. In a subsequent part of his examination he even asserts that he never heard that any of the king's servants joined in these murders, nay, more, that it was not generally known who committed them. Such is the evasion of the king's own physician, who doubtless was aware of the importance that would necessarily attach to this point. It was not generally known who committed these murders, and yet, at this lapse of time, we have had no difficulty in tracing the individuals, and ascertaining their names. It was not generally known that the king's own servants were the murderers, and yet we find this very circumstance prominently and specifically mentioned at the time in the native newspapers of the city. I need not, after this, recapitulate the evidence of all those who have clearly and satisfactorily proved that the king's servants were the murderers, for their testimony stands unshaken and unrefuted. It will amply suffice if I quote the statement of one of them, and which is as follows. "At this time Mr Fraser remained below trying to suppress the disturbance, and while thus engaged, I noticed that Haji, lapidary, cut him down with a talwar, and almost at the same instant, some of the king's servants cut at him with swords till he was dead. One of Mr. Fraser's murderers was an Abyssinian. After this they made a rush to the upper apartments, when I immediately ran round by another door and closed the door at the top of the stairs. I was engaged in shutting all the doors, when the crowd found entrance by the southern stair, and, having forced one of the doors on that side, came and gave admission to the men who

had assisted in murdering Mr Fraser. These immediately rushed into the apartments where the gentlemen, viz., Captain Douglas, Mr. Hutchinson and Mr. Jennings, had retired, and attacking them with swords, at once murdered them and the two young ladies. On this I run down the staircase. As I got to the bottom, I was laid hold of by one Mundoh, a bearer in the service of the king, who said, 'Tell me where Captain Douglas is, you have concealed him?' He forced me upstairs with him; I said, 'You have yourselves killed all the gentlemen already,' but, on reaching the room where Captain Douglas was, I saw that he was not quite dead. Mundoh, perceiving this also, hit him with a bludgeon on the forehead, and killed him immediately." Having now established that the murderers of these ladies were the special servants of the prisoner, it will be well to revert to the testimony of the physician, Ahsan Ulla Khán, and to ascertain from him the steps the prisoner took on the murders being reported to him. The only order he gave on this occasion appears to have been to close the gates of his palace, and we naturally inquire whether this was for the purpose of preventing the escape of the murderers. The evidence distinctly proves that it was not. The physician, being further interrogated, is obliged to confess that the prisoner took no steps whatever either to discover, to secure, or to punish the guilty, and attributes it to there being much confusion at the time, but if the king's authority had actually been set aside, and by his own servants too, this would have been the most terrible of all reasons for immediately re-establishing it, by at once bringing the offenders to justice. That this was not done we have been already informed, and we can only account for it on the supposition that these acts of the prisoner's servants, if not instigated by himself, had yet actually anticipated his wishes. We are thus perfectly prepared for what is to follow, viz., that no servant was ever dismissed, and not the slightest investigation or inquiry was ever instituted, in fact, in the words of the question put to the witness, the king continued these murderers both in his pay and in employment, and this too, as we have seen, when the very newspapers of the day gave information against them. After this, is it necessary to question whether he adopted these deeds as his own or not? I need not quote what may be the law of the land on such a point, for there is a yet higher law which must acquit or condemn him, the law of conscience and of sense, that law which every one who hears me can apply, and which carries with it a verdict more terrible than that which is pronounced in mere conformity to legal codes or military legislation: it is a law that does not depend upon local constitutions, upon human institutes, or religious creeds—it is a law fixed in the heart of man by his Maker, and can it now here be set aside?

Perhaps it may now be time to turn our attention to what was doing at the magazine, and to trace the further steps of the mutineers in that direction. Captain Forrest has told us that it was about 9 o'clock in the morning when the main body of the native troops from Mirath was passing over the bridge in military formation (that is, in subdivisions of companies), with fixed bayonets and sloped arms, the cavalry being in front. It was

actually in less than one hour after this that a subadar of the 38th Native Infantry, who was commanding the magazine guard outside the gate, informed them that the King of Dehh had sent a guard to take possession of the magazine, and to bring all the Europeans there up to his palace, and that, if they did not consent to this, none of them were to be allowed to leave the magazine. Captain Forrest adds that he did not see the guard at this time, but that he saw the man who had brought this message, and he was a well dressed Musalman. Nor was this all, for, shortly after the above, a native officer in the king's service arrived with a strong guard of the king's own soldiers in their uniform, and told the above-mentioned subadar and the non-commissioned officers that he was sent down by the king to relieve them of duty.


We thus see with what alertness and despatch this most important object, the seizure of the magazine, was attempted. Is it, however, to be believed that such was the ready, immediate, and, as it were, impulsive decision of the king, or of those who formed the court? To attribute to them anything of this nature would be to give them credit for a coolness of calculation, combined with a quickness of apprehension, such as pertains only to the more gifted of mankind. The scope and entire progress of the scheme speak loudly of a plan previously arranged, and of deliberations long matured by the counsels of many. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive that any one, not previously initiated in the secret, could, on the moment, so promptly and so effectually have entered upon and adopted the details necessary for carrying it out. You will recollect the extreme importance of the decision, the magnitude of the interests at stake. You will call to mind the cogent reasons and the numerous arguments that it would naturally array themselves against adopting so heinous and precipitate a measure. It was, in fact, an invitation to a king to league himself with ruffians and with cut-throats. Any inducement or prospective advantage that they could hold out to him was faint and almost imperceptible, compared with the open risk which he was to encounter. By embarking in so forlorn a cause he imperilled everything, his own life, and those of all belonging to him, and for what? The distant glimmer of a crown, which common reason, or the slightest consideration, would have convinced him was a mere *ignis fatuus*—a mockery of a sceptre, that would evade his grasp. Are we to imagine that it was under such circumstances that this weak and tremulous old man seized and improved his occasion, and with all the rapid instinct of determination directed his own troops upon the magazine, to establish himself there as the one point of primary and most vital importance—and this too in the first moment of a surprise when nothing but riot and disorder reigned supreme? Or are we to suppose that there was a secret and a deeper knowledge of what the other portions of the army were already ripe for, and that the five or six regiments to commence with were but the instalments of those that were to follow? Or, if such previous understanding and collusion did not exist either with the king or any of those immediately about him, are we to attribute to superstition and the pretended revelation of dreams, circumstances which scarcely admit of

to bear him, as he imagined, to the throne of Hindustan, but to leave him in its ebb a mere helpless wreck upon the sands.

I would here pause for a second, to refer to Lieutenant Willoughby, and to the brave men under him, who for so long a time held, against unnumbered odds, the magazine intrusted to them. One hardly knows which to admire most, the penetration and sagacity which, at a glance, foresaw the possible necessity for its destruction, and made arrangements accordingly, or the undaunted resolution with which the final sacrifice was accomplished. To do justice to such heroism will be the pleasing duty of the historian. I can merely give it a passing notice, having to dilate on other matters more immediately connected with the proceedings before us.

With the explosion of the magazine at Delhi, every hope of stemming the torrent of rebellion seems to have vanished, resistance had been there protracted to its utmost possible extent, the sacrifice was a final one, and thenceforward the European community, if, in isolated spots, still preserving the appearance of government authority, were left without one vestige of real power, so that it soon became a duty to the state and to themselves to save their lives by a timely retreat. Delhi was consequently abandoned to the miscreants who had, in the short space of 24 hours, stained themselves with crimes which can scarcely be equalled in all the catalogues of bygone iniquity. It is now that we find the king coming personally forward as the chief actor in that great drama which had more than England and Europe for its spectators, the progress of which was watched with such absorbing interest everywhere by the antagonistic powers of civilisation and of barbarism. The evidence shows that on the afternoon of the 11th of May, the king, having entered the hall of special audience, rested himself in a chair, when the soldiery, officers and all, came forward one by one and bowed their heads before him, asking him to place his hands on them. The king did so, and each then withdrew, saying whatever came into his mind. The witness, viz., Ghulam Abbas, the prisoner's attorney in court, informs us that this ceremony of the king putting his hands on the heads of the soldiery was equivalent to accepting their allegiance and services, and he further states, that though he is not aware of any regular proclamation having been made in Delhi in reference to the king assuming the reins of government, yet that such may have been done without his hearing of it, but that on the very day of the outbreak the king's authority was established, and that night a royal salute was fired of about 21 guns.

These matters bring us to the charges against the prisoner, and it may perhaps be as well now to consider them, not so much in regard to dates as the sequence in which they have been drawn up. The first charge against Muhammad Bahádur Sháh, ex-king of Delhi, is: "For that he, being a pensioner of the British Government in India, did, at Delhi, at various times between the 10th of May and 1st of October, 1857, encourage, aid, and abet Muhammad Bakht Khán, subahdar of the regiment of artillery, and divers others, native commissioned officers and soldiers unknown, of the East India Company's Army, in the crimes of mutiny and rebellion



against the State." I am not going to weary the Court by repeating even a tenth part of the evidence which has been brought forward to establish these charges, but it is perhaps necessary to show that proof of them has been recorded. Mr. Saunders, Officiating Commissioner and Agent to the Lieutenant-Governor, has explained under what circumstances the prisoner became a pensioner of the British Government in India, viz., that his grandfather, Sháh Álam, after having been kept in rigorous confinement by the Maráthás, on their defeat by the English in 1803, applied to the British Government for protection. This was accorded, and from that moment the titular Kings of Dehli became pensioned subjects of the British. It will be seen, then, that, as far as this family is concerned, there was no wrong to be complained of, and nothing but benefits to be remembered. The prisoner's grandfather, Sháh Álam, had not only lost his throne, but had his eyes put out, and been subjected to every species of indignity, and was still kept in most rigorous confinement, when the English, under Lord Lake, appeared as his deliverers, and, with generous sympathy for his misfortunes, bestowed on him rank and pension which, continued to his successors, have maintained them in honour and in influence, till, like the snake in the fable, they have turned their fangs upon those to whom they owed the very means of their existence. The evidence that connects the prisoner with Muhammad Baháí Khán, subahdar of the artillery, and which of itself will be sufficient to establish the charge, is a document from beginning to end in the prisoner's own handwriting.

"To the especial Slave, the Lord Governor, *Muhammad Baháí Khan Bahádur*

"Receive our favour, and understand that, whilst the Nimach force have reached Alapur, its baggage is still here, and that you are therefore directed to take 200 troopers and five or seven companies of infantry, and have all the baggage alluded to, such as tents, &c., together with commissariat supplies, conveyed by the gharis to Alapur. You are further directed not to allow the infidels staying near the Idgah to advance. It is known to you further, that if the army returns without victory, and divested of its appliances of war, the consequence must be disastrous. You have been admonished, and you are to consider these orders stringent."

It is true there is no date to this communication, but the allusions in it leave no possible doubt as to its having been written within the period embraced by the terms of the first charge.

Perhaps this will be the best place for the few observations I have to offer on the defence. The prisoner, like every other that we have tried, has, according to his own showing, been the mere victim of circumstances, declares that he had no intelligence on the subject previous to the outbreak, that the mutinous soldiery surrounded him completely, and placed batteries on all sides, and that, fearing for his life, he kept quiet, and went

to his own private apartments, that the mutinous soldiery kept the men, women, and children prisoners that he twice saved their lives by entreaty and persuasion, and that the third time he did all in his power to save them but that the rebellious soldiery would not heed him, and eventually carried out their purpose of slaying those poor people against his orders. Now the chief objection to all this is, that it is not only unsupported by evidence, but is directly in the teeth of all the testimony, whether oral or written, and whether given by his own servants or by others. The entire defence indeed is a mere tissue of denials of guilt, assertions of his not having been a free agent, and an endeavour to put the onus of his misconduct upon others. He cannot challenge the authenticity of the documents against him, or the evidence of his own handwriting or his own seal, and his only expedient consists in asserting, that what he wrote was by compulsion, and that his seal was affixed in the same way. The only dilemma that he appears unable to extricate himself from, to his own satisfaction, in this way, is the going out to Humáyun's tomb, and coming in again. It was of course, necessary to state that the last was by his own choice and free will, and this would scarcely have been possible had his going out been represented as compulsory, for, if the Sikáhus had forcibly taken him out, they would hardly allow him voluntarily to return, so we are treated with the following curious account — "When the revolted and rebellious troops prepared to abscond, finding an opportunity, I got away secretly under the palace windows, and went and stayed in Humáyun's mausoleum." One would have thought that if he wished to separate himself from the rebellious troops, his best plan would have been to have stayed in Dehli, when they were preparing to abscond, instead of secretly planning to go out with them. However, I do not mean to take the defence, paragraph by paragraph, and thus refute it. My best reply to it, I believe, will be by showing how fully and completely the charges have been proved, and to this task I now again address myself, and proceed to the consideration of the second count, which is, if possible, still more fully established than the first. It runs as follows — "For having at Dehli, at various times between the 10th of May and 1st of October, 1857, encouraged, aided and abetted Mirzá Mughul, his own son, a subject of the British Government in India, and divers others unknown, inhabitants of Dehli, and of the North West provinces of India, also subjects of the said British Government, to rebel and wage war against the State." The documents, and other evidence in support of this charge are so numerous that it would be tedious even to reckon them. The newspapers speak of the appointment of Mirzá Mughul to the office of commander-in-chief, of his investiture with a dress of honour, and other matters relating thereto. The oral testimony is very strong on the same subject, while, the discovered correspondence shows that Mirzá Mughul the son, was perhaps, next to his father, the leading chief of the rebels in Dehli. I shall for form's sake give a short extract from a petition of Maubari Muhammad Zohar Ali, police-officer of Najafgarh. It is as follows. —

"To the King! Shelter of the World!

"Respectfully sheweth,—That the orders of the royal missive have been fully explained to all the Thakurs, Chaudhāris, Kandungos, and Patwāris of this township of Najafgarh, and that the best arrangements have been established. Further, that, agreeably to your Majesty's injunctions, steps are being taken to collect horsemen and footmen, and it is explained to them, that their allowances will be paid from the revenue of this division of the district. Your slave's assurances on this point, however, will not be believed till some Ghāzis, recently engaged, shall have arrived. As regards Nāgh, Kakraula, Dachau Kalan and other adjacent villages, your slave has to represent that, unrestrained by the dread of consequences, and bent on all sorts of excesses, the inhabitants have commenced plundering travellers."

This might, I think, be sufficiently conclusive as to the words of the Thargo in reference to "aiding and abetting in rebellion Mirzā Mughul, his own son, and divers other unknown inhabitants of Delhi, and of the North Western Provinces of India, inasmuch as the petition from which I am quoting bears the autograph order of the prisoner referring it to his son Mirzā Mughul, and directing him quickly to send a regiment of infantry with its officers to Najafgarh, in accordance with the wishes, and for the purpose of aiding and abetting the petitioner's schemes of raising horsemen and footmen to fight against the English. But there is another petition, which has not yet been submitted to the Court, having only lately come to hand, and which may appropriately be introduced here. It is from Amir Ali Khan, son of the Nawāb of Khurajpura, and is dated 12th of July. It runs as follows:—

"To the King! Shelter of the World!

"Respectfully sheweth,—That your petitioner has come to your royal court, at which Darius might have served as a doorkeeper having left his house animated by the ambition to stake his life in your Majesty's cause, and laments that he has lived to see the day when the accursed English have presumed to direct their cannon against your royal dwelling, the guardians of which are the angels of heaven. From the first dawn of the powers of discernment, your petitioner has been trained, like the lion, to conflicts and war, and has not, like the fox, been concerned for his life—

"Leopards destroy their prey on the summits of mountains,
Crocodiles devour theirs on the banks of rivers."

"Your petitioner submits that if his prayer is accepted, and the plans and stratagems necessary in this war are entrusted to his judgment, aided by your Majesty's august auspices, he will, in three days, totally exterminate these people with their thana and dakh Gajinas. It was necessary,

information through all the suburbs of so large a city as Delhi. The prisoner's attorney allows that the king's authority was established on the 11th of May; and Guláb, messenger, being asked, "Was the king proclaimed as the reigning sovereign immediately after the outbreak?" answered, "Yes, the proclamation was made by beat of drum on the very day of the outbreak, about three in the afternoon, to the effect that it was now the king's Government," while Chuni, pehar, another witness, declares that, "On the 11th of May, about midnight, some 20 guns were fired in the palace. I heard the reports at my house, and next day, at about noon, a proclamation was made by beat of drum that the country had reverted to the possession of the king." The next paragraph in the charge is in reference to traitorously seizing and taking unlawful possession of the city of Delhi, but this is a point that I need not quote evidence to establish. It is difficult to turn our eyes in any direction without having convincing proofs of it. The charge then goes on to assert that the prisoner "did at various times, between the 10th of May and 1st of October, 1857, treasonably conspire, consult, and agree with Mirzá Mughul, his son, and with Muhammad Bakht Khán, subahdar of the regiment of artillery, and divers other false traitors unknown, to raise, levy, and make insurrection and war against the State." Mirzá Mughul was publicly appointed commander-in-chief, and a special state procession in honour of his being so took place a few days after the outbreak. The witness who deposes to this is Chuni Lal, pehar, but he is unable to specify the exact date on which he witnessed it. Mirzá Mughul's authority after this seems to have been uncontrolled, at any rate in all matters immediately relating to the army, until Subahdar Bakht Khán, of the artillery, arrived, and was appointed both Lord Governor General and Commander-in-Chief. The date of his arrival was the 1st of July, and after that some jealousy and clashing of authority between the two Commanders-in-Chief is observable, for, on the 17th of July, Mirzá Mughul writes and informs his father, that on that day he had formed up the army and taken it outside the city to attack the English, when General Bakht Khán interfered, and for a long time kept the whole force standing inactive, wanting to know by whose orders it had gone out, and, saying it was not to proceed without his permission, caused it to return. Mirza Mughul adds, "that having his orders reversed cannot but cause vexation to any officer, high or low, and begs that definite instructions may be given as to whom the real authority over the army belongs." There is no order on this letter, nor have we any intimation what decision was come to; but that some better arrangement was the consequence is evident, for on the very next day, the 18th of July, we find Mirzá Mughul and General Bakht Khán acting in concert, as the following letter from Mirzá Mughul to his father will show. It is dated the 19th of July, and runs as follows:—"Since yesterday the arrangements have been completed for carrying on active offensive operations both by night and day. If aid could be afforded now from the direction of Alapur, with the divine blessing, and through the influence of your Majesty's ever-during prestige, a final and decisive victory, it is to be

true to their faith and creeds, and to slay the English and their servants, and you are directed to have it further proclaimed, that those who are now present with the English force on the ridge, whether they be people of Hindustan, or foreigners, or hillmen, or Sikhs, or whatever country they may be natives of, or whether they be Muhammadans, or Hindus born in Hindustan, they are not to entertain any fears or dread of the enemy. Whenever they come over to this side, kind provision will be made for them, and they will be allowed to continue in their own creed and religions. You are directed to have it proclaimed further, that all who will join in the attacks on the enemy, whether they be or be not servants, will be allowed to keep themselves whatever property they may take from the English in plunder, and that they will beside receive additional rewards from his Majesty, and will be amply provided for." This paper, which I have just perused, is an office copy, and was found recently among other documents in the office of the King's chief police station. It bears the seal of that office, and is actually attested as a true copy by the signature of Bhaï Singh, assistant to the King's chief police officer. A more trustworthy and convincing document could hardly be laid before a Court. It seems to me fully to complete the proof of the third charge, and to render further quotation from the numerous other documents unnecessary. It also tends to establish the latter portion of the fourth charge.

To this charge I will now turn my attention. It accuses the prisoner "of having, at Dehli, on the 16th of May, 1857, or thereabouts, within the precincts of the palace at Dehli, feloniously caused and become accessory to the murder of 49 persons, chiefly women and children of European and mixed European descent." As far as the murder of these poor victims is concerned, I have nothing to allege, the facts have been detailed before the Court in all their horrid minuteness, and they are not such as to be easily forgotten. The cold blooded, hardened villainy that could revel in leading women and young children to the shambles, and this, too, without the miserable apology of imagined wrong, or to the mistaken zeal of religious frenzy, is something so inhuman that the mind might well refuse to accept it as truth, did not all the force of concurrent ideas, of direct testimony, of circumstantial proof, and elsewhere repeated enactings of the same dreadful tragedies, enforce it upon our convictions. It is not then, such admitted facts as the above that I am here called upon to establish. They are unhappily but too prominently and painfully shaped forth to require further illustration. It remains, however, to show how deeply the prisoner stands implicated in this revolting butchery, and whether, as averred in the indictment, he did "feloniously cause and become accessory to the murder of these 49 persons." I shall not, in so doing, attempt to avail myself of that law which makes all persons joining in insurrection and sedition individually responsible for every act of violence that may be committed by those with whom they stand league in illicit combination, even though such acts may have been against their wishes or without their cognisance. I mean, however, separately to consider each

"abundance of room where these English women and children would have been safe in the apartments occupied by the females of his own establishment," where, it is said, "there are secret recesses in which 500 people might be concealed, and where, even had the rebels dared to violate the sanctity of the zenana, all search would have been fruitless," and there being, according to another witness, no scarcity of vacant buildings in the palace in which the ladies and children could have been kept in confinement, and in which they might have had every comfort, this minion of English generosity preferred to select for them the very den set apart for culprits and for felons, and where they even received far worse than a felon's treatment, for they were crowded into a small space, and were daily exposed to the insult and cruelty of all who chose to molest them. Such was the requital to the English for a princely pension and an imperial police! It will be observed, from the statements of Ahsan Ulla Khan and Mrs. Aldnall, that both agree in attributing these measures personally to the king, and when we recollect the trifling matters which were, on every occasion, referred to him, and which, as has been fully demonstrated in this Court, received not only his attention but were endorsed by his own autograph instructions, is there any room left for doubt, that the more important concerns were under his special control also? Indeed, the concurrent testimony of many witnesses, and the irrefutable evidence of his own handwriting, incontestably prove that such was the case. It is thus we find the king appointing the prison, that the king's special armed retainers were always on guard over the prisoners, that it is the king who supplies them with their very indifferent food, and on two occasions sends them some of better quality, and thus, too, the Sultans asked them whether they would consent to become Muhammadans and slaves if the king granted them their lives, and who, on perusing even thus much of the evidence, can doubt that he had the power of doing so? Has there been one single circumstance elicited that shews that the prisoner even wished to save them, or that he even extended to them one act of common courtesy or kindness? Very far from it, for, whilst no check was given to those who showed the prisoners every species of unmanly brutality, the ordinary charity of giving food and water to a Christian was severely punished, and a Muhammadan woman, simply on this account, was actually immured with the prisoners. Can the bitterness of rancour go further than this? Or is it possible to contemplate the place and nature of the confinement fixed for these tender women and children, without coming to the conclusion that a cruel death was from the first moment reserved for them, and that, in the words of the witness, Mukund Lal, "they were but being collected?" Indeed the edge of the sword seems to have been but a merciful deliverance from the lingering death which confinement in so loathsome a den, at such a season of the year, must eventually have inflicted on all exposed to it.

Might I not here stop, and confidently on this point await the decision of the Court against the prisoner? The proof, however, swells in volume as it proceeds, and I mean to leave no portion of it untraced. Guilty, a

"abundance of room where these English women and children would have been safe in the apartments occupied by the females of his own establishment," where, it is said, "there are secret recesses in which 500 people might be concealed, and where, even had the rebels dared to violate the sanctity of the zenana, all search would have been fruitless," and there being, according to another witness, no scarcity of vacant buildings in the palace in which the ladies and children could have been kept in confinement, and in which they might have had every comfort, this minion of English generosity preferred to select for them the very den set apart for culprits and for felons, and where they even received far worse than a felon's treatment, for they were crowded into a small space, and were daily exposed to the insult and cruelty of all who chose to molest them. Such was the requital to the English for a princely pension and an imperial palace! It will be observed, from the statements of Ahsan Ulla Khán and Mrs. Aldwell, that both agree in attributing these measures personally to the king, and when we recollect the trifling matters which were, on every occasion, referred to him, and which, as has been fully demonstrated in this Court, received not only his attention but were endorsed by his own autograph in instructions, is there any room left for doubt, that the more important concerns were under his special control also? Indeed, the concurrent testimony of many witnesses, and the irrefutable evidence of his own handwriting, incontestably prove that such was the case. It is thus we find the king appointing the prison, that the king's special armed retainers were always on guard over the prisoners, that it is the king who supplies them with their very indifferent food, and on two occasions sends them some of better quality, and thus, too, the Sepoys asked them whether they would consent to become Muhammadans and slaves if the king granted them their lives, and who, on perusing even thus much of the evidence, can doubt that he had the power of doing so? Has there been one single circumstance elicited that shows that the prisoner even wished to save them, or that he even extended to them one act of common courtesy or kindness? Very far from it, for, whilst no check was given to those who showed the prisoners every species of unmanly brutality, the ordinary charity of giving food and water to a Christian was severely punished, and a Muhammadan woman, simply on this account, was actually immured with the prisoners. Can the bitterness of uncourtesy go further than this? Or is it possible to contemplate the place and nature of the confinement fixed for these tender women and children, without coming to the conclusion that a cruel death was from the first moment reserved for them, and that, in the words of the witness, Mukund Lal, "they were but being collected?" Indeed the edge of the sword seems to have been but a merciful deliverance from the lingering death which confinement in so loathsome a den, at such a season of the year, must eventually have inflicted on all exposed to it.

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chaprissi or messenger, has distinctly stated that, a couple of days before the massacre took place, it was known that the Europeans would be killed in two days, and that, on the day fixed for the slaughter arriving, great crowds of people were flocking to the palace. Every witness to the scene who has spoken of it in Court has alluded to the crowds assembled, both as spectators and actors, on the morning in question, and, as this was at the early hour of between eight and nine, there seems no doubt that previous information of what was to take place must have been given. Nothing indicates that an outburst of fury, either on the part of the populace or military, in any way led to a catastrophe so awful. On the contrary, the witness distinctly says that without orders it could not have happened, and that there were but two sources from which such an order could have emanated, viz, the king and his son, Mirzá Mughul, adding, that he does not know which of them gave the order. He, however, distinctly states that he was present at the murder of these European prisoners, and that he saw them all standing together, surrounded on all sides by the king's special armed retainers, or what you may term his body-guard, and some of the infantry mutineers, and that, though he did not observe any signal or order given, yet, on a sudden, the men just mentioned drew their swords, simultaneously attacked the prisoners, and continued cutting at them till they had killed them all. A second witness, viz, Chaul Lál, the news-writer, when asked by whose orders these Europeans were murdered, distinctly replies that "it was done by the king's order, who else could have given such an order?" He and other witnesses concur in stating that Mirzá Mughul, the king's son, from the top of his house which overlooked the court-yard, was a spectator on this occasion, this Mirzá Mughul being at that time second only to the king himself in authority. Is it credible, then, under such circumstances, that the king's own body-guard, his special armed retainers, could have dared to perpetrate this frightful butchery without his order and against his wishes? If a doubt could be entertained on such a subject, it would, I think, be speedily dispelled on a perusal of the writings evidently approved by the prisoner, in which bloodthirstiness and sanguinary ferocity against the English are so glaringly conspicuous. In reference to the presence of Mirzá Mughul, and in further proof that it was by the king's own orders that these unhappy women and children were massacred, I shall quote the testimony of the king's own secretary, Mukund Lál. To the question, "By whose order were the ladies and children that were prisoners in the palace murdered?" he replies, "These people were being collected for three days, on the fourth day, the infantry and cavalry soldiers, accompanied by Mirzá Mughul, came to the entrance of the king's private apartments, and requested the king's permission to kill them. The king was at this time in his own apartments. Mirzá Mughul and Basant Ali Khán went inside, while the soldiery remained without. They returned in about 20 minutes, when Basant Ali Khán publicly, and in a loud voice, proclaimed that the king had given his permission for the slaughter of the prisoners, and that they could take them away. Accordingly, the king's armed

retainers, in whose custody the prisoners had been, took them from the place of confinement, and, in connexion with some of the mutinous soldiery, killed them." It appears, then, Mirzá Mughul had just come from the prisoner's presence, and I was armed with his authority for carrying out this most hideous deed of blood. It may seem almost superfluous to add anything to the above; but the proof furnished by the extract from the prisoner's diary is so important and convincing that I feel bound to quote it. The evidence of the physician, Ashan Ulla Khán, regarding it, is as follows: "Was a Court diary of occurrences at the palace kept by order of the king during the rebellion?"—*Answer*. "The Court diary was kept up as usual, according to the custom which had long preceded the outbreak." *Question*, "Look at this leaf, and see whether you can recognise the handwriting on it?"—*Answer*. "Yes, it is in the handwriting of the man who kept the Court diary, and this leaf is a portion of it."

TRANSLATION of an Extract from the Court diary, for the 16th of May, 1857.

"The king held his court in the Hall of Special Audience, 49 English were prisoners, and the army demanded that they should be given over to them for slaughter. The king delivered them up, saying, 'The army may do as they please,' and the prisoners were consequently put to the sword. There was a large attendance, and all the chiefs, nobles, officers, and writers presented themselves at court, and had the honour of paying their respects."

Here, then, we have oral as well as most unimpeachable written testimony, all concurring on this point, and it would seem nearly impossible to make the proof clearer, had we not the prisoner's written confession of the crime. I do not mean in his defence, which is simply a document framed for this Court, and is but a mere tissue of false denials, without an effort at refuting what stands so prominently against him. I allude, of course, to his long letter to his son, Mirzá Mughul, in which he actually makes merit of the slaughter of his Christian prisoners, and urges it as a reason why the soldiery should be more attentive to his commands. After this, to prolog any argument on the subject would be improper. There is, then, but the last portion of the fourth charge uncommented on, and to establish it we have copies of circulars addressed from the King to Ráo Bhara, the Ruler of Kach Bhuj, to Ranjit Singh, Chief of Jaisalmer, and to Itájah Guláb Singh, of Jammu. The following extracts will be sufficient, viz.:—

To Rao Bhara, Ruler of Kach.

"It has been reported that you, ever-faithful one, have put the whole of the infidels to the sword, and have thoroughly cleansed and purified your dominions of their unclean presence. We have been extremely gratified to hear of such conduct on your part, and you are therefore

honoured with this address, to the intent that you will institute such arrangements through your territory as that none of the creatures of God may in any way be aggrieved or oppressed. Further, should any number of the infidels reach your dominions by sea, you will have them slain. In doing this you will act entirely in accordance with our pleasure and wishes."

To Ranjit Singh, Chief of Jaisalmir.

"It is clear to our belief that throughout your dominions the name and trace of these ill-omened infidels, the English, must not have remained; if, however, by any chance or possibility some have escaped till now by keeping hidden and concealed, first slay them, and after that, having made arrangements for the administration of your territory, present yourself at our court with your whole military following. Considerations and friendliness a thousand-fold will be bestowed on you, and you will be distinguished by elevation to dignities and places which the compass of your qualifications will not have capacity to contain."

To Rajah Gulab Singh, Ruler of Jammu.

"I have been made acquainted, by your petition, with all the particulars of the slaughter throughout your territory of the accursed unbelieving English. You are considered worthy of a hundred commendations. You have acted in this matter as all brave men ever acquit themselves, may you live and prosper." Again "Come to the royal presence, and slay the accursed, unbelieving English, and all other enemies, wherever you may find them on the way. Whatever may be your hopes and expectations, the dignity and elevation to which you will be promoted amongst your equals will surpass all that you may be able to imagine, and you will further be rewarded and dignified with the title of *Rajah*." On one of the petitions to the king from a darsadar of the 4th Irregular Cavalry, boasting of having murdered his officers at Mazaffarnagar, the order for an appointment in return is in the prisoner's own handwriting.

"I herewith conclude my observations on the charges, and it will now remain, gentlemen, for you by your verdict to determine whether the prisoner at your bar, in retirement and seclusion, may yet claim the respect due to deposed majesty, or whether he must henceforth rank merely as one of the great criminals of history. It will be for you to pronounce whether this last king of the imperial house of Taimur shall this day depart from his ancestral palace, bent down by age and by misfortune, but elevated, perhaps, by the dignity of his sufferings and the long borne calamities of his race, or whether this magnificent hall of audience, this shrine of the higher majesty of justice, shall this day achieve its crowning triumph in a verdict which shall record to this and to all ages that kings by crime are degraded to felons, and that the long glories of a dynasty may be for ever effaced in a day.

"The consideration of the specific charges against the prisoner being now

supported by our experiences of both. The great bulk of the infantry portion of the native army was undoubtedly Hindu, but we have not found this any check or restraint upon their revolting barbarity, and, as far as the army has been concerned, Hindus and Muhammadans appear to have vied with each other only in the enormity of their crimes. But, apart from the army, the revolt has perhaps assumed many of the features of a Musalmán conspiracy, and it is, I think, probable that to Musalmán intrigue may eventually be traced those false and fabricated rumours which, adroitly mixed up with some small portion of truth, have been so instrumental in effacing the last vestiges of fidelity in an army whose faithfulness was at one time perhaps its very chiefest pride and boast. It does not belong to such an occasion as this to revert to past years, and step by step to trace the causes which have combined to destroy the reliance once placed upon those who are now so notorious for their perfidy. Some of these causes doubtless have been beyond Government control, and were, perhaps, inherent to a state of continued progress on the one side, and an inveterate and mostly opposition to it on the other. It will be sufficient if I here more fully allude to several previous occasions, not of very distant date, when some regiments of the native army showed how little they were to be depended on. On these occasions also it was evident that a unity of purpose and a singleness of feeling were in a short time organised by some process not immediately patent to their European officers, a mutual correspondence either by emissaries or letters was perhaps then initiated, and the lesson thus learnt was not easily forgotten. I do not mean to argue that from that time the native Indian army became one large debating society, very far from it, I believe that in their own fashion most of the Sipáhis were good and well meaning servants of the Government. I say, in their own fashion, because it appears to me they are always deficient in natural firmness, and have no idea of strong moral rectitude, their fidelity, as long as it exists, is more of a habit than of true religion. Among such a body as this there must always be some discontented intriguers, and who that knows anything of Asiatic character will not readily admit, especially with reference to Hindus, that the few are more potent for evil than the many for good? Let but three or four leaders come forth in all the open audacity of crime, or mix themselves up in the secret intrigues of sedition, and the rest, if not immediately panic-struck, never think it their duty to check or oppose them. They may excuse themselves for a time, by holding aloof from what they do not approve, but active interference, even in prevention of mutiny and murder, seems to form no part of their creed, either religious or political. The most serious crimes are thus passively encouraged, and, temporary immunity securing proselytes, all are eventually engulfed in the same depths of infamy: thus the crimes of a few lead to the ruin of many. That these influences have been vigorously at work in extending the late rebellion I think few will be inclined to deny. I am aware that no correspondence, and perhaps little direct evidence to such a point has been brought

before the Court, indeed, in reference to the Sepoys, we have not been in a position to obtain either one or the other; still, if, as has been currently and, I believe, truly reported, that the number of letters passing among our native soldiers, for a month or two prior to the outbreak was very considerably larger than usual, this circumstance, combined with such facts as have come under our notice, would lead almost resistibly to the conclusion that some sinister agitation had been extensively at work, and that increased disaffection and subordination would necessarily be the result, moreover, that in such a state revolt would reduce itself to a mere calculation of time. In the above remarks I have attributed much of what has occurred to the pernicious influence of evil instigators, and it may naturally be inquired why these should have had greater effect at the present juncture than at any former one. Some of the causes I have already hinted at, such as the annexation of Oudh and the progress of European civilization, outstriking, and in its natural course threatening to sweep away the many barriers upraised by priestly cunning for the preservation of the grossest ignorance, and thus commencing the subversion of religions that are unable to bear the lights of even natural science. I believe, too, that the propagandists of sedition may artfully have availed themselves of some recent acts of the Government to spread panic and alarm in reference to future forcible interference with caste prejudices. I allude to the agitation about the remarriage of Hindu widows, the enlistment for general service, the cartridges, &c. I do not mean in this to offer the slightest apology for men whose conduct excites nothing but hatred and disgust. Pampered in their pride and besotted in their ignorance, they had as a body become too self-sufficient for military subordination and unhesitating obedience. Experienced, as they were, in mutual combination, they appear again easily to have entered into schemes for dictating to the Government their views in reference to imagined grievances; but that open, defiant mutiny had been generally resolved upon by the army—or, at any rate, by the Hindu portion of it, prior to the trial of the 3rd Light Cavalry troopers—is more, I think, than has been established. Up to that time there was, no doubt, a feeling of uneasiness, a restless apprehension, and an air of respectful mutiny pervading the native ranks. The Sepoys in many instances appeared to imagine that disobedience to military command was scarcely criminal if accompanied by a salute and a submissive demeanour. Habituated to combination, and well aware of the strength of numbers, they latterly had seldom lost an opportunity of bringing forward their grievances, not individually, but in masses. On such points there was no difference between Musalman and Hindu, they could both readily unite, and had already done so, for the purposes of insolent dictation. Indeed, if we search back into history, I believe we shall find that this has ever been what I may term the normal condition of Asiatic armies, and it is, perhaps, the necessary result of giving unity and power to large bodies of men without the checks furnished by education, loyalty, and religious principle to control them. military discipline without these auxiliaries is

but a dangerous weapon, and one that has frequently been turned against those who have sharpened and prepared it. As a corollary to this, it may be observed that rebellion and insurrection among the unarmed and untutored people of Asia is rare indeed, even the forcible conversion of the Hindus to Muhammadanism under former emperors of India seems to have been insufficient to rouse them to resistance. It is, then, the attempt at domination by the Sipsis alone that has to be guarded against. The distinctions of caste may, to a certain extent, at former periods have proved serious obstacles to any very extensive combination of men of different sects, either for political or other purposes, but we should remember that this very circumstance of caste-companionship has necessitated the existence of a number of distinct self-governing societies, has habituated the people of Hindustan to meetings among themselves where publicity is avoided and thus, giving them their primary lessons in uniting for particular objects, has endowed them with a natural facility for more extended combinations, of a secret and sinister character. Under these circumstances, there wanted but the means and the occasion for carrying them out, and who does not perceive that the native army afforded the one, and a variety of incidents have favoured the other? Brahman and Musalmán here met, as it were, upon a neutral ground, they have had in the army one common brotherhood of profession, the same dress, the same rewards, the same objects to be arrived at by the same means. They frequently joined each other in their separate festivals, and the union encouraged by the favour of the Government was finally resorted to as a measure to subvert it. I do not, however, intend to dwell on all of the many influences which may have assisted in bringing about the recent catastrophe, such a discussion in this place might not be approved of.

It seems to me, however, apparent that it was not and could not have been the greased cartridges alone that effected it. There was previous preparation among the Sipsis, and there was also a general unsettling of men's minds throughout the country, and among the Muhammadans in particular. I believe, indeed, that the facts alluded to this point may be ranged appropriately under the head of "Muhammadan conspiracy," the chief object of which seems to have been to spread disaffection and distrust of British rule, and, by the dissemination of false and evil reports, and by fabrications of the most insidious kind, to prepare all the people for chaos and insurrection. As far as can be traced, the commencement of this must have originated with the prisoner, or with some of those such as Hasan Azhari and others, who were admitted to his most secret and confidential councils. Be this as it may, there cannot, I imagine, be a doubt that in sending Sidi Kambar to Persia and Constantinople as an ambassador with letters to the sovereigns of that country, soliciting aid and elevation to a throne, the prisoner became the principal in a conspiracy which indirectly, at any rate, must have been auxiliary to the recent frightful outbreak and its attendant horrors. It is worthy of particular notice, as connecting the two together, that this Sidi Kambar's departure took place, according to the most reliable account, just two years before

May 1857, and that his promised return, with the aid sought for, was fixed for the time when the outbreak actually took place. Coupling this with the prophecy among the Muhammadans that English sovereignty in India was to cease 100 years after its first establishment by the battle of Plassey in 1757, we are able to form something more than conjecture as to the causes which have given to Muhammadan fanaticism its delusive hope of recovering all its former prestige. I have already alluded to the dream of Hasan Askari the priest, and its interpretation so piously contrived to correspond with the wishes of the king, and of those about him. The circumstance may seem trivial to us, but it was doubtless a means well calculated to make a deep impression upon the superstitious minds of those to whom it was addressed, and to cause expectation and belief in what was predicted by one said to be possessed of miraculous powers, and accredited with holding direct communication with Heaven. We learn too from the petition of Muhammad Darvesh to Mr Colvin the Lieutenant Governor, dated 27th of March, 1857, that Hasan Askari had, at this time, assured the King of Dehli that he had certain information that the prince royal of Persia had fully taken possession of an occupied Bushir, and that he had entirely expelled the Christians, or, rather, had not left one alive there, and had taken away many of them prisoners, and that, very soon indeed, the Persian army would advance by the way of Kandahar and Kabul towards Dehli. He, moreover, added, "That in the palace, but more especially in that portion of it constituting the personal apartments of the king, the subject of the conversation night and day was the early arrival of the Persians. Hasan Askari has, moreover, impressed the king with the belief that he has learned, through a divine revelation, that the dominion of the King of Persia will to a certainty extend to Dehli, or rather over the whole of Hindustan, and that the splendour of the sovereignty of Dehli will again revive as the sovereign of Persia will bestow the crown on the king." The writer goes on to say that throughout the palace, but particularly to the king, this belief has been the cause of great rejoicing, so much so that prayers are offered and vows made, while, at the same time, Hasan Askari has entered upon the daily performance, at an hour and a half before sunset, of a course of propitiatory ceremonies to expedite the arrival of the Persians and the expulsion of the Christians. It has been arranged that every Thursday several trays of victuals, wheat meal, oil, copper money and cloth should be sent by the king in aid of these ceremonies, and they are accordingly brought to Hasan Askari."

We thus see how early and how deeply the priesthood interested and engaged themselves in this matter, and how completely and exclusively Muhammadan in character was this conspiracy. If we could but have stepped behind the scenes, and witnessed these ceremonies at which superstition presided, and have heard these prayers and vows offered up for the arrival of the Persians and the expulsion of the Christians, we should doubtless have had depicted to us the foreshadowings of those dreadful tragedies which, to this time, will remain hauntingly remembered.

table. We may imagine and faintly conceive to ourselves some portion of the rancour of these Muhammadans, when we recollect not only their deeds, but the concentrated hatred which breathes through their petitions, and does not stop with this world, but rejoices in the idea of eternal torments for us hereafter. One cannot help inquiring whether there are really many millions of human beings in Hindustan imbued with these feelings for Europeans. I will leave those who hear me to form their own opinions on this subject without venturing to proffer mine. We learn, however, from Mrs. Aldwell that during the Muharram festival she heard the Muhammadan women praying and teaching their children to pray for the success of their faith, and these prayers were generally accompanied by execrations against the English. Nor did even accomplishing the cruel death and sufferings of helpless women and children tend in any way to abate the ferocity of their malignity, or to waken one chord of mercy or commiseration in their breasts, for we find from the local newspapers that at the time this most hideous massacre was being perpetrated about 200 Musalmán were standing at the reservoir, uttering the coarsest abuse against the prisoners. Were it not too well attested, such demoniac malignity would scarcely be credible.

The next point to which I shall advert, is the circulation of the chapatties, in the form of ship biscuits. Now, whether they were sent round under the fiction of a Government order, signifying that in future there should be but one food and one faith, or whether, according to another interpretation, they were meant to sound a note of alarm and preparation, giving warning to the people to stand by one another on any danger menacing them, the contrivance was a most insidious one, and calculated to breed distrust and suspicion in the hearts of many who were strangers to such feelings before. That it created no stronger impression on the native mind than it did, is perhaps attributable only to the early check it received at the hands of authority, and it would doubtless be both interesting and important if we could discover how and by whom such a proceeding was initiated. This and the false rumour about mixing ground bones with the flour had doubtless one common origin, and it is not going beyond the bounds of fair indication or reasonable inference to attribute both one and the other to the unceasing wiles of Muhammadan conspiracy. We perceive that the Hindu Sanyásis, under the impulse of a first reaction in their feelings, reproached the Muhammadans with misleading them, and it is a most significant fact on these proceedings, that though we come upon traces of Musalmán intrigue wherever our investigation has carried us, yet not one paper has been found to show that the Hindus, as a body, had been conspiring against us, or that their Brahmins and priests had been preaching a crusade against Christians. In their case there has been no king to set up, no religion to be propagated by the sword. To attribute to them, under such circumstances, the circulation of these chapatties or the fabrications about ground bones in the flour, would be to ascribe to them acts without a meaning, and a criminal deception without any adequate motive. A very marked feature in the

Muhammadan conspiracy is the activity and persistence with which it has been carried out, the circulation of the chapaties having been early prohibited by authority, and thus rendered non-effective for the purpose of extensive sedition, some other expedient was necessary to replace it, and we at once find the tale of the "bone-dust mingled with flour" very adroitly selected as the substitute. It was, in fact, still adhering to the material of chapaties, and continuing the symbol of "one food, one faith." It was indeed the chapaty without its form, and without its inconvenience. The schemers had apparently learnt that the chapaty was too specific and too tangibly open to European interference to be largely availed of as an agent for evil, and hence its transformation into flour, the bone dust being added to the one as the equivalent of the form of the ship biscuit to the other. To give out, then, that such was the nature of the flour stored at all the depots of supplies along the Grand Trunk Road, for from them, during their marches, the Sipáhis are in a manner compelled to get their food, was to attain the very object the conspirators must have most desired. If true, the Government had already commenced what would be deemed forcible conversion to Christianity. If they could, then, but establish a firm and general belief in this, the game was in their own hands, and that they did succeed in doing this to a very great extent it, I imagine, undeniable. I must own that to me this apparently natural transition from the chapaties to its component parts seems a master stroke of cunning, and evidenced most able leadership in the cause the conspirators were embarked in.

To prove, moreover, that no mean order of talent was at work, and that all the appliances that craft and treachery could avail themselves of were resorted to we have only to refer to the extracts from the "Authentic News," and also to the other native publications of that period, and we shall perceive with what steadfast consistency the ulterior aim is always kept in view. The chapaties, the bone-dust in the flour, the greased cartridges, were all most appropriate for the Hindus, but a different pabulum was requisite for the Musalmáns, and we shall now see with what subtlety it was administered. The first paper commences by announcing that the King of Persia had ordered a concentration of most of his troops at Teheran, and then, declaring it to be currently reported that such a demonstration against Dost Muhammad Khán was only a strategic move to cloak the King of Persia's real design of fighting against and conquering the English, the editor makes certain that, at any rate, some change of feeling has taken place amongst the three powers. The next extract is dated the 26th of January, 1857, and commences by asserting that all the news papers agree in declaring that the King of France and the Emperor of Turkey had not as yet openly avowed themselves the allies of either the English or the Persians but that their ambassadors were secretly visiting and presenting their gifts to both belligerents. "Some people," says the editor, "think that the King of France and the Emperor of Turkey will not mix themselves up in the quarrels between the Persians and the English, but most people," he adds, "say that they will both side with

the Persians. As for the Russians, however, they make no secret of the readiness with which they are assisting, and will continue to assist, the Persians, whether it be with funds or with forces. It may be said that virtually the Russians are the cause of the war, and that, using the Persians as a cloak, they intend to consummate their own designs regarding the conquest of Hindustan. It is to be believed that the Russians will soon take the field in great force." Here, then, we have not only Persia and Russia advancing immediately upon India with immense armies, but France and Turkey to assist them, while the forsaken and devoted English are represented as by no means sure even of the alliance of the Afghans under Dost Muhammad. Well might the editor, after announcing such formidable coalitions, somewhat dramatically exclaim, "Let the readers of the 'Authentic News' be prepared to see what the veil of futurity will disclose." Accordingly, in the next extract, we perceive that "the King of Persia had solemnly promised to his courtiers the governorships of the different presidencies and places one is to get Bombay, another Calcutta, and a third Puna, "while the crown of Hindustan is plainly spoken of as reserved for bestowal on the King of Dehli, this very prisoner before us. You will recollect, gentlemen, that several copies of this paper, the 'Authentic News,' used to be sent to the palace, and one can imagine the joy and exultation with which such passages must have been perused, especially when added thereto is the assertion that the Emperor of Russia had sent an effective and thoroughly appointed army of 400,000 men with abundant munitions, to assist the King of Persia in his hostile designs upon India. But it was not in the palace, and by the princes alone, that such paragraphs were read with avidity, the whole population was intent on them. Sir Theophilus Metcalfe has told us that the subject of the advance of the Persians upon Herat was much discussed among the natives, and frequently in connexion with the idea of Russian aggression upon India, every newspaper having at this time its correspondent in Kabul. Nor indeed did the discussion and interest excited by these concocted hostile movements cease here, for the same witness declares that agitation about this time prevailed among the Sipahis and that about five or six weeks before the outbreak it was currently reported in their lines, and much discussed among them, that 100,000 Russians were coming from the north, and that the Company's government would be destroyed, and in fact that the idea of a Russian invasion was universally prevalent. The venom and virus of these false publications were then taking their intended effect, and it would seem a mere perversion of reason longer to blind ourselves with the idea that the outbreak was fortuitous, or that a greased cartridge occasioned it. In a former article of the 'Authentic News,' we have seen Dost Muhammad alluded to as but a doubtful ally of the English. In this one, however, as events progress, he is spoken of as being secretly in league with the King of Persia, and, that superstitious aid may not be lost sight of, it is remarked how wonderfully four distinct unexpected coincidences had impelled the King of Persia to declare war against the

English. The first was that Herát, in another place described as the key of India, had so easily fallen into his possession, the second, the unforeseen coming of the Russians to assist him, the third, the nobles of Persia unanimously counselling an advance on India, and predicting that God would bestow victory, and the fourth, the simultaneous rising and assembling of the whole of Persia for the prosecution of a religious war. Portents and miracles were likewise brought forward still further to excite the Muhammadan mind as the following extract from the "Authentic News," dated 15th of September, 1856, will sufficiently prove. It is headed—

"Local News from the Hânsi District.

"A man just come from the country tells the editor that, unlike other places, the Huli is being burnt there at this season of the year, and the saturnalia attending the festival are now going on. The man who states this ascertained, on inquiry, that the reason for the unreasonable observance of this festival is, that three girls were born at a birth, and the three spoke immediately. The first said 'The coming year will be one of great calamities, various calamitous visitations will afflict the nation' the second said 'Those who live will see,' and the third, in an impressive and forcible tone, said 'If the Hindus burn the Huli in the present season, they will escape all these evils. God alone is omniscient.'"

It is too much, I am afraid, the case, with persons accustomed to European habits of thinking to view such statements and articles as these merely in reference to the impression they would be likely to make on themselves. The taking of Herát, the predictions of the nobles, &c., and the fabulous prophecies of these girls would, in that case, receive hardly passing attention. But we should commit a grievous and most fatal error if we were to gauge Asiatic thoughts and understandings by the same measure that would be applicable to our own. If, avoiding this mistake, we proceed to consider the above editorials in relation to the people they were written for, we shall find that they are not only most insidiously worked up to meet their peculiar prejudices, but are also made to bear a striking affinity to the fulfilment of their prophecies, to the dreams of Hasan Askari, to the negotiations of Sidi Kambar, and to the ancient traditions of Muhammadanism. Are we, then, to suppose that in all this there was no connexion between the palace and the press? Were all these concurrences fortuitous? Can it be that the dreams of the priests, the plots of the court, and the fabrications of the newspapers worked accidentally together? We have already seen the decoys by which the Hindu Sijâhis were to be gulled, and is it not the same spirit of evil that we can recognise here? Are the circumstances appealing to Muhammadan pride, to their superstitious bigotry, to their lust for religious war, and to their hatred for the English, dwelt upon with a less perfect knowledge of their peculiar inferences? In an extract from the 'Authentic News,' dated the 19th of March, it is stated that 900 Persian soldiers, with some officers of high rank, had entered India, and that 500 more

were then saying in Delhi itself in various disguises. It is true that this is given out on the authority of one Sadik Khán, a person whose identity not being established, was evidently in disguise even to his name, but this very circumstance was no doubt a part of the scheme. It gave an air of greater mystery to the announcement of the paper, and seems to have been purposely contrived to let the imagination of the readers supply an exaggerated idea of his real rank and importance. How, it may be asked, even under this cloak of a false name, could such a statement be given forth in the leading newspaper of the city without some deep and ulterior object? It not only has this deep conspiracy to the Persians, but, if false, as we know it to have been, is proof of conspiracy in the editor and those who employed him. This name of Sadik Khán, as it remembered, was the one attached to the proclamation purporting to be from Persia, and put up in the Jammi Masjid. The proclamation, then, and the assertion about those 900 Persian soldiers, were evidently parts of one and the same scheme, and seem to have been thus linked together that they one might, in a measure, support the other. If, for instance, any questioned the authority of the proclamation, there was the answer ready that the bringer of it was actually in the city with 500 other Persians also in disguise, and *vice versa*. If the advent of the Persians was disbelieved, was not the proclamation a voucher of its reality? The same depth of artifice is apparent everywhere, and the more we consider the subject the more fully convinced we shall be of the wiles and stratagems so systematically resorted to. For instance, what would such a proclamation as that attributed to the King of Persia have been without some demonstration, feigned or real, to support it? The sword depicted on one side, and the shield on the other, would have been equally meaningless but for the story of the men in disguise, and the officers of high rank who evidently must have been deputed to carry it through. The proclamation, so evidently false, is, for that very reason, one of our truest and most reliable expositors of conspiracy, and of Musalmán conspiracy too. It is, in fact, impossible to account for it under any other hypothesis. Who, then, was it that dictated and wrote the proclamation? This question, I believe, could be answered in every detail by the editor of the paper, who has recurred to it so frequently. It is evidently a pet subject of his, one on which he seems to be thoroughly at home. He has the exact transcript of it, is able to epitomise it, and no doubt was equally well informed as to the preparation of it.

I do not mean to wade through and to quote all the extracts from the newspapers that bear out the fact of a Muhammedan conspiracy. That appears to me unnecessary, for I believe I shall have no difficulty in establishing it by other testimony. However, there is one other extract, which it would be wrong to leave unnoticed. It bears date the 28th of April, and must have been the origin of the report that Sir Theophilus Metcalfe alludes to, when he says that, about fifteen days before the outbreak, it was currently reported that an anonymous petition had been presented to the magistrate, stating, "that the Kashmir gate would be

taken from the English. This being the chief stronghold in the city and main connexion with the cantonments of Delhi, it would naturally be the first point seized in any attempt at insurrection in the city, and, being the only gate at which there was any military guard, the importance of it, in a strategical point of view, must have been obvious to all." Sir Theophilus Metcalfe proceeds to say, "that this petition was never received, but that the current report about it was indicative of what was then occupying the thoughts of many of the natives." So, no doubt, it was, but it was also much more than this, for it was the real exposition of an article which the editor dare not, without disguising it, put into print. With what ingenuity and craft the idea is worked out, so as to become intelligible only to those who were meant to understand it, must now be obvious to all. The editor says several petitions have been given into the magistrate's court, and in these it is also mentioned that "a month hence from this date an overwhelming attack will be made on Kashmir, of the salubrity and beauty of which a poet has said, 'that should a parched and burnt-up soul reach Kashmir, though he might be a roasted fowl, he would recover his wings and feathers,' and that this cool and heavenly country will come into the possession of the writers of the petition." Now, it may be asked, were the writers of the petitions given into the magistrate's court at Delhi to take Kashmir, and who did not now perceive that the Kashmir gate of the city of Delhi was thus indicated by the country from which it derives its name, and that the salubrity and beauty of the former were to represent the importance, and its fitness for their objects, of the latter? I shall not here pause to consider whether, under the simile of a parched and burnt-up fowl, the prisoner before us was intended. No no doubt expected to recover some of his lost plumage by seizing the gate, and with it was meditating a flight to a higher elevation. In declaring on the 13th of April, that in one month from that date, an overwhelming attack would be made on this very point—for it was here the officers were shot down—the editor of the "Authentic News" was either the confidant and accomplice of conspiracy, or had soared into the regions of actual prophecy.

The coincidence of the above cautiously worded announcement of the editor, and the indiscreet revelations of Jawan Bakht, are certainly startling. The doubly foretold attack took place on the 11th of May, and, after what has been proved in regard to Muhammadan treachery, is there any one who hears me that can believe that a deep-planned and well concerted conspiracy had nothing to do with it?

The proofs of the intimate connexion of the prisoner with it do not, however, rest here, for Mujib, the Abyssinian, who was not merely in the service of the king, but was his private special attendant, and was always near his person takes Mr Everett aside and tells him that he had better leave the Company's service, and, with his troop, go over to the king, as this hot weather the Russians would be all over the place. Mr Everett seems to have laughed at this, and to have thought it but the man's foolishness, but we have now direct proof that it was something far

deeper than that, for at their next meeting, which occurred about a month after the outbreak had been accomplished, Mnyud says to him, "Did I not tell you to come away?" And then, as it were in explanation of the warning, proceeds to reveal to him the whole of the Sidh Kambhar transaction how, two years before, he had been sent to Constantinople as ambassador from the King of Delhi, how he had started on the pretence of going to Mekka, and how he had promised that he would return when the two years had expired. His explanation seems to be a very remarkable one. It shows clearly that it was not merely on the basis of an expected disturbance at Mirath that such a proposal was made, but that a far wider web of sedition was weaving. Who can now believe that none of the Muhammadan native officers and men of the regiments at Delhi and Mirath had been tampered with? Mr. Everett, as a Christian, was surely one of the last the conspirators would apply to. It should be remembered likewise, that Mr. Everett had none of his regiment with him at Delhi, and that, had there been any Musalmán officers of the corps present, they would doubtless have been preferred to a Christian. At the time too when the application was made to him the sentence of the Mirath court-martial must have been unknown in Delhi. It was not, then, as a consequence of, but as an addition and an adjunct to, what was anticipated at Mirath, that preparation was being made here; and by whom was this being done? Could a mere private servant and personal attendant, however great and favourite he might be, offer service to a risaldar and a whole troop of cavalry, withdrawing their allegiance from the Government, without any authority for so doing from his master? Who could have given the king's service to so large a body but the king himself? I would beg those who hear me, seriously to consider these questions, and then determine whether the answers to them do not bring home personal complicity in compassing the rebellion, to the prisoner in Court. We have been informed, too, by Mnyud Lal, the secretary, that it is now about three years since some infantry soldiers stationed at Delhi became disciples of the king, and that, on that occasion, the king gave each of them a document detailing the names and order of those who had preceded him in the direct line of disciples to each other, himself included, together with a muslin dyed pink as an emblem of his blessing. Now, three years ago from the present date is about the time of Sidh Kambhar's embassy to Paris, and of the apparent first commencement of Muhammadan conspiracy; and it certainly is a somewhat instructive fact to find that the occasion chosen for such an unwonted manifestation of piety on the one hand, and such an unusual display of kingly condescension on the other, was precisely that in which intimate relations between them of a more political character were beginning to be thought of. The Agent of the Lieutenant Governor, of course, put a stop to these exhibitions, but from that day, adds the witness, it may be said that a sort of understanding was established between the army and the king. I think it will be conceded, that in addition to the charge five facts have been established, viz., the concerted dreams and predictions of Hasan Ashraf, the priest;

the mission to Persia and Constantinople of Sidi Kambur, the Ahriman; a deliberate continuous plan of exciting distrust and revolt among the Hindus, a similar plan, by the fabrications of the native press, for inciting the Musalmans to a religious war, and lastly, by these means and others, an indirect, and also a personal, tampering with the fidelity of the Hindus and Musalmans of the native army. Has or has not a guilty participation in all these five points been traced to the prisoner? If the question (as I believe it will be) should be answered in the affirmative, there will still remain another to be responded to, of perhaps still greater importance, viz., Has he in these transactions been the leader, or the led? has he been the original mover, the head and front of the undertaking, or has he been but the consenting tool, the willing instrument in the hands of others, the forward, unscrupulous, but still pliant puppet, tutored by priestly craft for the advancement of religious bigotry? Many persons, I believe, will incline to the latter. The known restless spirit of Muhammadan fanaticism has been the first aggressor, the vindictive intolerance of that peculiar faith has been struggling for mastery, seditious conspiracy has been its means, the prisoner its active accomplice, and every possible crime the frightful result. It was, however, rather as the head of the Muhammadan religion in India than as the descendant of a line of kings that I believe the prisoner's influences were desired, the one indeed is so inseparable from the other that it is difficult to say where the difference commences. It was the union of the two, the religious and the political, that gave such importance to the prisoner as one of the abettors of conspiracy.

• Thus the bitter zeal of Muhammadanism meets us everywhere. It is conspicuous in the papers, flagrant in the petitions, and perfectly demonic in its actions. There seems, indeed, scarce any exemption from its contagious touch. The Prince Mirzá Abdulla, robbing his confiding visitor and former friend, and then sending his uncle to compass her death, seems no exaggerated instance of it. It is again represented by the Muhammadan officer Mirza Taki Beg, at Pasháwar, who, while in high employment and pay by the British Government, complacently quotes from his books that a change will take place, and that the British rule will soon be overthrown. It finds a still more unmistakable disciple in Karim Baksh, of the Dehli Magazine, who, while drawing English pay, avails himself of his scholarship and knowledge of Persian to send circulars to the native regiments to the effect that the cartridges prepared in the magazine had been smeared with a composition of fat, and that the Sikhs were not to believe their European officers if they said anything in contradiction of it. It will be recollected how active in his enmity this man proved when the King's troops were attacking the magazine, how he kept up a secret communication with them, and how completely he identified himself, from the commencement, with the conspirators. Can there be a doubt that he was one of those who had been successfully tampered with, that, while ostensibly serving the English, he was, in reality, in the pay and confidence of those seeking their destruction?

But why multiply instances of this sort? I would gladly cite some of a different tendency, and the petition of Muhammad Darwesh, in his admirable letter to Mr. Colvin, must not be passed over. It is one noble instance of faithfulness from a Muhammadan to the British. I am sorry I cannot class with it the petition purporting to be from Nubi Baksh Khan to the king, pronouncing it unlawful to slay women, and calling for a decree to that effect from the doctors of the Muhammadan religion, for since I delivered the paper into Court considerable doubt has been thrown on its having been written at the time indicated, and it seems by no means improbable that it was fabricated after the capture of Delhi, for the purpose of obtaining rewards and other advantages. Indeed, a further attentive perusal of it has convinced me that it is so; for no one in the situation of Nubi Baksh Khan would have dared to advise or propose to the king to let the soldiery first wreak their rage on his own royal person, as Nubi Baksh Khan pretends to have done. There are certainly a few instances in which the Muhammadans have behaved with kindness to the English, and not the less pleasing on account of the humble grades in which these instances occur. We may, perhaps, deduce from this, that the teachings such as are prescribed by their prophet have no softening effects on the hearts of his followers, nay, more, that adoration in such doctrines leads to ferocity and revolting crime, and is utterly incompatible with feelings of even ordinary humanity.

In the course of this address I have dwelt, long and frequently, upon those circumstances which appear to demonstrate that to Musalmán intrigue and Muhammadan conspiracy we may attribute the dreadful calamities of the year 1857. I have endeavoured to point out how intimately the prisoner, as the head of the Muhammadan faith in India, has been connected with the organisation of that conspiracy, either as its leader or its unscrupulous accomplice. I have alluded to the part taken by the native press and Muhammadans, in general, as preparing the Hindus for insurrection, and the native army, in particular, for revolt; and perhaps, in further corroboration of such facts, it may be as well to advert to the share that may be assigned to the Muhammadans in getting the cartridges refused on the parade ground of the 3rd Light Cavalry. Out of these 85 troopers the far larger moiety was Muhammadan. These men had no caste, and to them it could not possibly have mattered whether pig's and cow's fat was smeared on the cartridges or not. Captain Marneau tells us that at the Ambálah depot, as far as the cartridge question was concerned, the Muhammadan Sipáhis laughed at it, and we thus perceive that these men initiated open mutiny without one pretext for so doing, or the shadow of an excuse. They had not even the extenuation of a pretended grievance, yet they at once leagued themselves in rebellion against us, and induced the Hindus to join them, by speciously exciting them on that most vulnerable of points, the fear of being forcibly deprived of their caste. I say, induced the Hindus to join them, for such is the evidence before us, and this too on a pretext in which the Muhammadans could have had no possible sympathy with them. Nor indeed were the Hindus long in dis-

covering this, for as a witness, who has been frequently quoted, informs us, "immediately after the battle of the Hydan they spoke with much regret of the turn that affairs had taken, reproached the Muhammadans for having deceived them, and seemed to doubt greatly that the English Government had really had any intention of interfering with their caste. Great numbers of the Hindu Sipahis at this time declared that, if they could be sure their lives would be spared, they would gladly go back to the service of the Government, but the Muhammadans, on the contrary, used to assert that the king's service was much better than that of the English, that the nawabs and rajahs would supply the king with large forces, and that they must eventually conquer." If we now take a retrospective view of the various circumstances which we have been able to elicit during our extended inquiries, we shall perceive how exclusively Muhammadan are all the prominent points that attach to it. A Muhammadan priest, with pretended visions and assumed miraculous powers—a Muhammadan king his dupe and his accomplice—a Muhammadan clandestine embassy to the Muhammadan powers of Persia and Turkey resulting—Muhammadan prophecies as to the downfall of our power—Muhammadan rule as the successor of our own—the most cold-blooded murders by Muhammadan assassins—a religious war for Muhammadan ascendancy—a Muhammadan press unscrupulously abetting—and Muhammadan bijahs initiating the mutiny. Hinduism, I may say, is nowhere either reflected or represented, if it be brought forward at all, it is only in subservience to its over aggressive neighbour.

The arguments in reference to a Muhammadan conspiracy are now closed. I do not mean that many others might not be deduced from the proceedings before us, for I have selected only those that appeared to me the most prominent. I would wish, however, before sitting down, to quote one question and answer from Captain Martineau's evidence. "Did you ever hear any of the Sipahis speak complainingly of the efforts of English missionaries to convert natives to Christianity?" Answer—"No, never in my life, I don't think they cared one bit about it." I believe there is no officer whose duties have given him much experience of the Sipahi character or any insight into his feelings and prejudices but will readily confirm the correctness of this opinion. There is no dread of an open avowed missionary in India. It is not the rightful conversion to Christianity that either Sipahis or natives are alarmed at. If it be done by the efforts of persuasion, of teaching, or of example—the only means by which it can be done—it offends no caste prejudice, excites no fanatical opposition. A candid, undisguised endeavour to gain followers to Christ has never, that I am aware of, been viewed with the slightest sign of disapprobation by any portion of the natives, and, were it more constantly before their eyes, who can doubt that it would remove this present dark and debasing error that Christianity is itself a caste, and its only distinguishing tenet the privilege of eating everything? If this degrading idea were removed, the chief fear of the Hindus would vanish with it. Let them see that it is impossible to make converts to Christianity by force,

and you deprive the seditions of their most potent weapon of mischief Christianity, when seen in its own, pure light, has no terrors for the natives. It is only when kept in the shade that its name can be perverted to an instrument of evil. But I may, if I proceed further, be trenching on questions of State policy. I beg, then, to tender my thanks to the Court for the patient hearing they have given me, and to Mr Murphy, the interpreter, for the able assistance he has, in that capacity, afforded me on this and the other State trials. His very high attainments as an Oriental scholar have been most conspicuous. In the fluency of *viva voce* examinations, in the quick readiness with which all kinds of papers, in different hands, have been deciphered and read, and in the correctness and spirit of the written translations of documents of no ordinary difficulty his complete knowledge both of Urdu and Persian has been thoroughly attested. The notes appended to many of these papers are valuable in themselves, and speak more forcibly than I can do of Mr Murphy's very high proficiency as an interpreter. I should be wanting, both to him and myself, if I did not thus record my obligations to him.

FINDING.—The Court, on the evidence before them, are of opinion that the prisoner Muhammad Bahádur Sháh, ex-King of Dehli, is guilty of all and every part of the charges preferred against him.

M. DAWES, Lieut-Colonel, President.

Dehli, 9th March, 1853.

F J HARRIOTT, Major,
Deputy Judge Advocate-General.

Approved and confirmed.

N IENNY, Major-General,
Commanding Meerut Division.

Camp Saharan, 2nd April, 1853.

COPY of a LETTER of the CHIEF COMMISSIONER of the PANJÁB FORWARDING to the GOVERNOR GENERAL of INDIA the PROCEEDINGS on the TRIAL of the KING of DEHLÍ.

From R TEMPLE, Esq., Secretary to Chief Commissioner of the Panjáb to
G F MONMOUTH, Esq., Secretary to Government of India with the
Governor General

Lahor, 29th April, 1853.

SIR,—I am now directed to forward for submission to the Right Honourable the Governor General, the proceedings* and papers in the trial of

* See Parliamentary Paper, No 162 of Session 1853

Muhammad Bal'idur Shah, ex King of Dehli. As a supplement to the above, I am also to transmit translation of evidence of Ahsan-ullah Khán, late confidential physician of the ex-King, taken before the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner. It will be in the recollection of his Lordship that the physician's life was guaranteed on the condition of his answering satisfactorily such questions as might be put to him.

2 The trial was commenced on the 27th January, 1858, and was concluded on the 9th of March, 1858. The proceedings are very voluminous, and have only recently been received from the General commanding Marath division. The evidence relates not only to the specific charges on which the prisoner was arraigned, but also to the origin and character of the outbreak, and it lays bare the policy of the king's government and the internal economy of the rebel army during the siege of Dehli. On the whole, it is deeply interesting and instructive, whether viewed practically, politically, or historically.

3 In brief terms, it may be said that the documentary evidence comprises the system in which the general government was conducted, the raising of loans, military arrangements, the communication with foreign powers and neighbouring chiefs, the passages in the native newspapers relating to the war between the English and the Persians. There are also, of course, many papers of a miscellaneous character. The oral evidence describes the occurrences of the outbreak, and the sad circumstances connected with the massacre of the Christians in the palace, it also throws some light on the origin of the mutiny and the rebellion. The general effect of the evidence, documentary and oral is to present to the mind a wonderfully vivid picture of all that happened at Dehli during the eventful months between the 12th May and 20th September, 1857.

4. The papers referring to the system of the king's government exhibit in a remarkable manner the active personal share which the king himself took in the conduct of affairs. However wrongly he had assumed his position, it must be admitted that his orders were not unworthy of the situation. He did make some effort to preserve order in the city, to repress rapine and murder in the villages, to check malversation, to restrain the excesses of the soldiery, but it is clear, from first to last, he was unable to establish an administration either within or without the city. In the tracts nominally ruled by the king there was scarcely the semblance of authority, nor was there any protection for life or property. In but few cases did the king's agents succeed in collecting revenue from the districts. From its own records, the Mughul rule, while it lasted, seems to have been a reign of terror, and a period of intolerable anarchy to the people. Then the papers show the financial straits to which the king was driven, and the numerous forced loans and other contributions exacted from the mortgaged classes in Dehli. The military papers do not materially elucidate the plan of the operations, but they show that the mutinous army was utterly insubordinate to the government it had set up, and that its discipline was entirely relaxed. The papers comprising the correspondence with other powers indicate the deputations de-patched by the king of

questioning on this matter is of the last importance to the future stability of the empire.

8 In the first place, it is to be observed that the prisoner was not charged with any offence previous to the 11th May, 1857. Whatever may have been the King's participation in the events subsequent to that date, nothing has transpired on the trial, or on any other occasion, to show that he was engaged in a previous conspiracy to excite a mutiny in the Bengal army. Indeed, it is Sir John Lawrence's very decided impression that this mutiny had its origin in the army itself, that it is not attributable to any external or any antecedent conspiracy whatever, although it was afterwards taken advantage of by disaffected persons to compass their own ends, and that its proximate cause was the cartridge affair, and nothing else. Sir John Lawrence has examined many hundreds of letters on this subject from natives, both soldiers and civilians. He has, moreover, conversed constantly on the matter with natives of all classes, and he is satisfied that the general, and indeed almost the universal, opinion in this part of India is to the above effect.

9 It may be true that discontented Sipáhis worked upon the minds of their less guileless comrades, and persuaded them that a sinister but systematic attempt was about to be made on their ceremonial religion, and that in many regiments the majority was misled by designing individuals. But, as a body, the native army did really believe that the universal introduction of cartidge was destructive of their caste was a matter only of time. They heard (and believed as they heard) that the measure had been resolved on, and that some Sipáhis had been punished even by death for refusing to use the objectionable cartidges. They thought, therefore, that their only chance of escape was to band together, to refuse the cartridges, and to resist if force should be attempted by the Government, and the incendiary fires at the different stations were intended by the Sipáhis as a warning to their officers and to their Government of the feelings which had taken possession of the native army. Such truly was the origin of the mutiny, and this, I am to repeat, is the one circumstance which has fixed itself upon the Chief Commissioner's conviction in all that he has seen and heard. This is the one fact which stands out prominently in all the native letters which he has examined, in all the statements of the natives whom he has cross-questioned, and in all the conversations between the natives themselves which have been reported by our spies in Delhi and elsewhere.

10 As against the above conclusion, it might perhaps be urged that the mutiny first broke out at Mirath, where the new cartridges had never been used, and it is no doubt true that the men of the 3d Light Cavalry had never been asked to use the new cartridges, and were imprisoned for refusing cartidges of the old description, and perfectly unobjectionable. But the Chief Commissioner has always understood that the cartridges which these men did refuse to use were supposed to be enveloped in paper of a colour different from that generally used before, and he believes that this unfortunate circumstance would account for the bitter mistrust which was

excited in their minds. Indeed, a similar circumstance produced the same effect upon the 19th Native Infantry and other regiments in Bengal. Any person conversant with native character can understand how easily such a thing might be misinterpreted by men whose imagination and feelings had been wrought up to the belief that an attempt was in contemplation to injure them in so vital a point as that of caste and religion. Again, it has been said that the Sipáhis after the mutiny fired off some of these impure cartridges against our loyal troops during the siege of Delhi, but it is very doubtful whether this really took place. If it did, however, still the men might have escaped the fancied pollution by the refraining from biting the cartridges or they might have had the cartridges remade in a manner which would obviate the supposed impurity, or the cartridges might have been used only when the mutineers were becoming desperate, as their final defeat drew near. On the whole, the Chief Commissioner considers that neither of the above arguments is at all sufficient to weaken a conclusion so strong upon other grounds.

11. As an instance of the evidence which might be produced in favour of the above conclusion, I am to mention an important and interesting conversation which the Chief Commissioner and Brigadier General Chamberlaine recently held at Ambalah with a Jámádar of the Sidhaur Native Infantry. This man, a Bhujnra Rajput by caste, and a native of Hindustan, was at Gházipur on furlough when the mutiny broke out, he and his two brothers joined an English indigo planter, and during several months were of great use to that gentleman on several occasions of difficulty and disturbance. He was on his way thence to rejoin his regiment in the Panjáb when he met the Chief Commissioner's camp at Ambalah. Though holding a certificate of his good conduct and services at Gházipur, he still, even at Ambalah, seemed doubtful of the reception he would meet with. He was reserved at first, and it was only during a lengthened examination that he by degrees described what he had heard and seen. In this conversation he affirmed that there was a general belief among the Hindustani Sipáhis that the destruction of their caste and religion had been finally resolved on by the English. "So strong was this belief," he said, "that when I talked with the relations and friends of Sipáhis, and endeavoured to combat their views, I ended in almost believing that they were right. Then, again, when I talk to you and hear what you say, I see how foolish such ideas were." He added that the English officers little knew how strong this impression had become in the native army, that more than five years ago the belief had existed, and had nearly brought on an *insurrection*, that the caravanserais for travellers and the supply depots (sarkars and hardishikhs) erected by Government on the Grand Trunk Road were said to be devised with the object of destroying castes, and that before long impure kinds of food would be prepared in them which the people would be forced to buy and eat.

12. Such was the prevalent belief in the native army before the outbreak. The first excitement, according to the Chief Commissioner's belief, the first feeling of dissatisfaction, arose among the high caste Hindustani

Brahmins, and Rajputs of both the infantry and the cavalry, this disaffection then spread to the Muhammadans of the same regiments. With them also the feeling was at first a desire to resist the infringement of their caste and religion. Then, when they saw that the mutiny, which had now settled deep in the minds and hearts of the Hindus, might be expanded into a political movement calculated to subserve Musalman interests, they sedulously fanned the flame. But, while thus the Hindus and Muhammadans of the hue had united to mutiny, the Chief Commissioner's impression is, that in the first instance the Hindustani Irregular Cavalry did not join in the combination. While the regular army chiefly came from Oudh and the districts surrounding it, the irregular troopers were drawn from the districts within a circle of a hundred miles round Delhi. They had, therefore, no personal connexion with the line, and, except the mutual bond of religion, they had little or nothing in common even with the Muhammadans of the regular cavalry. In the many native letters which he examined at the outset of the disturbances the Chief Commissioner found nothing to implicate the irregulars, though the misconduct of the 10th Irregular Regiment at Naushahrá is a grave exception to what has been said above in regard to this branch of the service. But, of course, when Delhi had been seized by the mutineers, and when rebellion spread to the very districts whence the irregulars came, then very many of them also joined the movement. From that time the Muhammadan soldiers and the Muhammadan population became more actively hostile than the Hindus. Thus, indeed, it is easy to understand, fanaticism and ferocity being especially inculcated by the tenets of their religion.

13 But although stories against the British were fabricated and circulated by persons with ulterior designs, although individual intrigues were rife within and without the army, though the Muhammadans very frequently breathed a spirit of fanatic ferocity against the British, yet all their influences could not have drawn our native army from its allegiance, if it had not been already penetrated by that unfortunate belief about the cartridges. Nor would such an all feeling have so speedily arisen, nor would it have produced such a desperate disaffection, if the army had not been in an unsound and unsatisfactory state for some years past. That this state of things actually existed can now be ascertained from the natives themselves. At the time it would have been extremely difficult to discover as much from them, owing to their extraordinary reticence on matters which they fear to reveal. It is only by attentive observation, by study of their character and their conduct, and by the collating of their casual remarks, that their real opinions and feelings on such subjects can be discerned. It were needless to allude to the several causes which brought about this condition. There is, however, one essential and original cause which cannot be too prominently mentioned, nor too attentively considered. This cause was, that the Sipáhis were imbued with a sense of their own strength and of our weakness, and that our system consequently placed in their way temptations which en-

couraged them to revolt. They were, as they themselves said in their own phrase, the right arm, the hands and feet of the British Government. Their strength consisted in their great numbers, in their unexampled power of combination from their being one vast brotherhood, with common fatherland, language, religion, caste, and associations, and their possession of most of our magazines, many of our forts, and all our treasures, while our weakness consisted in the paucity of European troops. Moreover, while the native regiments were kept up to their full strength, while our already overgrown native army was being gradually increased, it so happened that we had not been so weak for many years past as European troops as we were in 1857. Some regiments had been subtracted from our complement during the Russian war, two regiments were in Persia. Those regiments we had were numerically weak, our corps had not received any fresh draughts for two years. These and all the other weak points of our system were patent to a native army, having many intelligent men in its ranks, employed promiscuously from Calcutta to Peshawar, and consequently well acquainted with our military arrangements. In short, it was a sense of overwhelming power acting upon men exasperated by a fancied wrong that led the Bengal army to mutiny. In the face of this grand motive cause for the mutiny existing in the army, why need we look abroad for foreign causes?

14. The real causes of the outbreak having been discussed, I am now to advert to certain circumstances which we sometimes said to be causes, but which in the Chief Commissioner's judgment were probably not so.

15. In the first place, with reference to conspiracies, which have been so frequently adduced as proximate causes of the outbreak, I am to state that, in the Chief Commissioner's belief, there was not any conspiracy in the army irrespective of the cartridge affair, and no really organised conspiracy even in respect to that. The Sikhs had corresponded in order to unite in refusing the cartridges; they had probably engaged to stand by one another in resistance to the supposed oppression, and being a fraternity with hopes, fears, prejudices, feelings, all in common, they all felt that such an engagement would be acted up to by the whole body. No doubt the course of affairs at Mirath precipitated the outbreak, and it is vain to speculate as to what could have been designed if that outbreak had been postponed. But it seems certain that no regular rising had up to that time been planned. A mass of Sikh correspondence has been inspected, the common talk of the mutiners in Delhi has been reported, the records of the palace have been ransacked, and yet no trace of any such detailed plan has been found. To show how little the course to be followed had been pre-arranged at the time of the Mirath outbreak, one or two significant circumstances may be cited. The well-known moonshee, Mohan Lal, who was at Delhi, stated that some men of the 3rd Light Cavalry told him that when the regiment broke out at Mirath they had scarcely left the cantonments when they held a council of war as to what should be done next. The general voice at first was for taking refuge in Rohilkhand, but one of the men pointed out that Delhi

was the proper place to make for. There, he said, were the magazine and the treasury, there the strong fortifications, there a large city population, there the king for a fitting instrument, and there, above all, an important point without European troops. The account of what took place on that occasion was corroborated by minute and extensive inquiries made by Brigadier General Chamberlain after the fall of Dehli. Again, it is ascertained from Mr Port, Magistrate of Gurgaon, that a large party of the 3rd Cavalry troopers actually fled through Dehli onward to the Gurgaon district on the very next day after the outbreak, and that 10 men of this party and 20 of the horses were seized by the magistrate. At the same time there is no doubt that the troops at Dehli were prepared for the occurrence of an outbreak at Mirath, and were fully resolved to stand by their comrades.

16 It was when the native army at large saw the immense success of the Mirath and Dehli mutineers, and the disasters of the British in the first instance, that they resolved to convert what had been a combination against supposed oppression into a struggle for empire and for a general military domination. The Sikhs had the command of all the public treasuries, no attempt was made to secure the treasure at outstations, the temptation to plunder was too great for the virtue even of our best disposed regiments, each corps acquired great wealth as it mutinied, as regiment after regiment fell away the power of resistance on the part of the Government lessened, in short, so manifold were the inducements, so certain the spread of infection, so powerful the effect of example, that no man acquainted with India could fail to see that such a mutiny and rebellion, unless trampled out at once, unless quenched in the blood of the soldiers who first revolted, must extend everywhere like wild fire.

17 Next I am to state that Sir John Lawrence does not believe that there was any previous conspiracy, Muhammadan or other, extending first through the influential classes in the country, and then to the native army. If there were such a thing, how comes it that no trace has been discovered in this part of India, the very quarter where any such conspiracy must have been hatched? How can it reasonably be explained, why none of those who have adhered to our cause were acquainted with such a conspiracy? The number of those who were with us in Hindustan may have been small, as compared with the number of those who were against us, but still the number of our adherents was considerable. Of these, many remained true to us under all trials, others again died fighting on our side, yet not one of these has ever been able to speak of any general conspiracy previous to the outbreak. Again, none of the mutineers and rebels who paid for their guilt the forfeit of their lives ever confessed in their last moments a knowledge of any such conspiracy, though they knew that any revelations on this subject would have saved them from death. Again, many papers of various kinds have come to hand, revealing important secrets, implicating many persons, jeopardising many lives, yet in all these there has been no allusion to such a conspiracy. In all his inquiries the Chief Commissioner has never heard a word from a native

mouth, nor seen anything in any native document, that could convey even the impression that any general plot had existed.

18 Furthermore, the Chief Commissioner considers that the conduct of the people generally negatives the supposition of a general conspiracy. If the people had conspired with the army, why was not the first outbreak immediately followed by a general insurrection? If there was concert and premeditation, then, why did not the population obey the first signals of revolt, such remarkable and encouraging signals as they were? Why did not all Hindustan rebel directly that Delhi had fallen to the mutineers when the English there had been massacred, when the troops had raked the bad characters of the city, and with their aid had seized the treasure magazines, and fortifications, when the king's sons, courtiers, and retainers had joined, and when the king himself had consented to head the movement? Why had not the population everywhere taken advantage immediately of our weakness? Our power in a large portion of Hindustan was temporarily paralysed. Our means were small, and those means we had were so placed as not to be capable of being at once brought to bear against the insurgents. And the Mirath force did nothing. The fact is, that at first our enemies were not prepared to profit by such unforeseen and tremendous events. It was not till afterwards that the Muhammadans of Hindustan perceived that the re-establishment of the throne of Delhi, the gradual rising of the Muhammadan population, and the losses of the British at so many stations, presented an opportunity when they might again strike for empire with some prospect of success. The fact is, that afterwards in many districts the people threw off or ignored our authority, and that many individuals, and some classes openly rose against us, with by no means prove a preconceived conspiracy, but, on the contrary, with a limit of such explanation. In no case did popular tumult precede the military outbreak, but, invariably where it occurred at all, it ensued upon a mutiny, like cause following effect. The population generally were passive at first. Then, as it appeared that the British were being swept off the face of the land, every village began to follow its own course. In most districts there was, of course, more or less misconduct. But through the whole time the people, even in the worst districts, never embarrassed us half as much as they would have done had they been rebels at heart. Large masses of people were coerced by the mutineers into insurrection if insurrection it could be called, where, again, the mutineers were beaten and expelled, the country rapidly settled down to peace and order. Wherever our officers were able to hold their own, the people remained wholly or puttially tranquil, when British rule ceased, utter disorder necessarily followed. And certainly the common belief in Hindustan was that the British dominion had been extinguished. Furthermore, it is to be remembered that in India, as indeed in almost every other country, there exists a discontented class ready for any change, in the hope of improving their condition. Moreover, in India especially, there are tribes by nature predatory, who before our rule subsisted on plunder and rapine. These were subdued more than half a century ago by our arms and on

policy. But the characteristics of those people survive in their descendants. The existing generation cling to the predatory traditions of their forefathers. They long for a return of the days of misrule—the good old times, when those might take who had the power, and those might keep who could. Most of them had indeed never seen a shot fired, and, living under the shadow of a strong Government, had become unwarlike. But, when our power became eclipsed and our prestige dimmed, the old instinct, the innate love of plunder revived, and the strong began to prey upon the weak. Then, again, a considerable section of the people, and especially the Muhammadans, are fanatical. This fanaticism, loosed from the bands of half a century, became a powerful engine against us. Whatever may be the intrinsic merits of our rule, the people of India can never forget that we are an alien race, in respect of colour, religion, habits, sympathies, while we, on the other hand, practically forgetting this, and wrapping ourselves up in our pride, self-reliance, and feeling of superiority, neglect the most ordinary precautions for our own security, and throw off even the slightest restraints on our freedom of action, though our very safety may depend upon such precautions.

19. The preceding observations convey, in the Chief Commissioner's judgment, a fair idea of the condition of the people after the outbreak in the Delhi territory, the Duab, of the Ganges and the Jumnab, and Rohilkhand. In Oudh, however, the case was different, there the population had been long inured to danger and warfare, their martial pride had been fostered by constant success in resistance to their own rulers, and by the vast numbers employed in foreign military service under the British. They had always lived free from civil restraint, and they had never felt the weight of our military power. After the province was annexed, we had not at all a strong military position. We were virtually attempting to hold the province by troops drawn from itself, we had but one European regiment, and some European artillery, while we had upwards of 11,000 indigenous troops, and while we had no European troops ready at hand in adjacent provinces. Yet, notwithstanding all this, we did, while acting with the best intentions, carry out some measures which had the effect of irritating various influential classes. As a counterpoise to such disaffection, we might have produced contentment and loyalty among other classes, but our tenure of dominion had been too short to effect this when the outbreak burst upon us. When the influential classes, whom our policy had provoked, found that the native army were ripe for revolt, they added fuel to a rising fire, and, when the crisis arrived, mutiny was immediately followed by insurrection. Had we been able at once to march European or other reliable troops into Oudh in sufficient numbers, we might even then have beaten down opposition. But this we could not do, and many months passed away. During that interval our enemies consolidated their power, and even those most friendly to our rule were, from sheer necessity, driven to swell the ranks of our opponents.

20. It may be that the Supreme Government have received information from other parts of India, but the foregoing conclusions regarding the

around them. At that juncture the Chief Commissioner himself could not avoid apprehending the day when, besides the British soldiers, there would be no man on our side. That such a day did not arrive is due only, in the Chief Commissioner's eyes, to the infinite mercy of the Almighty. The misfortunes and calamities which we experienced in Afghanistan in 1842 were renewed and surpassed in Hindustan during 1857. The issue has been less disastrous because in the last instance the country was less strong, the people less formidable, and our resources less distant, but, above all, because the Almighty Disposer of Events, though apparently determined to humble, had not resolved to destroy us. Many thoughtful and experienced men now in India believe that we have been extricated from destruction only by a series of miracles. It is no exaggeration to affirm, that in many instances the mutineers acted as if a curse rested on their cause. Had a single leader of ability risen amongst them, nay, had they followed any other course but the infatuated course which they actually did pursue in many instances, we must have been lost beyond redemption, but such a destruction was not decreed, it was a struggle between Christianity and civilisation on the one side and barbarism and heathenism on the other. That we escaped from destruction, and even obtained success, can be accounted for in no other way than by attributing it all to the operation of the Divine Will. And now, having been preserved by Providence thus far victorious, it urgently behoves us to strive to gain a right understanding of the real circumstances which brought on this crisis. If we can but acquire this, then there is hope that we may profit by a knowledge of the past, and in future avoid those errors which had well nigh led to our ruin.

23 In conclusion, I am to submit the Chief Commissioner's recommendation in regard to the future disposal of the prisoner Muhammad Bahádar Shah, ex King of Dehli. The Chief Commissioner suggests that the said prisoner be transported beyond the seas as a felon, and be kept in some island or settlement, where he will be entirely isolated from all other Muhammadans. As regards the prisoner's wife, Zinat Mahal, and his son, Jawán Bakht, no charges having been exhibited against them and the latter being only 17 years of age, but they both having been present at Dehli, the Chief Commissioner suggests that they be allowed the option of accompanying the prisoner to his place of transportation and that, in the event of their declining to do so they be confined as State prisoners somewhere in the Lower Provinces of the Bengal Presidency.

24 While forwarding these proceedings, I am to state that the Chief Commissioner commends to the favourable consideration of the Supreme Government the able exertions of Major J. F. Harriot, of 3rd Light Cavalry, the Deputy Judge Advocate General, in conducting this protracted trial. The Chief Commissioner also desires to bring to notice the valuable services of Mr. James Murphy, Collector of Customs, who acted as interpreter to the Court. This gentleman unaided by any means translated all the numerous and difficult documents adduced at the trial, he also read the originals before the Court, and conducted the examination

of the native witnesses. The translations are believed to be exceedingly faithful, and the circumstance that he was able to dispense with native assistance in the work ensured secrecy and other advantages, and evinced his eminent attainments as an Urdu and Persian scholar. The Chief Commissioner, I am to add, contemplates shortly proposing some reward in behalf of this meritorious officer.

I have, &c

(signed)

R TEMPLE.

(True copy)

(signed) J W KAYE,
Secretary in the Political and Secret Departments

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